WEBVTT

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This panel brings together influential

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voices shaping the discussion of the

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symposium . The topic of discussion is

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defending the skies , today's

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capabilities , tomorrow's edge . To

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moderate this discussion , we have

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Shana Senior . Shawna serves

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as a senior vice president of product

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at Goveni . She's held product

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leadership positions across consumer

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and defense tech companies including

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Amazon and Vanavar Labs . She holds a

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BA in philosophy , politics , and

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Economics from the University of

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Pennsylvania and an MBA from Harvard

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University . She's also a term member

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of the Council on Foreign Relations .

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Shawna , the floor is yours . Let's

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give it a round of applause .

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Thank you . Good afternoon . It's

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exciting to be here at Land Euro and a

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real honor to moderate this important

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conversation about the future of air

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and missile defense . My name is Shawna

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Senior , and I'm SVP of product at

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Goveni . Goveni is a defense software

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company focused on modernizing the

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defense acquisition system . We work

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closely with the US Army on some of its

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most critical sustainment and logistics

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needs , including some that are

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incredibly important to our NATO allies

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here in Europe . As many of you know ,

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Land Euro is quickly becoming the

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premier gathering for land power in the

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European theater . That's because the

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challenges we face here are urgent and

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the stakes are high . We are operating

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in an era of constant competition , one

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where deterrence , defense , and

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decision making are increasingly tested

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by speed , complexity , and scale . Our

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panel today defending the skies asks a

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critical question how do we maintain

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our edge in air and missile defense

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against a constantly evolving threat

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environment ? It's not just about

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upgrading weapons systems , the reality

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is our adversaries are not standing

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still . The threat spectrum is

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expanding from small unmanned aerial

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systems to advanced missile platforms ,

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and we're seeing a surge in low cost ,

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high impact systems like drone swarms .

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Defeating this kind of layered and

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diverse threat environment will require

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unified scalable responses across every

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domain . To stay ahead we have to

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rethink integration that means systems

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that talk to each other across services

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and allied forces architectures that

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are flexible , interoperable , and AI

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enabled , networks that can rapidly

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evaluate threats and adapt in real time .

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But it also means thinking beyond the

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kill chain . It means enabling the

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logistics and sustainment enterprise to

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keep pace with the front lines . At

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Covini , we work on this every day . We

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know from our work on munition and

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missile production and sustainment

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across the DOD that these problems

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cannot be solved across data silos . We

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need to understand all component pieces

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to identify bottlenecks and effectively

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communicate demand signal to industry

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partners . Because without agile

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sustainment , even the most advanced

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missile defense system becomes

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irrelevant . We'll also explore how

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emerging technologies from AI-driven

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threat evaluation to integrated

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electronic warfare and cyber

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capabilities are shaping what air

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defense will look like 5 to 10 years

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from now because that's the window

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we're planning for and accelerating

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towards . What excites me about this

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panel is that we're bringing together

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leaders who understand the dynamics

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from every angle command , industry ,

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innovation and policy . So with that

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I'm honored to introduce our panelists

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Brigadier General Curtis King ,

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commanding general of the 10th Army Air

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and Missile Defense Command . Retired

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Major General John George , Vice

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President and Army strategic account

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executive at Lidos , Doctor Alexei

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Boyarsky , special adviser to Ukraine's

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Minister of Digital Transformation ,

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and Mr . Ricky Ellison , founder and

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chairman of the Missile Defense

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Advocacy Alliance , thank you for being

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here with us . We'll begin with

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introductions from each panelists along

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with a few opening remarks and then

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move into our discussion . Thank you .

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So good afternoon , Kurt King . I have

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the pleasure of serving with 10th Army

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Air Missile Defense Command , uh ,

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obviously assigned to URAF , um , but

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also with a role supporting you safely

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and advising , uh , SAGGU and working

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with our Ukrainian partners . Uh , what

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I'd like to do today is just kind of

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set the stage that our panel will

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discuss with some overarching concepts

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that we've seen , uh , based on what

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the war with Russia and Ukraine . One ,

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I'd start with a threat . If you'd

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asked me 3 years ago , if I thought

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Russia had the ability to continually

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every single day launch 500 to 700

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one-way attack drones , I don't know

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that I would have told you that . Um ,

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I , I would have told you they probably

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could have got it . The ability to

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launch maybe 500 at a time , but the

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ability to do that every single day . I

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don't know that I would have predict it

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3 years ago . Then when you combine

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that with what they have done and the

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increase of capacity and capability

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with their cruise missiles and their

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ballistic missiles and the increase in

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their targeting cycle to do a complex

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attack , meaning that they can do all

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those threats . Simultaneously on

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targets and multiple targets across

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Ukraine . is very concerning when you

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look at this from defending the skies

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and what we and what we have to do with

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our air defenders . One , I will say

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Ukraine has done exceptional with what

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they've done to defend their country as

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we heard from the previous panel , um ,

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but that threat is the threat that it's

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not the future threat , it's the first

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threat we face today . It's the threat

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that's only going to grow . So when you

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look at what General Donahue has

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directed us to do in UCCOM and Uraf

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with the Ukraine of is to counter mass .

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How do we develop an air and missile

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defense capabilities to counter the

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mass that we see the enemy has the

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ability to do ? Um , what I would tell

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you is I'll talk a few just key points

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that we need to do that we're many were

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working , uh , obviously we're working

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with industry , we're working with our

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partners and Ukraine is demonstrating

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this every single day , but one . We

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can no longer rely on one single system .

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Uh , with an interceptor that's going

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to be able to hit everything from a

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small UAS all the way to a ballistic

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missile , we have to have a mix of

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capability to be able to counter that

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threat . And what I would tell you what

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the ground brings is when we talk about

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integrated air missile defense , we've

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got to have an air component and we've

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seen significant success from fixed

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wing aircraft and rotary wing even to

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shoot down , especially UAS's and

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cruise missiles , but the ground .

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Groundba air defense is critical to

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this fight because you just can't

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counter the mass from the air alone .

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You've got to have significant

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capability at the ground and you've got

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to have a treatable and low cost

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capabilities both in sensors and

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effectors . Um , some of the panel will

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get into some of those capabilities you

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heard some of those capabilities from

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the previous panel , um , but what we ,

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what we've got to do is we've got to

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identify how do we develop the

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capabilities . That we need on the

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battlefield , especially along the

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forward edge of the battlefield that

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when we say it's treatable , that we

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can develop those sensors and

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interceptors whether that be bullets ,

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whether it be missiles capable of

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taking down a large number of UAS's .

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Uh , potentially even cruise missiles

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so that we had trip that mass and then

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can take them down with our more

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exquisite systems as we get in the

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depths of the battlefield . Uh , we're

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seeing Ukraine do that every single day

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as they execute their mobile fire teams ,

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uh , all the way back to their systems

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that they have with Patriot , Nasams ,

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Hawk , RST , other systems they have to

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take down those more exquisite systems ,

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but we have to integrate that to be

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able to sustain against that capacity

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that the enemy can throw at us . The

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other thing we've got to do is

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sustainment , and you mentioned

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sustainment . It is a strategic

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deterrent . To be able to quickly

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regenerate combat power and get that

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back into the fight , especially when

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we look at our more exquisite weapon

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systems and the ability to produce

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parts at scale and the ability to do .

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Very advanced engineering level what we

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would normally consider done in a depot

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level repair with exquisite systems

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such as Patriot forward and as close to

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the battlefield as possible is critical

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to be able to get those systems back in

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the fight to counter that mass and

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we've done that we've done that

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recently , uh , as we've had to eva

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systems out of Ukraine we've worked

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with NATO . Uh , especially within the

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work that Germany has done , the

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Netherlands , Romania , Sweden , uh ,

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has helped us with repairing those

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systems to quickly get those back in

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the fight and give that combat

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capability back to Ukraine . We've

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demonstrated the ability to do that .

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The third one I will talk about is data ,

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uh , and we've already heard a lot of

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discussions on data , uh , and General

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Donahue mentioned how essential data is

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to this , this fight , uh , the

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currency of this fight , and especially

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what we're doing with the Eastern flank

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deterrence line , you know , how we

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transport that data . How we store that

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data , what I will tell you , and

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especially for our industry partners .

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It is critical , the ability to quickly

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be able to analyze that data to data

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reduction on what we just saw in the

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fight . And then quickly integrate

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upgrades , primarily software upgrades

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back into those weapon systems . We

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can't wait 3 weeks . We can't wait 3

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months . We can't wait 9 months to do

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that . We've got to look at how we use

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AI machine learning tools embedded in

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the weapon systems we have to gather

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that data , give us immediate feedback .

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That we can then implement changes

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because the fight the enemy is changing

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so quickly we can't wait on those

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historical models that we've done

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previously uh so with that I'll

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appreciate again great opportunity to

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be here and I'll turn it over to John .

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Thanks , thanks , um , um , good

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afternoon everybody , glad you hung

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with us . Looks like a little bit

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lighter crowd than the last . I don't

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know why . I mean we're gonna be just

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as interesting . um , I'm really happy

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to be here . Thanks to USA for , uh ,

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uh , the opportunity to . To partner

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with the great folks on on the stage

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here , um , so retired about 4 years

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ago my last uh command . I was at

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Combat capabilities Development Command

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responsible for delivering , um , you

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know , new technologies based on

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capability gaps that the army has

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determined . So my mindset when I

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started thinking about this panel and

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it goes a lot , uh , it goes right

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along with what General King said . You

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know , when you identify what the

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required capability gaps are for

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current and future um integrated air

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and missile defense as well as counter

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UAS uh capabilities , uh , mass

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obviously comes to mind , uh ,

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especially when you consider , I think ,

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um , and Doctor B , I'm probably I'm

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happy to be calibrated on this , but I

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think between the 8th and the 14th of

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July , the average was somewhere

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between 400 to 600 . Threats um that uh

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were encountered by the Ukrainian

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military , a mix of everything between

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the drones , um uh uh the uh

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hypersonics missiles , uh , as well as

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decoys and so a very sophisticated

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threat only to get I believe as we look

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at the future more sophisticated as

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these technologies continue to emerge

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and so when you think about what your

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worst day is and when you think about .

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What the most pressing threat is , I

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think you know saturation level attacks

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that are not just a one time event but

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a recurring event on a daily basis

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having mass of your own to be able

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to um uh defeat and

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deter future attacks is one of the

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required components of the solution

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that we ought to be looking at here . I

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think we also um as we think about how

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industry can facilitate meeting those

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uh required capabilities , AI enabled

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C2 , uh , that , uh , many companies

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like LiUs are working on , uh , we were ,

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we're delivering capabilities to the

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Air Force that are easily adaptable to

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the army as an example , uh , but , um ,

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those aided solutions for C2 and

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decision making . Has always been um

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one of the linchpins for future CAT C2

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uh aligned to multi-domain operations .

