WEBVTT 00:06.039 --> 00:08.380 The allied planning for the invasion of 00:08.390 --> 00:11.149 France was a protracted laborious 00:11.159 --> 00:14.220 affair since being driven from Dunkirk . 00:14.229 --> 00:17.219 In 1940 the British were determined to 00:17.229 --> 00:20.040 return to the continent but the failed 00:20.049 --> 00:23.649 raid at die in 1942 demonstrated just 00:23.659 --> 00:26.270 how costly a large scale amphibious 00:26.280 --> 00:28.649 operation across the English channel 00:28.659 --> 00:31.989 might be . Despite the losses in this 00:32.000 --> 00:34.659 raid , allied leaders moved ahead . 00:35.470 --> 00:37.192 Their plan for one of the most 00:37.192 --> 00:39.849 ambitious and complex invasions in 00:39.860 --> 00:43.340 history continued to evolve until D day . 00:52.110 --> 00:54.540 The planning of D DAY is absolutely a 00:54.549 --> 00:57.369 multi domain operation . Now you have a 00:57.380 --> 01:00.000 maritime aspect , you have the air 01:00.009 --> 01:02.231 fight and obviously you have the ground 01:02.231 --> 01:04.139 fight . Um You have information 01:04.150 --> 01:05.928 operations , you have deception 01:05.928 --> 01:08.094 operations . I mean D DAY is a classic 01:08.094 --> 01:10.180 example of multi domain operations . 01:12.919 --> 01:14.752 Prime Minister Winston Churchill 01:14.760 --> 01:17.160 famously contended that there is only 01:17.169 --> 01:19.129 one thing worse than fighting with 01:19.139 --> 01:21.580 allies and that is fighting without 01:21.589 --> 01:25.449 them . In early 1942 the US 01:25.459 --> 01:27.779 and British solidified their coalition 01:27.790 --> 01:30.330 by establishing a combined chiefs of 01:30.339 --> 01:33.569 staff . From the beginning , the Anglo 01:33.580 --> 01:35.410 American alliance had competing 01:35.419 --> 01:37.641 strategies for defeating Nazi Germany . 01:38.790 --> 01:40.809 The British urged a long term 01:40.819 --> 01:42.839 peripheral approach while their 01:42.849 --> 01:45.000 American counterparts insisted on a 01:45.010 --> 01:47.480 direct drive to the German homeland . 01:48.269 --> 01:50.260 The British and US staffs also 01:50.269 --> 01:52.436 conceptualized the role of the Supreme 01:52.436 --> 01:55.930 Allied Commander differently based on 01:55.940 --> 01:58.309 their flat joint command . The British 01:58.319 --> 02:00.319 wanted more of a committee approach 02:00.319 --> 02:02.375 that empowered the leaders under the 02:02.375 --> 02:04.830 Supreme Allied Commander . The 02:04.839 --> 02:07.610 Americans argued such a structure would 02:07.620 --> 02:10.869 hurt the unity of command even though 02:10.880 --> 02:13.047 it had not been decided who would lead 02:13.047 --> 02:14.936 the invasion . Lieutenant General 02:14.936 --> 02:17.229 Frederick Morgan , a British officer 02:17.240 --> 02:19.529 was appointed as the chief of staff to 02:19.539 --> 02:22.889 the Supreme Allied Commander known as 02:22.899 --> 02:25.190 Cossack Morgan . And his American 02:25.199 --> 02:27.449 deputy major General , Ray Barker 02:27.460 --> 02:29.699 started working on an invasion plan 02:29.759 --> 02:31.703 without knowing who would lead the 02:31.703 --> 02:35.039 operation headquartered in London . 02:35.220 --> 02:37.309 Cossack laid the foundation for what 02:37.320 --> 02:39.839 would become the Supreme Headquarters , 02:39.850 --> 02:42.169 allied Expeditionary force or 02:44.779 --> 02:47.139 a successful cross channel attack was 02:47.149 --> 02:49.371 imperative for the overall war effort . 02:49.750 --> 02:52.110 Selecting the most capable commanders 02:52.119 --> 02:55.860 was critical . Early on President 02:55.869 --> 02:57.980 Franklin D Roosevelt thought that the 02:57.980 --> 03:00.036 position should be held by a British 03:00.036 --> 03:02.091 officer because us troop levels were 03:02.091 --> 03:04.036 initially too low to spearhead the 03:04.036 --> 03:07.179 invasion as us mobilization accelerated . 03:07.440 --> 03:09.669 Roosevelt and Churchill agreed that an 03:09.679 --> 03:12.929 American should command . Roosevelt 03:12.940 --> 03:15.210 considered his chief of staff , General 03:15.220 --> 03:18.179 George C Marshall for the position but 03:18.190 --> 03:20.300 ultimately deemed his role stateside 03:20.309 --> 03:23.610 too important . In early December 03:23.619 --> 03:26.830 1943 Roosevelt designated General 03:26.839 --> 03:29.289 Dwight D Eisenhower as the Supreme 03:29.300 --> 03:31.550 commander of the allied expeditionary 03:31.559 --> 03:34.850 forces . Air Chief Marshal , Sir Arthur 03:34.860 --> 03:37.610 Tedder , a British officer would serve 03:37.619 --> 03:41.020 as his deputy as they prepared for one 03:41.029 --> 03:43.880 of the largest multi domain operations 03:43.889 --> 03:46.309 in history . Planners examined 03:46.320 --> 03:48.550 intelligence reports and sustainment 03:48.559 --> 03:50.710 options as part of their decision 03:50.720 --> 03:54.089 process . Today we call these processes , 03:54.100 --> 03:56.270 the military decision making process . 03:56.279 --> 03:59.289 MD P , the intelligence preparation of 03:59.300 --> 04:02.039 the battlefield , I PB and the 04:02.050 --> 04:03.860 sustainment preparation of the 04:03.869 --> 04:05.860 operational environment , the 04:05.869 --> 04:07.647 intelligence preparation of the 04:07.647 --> 04:09.647 battlefield , the military decision 04:09.647 --> 04:11.591 making process and the sustainment 04:11.591 --> 04:13.313 preparation of the operational 04:13.313 --> 04:15.369 environment . They're all together . 04:15.369 --> 04:17.591 You can't have one without the other MD 04:17.591 --> 04:19.480 MP . The military decision making 04:19.480 --> 04:21.758 process . That is the overarching . No , 04:21.758 --> 04:24.036 that's where everything comes together . 04:24.036 --> 04:23.959 But intelligence preparation , the 04:23.970 --> 04:26.137 battlefield with the intel folks , the 04:26.137 --> 04:27.803 sustainment preparation , the 04:27.803 --> 04:29.637 operational environment with the 04:29.637 --> 04:31.526 sustainment of log folks . I mean 04:31.526 --> 04:31.279 they're all kind of doing their things 04:31.290 --> 04:33.670 to feed into the military decision 04:33.679 --> 04:35.890 making process . Intelligence 04:35.899 --> 04:37.899 preparation on the battlefield is a 04:37.899 --> 04:39.899 systematic process of analyzing the 04:39.899 --> 04:42.200 mission variables of the enemy terrain , 04:42.209 --> 04:44.570 weather and civil considerations in an 04:44.579 --> 04:46.579 area of interest to determine their 04:46.579 --> 04:48.989 effect on operations . I PB allows 04:49.000 --> 04:51.290 commanders and staffs to make a 04:51.299 --> 04:53.359 holistic approach to analyzing the 04:53.369 --> 04:55.869 operational environment . I PB serves 04:55.880 --> 04:58.089 as the initial framework for analysis 04:58.100 --> 05:00.500 of the battlefield in all operations . 05:00.730 --> 05:03.309 There are four steps of I PB . Step one , 05:03.320 --> 05:05.376 define the operational environment . 05:05.376 --> 05:07.500 Step two describe the environmental 05:07.510 --> 05:10.010 effects on operations . Step three , 05:10.019 --> 05:12.220 evaluate the threat and step four 05:12.230 --> 05:14.286 determine threat courses of action , 05:15.190 --> 05:17.023 sustainment , preparation of the 05:17.023 --> 05:19.190 operational environment is just trying 05:19.190 --> 05:21.412 to give the commander , the information 05:21.412 --> 05:23.634 he needs to make the best decisions and 05:23.634 --> 05:25.857 that's really figuring out where things 05:25.857 --> 05:28.369 are that can be used to support and 05:28.380 --> 05:30.602 sustain the operation . There are three 05:30.602 --> 05:32.713 steps . The first step is to describe 05:32.713 --> 05:34.602 the operational environment . The 05:34.602 --> 05:36.769 second step is to look at the physical 05:36.769 --> 05:38.602 and environmental effects on the 05:38.602 --> 05:40.824 operational environment . The third and 05:40.824 --> 05:42.713 probably the most important is to 05:42.713 --> 05:44.769 evaluate the resources available . I 05:44.769 --> 05:46.936 think I PB and sustainment preparation 05:46.936 --> 05:49.158 and the operational environment go hand 05:49.158 --> 05:51.269 in hand and are complimentary to each 05:51.269 --> 05:53.213 other . As sustainment preparation 05:53.213 --> 05:55.269 focuses on six factors , geography , 05:55.269 --> 05:57.324 supplies and services , facilities , 05:57.324 --> 05:59.269 transportation , maintenance , and 05:59.269 --> 06:00.936 general skills , intelligence 06:00.936 --> 06:02.991 preparation of the battlefield nests 06:02.991 --> 06:05.213 with the sustainment preparation of the 06:05.213 --> 06:06.991 battlefield . Really , they are 06:06.991 --> 06:08.936 parallel processes . Obviously our 06:08.936 --> 06:11.102 friends and brothers and sisters there 06:11.102 --> 06:13.047 in the intelligence branch they're 06:13.047 --> 06:12.755 getting after it really looking at 06:12.765 --> 06:15.755 threat more than anything else from the 06:15.765 --> 06:17.709 sustained perspective . It is more 06:17.709 --> 06:19.725 looking at those physical assets . 