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I mean , the only way we're gonna get

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there with the speed um and

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acceleration is through AI enabled uh

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C2 and decision making aids . Um , I

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think the sustainable fires for those

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prolonged attacks , there are multiple

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ways to facilitate that more than just

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the quantities of munitions , uh , but ,

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um , having . Better intelligence ,

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understanding how you can find

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positional advantage for your

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formations to provide the levels of of

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uh protection required and then I think

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really uh an important aspect for the

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army is transitioning from uh the

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defense to the offense because we um in

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the US Army generally like to be on the

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offense to achieve the objectives laid

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out in our strategy , um , and then

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finally . How do you , uh , and I'm

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thinking about Ricky as we talk about

13:29.871 --> 13:31.593
this one , how do you converge

13:31.760 --> 13:34.359
capabilities across all of the domains

13:34.359 --> 13:37.280
to include space and uh cyber , you

13:37.280 --> 13:40.760
know , how do you , um , enable the uh

13:40.760 --> 13:42.593
not only protection but tactical

13:42.593 --> 13:45.119
deterrence of the threats from your

13:45.119 --> 13:48.239
adversaries by using uh the data that

13:48.239 --> 13:50.295
comes across all of the sensors from

13:50.295 --> 13:52.619
all of the the domains . So I tease

13:52.619 --> 13:55.280
that , I tea that up sort of as a tease

13:55.280 --> 13:57.210
for I think um some of the future

13:57.210 --> 13:59.510
conversation of the panel on . And how

13:59.510 --> 14:01.859
does industry help accelerate , uh ,

14:01.869 --> 14:03.925
moving in the direction of providing

14:03.925 --> 14:06.202
those capabilities , uh , and what can ,

14:06.309 --> 14:09.229
um , the interoperability between

14:09.229 --> 14:12.349
partners and allies provide to increase

14:12.349 --> 14:14.750
mass , uh , uh , you know , just by the

14:14.750 --> 14:16.806
sense of having more partners in the

14:16.806 --> 14:19.429
fight and more uh sensors and effectors

14:19.429 --> 14:23.059
in the fight , so thank you . Pass it .

14:23.070 --> 14:25.070
Yeah , thank you . Uh , great to be

14:25.070 --> 14:27.630
here . So my name is Alexei Payarsky ,

14:27.669 --> 14:29.669
and I was not supposed to be here 3

14:29.669 --> 14:32.359
years ago . I was happily doing

14:32.989 --> 14:35.229
particle physics and cosmology for the

14:35.229 --> 14:37.390
last 30 years and never thought to be

14:37.390 --> 14:41.169
doing anything military , but . The

14:41.169 --> 14:44.690
war started and um we all wanted to see

14:44.690 --> 14:48.609
how we can help and actually the

14:48.609 --> 14:52.130
first problem we met back in 2002 where

14:52.130 --> 14:55.570
our military activity started was um

14:55.849 --> 14:58.369
uh low flying cruise missiles which

14:58.849 --> 15:01.289
were hiding in the blind zones of

15:01.289 --> 15:04.859
radars and details of landscape . And

15:04.859 --> 15:07.859
we wanted to find a quick solution how

15:07.859 --> 15:11.059
to help to complete the radar field

15:11.059 --> 15:13.369
with something else and to be quick ,

15:13.429 --> 15:17.229
we decided to do . Passive , uh ,

15:17.239 --> 15:20.590
sensors and because our target cruise

15:20.590 --> 15:22.419
missile was not communicate

15:22.419 --> 15:25.520
communicating was not emitting , we

15:25.520 --> 15:28.849
decided to use acoustics and our first

15:29.559 --> 15:32.000
projects is the uh uh acoustic system

15:32.000 --> 15:35.260
which is running in Ukraine right now ,

15:36.140 --> 15:39.400
uh , 14,000 acoustic sensors and uh we

15:39.400 --> 15:43.169
are going to get more . Uh , to , to ,

15:43.239 --> 15:46.239
to close the low altitude echelon and

15:46.239 --> 15:49.780
complete , complete the , uh , uh , uh ,

15:50.010 --> 15:53.179
radar field , uh , this project

15:53.840 --> 15:57.400
attracted attention to the , the

15:57.400 --> 16:01.119
need in the completely new layer in the

16:01.119 --> 16:04.369
whole air defense system which , uh ,

16:04.380 --> 16:07.919
uh , became , became urgent

16:08.520 --> 16:11.969
during this war . For the layers that

16:11.969 --> 16:14.409
would have a new architecture , the

16:14.409 --> 16:16.729
classical air defense architecture is

16:16.729 --> 16:19.650
centralized when one of the main

16:19.650 --> 16:21.890
characteristics of any sensor or any

16:21.890 --> 16:24.369
weapon is its range . You want to have

16:24.369 --> 16:26.609
a long range . You want to see far ,

16:26.650 --> 16:29.080
you want to shoot far . It's very

16:29.570 --> 16:32.330
convenient . You can control . A big

16:32.330 --> 16:35.090
territory with a few systems . The

16:35.090 --> 16:37.330
problem with this approach is that it

16:37.330 --> 16:39.799
works only as long as the interceptor

16:40.210 --> 16:43.900
is more expensive than the . Target

16:44.469 --> 16:48.039
if it's easier for the uh for the

16:48.039 --> 16:50.750
enemy to make more targets and for you

16:50.750 --> 16:53.280
to make more interceptors , you lose

16:53.280 --> 16:56.789
how whatever sophisticated and

16:56.789 --> 16:58.956
successful your interceptor is because

16:58.956 --> 17:01.989
you will be exhausted or over or

17:01.989 --> 17:05.989
overwhelmed and so the for certain type

17:05.989 --> 17:09.910
of targets like uh . UEV , uh ,

17:09.920 --> 17:12.790
one way deep strike UEVs , but also

17:13.119 --> 17:16.319
cheap ballistic missiles or cheap

17:16.319 --> 17:18.750
cruise missiles which many

17:19.680 --> 17:22.000
manufacturers are making or working on

17:22.000 --> 17:24.189
right now for this kind of .

17:25.619 --> 17:29.150
Targets the price of the kill becomes

17:29.699 --> 17:32.199
a crucial characteristics because it's

17:32.199 --> 17:34.260
not only about money , it's about

17:34.260 --> 17:37.859
capability and if you want to have your

17:37.859 --> 17:41.780
short cheap you have to work with short

17:41.780 --> 17:44.869
range weapons and short range

17:44.869 --> 17:47.300
sensors and have distributed air

17:47.300 --> 17:50.979
defense system which . Which

17:50.979 --> 17:54.160
will cover a big territory , not by the

17:54.160 --> 17:56.599
range your crucial characteristics

17:56.599 --> 18:00.569
becomes . Density . You , you should

18:00.569 --> 18:04.160
think about it as digitalization of an

18:04.160 --> 18:06.449
image . You want to have a better

18:06.449 --> 18:08.560
resolution , you have more pixels per

18:08.560 --> 18:12.489
square . Enter . So

18:12.489 --> 18:14.545
if you want to achieve that , if you

18:14.545 --> 18:18.040
want to have a distributed system of

18:18.040 --> 18:21.920
short range weapons , uh , that does

18:21.920 --> 18:24.650
the job , you face challenges that are

18:24.650 --> 18:26.872
completely different from the classical

18:26.959 --> 18:29.280
long range air defense architecture .

18:29.609 --> 18:33.510
You need your data to . be transferred

18:33.510 --> 18:36.430
smoothly from bottom up and top down

18:36.750 --> 18:40.390
from a big grader to a gun system on

18:40.390 --> 18:43.449
the . Ground or from a cheap

18:43.449 --> 18:46.589
acoustics sensor to trigger then the

18:46.589 --> 18:49.880
patriot system . It's a big and

18:49.880 --> 18:53.199
complicated IT problem that requires

18:53.199 --> 18:56.719
also smoothless uh uh

18:57.599 --> 19:01.109
communications . It's a lot of new

19:01.109 --> 19:04.560
command and control challenges . It's

19:04.560 --> 19:06.727
training because large number of short

19:06.727 --> 19:10.000
range weapons requires involvement of

19:10.000 --> 19:13.750
significant number of military . Mm mm

19:13.750 --> 19:17.589
personal . And as the war is changing

19:17.589 --> 19:21.000
every month , you , you , you have to

19:21.000 --> 19:23.111
apply this approach in many different

19:23.111 --> 19:25.270
ways . When we started , the most

19:26.000 --> 19:28.111
interesting part was the low altitude

19:28.111 --> 19:30.222
because the strategy of the enemy was

19:30.222 --> 19:33.420
to hide . Now they combine low fly

19:33.420 --> 19:36.670
flying . Uh targets with higher

19:36.670 --> 19:38.880
altitude where they don't hide , they

19:38.880 --> 19:41.880
are very visible on radars but they're

19:41.880 --> 19:43.991
much more difficult to intercept . So

19:43.991 --> 19:46.319
you need this and but still because it

19:46.319 --> 19:49.920
scales we need at every altitude

19:49.920 --> 19:52.280
echelon for every type of the .

19:53.619 --> 19:56.060
Tactics implied by the enemy , we need

19:56.339 --> 19:59.300
a strategy that would require a cheap

19:59.300 --> 20:01.819
and scalable shot . Every kill has to

20:01.819 --> 20:04.699
be cheap and scalable and to achieve

20:04.699 --> 20:08.680
that , you . Always must

20:08.680 --> 20:11.439
use ground-based weapons . Everything

20:11.439 --> 20:13.479
that flies , let's say before

20:13.479 --> 20:17.040
1500 m has to be

20:17.040 --> 20:20.839
killed from the ground at high

20:20.839 --> 20:24.199
altitude when wind and turbulent

20:24.199 --> 20:26.532
component of the wind becomes important ,

20:26.532 --> 20:28.588
this approach doesn't work anymore .

20:28.588 --> 20:32.010
You need ro interceptors or other

20:32.010 --> 20:33.119
flying .

20:35.670 --> 20:38.550
and still the challenges are to deliver

20:38.550 --> 20:40.790
the best possible data to every weapon

20:40.790 --> 20:44.410
system , every . Deter and keep the

20:44.410 --> 20:48.199
whole system cheap and and scalable for

20:48.199 --> 20:51.650
this . For this approach with a large

20:51.650 --> 20:53.849
number of items involved , the

20:53.849 --> 20:55.571
automation obviously becomes .

20:57.800 --> 21:00.010
Crucial . You have to decide what what

21:00.010 --> 21:02.489
do you want to keep with the man to

21:02.489 --> 21:05.810
decide or or or and what you are happy

21:05.810 --> 21:08.810
to to outsource to AI or any other kind

21:08.810 --> 21:12.359
of of of of automated systems .

21:12.609 --> 21:16.489
So this type of challenges we face

21:16.489 --> 21:19.170
every day in Ukraine and we are working

21:19.170 --> 21:21.392
constantly on them with the team of the

21:21.392 --> 21:23.709
minister of digital . Uh ,

21:23.760 --> 21:25.704
transformation and Ukrainian armed

21:25.704 --> 21:29.000
forces and sometimes we , we , we feel

21:29.000 --> 21:31.056
like we are a bit ahead of the enemy

21:31.056 --> 21:34.050
sometimes the enemy has a move that

21:34.560 --> 21:38.020
faces challenges . Plus

21:38.780 --> 21:41.699
this is continuous uh sword and shield ,

21:41.819 --> 21:42.390
uh .

21:45.949 --> 21:47.782
Thank you , thank you , Alexia .

21:49.219 --> 21:52.109
Welcome , um , I wanted to thank

21:52.109 --> 21:55.910
General Brown . This is an energy

21:55.910 --> 21:59.589
changer . It is a momentum changer .

22:00.500 --> 22:03.760
It is what is required . In this

22:03.760 --> 22:06.410
continent to get on top of IMD .

22:08.040 --> 22:11.209
And it is all of you , it is all 80

22:11.209 --> 22:14.680
countries . It is unity . And the

22:14.680 --> 22:18.449
CD's point , it's trust , number

22:18.449 --> 22:20.671
one , and the only way you're gonna get

22:20.671 --> 22:23.800
trust is through action , not words ,

22:23.959 --> 22:27.439
not charts , not promises , action .

22:28.390 --> 22:31.819
And that's his leadership . In creating

22:31.819 --> 22:35.319
the Eastern flank deterrent line is

22:35.319 --> 22:39.209
action . This is not World

22:39.209 --> 22:42.810
War II . You can't refer back to the

22:42.810 --> 22:45.930
last 30 years of missile defense . This

22:45.930 --> 22:48.609
is not your daddy's or momma's missile

22:48.609 --> 22:51.469
defense . In the last month

22:53.239 --> 22:57.119
3 incidences changed our view on

22:57.119 --> 23:00.859
deterrence . Non-nuclear

23:01.000 --> 23:04.719
or nuclear nations that use , that do

23:04.719 --> 23:08.420
not use nuclear weapons . We , we've

23:08.420 --> 23:11.839
had a tremendous challenge in deterring

23:11.839 --> 23:15.239
that fight . But last month ,

23:16.510 --> 23:19.390
We changed the game in deterrent . We

23:19.390 --> 23:21.880
enhanced our deterrent . By what

23:21.880 --> 23:25.760
Ukraine did to Russia . And that is

23:25.760 --> 23:28.010
mixing offense with defense , no doubt

23:28.459 --> 23:31.880
that is left of launch , no doubt . And

23:31.880 --> 23:35.739
Israel to Iran , Iran to Israel , then

23:35.739 --> 23:37.930
the United States to Iran .

23:39.000 --> 23:42.449
Deterrence is 3 things only .

23:43.050 --> 23:46.050
Political will is #1 , and we haven't

23:46.050 --> 23:49.229
had political will . To do what we did

23:49.479 --> 23:51.701
to Iran that should have been done back

23:51.701 --> 23:55.369
in 1978 . Political will

23:55.900 --> 23:59.089
and you have it now . The second thing

23:59.089 --> 24:01.040
is you have to have your offensive

24:01.040 --> 24:03.300
capability to get through anything

24:03.300 --> 24:07.130
they've got . And hit them no matter

24:07.130 --> 24:09.579
what they've got . And the third thing

24:09.810 --> 24:11.900
is you better be able to defend

24:11.900 --> 24:14.089
yourself from counterattack . Each of

24:14.089 --> 24:17.800
those situations had those 3

24:18.349 --> 24:20.849
elements . Today

24:22.689 --> 24:26.040
We don't , you're . Does not have the

24:26.040 --> 24:28.010
ability to defend against the

24:28.010 --> 24:31.689
counterattack . Not one nation , not

24:31.689 --> 24:34.189
one forward operating base , not one

24:34.189 --> 24:36.930
maneuvering force could handle one

24:36.930 --> 24:39.949
night . You go back to July 7th ,

24:40.550 --> 24:43.979
728 . By Russia ,

24:44.239 --> 24:46.750
drones and missiles , only 2 of them

24:47.119 --> 24:49.063
were ballistic missiles and cruise

24:49.063 --> 24:50.897
missiles . The rest of them were

24:50.897 --> 24:52.786
Shahead 3s . That should tell you

24:52.786 --> 24:55.579
something . I have 3 is the best bang

24:55.579 --> 24:58.390
for the buck for the Russians . And

24:58.390 --> 25:01.079
they're beating us on the cost curve .

25:02.849 --> 25:06.780
We have to address this . And

25:06.780 --> 25:10.770
this Has to be done and it's being

25:10.770 --> 25:14.650
done . The , the

25:14.650 --> 25:16.729
eastern flank deterrent line .

25:18.250 --> 25:21.760
Data is the backbone . Of that

25:22.030 --> 25:25.880
concept . Data

25:25.989 --> 25:28.349
is the backbone of the golden dome .

25:31.339 --> 25:34.760
This is Europe's golden dome . And as

25:34.760 --> 25:38.709
CD said , The land sharing

25:38.709 --> 25:42.619
of open data . is equally

25:42.619 --> 25:44.900
as important now as the space sharing

25:45.260 --> 25:47.371
of data which we will be doing in the

25:47.371 --> 25:49.371
United States for the Golden Dome .

25:52.670 --> 25:56.489
The exercise of fly trap . Last

25:56.489 --> 25:58.609
month by the 5th Corps , Colonel Matt

25:58.609 --> 26:01.890
Davis . Demonstrated that

26:03.520 --> 26:06.770
A non-business , non-company was able

26:06.770 --> 26:09.390
to Dean Farrell of the 18th Air Corps

26:10.670 --> 26:14.380
was able to take his Ukrainian

26:14.380 --> 26:15.989
acoustic sensor .

26:18.229 --> 26:22.079
And put it in 8 . C 2

26:22.079 --> 26:24.079
systems , 8 .

26:25.770 --> 26:29.369
In unclassified data . and

26:29.369 --> 26:33.079
converted it into 8 systems

26:34.160 --> 26:37.920
From strategic to tactical , from joint .

26:39.130 --> 26:42.989
From partners , from coalition . And

26:42.989 --> 26:44.859
distribute that live .

26:47.010 --> 26:50.969
To do that . Didn't take 20 years ,

26:51.180 --> 26:53.430
didn't take 3 years , didn't take all

26:53.430 --> 26:55.739
the bureaucracy and the rules of the

26:55.739 --> 26:59.130
game . It took about a week .

27:01.219 --> 27:05.109
And we have to start there . We don't

27:05.109 --> 27:07.331
need to keep doing specials . We can do

27:07.331 --> 27:09.553
special stuff , but we better learn how

27:09.553 --> 27:11.498
to do blocking and tackling at the

27:11.498 --> 27:13.276
lowest level , which means open

27:13.276 --> 27:16.060
architecture to commercial level sector ,

27:16.589 --> 27:20.089
not classified . To put this out and

27:20.089 --> 27:22.510
share it because nobody shares ,

27:22.520 --> 27:26.069
obviously , by secret is very

27:26.069 --> 27:29.119
difficult . So the premise of the

27:30.319 --> 27:33.920
Eastern flight deterrent line is to

27:33.920 --> 27:37.359
share open data across all those

27:37.359 --> 27:39.581
European countries , and we're going to

27:39.581 --> 27:43.219
use the acoustic sensor . To

27:43.219 --> 27:45.900
start and the data which is much more

27:45.900 --> 27:49.270
important . I'm being able to move that

27:49.270 --> 27:52.300
information to everybody . We're gonna

27:52.300 --> 27:55.819
start , as you heard from CD in Estonia

27:55.819 --> 27:57.819
and the Baltics . We're gonna start

27:57.819 --> 27:59.969
there . And you're gonna be able ,

28:00.540 --> 28:02.707
industry is gonna be able to add on to

28:02.707 --> 28:05.260
this . This is just one layer that's

28:05.260 --> 28:09.079
gonna be easy to do . And have IOC in 2

28:09.079 --> 28:12.989
months . We can play . We have

28:12.989 --> 28:16.750
to play . We cannot not do

28:16.750 --> 28:20.260
this . Because we can't deter a world

28:20.260 --> 28:22.780
war because we don't have a defense to

28:22.780 --> 28:25.500
protect any counterattack . It's a

28:25.500 --> 28:28.540
challenge . It's frustrating going to

28:28.540 --> 28:31.209
see mounted and dismounted capabilities

28:31.500 --> 28:33.660
for our maneuvering force can't go

28:33.660 --> 28:37.619
forward . You've got fiber optic drones

28:37.619 --> 28:41.420
that are unbeatable right now . We We ,

28:42.229 --> 28:44.340
and just from the US perspective , we

28:44.340 --> 28:47.520
only have 50 Patriot batteries . We

28:47.520 --> 28:50.810
have 3 short a battalions and 8A

28:50.810 --> 28:53.640
batteries for 3 cocoms .

28:54.660 --> 28:56.859
You only got Kurt's only got one

28:56.859 --> 28:59.530
battalion here and you got the Golden

28:59.530 --> 29:01.697
Dome in the US probably trying to pull

29:01.697 --> 29:04.420
some of that stuff back to the US . You

29:04.420 --> 29:07.500
gotta , you gotta play . And this is

29:07.500 --> 29:11.300
not , that's why that 5%'s up . And

29:11.300 --> 29:13.522
certainly you should really be thinking

29:13.522 --> 29:15.780
about spending that 5% or that increase

29:15.780 --> 29:19.380
of 3 or 4% of being able to defend your

29:19.380 --> 29:23.010
infrastructure , your bases . And we

29:23.010 --> 29:26.489
can do this as a team , not as an

29:26.489 --> 29:29.130
individual country . To do this

29:30.500 --> 29:34.369
So we're at an inflection point . And I

29:34.369 --> 29:38.010
know CD is a man of action , and we're

29:38.010 --> 29:41.150
going forward with what we got . And

29:41.150 --> 29:43.349
I'm just awesome to see some of the

29:43.349 --> 29:45.640
guys he's already picked on his team .

29:45.709 --> 29:48.339
Kurt is going to be the military .

29:49.540 --> 29:52.390
Person over it , we've got Dean Farrell ,

29:52.420 --> 29:54.531
who's gonna be the 18th , who's gonna

29:54.531 --> 29:57.939
be the the uh data . In charge of the

29:57.939 --> 30:00.660
technical part of it . And we got uh

30:00.660 --> 30:02.827
Colonel Hill , PEO missiles in space .

30:02.827 --> 30:05.609
Frank Liano gave Colonel Hill two

30:06.339 --> 30:10.130
CD for the American US involvement of

30:10.130 --> 30:12.780
Pokemon record capabilities . It's an

30:12.780 --> 30:16.650
exciting time . And it is about

30:16.650 --> 30:19.469
winning a world championship . And we

30:19.469 --> 30:21.525
have to do it together . Thank you .

30:22.359 --> 30:24.760
Thank you . Um , Kurt , why don't we

30:24.760 --> 30:26.760
start with you ? Uh , you mentioned

30:26.760 --> 30:28.593
mass . What is the 10th doing to

30:28.593 --> 30:30.704
address the mass and precision threat

30:30.704 --> 30:34.050
posed by Russia ? We're taking a lot .