06:19.864 --> 06:23.114 Klaus says that war is a contest of 06:23.125 --> 06:26.404 wills from a logisticians perspective , 06:26.454 --> 06:28.343 math and physics rule . The world 06:29.089 --> 06:30.867 intelligence preparation of the 06:30.867 --> 06:32.869 battlefield nests within the 06:32.880 --> 06:34.602 sustainment preparation of the 06:34.602 --> 06:36.769 operating environment . They both deal 06:36.769 --> 06:38.880 with information . Information is the 06:38.880 --> 06:41.047 currency and you need to accumulate as 06:41.047 --> 06:43.158 much as you can . You got to find out 06:43.158 --> 06:45.380 the answers about where you're going to 06:45.380 --> 06:47.213 operate and for the intelligence 06:47.213 --> 06:46.350 community to find out about the 06:46.359 --> 06:48.526 opposing force , the enemy . And those 06:48.526 --> 06:50.470 two elements work together to help 06:50.470 --> 06:52.692 reduce risk and help reduce the unknown 06:52.692 --> 06:54.637 and give greater capability to the 06:54.637 --> 06:58.459 mission commander . Given the 06:58.470 --> 07:01.000 magnitude of the invasion planners 07:01.010 --> 07:04.470 faced a crucible of decisions . What 07:04.480 --> 07:06.739 was the enemy's disposition ? What 07:06.750 --> 07:09.450 resources were available ? Is it even 07:09.459 --> 07:11.769 possible to move millions of allied 07:11.779 --> 07:13.899 troops with equipment across the 07:13.910 --> 07:15.799 English Channel and into occupied 07:15.809 --> 07:19.390 territory in only 90 days . But 07:19.399 --> 07:21.455 first , the allies had to define the 07:21.455 --> 07:22.899 operational environment . 07:25.709 --> 07:27.931 Defining the operational environment is 07:27.931 --> 07:30.098 all trying to figure out what the heck 07:30.098 --> 07:32.320 is there . You know where the , where , 07:32.320 --> 07:34.640 where the roads , where the ports , 07:34.649 --> 07:36.820 where are the key warehouses ? What is 07:36.829 --> 07:38.773 the road and rail network ? Look , 07:38.773 --> 07:40.940 where are the airfields ? What are the 07:40.940 --> 07:43.051 airfields capable of ? I mean , it is 07:43.051 --> 07:45.162 really looking at the the physicality 07:45.162 --> 07:47.273 of things and whether that's northern 07:47.273 --> 07:50.765 France or you know , Eastern Europe or 07:50.774 --> 07:53.515 a small island in the South China Sea , 07:53.524 --> 07:55.580 I mean , you gotta figure out what's 07:55.580 --> 07:57.725 there to use because uh the American 07:57.734 --> 07:59.290 army has always been a very 07:59.290 --> 08:01.456 expeditionary army . But at the end of 08:01.456 --> 08:03.512 the day , we want to use things that 08:03.512 --> 08:05.567 are actually in the place that we go 08:06.410 --> 08:08.980 during their evaluation of the Dutch , 08:08.989 --> 08:11.679 Belgian and French coasts . Cossack 08:11.690 --> 08:13.690 divided the operational environment 08:13.690 --> 08:16.529 into six possible landing sites . They 08:16.540 --> 08:18.762 created five criteria for assessing the 08:18.762 --> 08:21.579 operational environment . First , could 08:21.589 --> 08:23.756 air superiority be maintained over the 08:23.756 --> 08:25.980 assault area with fighters based on 08:25.989 --> 08:29.500 British fields . Second , how many 08:29.510 --> 08:31.809 divisions could be put ashore on D day ? 08:32.809 --> 08:35.380 Third , how many divisions . Could the 08:35.390 --> 08:37.450 enemy be expected to throw against a 08:37.460 --> 08:39.780 landing during its first week ashore ? 08:40.820 --> 08:43.289 Fourth , what would the requirements of 08:43.299 --> 08:45.750 that area be for naval craft and air 08:45.760 --> 08:49.609 transport ? And fifth , how many tons 08:49.619 --> 08:52.159 of supply might be transported each day 08:52.169 --> 08:54.113 across the beaches and through the 08:54.113 --> 08:57.580 nearby ports ? Based on their analysis , 08:57.590 --> 09:00.090 four of the six possible landing sites 09:00.099 --> 09:03.030 were quickly discarded . This left two 09:03.039 --> 09:06.390 options . The area around Calais , the 09:06.400 --> 09:08.567 shortest point between England and the 09:08.567 --> 09:11.130 continent or the Normandy sector north 09:11.140 --> 09:14.950 of Khan . The analysis pointed to 09:14.960 --> 09:16.859 Normandy as the better option , 09:17.179 --> 09:19.235 especially in terms of being able to 09:19.235 --> 09:22.450 limit German reinforcements . An 09:22.460 --> 09:24.760 elaborate deception operation was later 09:24.770 --> 09:27.049 initiated to convince German decision 09:27.059 --> 09:29.520 makers that Calais was the real landing 09:29.530 --> 09:33.390 point . Cossack's early plan included a 09:33.400 --> 09:36.030 three division amphibious assault on 09:36.039 --> 09:38.710 Normandy comprised of two British 09:38.719 --> 09:42.570 divisions and one American . This was 09:42.580 --> 09:44.747 to be followed by two more divisions , 09:44.909 --> 09:48.109 one British , one American , an 09:48.119 --> 09:50.175 airborne operation would support the 09:50.175 --> 09:53.940 amphibious landings in total . The plan 09:53.950 --> 09:56.710 called for 26 to 30 divisions to 09:56.719 --> 09:59.940 establish the lodge in need of a deep 09:59.950 --> 10:01.989 water port . Shear board was to be 10:02.000 --> 10:04.679 captured no later than D plus 14 . 10:05.869 --> 10:08.559 Once operational Schaff would review 10:08.570 --> 10:12.299 and expand Cossack's plan . This 10:12.309 --> 10:15.119 plan was based on limited resources 10:15.130 --> 10:17.340 stemming from competing operations . 10:18.390 --> 10:21.159 These deficiencies became a significant 10:21.169 --> 10:24.200 problem when Eisenhower , Field Marshal , 10:24.210 --> 10:26.849 Bernard Montgomery and others at Schafe 10:26.859 --> 10:29.559 wanted to expand the landing areas to 10:29.570 --> 10:32.460 create a wider front . The original 10:32.469 --> 10:34.719 landing sites were deemed too narrow 10:34.979 --> 10:37.789 and were enlarged from 40 to 65 10:37.799 --> 10:40.650 kilometers . Schaff also wanted to add 10:40.659 --> 10:43.010 two more divisions to the initial 10:43.020 --> 10:45.909 assault . The biggest limitation to 10:45.919 --> 10:48.950 adding more divisions was a shortage of 10:48.960 --> 10:52.390 landing craft . Churchill barked the 10:52.400 --> 10:55.570 destinies of two great empires seemed 10:55.580 --> 10:58.619 to be tied up in some things called 10:58.630 --> 11:02.169 LSTs . Probably the 11:02.179 --> 11:04.235 biggest data factor that was driving 11:04.235 --> 11:06.289 planning for operation overlord 11:06.299 --> 11:07.855 operation . Neptune was the 11:07.855 --> 11:10.039 availability of landing craft . There 11:10.049 --> 11:12.489 were not enough . The actual date of 11:12.500 --> 11:15.219 the operation was driven by when we 11:15.229 --> 11:17.062 could get a sufficient number of 11:17.062 --> 11:19.229 landing craft to England ready for the 11:19.229 --> 11:22.960 invasion . Soon expanded the amphibious 11:22.969 --> 11:26.179 landings from 3 to 5 divisions and 11:26.190 --> 11:28.190 increased the scale of the airborne 11:28.190 --> 11:30.830 mission to nearly three divisions . The 11:30.840 --> 11:33.010 operation would begin with airborne 11:33.020 --> 11:34.780 units assaulting into the Coin 11:35.280 --> 11:37.950 Peninsula and near the town of Khan . 11:39.210 --> 11:41.650 Amphibious forces from the first US 11:41.659 --> 11:43.809 army and second British army would 11:43.820 --> 11:46.609 follow landing between the Orne River 11:46.619 --> 11:50.369 and the Carton estuary . Once she 11:50.679 --> 11:53.349 was captured , the operation would then 11:53.359 --> 11:56.140 expand its boundaries with limits of 11:56.150 --> 11:58.950 advance to the Lua River in the south 11:59.119 --> 12:02.000 and to the Seine in the East . During 12:02.010 --> 12:03.899 step two of the IPB process , the 12:03.899 --> 12:05.732 intelligence staff describes how 12:05.732 --> 12:07.677 significant characteristics affect 12:07.677 --> 12:09.843 friendly operations . The intelligence 12:09.843 --> 12:11.788 staff also describes how terrain , 12:11.788 --> 12:13.849 weather , civil considerations and 12:13.859 --> 12:16.039 friendly forces affect threat forces . 12:17.070 --> 12:18.792 In step two of the sustainment 12:18.792 --> 12:20.514 preparation of the operational 12:20.514 --> 12:22.514 environment . The assessment is the 12:22.514 --> 12:24.681 geographical uh characteristics of the 12:24.681 --> 12:27.270 chosen region . Uh Rivers , lakes , 12:27.280 --> 12:31.179 roads , uh weather primarily um how 12:31.190 --> 12:33.412 that's gonna affect possible operations 12:33.412 --> 12:35.634 and how it can limit your operations or 12:35.634 --> 12:37.801 even advance and serve as an advantage 12:37.801 --> 12:40.023 that has to be taken into consideration 12:40.023 --> 12:39.700 because if it is not , it could be very 12:39.710 --> 12:43.530 detrimental to any operation . So , 12:43.539 --> 12:45.650 describing the fiscal , environmental 12:45.650 --> 12:47.650 impacts on operations , I mean , we 12:47.650 --> 12:49.650 obviously we live in the world . So 12:49.650 --> 12:51.706 what's the weather like ? You know , 12:51.706 --> 12:53.817 what is the terrain like ? You know , 12:53.817 --> 12:56.039 what , what time of the year is it even 12:56.039 --> 12:58.150 back to ancient times in the fighting 12:58.150 --> 13:00.372 season ? So the fighting season is from 13:00.372 --> 13:02.483 the spring to the fall because in the 13:02.483 --> 13:04.650 early spring , the roads are too muddy 13:04.650 --> 13:06.872 to move anything . I mean , same time , 13:06.872 --> 13:06.609 what is the , how is weather gonna 13:06.619 --> 13:08.619 impact operations in planning for 13:08.630 --> 13:10.950 operation overlord operation ? Neptune . 13:11.210 --> 13:13.090 The allies absolutely really 13:13.099 --> 13:15.250 concentrated on those physical and 13:15.260 --> 13:17.630 environmental impacts . It comes down 13:17.640 --> 13:19.807 to really choosing where they would go 13:19.807 --> 13:21.640 ashore . I mean , looking at the 13:21.640 --> 13:23.619 beaches are the beaches capable of 13:23.630 --> 13:25.686 supporting , you know , large forces 13:25.686 --> 13:27.686 coming ashore . And then the allies 13:27.686 --> 13:29.463 actually use some of the uh the 13:29.463 --> 13:31.686 earliest combat swimmers to go and take 13:31.686 --> 13:33.908 soil samples to figure out where is the 13:33.908 --> 13:36.739 best beach to come ashore ? One man , 13:36.750 --> 13:39.028 submarines , torpedo boats , commandos , 13:39.028 --> 13:41.028 we used them all to bring back cups 13:41.028 --> 13:42.917 full of sand from the beaches for 13:42.917 --> 13:44.972 analysis . It had to be quick drying 13:44.972 --> 13:47.194 with a solid clay foundation . It would 13:47.194 --> 13:48.972 have to support 30 ton tanks in 13:48.972 --> 13:51.083 planning for operation overlord . The 13:51.083 --> 13:53.194 planners used step two to analyze the 13:53.194 --> 13:55.417 geography of the environmental concerns 13:55.417 --> 13:57.630 of operation overlord . Now , one of 13:57.640 --> 13:59.862 the biggest concerns was the Germans of 13:59.862 --> 14:01.918 course , but the other major concern 14:01.918 --> 14:04.084 was the weather . What was the weather 14:04.084 --> 14:05.862 facility going to be like now , 14:05.862 --> 14:07.918 noticeably the weather once you land 14:07.918 --> 14:07.780 but also the English Channel itself 14:07.789 --> 14:09.929 notoriously dangerous and notoriously 14:09.940 --> 14:12.500 difficult to operate . The weather has 14:12.510 --> 14:14.299 an ever changing impact on an 14:14.309 --> 14:16.580 operational environment . Allied 14:16.590 --> 14:18.929 planners wanted to invade in early 14:18.940 --> 14:21.169 spring to ensure there was plenty of 14:21.179 --> 14:23.123 good weather for forces to advance 14:23.123 --> 14:25.440 toward Germany before winter , obscured 14:25.450 --> 14:27.890 targets , slowed transportation and 14:27.900 --> 14:31.000 logistics and forced soldiers to endure . 14:31.010 --> 14:34.979 The harshest elements may was deemed 14:34.989 --> 14:37.210 the earliest month . The allies should 14:37.219 --> 14:40.299 attempt an invasion narrowing the 14:40.309 --> 14:43.849 timeline , only six days each month met 14:43.859 --> 14:45.915 optimal conditions for the planner's 14:45.915 --> 14:48.489 criteria regarding tides and sunrise . 14:50.020 --> 14:51.853 Cossack's early planning had not 14:51.853 --> 14:54.076 determined if the invasion should occur 14:54.076 --> 14:57.510 at night or during the day . The allied 14:57.520 --> 14:59.464 landings in the Mediterranean were 14:59.464 --> 15:01.520 executed under the cover of darkness 15:01.840 --> 15:04.309 for Normandy . It was decided that the 15:04.320 --> 15:06.539 airborne units would deploy at night 15:06.799 --> 15:10.510 preferably on a moon at night . Against 15:10.520 --> 15:13.030 the Navy's recommendation . Schiff also 15:13.039 --> 15:15.150 decided the amphibious invasion would 15:15.150 --> 15:17.599 occur during daylight hours so the 15:17.609 --> 15:19.387 joint fire support could better 15:19.387 --> 15:21.750 identify targets . Planners deemed 15:21.760 --> 15:23.969 firepower more important than 15:23.979 --> 15:27.630 concealment each hour needed to 15:27.640 --> 15:30.260 occur no sooner than 30 minutes after 15:30.270 --> 15:32.900 daylight and no later than an hour and 15:32.909 --> 15:36.539 a half from daybreak . Of course , this 15:36.549 --> 15:39.000 meant the German defenders would also 15:39.010 --> 15:42.159 have good visibility . The allies 15:42.169 --> 15:45.950 selected 06 30 as each hour for the US 15:45.960 --> 15:49.469 beaches , Shakespeare wrote 15:49.679 --> 15:52.590 there is a tide in the affairs of men 15:52.840 --> 15:56.219 which taken at the flood leads on to 15:56.229 --> 15:59.929 fortune for the allies . 15:59.940 --> 16:02.250 This was literally true of the Normandy 16:02.260 --> 16:04.989 beaches . The difference between high 16:05.000 --> 16:08.409 tide and low tide was nearly 6 m 16:09.619 --> 16:11.880 for counter mobility . German defenders 16:11.890 --> 16:14.179 had been placing anti personnel and 16:14.190 --> 16:17.039 anti craft obstacles in both high and 16:17.049 --> 16:20.070 low tide areas . Allied planners had to 16:20.080 --> 16:23.429 make a choice involving risk . Landing 16:23.440 --> 16:25.679 at high tide was treacherous since the 16:25.690 --> 16:28.270 landing craft could not identify any of 16:28.280 --> 16:31.590 the underwater obstacles . Landing at 16:31.599 --> 16:34.039 low tide meant the allies could see the 16:34.049 --> 16:36.390 exposed German obstacles near the sea 16:36.400 --> 16:39.489 wall . But it also meant soldiers would 16:39.500 --> 16:43.200 have to cover an extra 350 m of 16:43.210 --> 16:47.070 exposed beach . That was a long way for 16:47.080 --> 16:50.059 water soaked Gs in full combat gear , 16:51.630 --> 16:53.909 decided to land after low tide . So 16:53.919 --> 16:55.919 landing craft could navigate German 16:55.919 --> 16:57.975 obstacles and avoid getting stuck on 16:57.975 --> 17:00.940 the beach . Engineers were to clear the 17:00.950 --> 17:02.700 obstacles and once that was 17:02.710 --> 17:04.739 accomplished later , assault waves 17:04.750 --> 17:06.959 could ride the rising tide up to the 17:06.969 --> 17:09.979 sea wall . In late January 17:09.989 --> 17:13.609 1944 Eisenhower proposed May 1st as D 17:13.619 --> 17:16.469 day , but he was willing to delay if it 17:16.479 --> 17:18.701 meant more resources would be available 17:18.701 --> 17:22.390 for the landings . This included the 17:22.400 --> 17:25.250 much needed landing craft . The 17:25.260 --> 17:27.410 decision was soon made to push the 17:27.420 --> 17:31.069 operation back a month by postponing 17:31.079 --> 17:34.439 from May to June . Eisenhower chose an 17:34.449 --> 17:36.969 increase in resources over an 17:36.979 --> 17:39.312 additional month of campaigning weather . 17:39.939 --> 17:41.995 The first dates in June that met the 17:41.995 --> 17:44.300 allied landing criteria were the 5th , 17:44.310 --> 17:48.300 6th or seventh . Any deviation 17:48.310 --> 17:50.310 from these days would necessitate 17:50.319 --> 17:52.930 waiting two additional weeks or 17:52.939 --> 17:55.106 electing to go against the established 17:55.106 --> 17:58.449 invasion requirements . Delays 17:58.459 --> 18:00.489 increased the risk that German High 18:00.500 --> 18:02.800 Command might learn that the invasion 18:02.810 --> 18:05.839 was imminent . Eisenhower selected 18:05.849 --> 18:09.560 Monday June 5th for D day . The 18:09.569 --> 18:12.020 unpredictability of the English channel 18:12.030 --> 18:14.800 threatened the operation as unexpected 18:14.810 --> 18:17.410 storms could wreak havoc on air and 18:17.420 --> 18:20.199 naval operations . As the invasion 18:20.209 --> 18:22.439 neared , the Supreme Allied Commander 18:22.449 --> 18:24.560 and members of his staff were meeting 18:24.560 --> 18:26.782 with the Meteorologic Committee twice a 18:26.782 --> 18:30.599 day at 21 30 again at 0 400 18:31.439 --> 18:33.369 due to severe wind and rain . 