30:34.170 --> 30:36.170
What we're doing is , when I talked

30:36.170 --> 30:38.059
about the threat , but really the

30:38.059 --> 30:40.281
observations and the lessons that we're

30:40.281 --> 30:42.819
seeing out of Ukraine . Defense in

30:42.819 --> 30:44.763
depth has been a principle for air

30:44.763 --> 30:47.369
defense for . 40 , 50 years . We've

30:47.369 --> 30:49.591
learned that from World War 2 forward ,

30:49.591 --> 30:51.758
but really what we're doing is looking

30:51.758 --> 30:53.980
at . How countering the mass , how do ,

30:53.980 --> 30:56.091
and , and Alexi mentioned , how do we

30:56.091 --> 30:58.147
do do that at a more affordable cost

30:58.147 --> 30:58.140
curve , um , so when we looked at the

30:58.140 --> 31:00.307
eastern flank deterrence line and John

31:00.307 --> 31:02.473
Donahue's direction to us , there's an

31:02.473 --> 31:04.640
unmanned security area . So one of the

31:04.640 --> 31:06.918
key pieces we're focusing on right now ,

31:06.918 --> 31:09.084
uh , with through as Ricky mentioned ,

31:09.084 --> 31:11.540
flytrap transformation and contact , my

31:11.540 --> 31:13.651
team's working with Ukraine , working

31:13.651 --> 31:15.930
with 5th Corps , working with industry .

31:16.219 --> 31:19.910
How do we get . Unmanned systems

31:20.400 --> 31:23.359
that have sensors and factors that we

31:23.359 --> 31:25.359
can place in that unmanned security

31:25.359 --> 31:27.526
area to be able to blunt or block that

31:27.526 --> 31:29.630
first wave , especially UAS is

31:29.630 --> 31:31.797
predominantly looking at the mass that

31:31.797 --> 31:33.741
that can be generated with one-way

31:33.741 --> 31:35.963
attack drones . How do we develop those

31:35.963 --> 31:38.130
capabilities that we can put forward ?

31:38.130 --> 31:40.297
We're , we're not putting a person , a

31:40.297 --> 31:42.463
soldier in danger , um , but we've got

31:42.463 --> 31:44.297
a capability that if it does get

31:44.297 --> 31:46.463
destroyed , we didn't lose hundreds of

31:46.463 --> 31:48.686
millions of dollars , but they take out

31:48.686 --> 31:51.280
the preponderance of that threat that's

31:51.280 --> 31:53.640
coming across that mass that's coming

31:53.640 --> 31:56.880
across and the other pieces that we

31:56.880 --> 31:59.189
would have the ability to reposition

31:59.189 --> 32:01.430
those forward . Uh , as Ricky talked

32:01.430 --> 32:03.430
about offensive and and John talked

32:03.430 --> 32:05.541
about offensive fires that those same

32:05.541 --> 32:07.541
sensors , especially that data that

32:07.541 --> 32:09.708
they're gathering , we can get that to

32:09.708 --> 32:12.349
the targeteers whether that be ground

32:12.349 --> 32:15.270
base or air base to go target those

32:15.270 --> 32:17.048
ground control stations , those

32:17.048 --> 32:19.159
launchers that they may be picking up

32:19.159 --> 32:21.159
from those sensors that we've got .

32:21.159 --> 32:24.359
Great . Um , John , how do you think

32:24.359 --> 32:26.581
the defense industry can accelerate the

32:26.581 --> 32:28.637
delivery of advanced air missile and

32:28.637 --> 32:30.748
UAS defense systems to meet the needs

32:30.748 --> 32:32.915
of the Army formations , especially in

32:32.915 --> 32:34.970
light of these emerging threats like

32:34.970 --> 32:37.137
hypersonic missiles and drone swarms ?

32:38.109 --> 32:40.220
Yeah , I think , um , well , first of

32:40.220 --> 32:43.199
all , um . I think the administration

32:43.199 --> 32:45.369
and the army leadership is taking us

32:45.369 --> 32:47.890
taking us in terms of priorities in the

32:47.890 --> 32:50.057
right way to put your money where your

32:50.057 --> 32:53.380
requirements are . So of course , um ,

32:53.689 --> 32:55.856
for programs or record , for example ,

32:55.856 --> 32:58.290
you know , Linus is a prime for Inc too .

32:59.180 --> 33:02.069
Uh , delivering on pace with what their

33:02.579 --> 33:05.209
requirements are from the PO , um ,

33:05.339 --> 33:08.000
certainly could go faster . Um , so

33:08.000 --> 33:09.833
that's one thing if you consider

33:09.833 --> 33:11.778
programs a record , it's a funding

33:11.778 --> 33:13.444
based pace of delivery of the

33:13.444 --> 33:15.349
capabilities , but I think what

33:15.349 --> 33:18.479
industry can do , and that is often not

33:18.479 --> 33:20.646
leveraged to the degree it should be ,

33:20.890 --> 33:24.550
um , by the army is , um ,

33:24.800 --> 33:27.199
prioritizing IRAD investments in places

33:27.199 --> 33:29.680
where it would accelerate delivery of

33:29.680 --> 33:31.624
new technologies . I mean , if you

33:31.624 --> 33:33.550
think about the top 10 defense

33:33.550 --> 33:36.160
contractors probably spend $6 billion a

33:36.160 --> 33:39.439
year . And IRA , that's a , that's

33:39.439 --> 33:43.079
almost a quarter of the uh army's um

33:43.079 --> 33:45.229
procurement RDTNE funds every year .

33:45.319 --> 33:47.939
That's a lot of money . And so industry

33:47.939 --> 33:51.300
um works to uh develop

33:51.670 --> 33:55.300
new technology by self-funding . And

33:55.300 --> 33:58.219
then , um , finding the right

33:58.739 --> 34:01.219
mechanisms to put it in to test , put

34:01.219 --> 34:03.500
it into experiments , if you can get

34:03.500 --> 34:05.939
into Ukraine , that's even better to

34:05.939 --> 34:09.739
learn from the brutal reality of , of

34:09.739 --> 34:13.658
uh combat . And to

34:13.658 --> 34:15.880
modify those capabilities as quickly as

34:15.880 --> 34:18.259
possible by being present and partnered

34:18.259 --> 34:21.648
with the user community , um , I think

34:21.648 --> 34:23.759
is a responsibility that industry has

34:24.168 --> 34:26.499
to help accelerate that , um , and the

34:26.499 --> 34:29.049
other thing and all that we do , we

34:29.049 --> 34:31.208
should be using digital engineering

34:31.208 --> 34:35.050
tools . To facilitate modifications

34:35.050 --> 34:37.580
to systems and their interoperability

34:37.580 --> 34:40.810
requirements um by

34:41.169 --> 34:43.610
enabling rapid reconfiguration and

34:43.610 --> 34:46.889
learning uh to change systems

34:46.889 --> 34:49.689
characteristics as required from the

34:49.689 --> 34:51.800
learning events when you get feedback

34:51.800 --> 34:53.911
from the user community . Those are a

34:53.911 --> 34:55.911
couple of examples I'd say that you

34:55.911 --> 34:58.689
know industry leaning forward at

34:58.689 --> 35:02.000
industry risk , um . Because the

35:02.370 --> 35:04.426
ROI is not always there . The demand

35:04.426 --> 35:07.340
signal sometimes is weak , so having a

35:07.610 --> 35:10.409
a good demand signal and the ability to

35:10.409 --> 35:13.090
project take risk , um , and be

35:13.090 --> 35:16.399
brutally transparent with the army user

35:16.610 --> 35:19.129
on where we are with our um development

35:19.129 --> 35:22.389
of those capabilities . In partnership

35:22.389 --> 35:24.649
can enable going quicker and uh

35:24.649 --> 35:26.871
delivering capability that maybe not be

35:26.871 --> 35:30.719
the 100% but an 80% solution um that's

35:30.719 --> 35:32.886
better than having nothing I would say

35:32.886 --> 35:35.629
if I can what what John said is really

35:35.919 --> 35:38.086
really important and what we're seeing

35:38.086 --> 35:40.399
with transformation and contact efforts

35:40.399 --> 35:42.399
that we're doing here in Europe and

35:42.399 --> 35:44.455
here and also state side from the US

35:44.455 --> 35:46.677
perspective is we have to be willing to

35:46.677 --> 35:48.843
accept more risk and understand that .

35:48.843 --> 35:51.010
When industry brings that technology ,

35:51.010 --> 35:53.232
we're not getting that finished product

35:53.232 --> 35:55.288
that you know that TRL highest level

35:55.288 --> 35:57.455
that we're gonna develop a lot of this

35:57.455 --> 35:59.455
in stride , and I think that's what

35:59.455 --> 35:58.979
we're seeing with transformation and

35:58.979 --> 36:01.035
contact flytrap , these other events

36:01.035 --> 36:03.146
that we're doing here , they're being

36:03.146 --> 36:05.257
done stateside is you've got soldiers

36:05.257 --> 36:07.423
on the ground with the industry . That

36:07.423 --> 36:09.090
overnight are doing a doing a

36:09.090 --> 36:11.090
demonstration , doing an experiment

36:11.090 --> 36:12.979
they're they're observing they're

36:12.979 --> 36:14.923
collecting the data they're making

36:14.923 --> 36:14.530
industries going back and making

36:14.530 --> 36:16.697
changes that night and coming back the

36:16.697 --> 36:18.919
next day with a better product . I mean

36:18.919 --> 36:21.141
that that's Ukraine's doing that in the

36:21.141 --> 36:22.863
fight every single day . Alexi

36:22.863 --> 36:22.435
mentioned that . But that's what we've

36:22.435 --> 36:24.834
got to continue to do to maintain pace

36:24.834 --> 36:26.778
or we're not gonna we're we're not

36:26.778 --> 36:29.001
gonna be able to maintain that pace and

36:29.001 --> 36:31.334
we're not gonna learn as fast to and we ,

36:31.334 --> 36:31.195
we , we've got the model now to do that .

36:31.235 --> 36:33.635
We've got to continue that , um , that

36:33.635 --> 36:35.746
model forward to be able to learn and

36:35.746 --> 36:37.968
be able to implement these changes that

36:37.968 --> 36:40.079
John spoke about . Yeah , I just also

36:40.079 --> 36:42.191
want to add to this , uh , I'm making

36:42.191 --> 36:44.246
products myself with my team and I'm

36:44.246 --> 36:46.413
testing other , other products and I'm

36:46.413 --> 36:48.413
working with users and from all the

36:48.413 --> 36:50.580
sizes I can tell you . I also went

36:50.580 --> 36:53.179
through the US organized tests right in

36:53.179 --> 36:55.401
the US , in Europe , and everywhere and

36:56.229 --> 36:58.979
always creating the conditions that are

36:58.979 --> 37:00.812
similar to the real life is very

37:00.812 --> 37:02.812
difficult . It's simply very , very

37:02.812 --> 37:04.923
difficult in the test range and yes ,

37:04.923 --> 37:06.590
you might think you have more

37:06.590 --> 37:08.646
controllable environment . It's good

37:08.646 --> 37:10.312
when you want to measure some

37:10.312 --> 37:12.368
particular quantity , right ? But it

37:12.368 --> 37:14.257
does not tell you how your system

37:14.257 --> 37:17.449
really works . Measuring separate

37:17.449 --> 37:19.790
numbers does not tell you that . And if

37:19.790 --> 37:22.040
you go and test it in on real targets

37:22.040 --> 37:23.984
in real life , especially in their

37:23.984 --> 37:26.096
defense , because when you're talking

37:26.096 --> 37:28.207
about battlefield systems , you might

37:28.600 --> 37:32.040
say that if you don't want to test

37:32.040 --> 37:34.399
because someone's life might depend on

37:34.399 --> 37:36.677
it . But for air defense , if you test ,

37:36.679 --> 37:39.500
you never like you no one counts on you ,

37:39.560 --> 37:41.616
right ? You , you might contribute ,

37:41.679 --> 37:44.239
but it's if you fail , it's not bad ,

37:44.250 --> 37:47.850
so . Uh , just for everyone , please

37:47.850 --> 37:50.610
come and test . It , you will learn in

37:50.610 --> 37:53.560
one night more than in many months on ,

37:53.729 --> 37:56.370
uh , of simulations or test strange

37:56.370 --> 37:58.810
work and so on . It , it might , might

37:58.810 --> 38:01.649
be very helpful to us , but it's , it's .