18:33.640 --> 18:36.880 Eisenhower moved D day from the 5 to 6 18:36.939 --> 18:40.910 of June even before the outbreak of 18:40.920 --> 18:43.040 war . British intelligence maintained 18:43.050 --> 18:45.280 archives on European sub soils , 18:45.290 --> 18:48.530 bridges , moorings , wage and rivers . 18:50.329 --> 18:53.729 Starting in March 1944 the terrain and 18:53.739 --> 18:55.630 defense section under the G two 18:55.640 --> 18:57.529 intelligence section of the first 18:57.529 --> 18:59.729 United States army group examined the 18:59.739 --> 19:02.420 Normandy coast . Their primary mission 19:02.430 --> 19:04.640 was to inform commanders on enemy 19:04.650 --> 19:08.050 controlled terrain , defenses and 19:08.060 --> 19:11.050 capabilities . In addition to terrain , 19:11.140 --> 19:13.459 the allies had to monitor an ever 19:13.469 --> 19:15.300 changing landscape of defensive 19:15.310 --> 19:18.349 fortifications known as the Atlantic 19:18.359 --> 19:20.609 Wall . German forces were in the 19:20.619 --> 19:23.109 process of building 12,000 19:23.119 --> 19:25.609 fortifications , constructing half a 19:25.619 --> 19:28.380 million shore obstacles and laying more 19:28.390 --> 19:31.939 than 6 million mines . Coastal 19:31.949 --> 19:34.079 artillery batteries were especially 19:34.089 --> 19:36.699 concerning due to their extended range 19:36.709 --> 19:39.270 into the channel . There's a lot that 19:39.280 --> 19:40.891 we can learn today about the 19:40.891 --> 19:42.836 sustainment planning for operation 19:42.836 --> 19:44.724 overlord . But one of the biggest 19:44.724 --> 19:46.502 elements is how the planning is 19:46.502 --> 19:48.558 conducted . One of the weaknesses of 19:48.558 --> 19:48.359 the overlord was that a lot of this 19:48.369 --> 19:50.425 operational planning was done at the 19:50.425 --> 19:52.540 same time . So gathering statistics , 19:52.550 --> 19:54.439 one team was still gathering that 19:54.439 --> 19:56.550 element and the other team was trying 19:56.550 --> 19:58.717 to utilize it . So sometimes they were 19:58.717 --> 19:58.180 operating without the full amount of 19:58.189 --> 20:01.150 information . The Anglo American 20:01.160 --> 20:03.859 Theater Intelligence Service or is 20:03.989 --> 20:06.500 process information on enemy defenses . 20:07.140 --> 20:10.689 They use agents , escapees , evacuees 20:10.699 --> 20:12.969 prisoners , signals , air 20:12.979 --> 20:15.500 reconnaissance and air photos to gather 20:15.510 --> 20:17.343 information on order of battle , 20:17.343 --> 20:19.189 technical target and defense 20:19.199 --> 20:22.020 intelligence . Starting on 1 April . 20:22.089 --> 20:24.660 The allies flew 4500 reconnaissance 20:24.670 --> 20:26.892 missions to photograph the situation on 20:26.892 --> 20:30.650 the ground , created defense overlays 20:30.660 --> 20:33.000 of the Atlantic Wall in scales of 1 to 20:33.010 --> 20:36.680 10,000 , 1 to 25,001 to 20:36.689 --> 20:39.540 50,000 . While the terrain and defense 20:39.550 --> 20:42.150 section maintained a defense situation 20:42.160 --> 20:45.859 map at 1 to 100,000 in the G two 20:45.869 --> 20:48.810 war room . This sizable map showed 20:48.819 --> 20:51.270 probable enemy battery locations , the 20:51.280 --> 20:54.000 number of guns , the arc of fire as 20:54.010 --> 20:56.300 well as their range caliber and 20:56.310 --> 20:58.959 orientation . Additionally , the map 20:58.969 --> 21:01.439 showed underwater obstacles , beach 21:01.449 --> 21:04.239 obstacles , generalized field works , 21:04.250 --> 21:07.339 inundation , air landing obstructions , 21:07.349 --> 21:09.939 secret weapon sites and the general 21:09.949 --> 21:12.699 density of strong points . This 21:12.709 --> 21:15.430 intelligence was invaluable in creating 21:15.439 --> 21:19.130 the landing plan . An allied 21:19.140 --> 21:21.362 report from after the war described the 21:21.362 --> 21:23.640 German effort along the Normandy coast , 21:24.810 --> 21:26.609 beaches were mined , underwater 21:26.619 --> 21:29.000 obstacles were installed and mined gun 21:29.010 --> 21:31.560 positions were case mated pill boxes , 21:31.569 --> 21:34.069 mine fields , tank traps and air 21:34.079 --> 21:35.801 landing obstacles were rapidly 21:35.801 --> 21:38.810 multiplied . Enemy firepower covering 21:38.819 --> 21:40.875 the approaches was steadily mounting 21:41.199 --> 21:43.180 until d day . However , nearly the 21:43.189 --> 21:44.745 whole enemy effort had been 21:44.745 --> 21:46.856 concentrated on the immediate coastal 21:46.856 --> 21:50.290 crust . There is no serious threat of 21:50.300 --> 21:53.660 defense in depth while the allies 21:53.670 --> 21:55.837 invested heavily in learning about the 21:55.837 --> 21:58.189 shoreline . Planners neglected the 21:58.199 --> 22:00.366 terrain that led out of the bridgehead 22:01.040 --> 22:03.739 known as the BAA . This part of the 22:03.750 --> 22:05.880 Normandy countryside was divided by 22:05.890 --> 22:07.839 rock walls and hedge rows that 22:07.849 --> 22:09.738 obstructed visibility in hampered 22:09.738 --> 22:12.770 maneuver . The Baka favored a defending 22:12.780 --> 22:16.280 force and offered few major roadways 22:16.709 --> 22:19.170 under time restraints for a massive 22:19.180 --> 22:22.040 operation . Allied planning was more 22:22.050 --> 22:24.619 concerned with the landing and build up 22:24.630 --> 22:28.030 than the subsequent breakout in the 22:28.040 --> 22:30.170 combined chiefs of staff directive to 22:30.180 --> 22:32.459 the Supreme Allied Commander , General 22:32.469 --> 22:34.413 Eisenhower was ordered to liberate 22:34.413 --> 22:36.420 allied territories and re establish 22:36.430 --> 22:38.540 civil governments . The exiled 22:38.550 --> 22:40.579 governments of the Netherlands , 22:40.589 --> 22:43.739 Belgium and Norway agreed to give the 22:43.750 --> 22:45.939 Supreme Commander sovereignty over 22:45.949 --> 22:48.449 their occupied territories until he 22:48.459 --> 22:51.020 deemed the situation ready for a return 22:51.030 --> 22:54.410 to civilian control . This contrasted 22:54.420 --> 22:56.531 the complex situation with the French 22:56.531 --> 22:58.630 who had multiple leaders claiming 22:58.640 --> 23:01.550 authority , for example , French 23:01.560 --> 23:04.069 General Charles de Gaulle refused to 23:04.079 --> 23:06.469 assist allied planners unless he 23:06.479 --> 23:08.380 received public assurances of a 23:08.390 --> 23:10.810 position after the war concluded 23:12.030 --> 23:14.160 divides within the French leadership 23:14.170 --> 23:16.280 trickled down to the tactical level 23:16.290 --> 23:18.346 where fractured resistance groups on 23:18.346 --> 23:20.719 the ground only recognized certain 23:20.729 --> 23:23.599 commanders . This made organized 23:23.609 --> 23:26.560 resistance efforts far more difficult . 23:28.130 --> 23:31.260 Air power proponents had long advocated 23:31.270 --> 23:33.780 that the war could be won from above . 23:34.300 --> 23:36.189 Some planners wanted to shape the 23:36.189 --> 23:38.133 battlefield before the invasion by 23:38.133 --> 23:40.199 targeting roads , bridges and rail 23:40.209 --> 23:43.630 lines , even if cities were avoided , 23:43.920 --> 23:46.010 one report estimated the bombing 23:46.020 --> 23:48.979 campaign preceding D day might surpass 23:48.989 --> 23:52.439 80,000 civilian deaths . Discounting 23:52.449 --> 23:55.280 the veracity of the report , Shaf moved 23:55.290 --> 23:57.599 forward with air operations but 23:57.609 --> 24:00.000 attempted to warn locals with radio 24:00.010 --> 24:03.390 communique and leaflet drops . The head 24:03.400 --> 24:05.567 of French forces in the United Kingdom 24:05.567 --> 24:07.790 was also consulted before bombing 24:07.800 --> 24:09.859 missions where civilian deaths might 24:09.869 --> 24:12.839 occur . The allies became less 24:12.849 --> 24:14.905 concerned with the potential for non 24:14.905 --> 24:17.127 combatant deaths . After learning , the 24:17.127 --> 24:19.349 Germans had been removing non essential 24:19.349 --> 24:21.250 civilians in anticipation of an 24:21.260 --> 24:24.719 invasion . Planners had to 24:24.729 --> 24:27.939 determine where to fire and where not 24:27.949 --> 24:31.780 to fire . In step three , 24:32.060 --> 24:34.116 you have a couple of categories when 24:34.116 --> 24:35.949 you're looking at for evaluating 24:35.949 --> 24:38.060 resources available . Number one is , 24:38.060 --> 24:40.430 show me the money , it is about funding . 24:40.439 --> 24:42.495 You know , because at the end of the 24:42.495 --> 24:44.606 day , you know , resources are finite 24:44.606 --> 24:46.661 and anything that we can't find over 24:46.661 --> 24:48.828 there , we're gonna have to bring from 24:48.828 --> 24:50.550 here . But the other resources 24:50.550 --> 24:52.606 available really is what is the host 24:52.606 --> 24:54.661 nation willing to provide the United 24:54.661 --> 24:57.050 Kingdom's geographic location , enabled 24:57.060 --> 24:59.369 the allies to threaten continental 24:59.380 --> 25:02.199 Europe . But before this could happen , 25:02.209 --> 25:04.949 a massive build up of forces and 25:04.959 --> 25:08.079 material had to occur . Allied 25:08.089 --> 25:09.890 commanders were continuously 25:09.900 --> 25:12.410 reallocating resources to meet demands 25:12.420 --> 25:14.819 in North Africa and the Mediterranean . 25:15.020 --> 25:17.630 But priorities shifted when planners 25:17.640 --> 25:20.900 eventually called for 1.4 million 25:20.910 --> 25:24.119 troops to be available in the UK . By 1 25:24.130 --> 25:27.380 May 1944 a 25:27.390 --> 25:29.650 significant troop build up arrived in 25:29.660 --> 25:33.479 late 1943 exploding in the months 25:33.489 --> 25:35.489 leading up to the spring invasion , 25:36.119 --> 25:38.589 many embarked through Hampton roads , 25:38.599 --> 25:42.310 Boston and New York . By 31 May 25:42.550 --> 25:45.560 1.5 million troops had arrived with the 25:45.569 --> 25:48.319 majority being ground forces , air 25:48.329 --> 25:51.869 forces and services of supply . By the 25:51.880 --> 25:54.213 time the army is ready for the invasion , 25:54.213 --> 25:56.439 there are 1.5 million American troops 25:56.449 --> 25:59.189 in southern England . Over 400,000 of 25:59.199 --> 26:00.449 them are logistics . 26:02.739 --> 26:05.119 Logistics are more than just possessing 26:05.130 --> 26:08.199 resources . It is also about being able 26:08.209 --> 26:10.431 to put them at the right place . At the 26:10.431 --> 26:13.550 right time . The sheer size of 26:13.560 --> 26:16.579 operation overlord caused an array of 26:16.589 --> 26:19.209 sustainment issues . Items not 26:19.219 --> 26:21.439 available in the United Kingdom needed 26:21.449 --> 26:23.979 to be imported in the months . Leading 26:23.989 --> 26:26.709 to the invasion , over a million tons 26:26.719 --> 26:28.663 of cargo were flowing into British 26:28.663 --> 26:31.910 ports each month . When we talk about 26:31.920 --> 26:33.920 tonnage , basically , we're talking 26:33.920 --> 26:36.087 about the amount of stuff that's being 26:36.087 --> 26:38.031 offloaded . Now basically a ton is 26:38.031 --> 26:40.760 £2000 but also that also implies 26:40.770 --> 26:43.500 £2000 of class one food is a different 26:43.510 --> 26:45.400 amount than £2000 of class five 26:45.410 --> 26:47.577 ammunition . And these are the numbers 26:47.577 --> 26:49.410 that have to be planned and come 26:49.410 --> 26:51.466 together when you're offloading that 26:51.466 --> 26:53.577 tonnage to those facilities . Once in 26:53.577 --> 26:55.410 theater , the massive amounts of 26:55.410 --> 26:57.930 supplies needed to be housed near their 26:57.939 --> 27:00.719 departure port . A challenge compounded 27:00.729 --> 27:03.319 by a lack of warehouses and space . 27:04.010 --> 27:06.900 Planners had to adopt new doctrine once 27:06.910 --> 27:09.400 it was realized that transporting units 27:09.410 --> 27:11.400 with their full combat loads was 27:11.410 --> 27:13.800 impossible due to shipping constraints . 27:15.300 --> 27:17.133 Allied training for the Normandy 27:17.133 --> 27:19.469 landings took place even as the plan 27:19.479 --> 27:22.020 was being refined and units were still 27:22.030 --> 27:24.560 arriving in theater . This training 27:24.569 --> 27:27.089 assisted in developing and refining the 27:27.099 --> 27:29.839 tactics , techniques and procedures 27:29.849 --> 27:31.293 that were used on D day . 27:33.300 --> 27:35.619 However , not all of the training went 27:35.630 --> 27:39.619 well . In late April 1944 the allies 27:39.630 --> 27:42.510 initiated operation Tiger . A large 27:42.520 --> 27:44.630 scale rehearsal at Slap in Sands 27:44.640 --> 27:46.949 England that simulated the upcoming 27:46.959 --> 27:49.959 amphibious landings . What started as a 27:49.969 --> 27:53.060 live fire exercise turned into a 27:53.069 --> 27:55.810 disaster when remnants of the German 27:55.819 --> 27:58.959 Navy breached the perimeter sinking two 27:58.969 --> 28:02.910 LSTs and killing 700 . The 28:02.920 --> 28:05.719 tragedy was a stark reminder of the 28:05.729 --> 28:08.099 danger posed by a cross channel 28:08.109 --> 28:08.810 invasion 28:12.719 --> 28:15.930 before D day . Soldiers supplies and 28:15.939 --> 28:18.670 vehicles had to travel from all over 28:18.680 --> 28:20.680 the United Kingdom to concentration 28:20.680 --> 28:24.050 areas then onto marshaling areas 28:24.060 --> 28:27.180 located near embarkation areas before 28:27.189 --> 28:30.819 being loaded on ships . The 28:30.829 --> 28:33.449 selection of a spring invasion meant 28:33.459 --> 28:35.626 the troops could be outfitted with the 28:35.626 --> 28:37.626 bare minimum . A lesson learned the 28:37.626 --> 28:40.040 hard way in the Mediterranean , some 28:40.050 --> 28:42.680 units in the UK ignored this only to be 28:42.689 --> 28:44.979 relieved of their excess gear . Once 28:44.989 --> 28:48.000 they reached the staging areas , this 28:48.010 --> 28:50.729 extra step bogged down an already 28:50.739 --> 28:54.079 tedious process . Each us soldier had 28:54.089 --> 28:56.910 to be fed the approved 3300 calories 28:56.920 --> 28:59.560 per day . A number that increased when 28:59.569 --> 29:01.949 they entered combat . This required 29:01.959 --> 29:05.910 training 4500 new cooks on the 29:05.920 --> 29:08.199 eve of the invasion , soldiers were 29:08.209 --> 29:10.709 treated to an upscale meal of steak , 29:10.719 --> 29:13.800 chicken and roast beef , which 29:13.810 --> 29:16.869 unfortunately made many of them ill 29:16.880 --> 29:19.579 while they were still on land , meals 29:19.589 --> 29:22.420 were soon changed to a sea passage menu 29:22.430 --> 29:25.109 of bland foods less likely to make the 29:25.119 --> 29:27.063 soldiers sick during the turbulent 29:27.063 --> 29:28.979 crossing of the English channel . 29:30.589 --> 29:32.700 Data analytics is probably one of the 29:32.700 --> 29:34.729 most important elements of today's 29:34.739 --> 29:36.739 sustainment , professional military 29:36.739 --> 29:38.517 education , every logistician , 29:38.517 --> 29:40.628 especially at the higher echelons and 29:40.628 --> 29:42.790 especially at the theater needs it . 29:42.800 --> 29:44.967 You can't do your job without it . One 29:44.967 --> 29:46.689 of the biggest challenges with 29:46.689 --> 29:48.856 sustainment preparation is that you're 29:48.856 --> 29:51.078 never going to have all the information 29:51.078 --> 29:52.800 you absolutely need . It's the 29:52.800 --> 29:54.633 accumulation of statistics and a 29:54.633 --> 29:56.522 tonnage . And you look at back on 29:56.522 --> 29:58.578 historical data for this as best you 29:58.578 --> 29:58.500 can for instance . But is it ever going 29:58.510 --> 30:00.288 to give you the whole picture ? 30:00.739 --> 30:02.739 Unfortunately not , you can go with 30:02.739 --> 30:05.790 your best judgment . Lacking data , 30:05.800 --> 30:08.439 evaluating allied resources became a 30:08.449 --> 30:12.290 monumental task by 1944 the allies 30:12.300 --> 30:14.078 had experience with large scale 30:14.078 --> 30:16.900 operations but data for an operation , 30:16.910 --> 30:19.719 the size of overlord did not exist . 