38:02.229 --> 38:05.729
Immediately advancing you very , very ,

38:06.780 --> 38:09.300
very , very significantly ahead and uh

38:09.300 --> 38:11.899
we have all infrastructure to do that .

38:11.939 --> 38:14.820
We have a special units that are used

38:14.820 --> 38:16.987
to new equipment that are very good in

38:16.987 --> 38:20.489
working with uh uh uh industry partners ,

38:20.820 --> 38:22.939
testing new equipment , giving you

38:22.939 --> 38:25.939
qualified feedback and this is the data .

38:25.979 --> 38:28.620
So it's uh it's something that I would

38:28.620 --> 38:31.500
encourage everyone to to be considering .

38:33.550 --> 38:36.750
Um , Ricky , you mentioned the EFDL as

38:36.750 --> 38:39.189
did , uh , Kurt . How do you think it

38:39.189 --> 38:41.790
relates to President Trump's vision for

38:41.790 --> 38:43.709
Golden Dome and could they work

38:43.709 --> 38:47.449
together ? OK , well . I've been at the

38:47.449 --> 38:50.570
White House a couple times since the

38:50.570 --> 38:53.969
executive order went out . And there is

38:53.969 --> 38:57.669
frustration . On delivering

38:57.879 --> 38:58.840
architecture .

39:01.550 --> 39:04.090
And Where we're going

39:05.909 --> 39:08.310
I In space

39:09.860 --> 39:12.629
With an ability to detect

39:13.739 --> 39:16.510
anything from anywhere in the world .

39:17.860 --> 39:21.260
And have that data . Be

39:21.260 --> 39:24.830
available for offense precision strike .

39:25.629 --> 39:29.449
And for defensive fires . We're going

39:29.449 --> 39:31.560
to spend the United States of America

39:31.560 --> 39:35.169
is going to spend 175 billion in 3

39:35.169 --> 39:38.290
years to get this right . We haven't

39:38.290 --> 39:41.879
done it . We are not a joint C2 .

39:42.250 --> 39:45.889
We have not done that . This is bigger

39:45.889 --> 39:48.780
than anything we've ever done . To be

39:48.780 --> 39:52.530
able to have 1 C2 . And it's not going

39:52.530 --> 39:54.770
to be a single company . It will be a

39:54.770 --> 39:57.050
consortium , and this is where some of

39:57.050 --> 39:59.272
the new companies and old companies can

39:59.272 --> 40:03.129
come together to create that . That is

40:03.129 --> 40:06.250
a deterrent against China and Russia .

40:06.290 --> 40:08.512
They're going to have to spend a lot of

40:08.512 --> 40:11.360
money to defeat that . So the Golden

40:11.360 --> 40:15.320
Dome is moving and you as NATO need

40:15.320 --> 40:17.639
to be able to tap into that data .

40:19.870 --> 40:22.290
And and go do needs to be able to tap

40:22.290 --> 40:25.949
into your data . And that's going to be

40:25.949 --> 40:28.669
available , but probably not soon .

40:29.969 --> 40:32.820
But I believe CD with what we're doing

40:32.820 --> 40:35.179
with the land data exchange will be the

40:35.179 --> 40:37.790
same as the as the UDL , Universal Data

40:37.790 --> 40:39.939
library up in space , and we will

40:39.939 --> 40:42.540
connect that . We're on a momentum

40:42.540 --> 40:45.649
shift . Everything else is commodities .

40:45.899 --> 40:47.899
We'll , we'll figure out what those

40:47.899 --> 40:49.899
factors are , and they've got to be

40:49.899 --> 40:52.429
cost curve . Capabilities , but we

40:52.429 --> 40:54.318
still have to have the expense of

40:54.318 --> 40:57.179
exquisite . Counter hypersonic glide

40:57.179 --> 40:59.770
and We have to have those .

41:01.500 --> 41:05.459
So this is a really opportune time to

41:05.459 --> 41:07.729
put everything together , and I believe

41:08.070 --> 41:12.060
the eastern flank deterrent line is in

41:12.060 --> 41:14.969
a great position to show a little gold

41:15.580 --> 41:18.340
to everyone to help this thing move

41:18.340 --> 41:21.360
forward . And all of us that want

41:22.479 --> 41:24.535
all of you that want to contribute ,

41:24.535 --> 41:26.701
you're , you're either a data consumer

41:26.701 --> 41:29.850
or a data provider . That's it . And I

41:29.850 --> 41:33.479
think we will have another series

41:33.479 --> 41:35.729
current in Flytrap next month . I think

41:35.729 --> 41:37.951
there's going to be some more series of

41:37.951 --> 41:40.929
that . And that's open That's open

41:41.699 --> 41:43.866
for people that want to provide data .

41:44.610 --> 41:47.360
And consume data with countries . The

41:47.360 --> 41:50.060
more the better We're moving out ,

41:50.189 --> 41:52.189
we're not sitting . this is this is

41:52.189 --> 41:55.110
happening . This is gonna , it's moving .

41:55.810 --> 41:57.366
It's not gonna be stopped .

41:59.929 --> 42:03.250
Right Um , Kurt , what is the 10th

42:03.250 --> 42:04.972
doing to address the increased

42:04.972 --> 42:07.479
transparency and , uh , lethality on

42:07.479 --> 42:08.757
today's battlefields ?

42:11.590 --> 42:13.701
Again , so when we look at the threat

42:13.701 --> 42:17.280
of what we've seen . Again ,

42:17.310 --> 42:19.860
the capacity of that threat and and the

42:19.860 --> 42:22.082
complexity of that threat . This is the

42:22.082 --> 42:24.304
data that we've been talking about . So

42:24.304 --> 42:26.304
when we've got an innovation , we ,

42:26.304 --> 42:28.360
we've reorganized a little bit right

42:28.360 --> 42:28.060
now where we've got more reorganization

42:28.060 --> 42:29.899
to do intent . We stood up an

42:29.899 --> 42:32.010
innovation cell that again is working

42:32.010 --> 42:34.232
with the many of the organizations that

42:34.232 --> 42:36.232
we've mentioned working back to PEO

42:36.232 --> 42:38.455
missiles in space , RICTO , many of our

42:38.455 --> 42:40.810
NATO partners to uh really with this

42:40.810 --> 42:43.270
data , when we talk about transparency

42:43.270 --> 42:45.381
of the data , we've got to be able to

42:45.381 --> 42:47.429
get this data . To all the

42:47.429 --> 42:49.762
organizations that need it quicker , uh ,

42:49.762 --> 42:51.540
but one of the key things we've

42:51.540 --> 42:53.485
experienced with the data is . And

42:53.485 --> 42:55.485
Ricky mentioned we still gotta have

42:55.485 --> 42:57.485
exquisite systems . There are still

42:57.485 --> 42:59.651
weapons platforms that require certain

42:59.979 --> 43:02.201
types of information what we'll call it

43:02.201 --> 43:04.659
we call it covariance data we've got to

43:04.659 --> 43:06.979
make sure that , you know , we can get

43:06.979 --> 43:08.923
that data quickly to those weapons

43:08.923 --> 43:10.868
platforms that need to use that to

43:10.868 --> 43:13.146
engage uh with interceptors , missiles ,

43:13.300 --> 43:16.620
um , but also some of that data again

43:16.620 --> 43:18.731
as we I said a little bit , I think I

43:18.731 --> 43:20.842
said earlier in this form was we just

43:20.842 --> 43:23.520
need to get . The lower cost factor

43:23.520 --> 43:25.742
looking in the right direction , get it

43:25.742 --> 43:27.798
launched , and then let it use other

43:27.798 --> 43:30.560
type of sensors , EOIR sensors to hone

43:30.560 --> 43:32.629
that uh effector in that's at a much

43:32.629 --> 43:34.740
low cost , so we're not having to pay

43:34.740 --> 43:37.479
to get that exquisite radar , um , you

43:37.479 --> 43:39.679
know , um , interceptor engagement on

43:39.679 --> 43:41.790
that target . I think with again with

43:41.790 --> 43:43.790
drones , we're , we're there , that

43:43.790 --> 43:46.012
technology exists , we're doing that in

43:46.012 --> 43:48.179
very low scale . We've got to increase

43:48.179 --> 43:50.346
that one rapidly . Um , and then we've

43:50.346 --> 43:52.457
got to get that back to the offensive

43:52.457 --> 43:51.959
fires . We've got to get that data

43:52.370 --> 43:54.259
quickly back because a lot of the

43:54.259 --> 43:56.426
sensors , a lot of the data that we're

43:56.426 --> 43:58.537
talking about that's needed either by

43:58.537 --> 43:58.050
offensive or defensive fires , it

43:58.050 --> 44:00.449
exists , but we've developed systems

44:00.449 --> 44:02.505
that are only using a portion of the

44:02.505 --> 44:04.616
data that they have available to them

44:04.616 --> 44:06.616
and now we've got to be able to tap

44:06.616 --> 44:08.782
into that data and quickly get it over

44:08.782 --> 44:10.893
to the offensive side as well so that

44:10.893 --> 44:13.005
they can very quickly instantaneously

44:13.005 --> 44:15.719
execute fire commands , uh , to strike

44:15.969 --> 44:19.120
those systems . Counterattack , but

44:19.120 --> 44:21.176
even preferably if we detected where

44:21.176 --> 44:23.342
they are before they launch a threat ,

44:23.342 --> 44:25.398
we can destroy them before they ever

44:25.398 --> 44:27.509
launch . Hey Kurt , do you think with

44:27.509 --> 44:29.453
this transformation , should we be

44:29.453 --> 44:31.620
combining our defensive fires with our

44:31.620 --> 44:33.709
offensive fires and putting them

44:33.709 --> 44:35.840
together ? And when is the DVardi

44:35.840 --> 44:38.118
coming back ? When are our maneuvering .

44:38.719 --> 44:41.909
Regiments are maneuvering cops . When

44:41.909 --> 44:44.020
did they get missile defense ? We , I

44:44.020 --> 44:46.020
mean , it's ridiculous . They don't

44:46.020 --> 44:48.070
have it . And so they're useless

44:48.070 --> 44:49.959
without it . I , I , when is that

44:49.959 --> 44:51.681
happening ? Is it you see that

44:51.681 --> 44:53.848
transformation or you're gonna keep it

44:53.848 --> 44:55.959
separate like we've been doing in the

44:55.959 --> 44:57.903
last 30 years ? You know , General

44:57.903 --> 44:57.729
Donahue , uh , give a couple of

44:57.729 --> 44:59.785
examples . General Donahue mentioned

44:59.785 --> 45:01.896
the common launcher , um , you know ,

45:01.896 --> 45:03.840
that , that's an initiative that's

45:03.840 --> 45:05.785
we've been that the US Army's been

45:05.785 --> 45:08.118
working on for a while , but that gives ,

45:08.118 --> 45:07.270
you know , that would give us the

45:07.270 --> 45:09.103
concept behind that , as , as he

45:09.103 --> 45:11.159
discussed this morning and mentioned

45:11.159 --> 45:10.550
would give us the ability to fire .