30:20.099 --> 30:22.569 For example , our planners supposed to 30:22.579 --> 30:24.890 estimate pol requirements when the 30:24.900 --> 30:26.959 number of vehicles being used in the 30:26.969 --> 30:30.560 operation constantly fluctuated . Like 30:30.569 --> 30:33.030 so many of the supply classes . Pol 30:33.040 --> 30:35.699 demands would rise as units advanced 30:35.709 --> 30:38.689 inland quartermaster units needed to 30:38.699 --> 30:41.660 know how much pol was required , where 30:41.670 --> 30:43.892 it was going and how it was going to be 30:43.892 --> 30:46.226 transported . The statement preparation , 30:46.226 --> 30:48.337 the operational environment tells you 30:48.337 --> 30:50.559 how much gas you got in the tank boss , 30:50.559 --> 30:52.670 you can go this far if you don't know 30:52.670 --> 30:54.892 how far you can go . You're never going 30:54.892 --> 30:57.579 to get to where you're going . American 30:57.589 --> 30:59.422 planners had estimated the cross 30:59.422 --> 31:01.569 channel attack would need 6 million 31:01.579 --> 31:04.689 jerry cans . A number that later rose 31:04.699 --> 31:08.119 to 11.5 million . Their British 31:08.130 --> 31:10.352 counterparts believed the number needed 31:10.352 --> 31:12.660 to be closer to 20 million . These 31:12.670 --> 31:14.819 types of logistical questions did not 31:14.829 --> 31:17.739 stop the allies from a massive build up 31:18.099 --> 31:20.579 by D day . The allies had transported 31:20.589 --> 31:24.150 14 million tons of cargo from the 31:24.160 --> 31:27.329 United States to the British Isles . In 31:27.339 --> 31:29.561 step three , the key point is to assess 31:29.561 --> 31:31.506 what facilities are present in the 31:31.506 --> 31:33.617 operational environment . You look at 31:33.617 --> 31:35.506 the the rail network and the road 31:35.506 --> 31:37.561 network and and and a possible river 31:37.561 --> 31:40.160 and channel network or the um and how 31:40.170 --> 31:42.170 those facilities may be used or the 31:42.170 --> 31:44.392 port facilities and you start assessing 31:44.392 --> 31:46.614 things and how much tonnage can it take 31:46.949 --> 31:49.060 while the United Kingdom had multiple 31:49.060 --> 31:51.410 deep water harbors . Planners needed to 31:51.420 --> 31:53.364 figure out how to get thousands of 31:53.364 --> 31:55.640 ships ready . At relatively the same 31:55.650 --> 31:58.520 time , this was accomplished by pre 31:58.530 --> 32:00.586 loading as many supplies as possible 32:00.589 --> 32:02.780 starting one month before d day . A 32:03.319 --> 32:05.239 bigger challenge was the port 32:05.250 --> 32:07.839 infrastructure in France , German High 32:07.849 --> 32:10.290 Command organized their defense based 32:10.300 --> 32:12.189 on the presumption that an allied 32:12.189 --> 32:14.810 invasion would try to seize a major 32:14.819 --> 32:17.699 port early on in the Normandy region . 32:17.709 --> 32:21.510 This meant Seror or the allied 32:21.520 --> 32:23.979 assessment of LA Hav found its defenses 32:23.989 --> 32:26.849 quite formidable and its location east 32:26.859 --> 32:29.489 of the same river as easily reinforce 32:30.439 --> 32:31.780 that left Cher 32:34.630 --> 32:37.099 looking to avoid the heavily defended 32:37.109 --> 32:39.079 harbors in the early phases of the 32:39.089 --> 32:42.319 invasion . The allies decided instead 32:42.569 --> 32:45.670 to bring one with them . The idea of an 32:45.680 --> 32:47.920 artificial harbor had initially been 32:47.930 --> 32:50.729 met with laughter but Cossack and later 32:50.739 --> 32:54.349 Shaf adopted the idea known as Mulberry . 32:54.800 --> 32:57.900 Two massive artificial harbors were to 32:57.910 --> 32:59.688 be pulled across the channel by 32:59.688 --> 33:02.920 tugboats in pieces and then reassembled 33:02.930 --> 33:06.160 offshore at Omaha and Gold beaches . 33:07.050 --> 33:09.000 The plan additionally called for 33:09.010 --> 33:11.660 gooseberries , the intentional sinking 33:11.670 --> 33:14.270 of old commercial and military ships to 33:14.280 --> 33:17.369 create breakwaters . Sustainer planned 33:17.380 --> 33:19.819 to use these artificial harbors until 33:19.829 --> 33:22.060 they could capture Sherard and open the 33:22.069 --> 33:24.020 port within weeks after landing 33:28.439 --> 33:31.010 to create the artificial harbor , we 33:31.020 --> 33:33.459 began by sinking the Phoenixes along a 33:33.469 --> 33:35.691 rough semi circle swinging outward from 33:35.699 --> 33:38.489 Omaha Beach beyond the Phoenixes . The 33:38.500 --> 33:40.839 bomber dons were moored to reduce wave 33:40.849 --> 33:43.030 action at the entrances to the harbor 33:45.079 --> 33:47.969 inside the harbor . The 3000 ft bridges 33:47.979 --> 33:49.989 were assembled running out to the 33:50.000 --> 33:53.739 floating lob in its piers . The 2100 ft 33:53.750 --> 33:56.380 sunken causeways afforded dry firm 33:56.390 --> 33:58.900 surfaces for landing at any tidal stage . 34:01.130 --> 34:03.297 The sea wall was completed by the line 34:03.297 --> 34:04.297 of sunken ships . 34:10.100 --> 34:12.729 The lateral tide range was 2000 ft . 34:13.479 --> 34:16.209 This meant that at low tide , 2000 ft 34:16.219 --> 34:18.750 of the bridges were resting on sand and 34:18.760 --> 34:21.370 2000 ft of the causeways were exposed . 34:22.709 --> 34:25.520 Note the water depths , the vertical 34:25.530 --> 34:29.520 tidal range was 18.5 ft . The Phoenixes 34:29.530 --> 34:31.879 were sunk in water that was 32.5 ft 34:31.889 --> 34:35.229 deep at low tide and 51 ft deep at high 34:35.239 --> 34:37.959 tide . Their timeline proved overly 34:37.969 --> 34:40.429 optimistic when a massive storm 34:40.439 --> 34:43.080 destroyed the Mulberry at Omaha and 34:43.090 --> 34:45.989 Cher was not liberated until late June . 34:47.100 --> 34:49.100 Engineers were not able to open the 34:49.100 --> 34:51.560 French naval port until 16 July . A 34:51.750 --> 34:55.570 month behind schedule , rail lines were 34:55.580 --> 34:57.524 not expected to have a significant 34:57.524 --> 35:00.010 impact until D plus 50 because of the 35:00.020 --> 35:02.540 damage anticipated from sabotage and 35:02.550 --> 35:05.100 allied bombing , unsure of what 35:05.110 --> 35:07.166 resources would be available . After 35:07.166 --> 35:09.719 landing , planners decided to transport 35:09.729 --> 35:11.562 rail supplies across the English 35:11.562 --> 35:14.399 Channel including heavy equipment like 35:14.409 --> 35:16.729 locomotives , covered cars and freight 35:16.739 --> 35:20.530 cars to protect the exits from Utah 35:20.540 --> 35:23.250 beach and prevent German reinforcement . 35:23.459 --> 35:25.570 Airborne divisions were to secure the 35:25.570 --> 35:28.030 roadway bottleneck at carton and cut 35:28.040 --> 35:30.919 off the Peninsula . This would isolate 35:31.290 --> 35:33.290 Cherbourg and open roadways for the 35:33.290 --> 35:35.979 arriving amphibious forces . When 35:35.989 --> 35:38.790 intelligence discovered new enemy units 35:38.800 --> 35:41.300 near the intended 82nd airborne 35:41.310 --> 35:44.050 divisions drop zone . Days before the 35:44.060 --> 35:46.870 invasion , the landing sites were moved 35:46.879 --> 35:50.020 to the east because planners 35:50.030 --> 35:52.209 anticipated significant damage to 35:52.219 --> 35:54.909 railways . Motor transportation was 35:54.919 --> 35:56.975 expected to carry the burden for the 35:56.975 --> 36:00.310 1st 90 days ashore . In spite of this 36:00.330 --> 36:03.159 us , transporters were only authorized 36:03.169 --> 36:06.459 160 truck companies by the theater G 36:06.469 --> 36:09.280 four , not the 240 that had been 36:09.290 --> 36:12.870 requested . Bridges were another issue 36:12.879 --> 36:14.935 that would have to be considered and 36:14.935 --> 36:17.169 planned for , to isolate the lodgment 36:17.179 --> 36:19.346 and protect it from the German counter 36:19.346 --> 36:21.310 attacks . Allied air destroyed the 36:21.320 --> 36:24.219 bridges over the Lois and Sane Rivers . 36:24.989 --> 36:27.100 Operation overlord is probably one of 36:27.100 --> 36:29.570 the most planned military operations in 36:29.580 --> 36:32.459 history . You know , years of planning 36:32.469 --> 36:34.580 and preparation went into it and they 36:34.580 --> 36:36.469 had to make assumptions as do all 36:36.469 --> 36:38.525 planners at the beginning of MD MP . 36:38.525 --> 36:40.802 You have facts and assumptions , facts . 36:40.802 --> 36:42.913 I got this much stuff , assumptions , 36:42.913 --> 36:45.136 I'm gonna consume this much stuff . The 36:45.136 --> 36:47.520 most , not necessarily flawed 36:47.530 --> 36:49.363 assumption that came out of this 36:49.363 --> 36:51.308 particular process was the rate of 36:51.308 --> 36:54.030 advance and the consumption of supplies . 