45:10.649 --> 45:12.482
Either an offensive or defensive

45:12.482 --> 45:14.649
interceptor out of the same launcher ,

45:14.649 --> 45:14.600
which there's a lot of benefits to that .

45:14.629 --> 45:16.907
The enemy doesn't know which one it is .

45:16.907 --> 45:19.129
It obviously helps us with our magazine

45:19.129 --> 45:21.351
depth , uh , and I think that the other

45:21.351 --> 45:23.462
piece that we're doing , we've done a

45:23.462 --> 45:25.629
very small scale on the US side , uh ,

45:25.629 --> 45:27.407
is through , for example , IBCS

45:27.407 --> 45:29.296
integrated battle command control

45:29.296 --> 45:31.518
systems is to be able to take that data

45:31.518 --> 45:33.685
that I was talking about from a from a

45:33.685 --> 45:33.439
defensive primarily what's been a

45:33.439 --> 45:35.439
defensive sensor . Uh , but that is

45:35.439 --> 45:37.340
detected either the target or the

45:37.340 --> 45:39.979
launch point digitally pass that

45:39.979 --> 45:42.201
through to an offensive capability such

45:42.201 --> 45:44.929
as high mars , attacks , and with

45:45.139 --> 45:47.419
within milliseconds process of firing

45:47.419 --> 45:49.752
command , uh , humans still in the loop ,

45:49.752 --> 45:51.975
but process of firing command to reduce

45:51.975 --> 45:54.086
the time that it took . Those , those

45:54.086 --> 45:56.308
are we're doing . So when we talk about

45:56.308 --> 45:58.363
offensive defensive fires that about

45:58.363 --> 46:00.197
the schoolhouse , what about the

46:00.197 --> 46:02.308
training of . Emerging that with with

46:02.308 --> 46:04.530
going putting our air defense guys back

46:04.530 --> 46:06.697
in with her maneuvering units , yeah ,

46:06.697 --> 46:06.135
I think that's that's a discussion that

46:06.135 --> 46:08.854
we've gotta have . uh I think um what

46:08.854 --> 46:10.854
we've got to assess is what are the

46:10.854 --> 46:12.854
skill sets that are required at the

46:12.854 --> 46:15.021
battalion level right now , um , and .

46:15.820 --> 46:17.987
You know , I , I don't know that we're

46:17.987 --> 46:19.931
at the point to completely combine

46:19.931 --> 46:22.098
those because the skill sets and , and

46:22.098 --> 46:21.669
the training on the technology is so

46:21.669 --> 46:23.780
different right now , but I will tell

46:23.780 --> 46:25.870
you at the WMDC levels , the theater

46:25.870 --> 46:27.989
fires commands , our ability to

46:27.989 --> 46:30.100
integrate what has been our targeting

46:30.100 --> 46:32.322
sales and our defensive fire sales is a

46:32.322 --> 46:34.489
must , and , and we do that on we , we

46:34.489 --> 46:36.656
do that . Um , but we've got to look ,

46:36.656 --> 46:38.822
uh , to do that better and , and we've

46:38.822 --> 46:41.045
got really where we've got to gain some

46:41.045 --> 46:43.045
efficiencies is using technology to

46:43.045 --> 46:45.267
help us do that , but also when we look

46:45.267 --> 46:46.933
at space-based capabilities ,

46:46.933 --> 46:48.989
electronic warfare capabilities , as

46:48.989 --> 46:50.933
Alexei mentioned , um , you know ,

46:50.933 --> 46:50.919
we've got , we've got to integrate from

46:50.919 --> 46:53.030
a defensive perspective to understand

46:53.030 --> 46:55.086
how we can use electronic warfare to

46:55.086 --> 46:57.086
defend as much as we're using it to

46:57.086 --> 46:58.975
target , um , and same thing with

46:58.975 --> 47:01.030
space-based capabilities , there are

47:01.030 --> 47:02.975
some obviously . You know , we use

47:02.975 --> 47:05.030
those to target ISR to find things .

47:05.030 --> 47:07.141
We've got to figure out how we use to

47:07.141 --> 47:09.252
protect that . We do that . But we're

47:09.252 --> 47:11.197
not always the best at integrating

47:11.197 --> 47:10.850
those two . I wanna ask you one more

47:10.850 --> 47:12.850
question . I know it's hard , but I

47:12.850 --> 47:14.906
just , I need to throw it out here .

47:15.040 --> 47:17.040
The army is defending all these air

47:17.040 --> 47:19.469
bases , man , are we changing the roles

47:19.469 --> 47:21.590
responsibilities to let the Air Force

47:21.590 --> 47:23.646
go and defend their own runways ? We

47:23.646 --> 47:25.909
don't have enough capacity to do that

47:25.909 --> 47:27.965
alone , let alone do logistical army

47:27.965 --> 47:30.429
bases and maneuvering forces , and

47:30.429 --> 47:32.540
you're forced with that mission set .

47:32.540 --> 47:34.540
Is it time for somebody else to pay

47:34.540 --> 47:36.596
that bill or to be able to protect .

47:37.330 --> 47:39.552
Basis for their maneuvering force . Why

47:39.552 --> 47:41.386
is the army protecting Air Force

47:41.386 --> 47:44.479
maneuvering bases ? I , I can't speak

47:44.479 --> 47:46.146
to the Department of the Army

47:46.146 --> 47:48.257
Department Air Force , but I can tell

47:48.257 --> 47:50.479
you , you know , you safe , who we work

47:50.479 --> 47:52.646
hand in hand with , um , from 10th Air

47:52.646 --> 47:52.590
missile defense and our and our deputy

47:52.590 --> 47:54.646
area air defense role , is they're ,

47:54.646 --> 47:56.868
they're doing that . They're developing

47:56.868 --> 47:58.979
that they have got capability now and

47:58.979 --> 47:58.649
they're developing other capabilities

47:58.649 --> 48:01.969
to defend their air bases that we that

48:01.969 --> 48:04.191
we coordinate with them and we may have

48:04.191 --> 48:05.969
some capabilities , but they're

48:05.969 --> 48:07.969
developing . Capabilities as well .

48:07.969 --> 48:10.025
Many , many of the same systems . So

48:10.025 --> 48:12.247
that , I think that is happening , um ,

48:12.247 --> 48:14.302
and , and but it's a discussion that

48:14.302 --> 48:13.739
we've got to continue to push forward

48:13.739 --> 48:15.906
because you're right , none of us have

48:15.906 --> 48:17.850
the capacity alone to counter that

48:17.850 --> 48:20.719
threat . Great , well , I'm gonna open

48:20.719 --> 48:23.310
it up to some audience Q and A , um ,

48:23.439 --> 48:25.606
the first one , this is for for really

48:25.606 --> 48:27.828
anyone , um , what have we learned from

48:27.828 --> 48:31.719
the April 2024 stoppage of the 297 of

48:31.719 --> 48:34.360
300 Iranian missiles and drones and is

48:34.360 --> 48:36.360
any of that applicable to Ukraine ?

48:39.919 --> 48:42.669
So , so I , I would say when you again ,

48:42.969 --> 48:45.191
um , and I , I don't remember the exact

48:45.191 --> 48:47.358
numbers of the , of , of that launch ,

48:47.358 --> 48:50.270
but , um , I mean just the sheer mass ,

48:50.330 --> 48:53.290
um , you know . You know , previously

48:53.290 --> 48:55.457
when we , when we look at a lot of our

48:55.457 --> 48:57.123
models and our more exquisite

48:57.123 --> 48:59.346
interceptors , we've done modeling that

48:59.346 --> 49:01.570
would look at the , you know , the

49:01.570 --> 49:04.810
defeat of one or two missiles , um .

49:05.310 --> 49:07.510
When you have tens of missiles in the

49:07.510 --> 49:09.800
air and and being intercepted and the

49:09.800 --> 49:12.149
debris and and everything else that

49:12.149 --> 49:14.371
occurs with that every single time that

49:14.371 --> 49:16.593
happens we learn a tremendous amount of

49:16.593 --> 49:18.649
data and just from that that fact or

49:18.649 --> 49:20.593
those instances there's a lot that

49:20.593 --> 49:22.538
we're learning right now on how we

49:22.538 --> 49:24.649
improve and optimize our more our air

49:24.649 --> 49:26.649
missile defense systems uh and that

49:26.649 --> 49:28.427
gets back to my . My kind of my

49:28.427 --> 49:30.538
discussion on data that's where we've

49:30.538 --> 49:32.649
got to have more rapid data reduction

49:32.649 --> 49:34.871
capability . We've got to have on board

49:34.871 --> 49:36.927
capability uh that gives us at least

49:36.927 --> 49:38.927
some immediate feedback that we can

49:38.927 --> 49:40.927
make changes to optimize , uh , our

49:40.927 --> 49:43.149
what we're our what we what we call our

49:43.149 --> 49:45.093
firing doctrine but our ability to

49:45.093 --> 49:47.149
intercept and destroy those missiles

49:47.149 --> 49:49.149
that that's one thing for sure that

49:49.149 --> 49:51.260
we've learned . The other is . You've

49:51.260 --> 49:53.316
got to look at the target and you've

49:53.316 --> 49:52.580
got to look at the offensive , you've

49:52.580 --> 49:54.802
got to look at the offense piece . It's

49:54.802 --> 49:56.802
got to be and Ricky , I think Ricky

49:56.802 --> 49:55.939
said this too , it's got to be

49:55.939 --> 49:57.995
integrated , you know , what you saw

49:57.995 --> 50:00.217
from that , that was a coalition , um ,

50:00.217 --> 50:02.629
so no one nation can do this alone .

50:02.699 --> 50:04.810
That's gotta be a coalition with that

50:04.810 --> 50:07.032
capacity to defeat that . I'll just add

50:07.032 --> 50:10.889
that that that was the true integration

50:11.300 --> 50:14.659
maximum with another country . The the

50:14.659 --> 50:17.419
integration or operability from our

50:17.419 --> 50:20.709
ships shooting stuff down from our

50:20.709 --> 50:24.620
F-15Es shooting stuff down from our

50:24.620 --> 50:28.409
TAS patriots in conjunction with Israel

50:28.409 --> 50:32.020
that that's huge no no other country

50:32.020 --> 50:34.260
comes close to that in relationship to

50:34.260 --> 50:36.093
having an integrated air missile

50:36.093 --> 50:38.204
defense between the United States and

50:38.204 --> 50:40.316
Israel , we've got to work to that to

50:40.316 --> 50:42.427
other countries to do that , but that

50:42.427 --> 50:44.699
was perfection . Yeah . Um , Alexi ,

50:44.939 --> 50:47.050
what , uh , technological evolution ,

50:47.050 --> 50:49.459
whether it's AI directive energy ,

50:49.580 --> 50:51.780
electronic warfare , do you believe

50:51.780 --> 50:53.836
will have the greatest impact on the

50:53.836 --> 50:55.891
future of air and missile defense in

50:55.891 --> 50:59.030
the coming decade ? I think uh one of

50:59.030 --> 51:01.252
the first things that any air defenders

51:01.252 --> 51:03.500
is learning is that in this field there

51:03.500 --> 51:05.949
is no silver bullet if

51:05.949 --> 51:09.239
you fully believe on

51:09.239 --> 51:13.219
one technology , you're done always uh

51:13.219 --> 51:16.540
EW is a very good example of course

51:16.540 --> 51:18.651
it's very attractive to do soft kills

51:18.651 --> 51:20.873
rather than hard kills . It's cheaper .