36:54.040 --> 36:56.040 I mean , unfortunately , that would 36:56.040 --> 36:58.270 ultimately lead to the supply crisis of 36:58.280 --> 37:01.239 August 1944 which of course gave us the 37:01.250 --> 37:04.770 Red Ball Express . The purpose of 37:04.780 --> 37:06.947 evaluating the threat in step three of 37:06.947 --> 37:09.113 I PB is to understand how a threat can 37:09.113 --> 37:11.224 affect friendly operations . Although 37:11.224 --> 37:13.280 threat forces may conform to some of 37:13.280 --> 37:15.391 the fundamental principles that guide 37:15.391 --> 37:17.558 us army operations . These forces will 37:17.558 --> 37:19.669 have differences in how they approach 37:19.669 --> 37:21.669 situations and problem solving . In 37:21.669 --> 37:24.189 January 1944 Field Marshal Montgomery 37:24.199 --> 37:26.469 staff estimated that there were 50 37:26.479 --> 37:29.010 divisions in France , six of which were 37:29.020 --> 37:32.469 panzer divisions on paper . The German 37:32.479 --> 37:34.639 order of battle in the West appeared 37:34.649 --> 37:37.610 quite formidable . The army alone 37:37.620 --> 37:41.409 consisted of 860,000 soldiers while the 37:41.419 --> 37:44.939 Loft Wafa had 325,000 personnel . The 37:44.949 --> 37:48.689 navy , over 200,000 37:48.699 --> 37:50.921 more filled out the ranks of the Waffen 37:50.921 --> 37:54.750 Ss and police . Their million man force 37:54.760 --> 37:56.719 was responsible for delaying , 37:56.729 --> 37:59.409 disrupting and destroying an allied 37:59.419 --> 38:03.070 invasion . This started on the 38:03.080 --> 38:06.100 water . The German Navy , the Kris 38:06.189 --> 38:08.560 Marine was in no position to slow an 38:08.570 --> 38:11.959 invasion and the allies knew it without 38:11.969 --> 38:14.250 a capable surface fleet . The German 38:14.260 --> 38:16.929 Navy was reserved to planting mines in 38:16.939 --> 38:19.250 the channel , an indicator of their 38:19.260 --> 38:22.080 degraded status after the war . A 38:22.090 --> 38:24.360 German admiral stated that their force 38:24.370 --> 38:28.340 could inflict only flea bites by 38:28.350 --> 38:32.010 1944 . The once mighty Luftwaffe was 38:32.020 --> 38:34.076 struggling under the toll of a multi 38:34.076 --> 38:36.659 year war . Previous air campaigns 38:36.669 --> 38:38.780 combined with the continuous need for 38:38.780 --> 38:40.891 pilots and planes on the other fronts 38:40.891 --> 38:44.169 had exhausted the German air force in 38:44.179 --> 38:46.139 the preparation for D day . Allied 38:46.149 --> 38:48.659 planners focused on further degrading 38:48.780 --> 38:51.570 Luftwaffe capabilities from Cossack to 38:51.580 --> 38:53.820 Shaf . Commanders understood the 38:53.830 --> 38:56.320 importance of gaining air superiority . 38:57.129 --> 38:59.699 Limiting the Luftwaffe's capabilities 38:59.750 --> 39:01.879 also hid the build up and invasion 39:01.889 --> 39:04.399 force from enemy reconnaissance flights . 39:06.060 --> 39:08.360 Allied intelligence confirmed that 39:08.370 --> 39:11.030 German engineering had created a new 39:11.040 --> 39:13.639 threat vengeance weapons 39:15.070 --> 39:17.570 of steel construction . The flying bomb 39:17.580 --> 39:20.250 is driven by jet propulsion into the 39:20.260 --> 39:22.399 power unit . Fuel is injected under 39:22.409 --> 39:24.709 pressure from compressed air bottles . 39:24.800 --> 39:26.967 The bomb is kept on a set course by an 39:26.967 --> 39:29.229 automatic pilot immediately behind the 39:29.239 --> 39:31.810 streamlined nose is a one ton explosive 39:31.820 --> 39:32.479 charge 39:36.189 --> 39:38.850 known to the allies as buzz bombs or 39:38.860 --> 39:41.820 robots . The German V one S were the 39:41.830 --> 39:44.709 predecessor to today's cruise missiles . 39:45.149 --> 39:47.429 The allies discovered the existence of 39:47.439 --> 39:50.899 the V One program in the spring of 1943 . 39:51.270 --> 39:54.500 And by the fall concerns rose after 39:54.510 --> 39:57.270 69 possible weapons platforms were 39:57.280 --> 40:00.659 identified on the continent within 240 40:00.669 --> 40:04.020 kilometers of London because the V ones 40:04.030 --> 40:06.030 were able to hit southern England . 40:07.610 --> 40:09.760 Allied commanders were worried the 40:09.770 --> 40:12.040 Germans could target allied bases , 40:12.050 --> 40:15.429 staging areas , ports and 40:15.439 --> 40:19.040 ultimately the invasion force itself . 40:19.469 --> 40:23.149 The V ONE S became operational one week 40:23.159 --> 40:26.659 after D day . Unbeknownst to the allies , 40:26.760 --> 40:28.979 German intelligence organizations were 40:28.989 --> 40:31.790 divided and uncooperative keeping . 40:31.800 --> 40:33.856 German commanders guessing about the 40:33.856 --> 40:36.110 location of the intended landing site 40:36.120 --> 40:38.459 was absolutely pivotal to the success 40:38.469 --> 40:41.540 of the invasion before D day . The 40:41.550 --> 40:43.494 allies attempted to exploit German 40:43.494 --> 40:45.530 intelligence through a series of 40:45.540 --> 40:48.389 deception operations most notably 40:48.399 --> 40:51.149 fortitude , an operation designed to 40:51.159 --> 40:53.270 mislead German decision makers of the 40:53.280 --> 40:56.399 time place and scale of the invasion , 40:57.310 --> 41:00.679 blinded by propaganda arrogance . And 41:00.689 --> 41:03.260 ideology . Many German commanders 41:03.270 --> 41:05.214 questioned if the allies were even 41:05.219 --> 41:07.330 capable of attempting a cross channel 41:07.330 --> 41:09.780 attack . Others doubted France would be 41:09.790 --> 41:13.199 the target time would eventually unveil 41:13.209 --> 41:15.520 their adversary's weaknesses . But 41:15.530 --> 41:17.830 allied planners did not grasp the rot 41:17.840 --> 41:19.979 inside the German army in the West . 41:20.399 --> 41:22.621 How long has this young man been in the 41:22.621 --> 41:23.677 military service ? 41:26.729 --> 41:29.129 He's been there for four years and for 41:29.139 --> 41:31.760 four years that has this young man ever 41:31.770 --> 41:33.881 had any combat with American troops , 41:33.881 --> 41:33.850 Hansi , 41:37.949 --> 41:41.510 he says , no , I'm fat . What's the age 41:41.520 --> 41:45.270 of this young man ? He's 14 years 41:45.280 --> 41:47.447 old . He's 14 years old . He's been in 41:47.447 --> 41:49.502 the army for four years . He entered 41:49.502 --> 41:51.613 the army when he was 10 . That's well 41:51.613 --> 41:53.780 sergeant . I guess that's about all of 41:53.780 --> 41:55.947 the information we need off this young 41:55.947 --> 41:58.002 man . Intelligence did indicate that 41:58.002 --> 42:00.002 many units lacked mobility and were 42:00.002 --> 42:02.169 under strength . Still allied concerns 42:02.169 --> 42:04.280 centered on the panzer divisions that 42:04.280 --> 42:06.558 were capable of defeating the invasion . 42:06.558 --> 42:08.780 The allies were right to be concerned . 42:08.830 --> 42:11.010 Strong German counter attacks during 42:11.020 --> 42:12.798 multiple allied landings in the 42:12.798 --> 42:15.449 Mediterranean had come close to causing 42:15.459 --> 42:18.270 those operations to fail . Power , 42:18.280 --> 42:20.879 disputes between German leaders coupled 42:20.889 --> 42:23.600 with having a vast shoreline to defend 42:23.709 --> 42:26.090 cause decision makers to disperse the 42:26.100 --> 42:28.322 Panzer divisions throughout the theater 42:28.322 --> 42:30.560 rather than concentrating them near 42:30.570 --> 42:33.610 likely invasion sites to slow the 42:33.620 --> 42:35.689 anticipated German counter attack . 42:35.699 --> 42:38.000 Allied deception plans were designed to 42:38.010 --> 42:40.909 hold the panzers in place . Planners 42:40.919 --> 42:43.030 also looked to the air in the lead up 42:43.030 --> 42:44.760 to D day bombers would strike 42:44.770 --> 42:46.937 throughout France to avoid tipping the 42:46.937 --> 42:49.790 location of the landing sites . Once 42:49.800 --> 42:52.330 the invasion started , allied air would 42:52.340 --> 42:54.451 attempt to slow the counter attack by 42:54.451 --> 42:56.409 destroying intact road and rail 42:56.419 --> 42:58.669 networks , thus limiting German 42:58.679 --> 43:01.040 mobility . In addition to sealing off 43:01.050 --> 43:03.760 Normandy , air forces were also tasked 43:03.770 --> 43:05.770 with targeting panzer and motorized 43:05.770 --> 43:08.370 units as they advanced toward the beach 43:08.379 --> 43:11.840 head . The sustainment preparation of 43:11.850 --> 43:13.572 the operational environment is 43:13.572 --> 43:15.572 important because the basic line is 43:15.572 --> 43:17.683 that it's there to reduce or mitigate 43:17.683 --> 43:20.159 risk . During step four of I PB , the 43:20.169 --> 43:22.058 intelligence staff identifies and 43:22.058 --> 43:24.058 develops possible threat courses of 43:24.058 --> 43:26.225 action that can affect , accomplishing 43:26.225 --> 43:28.391 the friendly mission , identifying and 43:28.391 --> 43:30.558 developing all valid threat courses of 43:30.558 --> 43:32.558 action , minimizes the potential of 43:32.558 --> 43:34.336 surprise to the commander by an 43:34.336 --> 43:36.558 unanticipated threat . Action , failure 43:36.558 --> 43:38.780 to fully identify and develop all valid 43:38.780 --> 43:40.836 threat courses of action may lead to 43:40.836 --> 43:42.725 the development of an information 43:42.725 --> 43:44.891 collection strategy that won't provide 43:44.891 --> 43:46.947 the information needed to confirm or 43:46.947 --> 43:49.169 deny the threat course of action . This 43:49.169 --> 43:51.169 may result in friendly forces being 43:51.169 --> 43:53.058 surprised and possibly defeated . 43:53.669 --> 43:55.891 Allied planners were concerned with the 43:55.891 --> 43:58.002 composition and disposition of German 43:58.002 --> 44:01.250 forces . Questions remained as to how 44:01.260 --> 44:03.427 the German High Command would react to 44:03.427 --> 44:06.780 the invasion , where when and how it 44:06.790 --> 44:09.080 would deploy or redeploy its forces . 44:09.939 --> 44:12.110 Both sides knew that once the landing 44:12.120 --> 44:14.610 started and a bridgehead was created , 44:14.719 --> 44:17.649 it was essentially a race against time . 44:18.370 --> 44:20.560 Allied intelligence estimated the 44:20.570 --> 44:24.270 Germans had 10 Panzer divisions and 14 44:24.280 --> 44:27.040 to 17 infantry divisions in reserve . 44:27.510 --> 44:29.419 Local commanders lacked the force 44:29.429 --> 44:31.770 strength required to defend in depth at 44:31.780 --> 44:34.159 every beach . So Schiff expected the 44:34.169 --> 44:36.800 reserve units to be committed quickly . 44:37.489 --> 44:39.870 Allied Intelligence assessed that the 44:39.879 --> 44:42.340 Germans most likely course of action 44:42.479 --> 44:44.790 would be for the defenders to disrupt 44:44.800 --> 44:46.949 the landing forces long enough to 44:46.959 --> 44:49.530 deploy its mobile reserves and counter 44:49.540 --> 44:51.750 attack the beet in order to repel the 44:51.760 --> 44:54.534 allies , Germany's most dangerous 44:54.544 --> 44:56.925 course of action would be the Luftwaffe 44:57.165 --> 45:00.294 neutralizing allied air support and V 45:00.304 --> 45:02.754 One rockets inflicting heavy casualties 45:02.764 --> 45:05.635 on embarking forces followed by U boat 45:05.645 --> 45:08.324 disruption of the crossing force , the 45:08.334 --> 45:10.594 fixing of allied forces on beaches by 45:10.604 --> 45:13.254 local defenders and a counter attack by 45:13.264 --> 45:15.604 mobile reserves with integrated close 45:15.614 --> 45:18.254 range fires to destroy units ashore . 45:22.219 --> 45:25.459 I wish the rest of the staff understood 45:25.739 --> 45:28.479 that they are a valued member of the I 45:28.489 --> 45:31.290 PB process and to bring in the other 45:31.300 --> 45:33.520 staff elements like fires and air 45:33.530 --> 45:35.870 defense and sustainment because 45:35.879 --> 45:37.935 everybody has a contribution to make 45:37.935 --> 45:40.219 because the I PB products are 45:40.229 --> 45:43.879 fundamental in the MD MP process which 45:43.889 --> 45:46.129 is driving the the larger operation . 45:47.540 --> 45:49.373 So at the end of the sustainment 45:49.373 --> 45:51.096 preparation of the operational 45:51.096 --> 45:53.207 environment , the commander knows the 45:53.207 --> 45:55.318 limits of the possible . This is like 45:55.318 --> 45:57.540 boss , you got this much fuel , you got 45:57.540 --> 45:59.484 this much gas , you got these many 45:59.484 --> 46:01.707 airfields , you got this many roads and 46:01.707 --> 46:01.409 railroads . The bridges can only take 46:01.419 --> 46:04.570 this , you know that sets the rails in 46:04.580 --> 46:06.636 the right and left rail for what the 46:06.636 --> 46:08.413 commander is able to physically 46:08.413 --> 46:10.524 accomplish the planning for operation 46:10.524 --> 46:12.691 overlord . Operation two was very much 46:12.691 --> 46:15.570 a data driven event . You know , today 46:15.580 --> 46:17.802 in the 21st century , the importance of 46:17.802 --> 46:20.136 data analytics and sustainment planning . 46:20.136 --> 46:22.358 It's , it's it's fundamental in today's 46:22.358 --> 46:24.413 army . It is crucial that all senior 46:24.413 --> 46:26.524 leaders and not just the officers but 46:26.524 --> 46:28.747 also the non commission and the warrant 46:28.747 --> 46:30.747 officers need to understand all the 46:30.747 --> 46:32.580 parts of sustainment preparation 46:32.580 --> 46:32.419 because it's gonna affect all the 46:32.429 --> 46:34.620 operations , especially in today's um 46:34.629 --> 46:37.239 FM 30 multi domain operational world . 46:37.250 --> 46:39.361 All the areas are gonna come together 46:39.361 --> 46:41.417 and everyone needs to understand how 46:41.417 --> 46:43.639 that plays into planning and to mission 46:43.639 --> 46:45.489 execution . Looking to instill 46:45.500 --> 46:48.060 confidence in his troops before D day . 46:48.429 --> 46:51.340 Field Marshal Montgomery said when the 46:51.350 --> 46:53.350 time comes for us to operate on the 46:53.350 --> 46:55.517 continent , no one will claim that our 46:55.520 --> 46:58.149 task will be easy . The enemy is in 46:58.159 --> 47:00.659 prepared positions . He has protected 47:00.669 --> 47:03.340 his beaches with obstacles , we cannot 47:03.350 --> 47:05.260 gain close contact and wreck his 47:05.270 --> 47:08.139 position carefully . So as to examine 47:08.149 --> 47:10.093 the problem and ensure we have the 47:10.093 --> 47:12.689 right solution . There are and there 47:12.699 --> 47:15.290 are bound to be many unknown hazards . 47:15.300 --> 47:17.479 He has reserves positioned for counter 47:17.489 --> 47:20.750 attack . We have a long sea journey and 47:20.760 --> 47:22.982 the end of it , we will have to land on 47:22.982 --> 47:25.080 an enemy coast in the face of 47:25.090 --> 47:27.760 determined opposition . During all this , 47:27.770 --> 47:29.937 there is bound to be a certain loss of 47:29.937 --> 47:32.159 cohesion in assaulting units and even 47:32.169 --> 47:34.391 reserves coming ashore . Will require a 47:34.391 --> 47:36.613 little time to collect themselves . The 47:36.613 --> 47:38.860 enemy will know every inch of the 47:38.870 --> 47:41.310 ground . We shall be operating in a 47:41.320 --> 47:45.250 strange country but we have certain 47:45.260 --> 47:47.830 very great assets and they are the ones 47:47.840 --> 47:50.790 that matter . We have the initiative . 47:50.800 --> 47:53.510 The enemy does not know where or when 47:53.520 --> 47:56.600 we shall land . We have great firepower 47:56.610 --> 47:58.832 to support our initial landing from the 47:58.832 --> 48:02.520 sea and from the air . We have a good 48:02.530 --> 48:05.949 and simple plan . That 48:05.959 --> 48:08.899 simple plan was the culmination of 48:08.909 --> 48:11.820 years of work . The expansion and 48:11.830 --> 48:14.219 evolution of the allied plan was based 48:14.229 --> 48:16.439 on a changing strategic situation , 48:16.649 --> 48:19.889 intelligence and available resources . 48:19.899 --> 48:22.699 It was not perfect but its flexibility 48:22.709 --> 48:25.780 over time worked ultimately unleashing 48:25.790 --> 48:28.239 significant combat power into northern 48:28.250 --> 48:31.219 France 6 June 48:31.229 --> 48:34.100 1944 D day . 48:40.389 --> 48:42.500 It is the story of the Nazi defeat on 48:42.510 --> 48:45.649 the western front so far as possible . 48:45.939 --> 48:48.106 The editors have made it an account of 48:48.106 --> 48:49.939 the really important men in this 48:49.939 --> 48:52.649 campaign , the enlisted soldiers , 48:52.659 --> 48:54.989 sailors and airmen that fought through 48:55.000 --> 48:58.360 every obstacle to victory . Of course , 48:58.370 --> 49:00.314 to tell the whole story would take 49:00.314 --> 49:02.739 years . But the theme would be the same 49:03.530 --> 49:06.870 teamwork , wins , wars . I mean 49:06.879 --> 49:10.159 teamwork among nations services and men 49:11.909 --> 49:14.189 all the way down the line . From the G 49:14.199 --> 49:16.929 I and the Tommy to West brass hats . 49:18.429 --> 49:21.030 Our enemy in this campaign was strong , 49:21.040 --> 49:23.629 resourceful and cunning , but he made a 49:23.639 --> 49:26.530 few mistakes . His greatest blunder was 49:26.540 --> 49:28.830 this . He thought he could break up our 49:28.840 --> 49:31.610 partnership . But we were welded 49:31.620 --> 49:33.750 together by fighting for one great 49:33.760 --> 49:37.659 cause . In one great team , a team 49:37.780 --> 49:41.090 in which you were an indispensable and 49:41.100 --> 49:44.100 working member . That spirit of free 49:44.110 --> 49:46.659 people , working , fighting and living 49:46.669 --> 49:49.169 together in one great cause has served 49:49.179 --> 49:52.060 us well . On the western front , we in 49:52.070 --> 49:54.780 the field pray that that spirit of co 49:55.040 --> 49:57.949 ship will persist forever among the 49:57.959 --> 49:59.899 free peoples of the United Nations .