51:20.919 --> 51:22.808
It seems very attractive , but in

51:22.808 --> 51:24.863
Ukraine we went through waves when .

51:24.889 --> 51:27.729
Our EW was very effective and then it

51:27.729 --> 51:30.449
was not effective at all against let's

51:30.449 --> 51:34.050
say shades and it can always change you ,

51:34.129 --> 51:36.810
you , you , it's , it's good to have it

51:36.810 --> 51:38.921
but you cannot count on it . Uh , the

51:38.921 --> 51:41.560
same is true for all other types of ,

51:41.780 --> 51:45.560
of , of , uh , uh , of . The ,

51:46.540 --> 51:48.873
uh , technologies , we developed a very ,

51:48.873 --> 51:50.984
very good system of mobile fire teams

51:50.984 --> 51:53.199
which were super efficiently killing

51:53.199 --> 51:57.179
low flying , uh , shahids and the whole

51:57.179 --> 51:59.346
point was that they were hiding , like

51:59.346 --> 52:01.459
I mentioned from the radars . Now

52:01.459 --> 52:03.340
they're trying to overwhelm us ,

52:03.699 --> 52:05.755
maximizing their altitude instead of

52:05.755 --> 52:08.179
minimizing it , and then switching off

52:08.179 --> 52:10.229
the engine and trying to glide very

52:10.229 --> 52:13.034
fast , creating . A new type of

52:13.034 --> 52:15.354
challenge where your altitude like up

52:15.354 --> 52:19.155
to 4000 m , it becomes even difficult

52:19.155 --> 52:21.675
for some helicopters saying nothing

52:21.675 --> 52:24.875
about ground ground based uh weapons so

52:24.875 --> 52:27.554
you need to have different .

52:29.070 --> 52:32.580
Delusions for uh uh the same

52:32.580 --> 52:36.510
uh type of threat you you you need to

52:36.510 --> 52:39.500
have a lot of uh redundancy . I don't

52:39.500 --> 52:41.830
think that one technology will will

52:41.830 --> 52:43.774
solve it all . Everything that you

52:43.774 --> 52:46.699
mentioned will play a role . directed

52:46.699 --> 52:50.229
energy , I think it didn't , didn't

52:50.229 --> 52:52.830
show its full , uh .

52:54.090 --> 52:56.330
A potential but it has its own

52:56.919 --> 53:00.439
limitations whether , for example , and

53:00.439 --> 53:04.320
so on , well I , I , yeah , that's my

53:04.320 --> 53:07.399
answer . I think we we need complex

53:07.399 --> 53:10.600
multidirectional development and we and

53:10.600 --> 53:13.260
the good air defense system , every

53:13.260 --> 53:15.959
layer , every good layer of of air

53:15.959 --> 53:18.469
defense system . Can have a lot of

53:18.469 --> 53:20.636
redundancies . Yeah , that makes a lot

53:20.636 --> 53:22.649
of sense . Um , we've mentioned

53:22.649 --> 53:25.510
interoperability a lot , um , but I

53:25.510 --> 53:27.732
guess maybe for John or Lexi or both of

53:27.732 --> 53:30.459
you , um , what do you think , what

53:30.459 --> 53:32.403
role does interoperability play in

53:32.403 --> 53:34.626
ensuring NATO's air and missile defense

53:34.626 --> 53:36.792
and what role do you think the defense

53:36.792 --> 53:38.792
industry and commercial tech should

53:38.792 --> 53:41.090
play ? Yeah , um ,

53:42.500 --> 53:44.500
We talked about interoperability as

53:44.500 --> 53:46.611
being uh foundational I think to mass

53:46.611 --> 53:48.939
having mass , you know , on our own a

53:48.939 --> 53:52.919
deeper magazine , um , having , uh

53:52.919 --> 53:56.120
advantageous position positioning of

53:56.120 --> 53:58.760
formations because then you can operate

53:58.760 --> 54:01.020
together , you see , you know , you

54:01.020 --> 54:03.909
stensibly have the same , um , uh ,

54:03.919 --> 54:07.560
picture of the threat , um , and I

54:07.560 --> 54:09.504
think without interoperability you

54:09.504 --> 54:11.800
don't meet the true nature of CAT C2 .

54:12.100 --> 54:14.620
You know , the best , uh , shooter for

54:14.620 --> 54:17.800
any sensor , um , and so

54:17.800 --> 54:19.879
interoperability from an industry

54:19.879 --> 54:22.101
perspective is , you know , we're gonna

54:22.101 --> 54:23.879
build to the standards that are

54:23.879 --> 54:26.770
dictated . I think IBCS clearly is , um ,

54:26.800 --> 54:29.989
what the army has uh settled on for IMD

54:30.429 --> 54:32.949
um I think it's a question for our

54:33.280 --> 54:35.510
coalition and allied partners , um ,

54:35.560 --> 54:38.030
are gonna be by IBCS or are you going

54:38.030 --> 54:41.879
to . Uh , live with the

54:41.879 --> 54:45.120
API connected , uh , multiple C2

54:45.120 --> 54:47.459
structures that potentially have delays ,

54:47.860 --> 54:50.760
um , and sometimes seconds can be , uh ,

54:51.080 --> 54:55.010
pretty , um . Uh , impactful for your ,

54:55.060 --> 54:58.229
for your defense , um , I think , uh ,

54:58.600 --> 55:00.679
for us we build open architecture

55:00.679 --> 55:03.070
solutions that enable , uh ,

55:03.080 --> 55:05.560
connectivity across multiple C2

55:05.560 --> 55:07.919
solutions , um , and I think that's

55:07.919 --> 55:10.280
what we owe the owe the army and the

55:10.280 --> 55:12.439
joint force or solutions that can

55:12.760 --> 55:14.927
interoperate with the right connective

55:14.927 --> 55:17.399
tissue certainly I , you know , there's

55:17.399 --> 55:19.889
probably . Everybody buying the same

55:19.889 --> 55:22.000
thing makes it a little bit easier if

55:22.000 --> 55:24.167
you've practiced and you rehearsed and

55:24.167 --> 55:26.445
you operate together in that manner um .

55:26.870 --> 55:29.899
And so it's a question for I think uh

55:30.709 --> 55:33.469
um the coalition how much risk are you

55:33.469 --> 55:35.949
willing to take with multiple C2

55:35.949 --> 55:39.110
systems that require additional efforts

55:39.110 --> 55:42.479
to create interoperability , um , but

55:42.479 --> 55:44.830
we're building those that can work in

55:44.830 --> 55:47.479
that uh in that vein or through the IBS

55:47.479 --> 55:51.030
IBCS structure . In my opinion ,

55:51.129 --> 55:53.770
interoperability is a combination of

55:53.770 --> 55:56.290
policy from one side and goodwill from

55:56.290 --> 55:58.800
another side . There is no technical

55:58.800 --> 56:01.090
problem making everything interoperable

56:01.090 --> 56:03.409
from the manufacturer side . It's just

56:03.409 --> 56:07.340
a business . Strategy and

56:07.340 --> 56:10.379
if the end users have enough push uh

56:10.379 --> 56:14.379
that we do not accept products that are

56:14.379 --> 56:17.489
based on closeness rather than open

56:18.620 --> 56:22.020
and being open , I think it's it's ,

56:22.060 --> 56:24.340
it's very easily achievable in reality .

56:29.229 --> 56:31.340
Um , this could be for , for anyone ,

56:31.340 --> 56:33.507
but maybe starting with Ricky , what ,

56:33.507 --> 56:36.120
what changes to policy , acquisition or

56:36.120 --> 56:38.330
industry are most needed to scale

56:38.330 --> 56:40.199
missile defense across NATO more

56:40.199 --> 56:42.421
affordably ? Well , I think that's what

56:42.421 --> 56:44.477
we're doing with Golden Dome . We're

56:44.477 --> 56:47.830
going back to Oppenheimer , Grover or

56:47.830 --> 56:50.219
Groves . We're going back to Rickover

56:50.219 --> 56:52.949
with the nuclear sub to Schriever with

56:52.949 --> 56:56.219
the ICBM . Mike Gulein will have

56:56.870 --> 57:00.389
authorities over all the acquisition .

57:01.169 --> 57:04.129
Direct report to the Debsec .

57:05.290 --> 57:07.449
Take him and give him the problem .

57:08.479 --> 57:10.590
That's what we're doing . It's a huge

57:10.590 --> 57:14.469
shift . To break What we've done

57:14.469 --> 57:16.580
before . We are , we , this was great

57:16.580 --> 57:19.659
when we were fighting um SEO in the

57:19.659 --> 57:22.870
Middle East . It is not good . We have

57:22.870 --> 57:26.600
to fight Russia and China . And we

57:26.600 --> 57:28.933
can't do it the way we've been doing it .

57:29.489 --> 57:32.330
Authorities are huge . They're gonna be

57:32.330 --> 57:34.979
done that way , and I think leveraging

57:35.530 --> 57:39.239
leveraging um . My Goog line over here .

57:40.159 --> 57:43.360
would help you , help you greatly on

57:43.360 --> 57:46.949
getting this done . This is , again ,

57:47.070 --> 57:49.237
we have to start trusting each other .

57:49.237 --> 57:51.237
We gotta start at the very bottom .

57:51.969 --> 57:55.010
With unclassed data , share it , and

57:55.010 --> 57:57.560
then build those relationships to be

57:57.560 --> 58:00.959
able to truly give our open data across

58:00.959 --> 58:01.959
the board .

58:05.120 --> 58:08.320
Right . I , I just want to add that the

58:08.320 --> 58:10.959
main change probably should be the

58:10.959 --> 58:13.399
following every technical or scientific

58:13.399 --> 58:16.080
problem solution for it depends on the

58:16.080 --> 58:18.469
boundary conditions . If I want to make

58:18.469 --> 58:20.790
a seeker , let's say for a missile ,

58:20.840 --> 58:23.620
right ? The first question , am I

58:23.620 --> 58:26.939
allowed to build exclusive components

58:26.939 --> 58:29.500
for it , or should I make them from off

58:29.500 --> 58:31.556
the shelf components ? These are two

58:31.556 --> 58:33.899
different problems . They will give two

58:33.899 --> 58:37.209
different solutions . Only a product

58:37.209 --> 58:39.419
made of off the shelf components is

58:39.419 --> 58:42.419
scalable and will not depend on long

58:42.419 --> 58:44.979
lead times and , and , and so on , and

58:45.500 --> 58:48.659
we need exclusive products . We do need

58:48.659 --> 58:50.715
them because sometimes it's the only

58:50.715 --> 58:53.159
way to make . Uh , an interceptor for a

58:53.159 --> 58:55.215
hypersonic missile or something like

58:55.215 --> 58:57.270
that , but if you want to counteract

58:57.270 --> 58:59.379
scalable target , you need scalable

58:59.379 --> 59:02.860
answers , so you must have a product

59:02.860 --> 59:05.659
made off of the shelf , uh , components ,

59:05.699 --> 59:07.810
and this will be a boundary condition

59:07.810 --> 59:09.889
for engineers to design it and this

59:09.889 --> 59:13.469
genre of military . Procurement

59:13.800 --> 59:16.489
does not exist . It it it didn't exist

59:16.489 --> 59:20.159
before . We from time to time , MODs

59:20.159 --> 59:24.159
must create a call or a tender for

59:24.159 --> 59:26.919
a product which is by definition made

59:26.919 --> 59:30.000
only of of the easily substitutable of

59:30.000 --> 59:32.479
the shelf components that's I think is

59:32.479 --> 59:35.360
the key to have uh in

59:35.360 --> 59:38.750
your toolbox also

59:39.080 --> 59:42.080
this cheap and easily scalable uh .

59:42.709 --> 59:45.959
Weapons . To other critical points here

59:46.610 --> 59:48.777
in the executive order , the president

59:48.777 --> 59:52.209
of the United States . Put forward our

59:52.209 --> 59:55.489
ability to track , sense , intercept in

59:55.489 --> 59:58.449
space . That is now policy . That's not

59:58.449 --> 01:00:00.171
a hurdle anymore . You have to

01:00:00.171 --> 01:00:02.171
understand that that has happened .

01:00:02.250 --> 01:00:04.250
That's a tremendous shift from what

01:00:04.250 --> 01:00:06.610
we've been doing in NATO . So we're

01:00:06.610 --> 01:00:10.080
gonna war fight in space starting with

01:00:10.090 --> 01:00:13.169
with the golden the golden dome on that .

01:00:13.870 --> 01:00:16.169
The second thing is policy . Look at

01:00:16.169 --> 01:00:19.899
NATO . We built stuff that was

01:00:19.899 --> 01:00:22.340
directly not allowed to face Russia .

01:00:22.530 --> 01:00:24.863
You don't have any radars facing Russia .

01:00:24.929 --> 01:00:27.760
You weren't allowed to do that . You've

01:00:27.760 --> 01:00:30.560
got an upper tier system basically

01:00:30.560 --> 01:00:34.280
focused to Iran . You are

01:00:34.280 --> 01:00:36.560
hopefully shifting that integration to

01:00:36.560 --> 01:00:39.399
IMD for all threats , but it's not been

01:00:39.399 --> 01:00:41.729
done . You need , you need stuff facing

01:00:41.729 --> 01:00:44.080
Russia . And I don't know where the

01:00:44.080 --> 01:00:46.179
policy is yet with NATO , but I'm

01:00:46.179 --> 01:00:47.919
pretty sure it's going in that

01:00:47.919 --> 01:00:50.810
direction . Because we're not where we

01:00:50.810 --> 01:00:53.610
were 20 years ago . This is we got a

01:00:53.610 --> 01:00:55.889
real threat and if there was a

01:00:55.889 --> 01:00:58.000
settlement in Russia , and if there's

01:00:58.000 --> 01:00:59.945
gonna be a settlement in Ukraine ,

01:00:59.945 --> 01:01:02.167
they're coming . Putin's not stopping ,

01:01:02.167 --> 01:01:04.333
so you're gonna have to deal with this

01:01:04.333 --> 01:01:06.556
and you're gonna have to spend money on

01:01:06.556 --> 01:01:08.969
missile defense capabilities to make

01:01:08.969 --> 01:01:12.879
Europe safe . Um ,

01:01:12.979 --> 01:01:15.459
great . So we're kind of closing this

01:01:15.459 --> 01:01:17.681
out . I would love it if everyone could

01:01:17.681 --> 01:01:19.959
just go around and say , what are , um ,

01:01:19.979 --> 01:01:22.090
if there was one thing you wanted the

01:01:22.090 --> 01:01:24.035
audience to take away from today's

01:01:24.035 --> 01:01:26.560
panel , what would it be ? Well , again ,

01:01:26.679 --> 01:01:28.901
thanks . Great , great to be here today

01:01:28.901 --> 01:01:30.901
and , and with the panel members to

01:01:30.901 --> 01:01:32.901
speak to you about uh defending the

01:01:32.901 --> 01:01:35.123
skies , you know , what we're doing air

01:01:35.123 --> 01:01:37.346
defense . Uh , again , I just say one ,

01:01:37.346 --> 01:01:39.235
it's a , it's . It's an everybody

01:01:39.235 --> 01:01:41.512
effort , um , you know , just with the ,

01:01:41.512 --> 01:01:43.568
with the threat we've , we've got to

01:01:43.568 --> 01:01:45.679
develop this together we've got to be

01:01:45.679 --> 01:01:45.350
willing , especially in the development

01:01:45.520 --> 01:01:47.687
and our work with the industry , we've

01:01:47.687 --> 01:01:49.798
got to be willing to accept more risk

01:01:49.798 --> 01:01:51.853
and look at those policy authorities

01:01:51.853 --> 01:01:53.964
that we need to adjust so that we can

01:01:53.964 --> 01:01:56.242
get capabilities into soldiers earlier ,

01:01:56.242 --> 01:01:58.409
um . Get soldiers on them , experiment

01:01:58.409 --> 01:02:00.576
with them , learn from them quickly so

01:02:00.576 --> 01:02:02.798
we can get them integrated and then the

01:02:02.798 --> 01:02:02.719
last one I'll just close that again is

01:02:02.719 --> 01:02:06.320
I can't stress enough the data and how

01:02:06.320 --> 01:02:08.542
important it is to quickly analyze that

01:02:08.542 --> 01:02:10.376
data and be able to make changes

01:02:10.376 --> 01:02:12.598
quickly and that's where we got to look

01:02:12.598 --> 01:02:12.399
at open architecture software based

01:02:12.399 --> 01:02:14.566
systems um that we have that available

01:02:14.566 --> 01:02:17.189
to us . Thank you . Yeah I'd say the

01:02:17.189 --> 01:02:19.429
one thing I , I would want to emphasize

01:02:19.429 --> 01:02:23.330
is , uh . Just the necessity of good

01:02:23.330 --> 01:02:26.850
partnerships , um , industry to

01:02:26.850 --> 01:02:28.961
government , to , you know , industry

01:02:28.961 --> 01:02:30.906
to army , industry to industry and

01:02:30.906 --> 01:02:33.770
building trust and um . You know ,

01:02:33.889 --> 01:02:36.129
through brutal transparency , I'd say

01:02:36.129 --> 01:02:40.060
on uh requirements , capability needs

01:02:40.489 --> 01:02:42.850
and development efforts , um , so that

01:02:42.850 --> 01:02:45.017
we can solve these problems together ,

01:02:45.330 --> 01:02:48.729
um . There's a lot of great technology ,

01:02:49.489 --> 01:02:51.989
and industry , and I think we're

01:02:51.989 --> 01:02:55.139
sometimes talking past each other and

01:02:55.139 --> 01:02:58.580
missing opportunities to um uncover

01:02:58.580 --> 01:03:01.659
potential solutions and it takes events

01:03:01.659 --> 01:03:05.179
like this it takes the openness of army

01:03:05.179 --> 01:03:07.979
leadership to accept , uh , you know ,

01:03:08.379 --> 01:03:11.500
conversations with industry and um and

01:03:11.500 --> 01:03:13.778
industry again to be um transparent on .

01:03:14.239 --> 01:03:17.110
Their development efforts uh that are

01:03:17.110 --> 01:03:19.239
real capabilities that can provide

01:03:19.629 --> 01:03:21.830
solutions that the army needs . The

01:03:21.830 --> 01:03:23.941
more that we talk and communicate and

01:03:23.941 --> 01:03:27.530
share information , uh , routinely uh

01:03:27.530 --> 01:03:29.808
and build trust in those relationships ,

01:03:29.808 --> 01:03:31.974
I think the better off we're all gonna

01:03:31.974 --> 01:03:35.580
be . Well I propose to take home

01:03:35.580 --> 01:03:37.747
questions that air defense is the area

01:03:37.747 --> 01:03:39.959
where quantity can sometimes beat

01:03:39.959 --> 01:03:42.300
quality . So if you want to have real

01:03:42.300 --> 01:03:44.489
advantage , you need definitely

01:03:44.489 --> 01:03:46.489
advantage in quality , but you also

01:03:46.489 --> 01:03:49.219
need to have to be able , if needed to

01:03:49.219 --> 01:03:51.330
have advantage in quantity , and this

01:03:51.330 --> 01:03:53.580
is a different technical challenge

01:03:53.580 --> 01:03:56.090
which requires different technologies

01:03:56.090 --> 01:03:58.260
and different approaches in everything

01:03:58.260 --> 01:04:01.179
from sensing to intercepting and the

01:04:01.179 --> 01:04:03.340
organization of of of of your system

01:04:03.340 --> 01:04:05.590
and . Uh , so you , you must have

01:04:05.590 --> 01:04:07.739
proper , uh , technologies in your

01:04:07.909 --> 01:04:10.060
portfolio . It has to be balanced at

01:04:10.060 --> 01:04:12.889
this flank as well . OK ,

01:04:14.110 --> 01:04:16.669
I think you got to find a way to be

01:04:16.669 --> 01:04:18.947
part of the eastern flank to turn line .

01:04:19.070 --> 01:04:21.669
That's the winning team . Find a way to

01:04:21.669 --> 01:04:24.870
get in there any way possible to be

01:04:24.870 --> 01:04:27.229
part of that growth that's really at

01:04:27.229 --> 01:04:29.590
the infant stage right now and

01:04:29.590 --> 01:04:32.679
contributing to that and creating trust

01:04:32.989 --> 01:04:36.350
with each other . Joint combined .

01:04:37.330 --> 01:04:40.080
And partners , that's how you win . The

01:04:40.080 --> 01:04:43.570
momentum is with us . Become invincible .

01:04:45.489 --> 01:04:47.545
Thank you . Uh , well , I just wanna

01:04:47.545 --> 01:04:49.489
say thank you to our panelists and

01:04:49.489 --> 01:04:51.711
thank you for our to our audience for a

01:04:51.711 --> 01:04:53.767
very engaging , uh , conversation on

01:04:53.767 --> 01:04:56.045
this , uh , critically important topic .

01:05:04.100 --> 01:05:06.820
Wow , wow , wow . Ladies and gentlemen ,

01:05:06.899 --> 01:05:09.066
this concludes the programming portion

01:05:09.066 --> 01:05:12.020
of today . We'll begin tomorrow morning

01:05:12.020 --> 01:05:15.250
at 0 8:30 with General Alexis Grinkovic ,

01:05:16.189 --> 01:05:19.020
the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and

01:05:19.020 --> 01:05:21.540
Commanding General US European Command

01:05:21.780 --> 01:05:24.002
as our morning keynote speaker . Have a

01:05:24.002 --> 01:05:25.860
good evening . Good nobbing .