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Well , good afternoon . I'm a 

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Lieutenant General , Retired Jim Dubik , 

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I'm your a U . S . A . Uh advertisement 

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to start this uh , conference off . 

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Thank you for joining us for this 

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contemporary military forum entitled 

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transforming land power to meet global 

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challenges . We certainly have , I 

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think the best panel of the day to talk 

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about this as your professional 

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association , the United States 

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Association of the United States Army 

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is proud to provide forums like this 

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throughout the year that broaden the 

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professional knowledge base of our 

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professionals and those who support the 

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army . That's right . A U . S . A will 

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amplify the army's narrative to 

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audiences inside the army and to help 

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further the associations missions to be 

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the voice of the army outside . Of 

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course , we don't do this alone . This 

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A USA relies on its members 

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to help tell the army story and to help 

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support our soldiers and families . A 

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strong membership based therefore is 

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vitally important for our advocacy to 

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the Congress in the pentagon , defense 

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industries , the public in communities 

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across the country And in the 122 

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chapters across the country if you 

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remember , Great thank you . If you're 

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not uh , move out right now and go join 

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just one administrative announcement 

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before we start the panel because of 

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the current environment , we've had to 

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reduce the capacity in each of these 

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forums . So if you leave the room for 

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some reason , please know that you may 

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or may not be able to get back in that 

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were attending , uh , the numbers 

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outside . So with that I turn the 

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channel over to Francis Rose , our 

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moderator and I welcome all the panel 

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members on behalf of the U . S . A . 

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Good to see you . Thank you sir , I 

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appreciate the warm welcome and thanks 

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to all of you for coming . I'm really 

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happy to be back in person . I missed 

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seeing everyone last year . I'm a 

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rookie compared to a lot of you , I 

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imagine this is my sixth A . U . S . A . 

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And so I always enjoy coming and seeing 

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familiar faces and meeting new folks . 

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Um the discussion at hand is 

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tremendously important . I will not 

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bore you with the headlines that I'm 

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sure you have already followed that uh 

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uh make the implications of what we're 

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discussing here clear transforming land 

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power to meet global challenges . I 

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want to welcome my fellow panelists , 

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uh general Christopher casually , 

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General Charles Flynn Vikram Singh core , 

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Ishaqi and Mackenzie Egland directly to 

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my left . We have plenty of time for 

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each of them to give some thoughts to 

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begin the conversation . I will then I 

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have a few things that I've scribbled 

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down and uh that I want to ask them 

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about and then I hope to set aside a 

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fair amount of time for you to be 

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involved too . We have the microphones 

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that you see and there will be plenty 

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of opportunity . So as you're thinking 

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about um what you're hearing , I 

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welcome you to jot them down or 

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remember those thoughts and pose them 

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to the members of the panel 

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without further ado I'll start with 

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General Qawwali welcome and thank you 

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very much for participating and please 

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take it away . Thank you Mr Rose 

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appreciate it very much . It's good to 

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be here . Thank you for the invitation 

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to be on this panel . It's wonderful to 

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be on a panel with such a distinguished 

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colleagues and uh it's good to see so 

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many friendly faces in the audience to 

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include Andy Knight who I just saw for 

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the first time in more than a year . 

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One of my favorite soldiers and 

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artillery men who was so good , we gave 

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him command of an infantry company when 

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he was a young officer . So it's good 

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to be here . I've been a command of U . 

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S . Army europe for the last 3.5 years 

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as many as you know in the past year we 

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um combined it with us army Africa and 

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my headquarters adopted the Africa 

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portfolio as well . But today I'd like 

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just to dwell on U . S . Army europe 

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for a moment and the efforts we've been 

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taking there . So the most recent um uh 

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huh National Defense strategy named 

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adversaries . Uh not a very common 

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thing but one that gave us a great deal 

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of focus that focus built on the focus 

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that we have started to generate in the 

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wake of 2000 and eight in 2000 and 14 . 

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Um the annexation of Crimea and um the 

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incursion into Eastern Ukraine and 

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essentially I think the big top line 

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message from U . S . Army europe as we 

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have been and are preparing training , 

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organizing , training and equipping for 

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large scale ground combat operations as 

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a method of deterrence , but also 

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because we deter by being prepared to 

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win . Um So the history of U . S . Army 

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europe as many of you know , started 

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the Cold War , huge fraction of the U . 

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S . Army was located for deployed 

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inside europe um Over time after the 

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Cold War we drew that down until 

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finally in 2013 , the last U . S . 

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Tanks left the european continent soon 

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thereafter . Um uh the events of 

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2014 transpired , we began to reverse 

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that first with rotational 

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organizations and armored brigade , 

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combat team rotating heel to toe 

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through europe since 2015 . Later , a 

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combat aviation brigade in addition to 

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that and a division headquarters minus . 

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So that was rotational forces where the 

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U . S . Is first attempt to thicken our 

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stance there . But in the past couple 

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of years we've had significant targeted , 

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very specifically targeted but 

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significant growth . First of all , the 

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41st fires brigade , a rocket launcher 

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brigade consisting of two launcher 

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battalion stationed in Grafenwoehr 

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Germany up and running fully 

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operationally capable as of february of 

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this year , a huge addition to our 

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combat power on the continent of europe . 

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Second , we created one of the army's 

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first active component , short range 

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air defense battalions , the fifth of 

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the fourth Air defense artillery , it's 

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located in Ansbach and a couple of 

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other locations in in europe . Very 

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importantly , the army re established 

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the us 5th corps and aligned it against 

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the european problems that Lieutenant 

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General john kolasinski maybe in this 

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room right now . There he is . John 

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kolasinski uh is the commander of Fifth 

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Corps just finished his final 

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certification exercise to declare 

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operational capability in only a year 

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after being established at fort Knox . 

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So a huge feet on the part of my 

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Garrett's forces command and john you 

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personally that operational layer of 

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command and control will add 

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immeasurably to our ability to prepare 

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for operations on the continent . And 

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most recently we activated the first , 

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the Army's second multi domain task 

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force . It will be headquartered in 

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mines castel Germany just south of my 

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headquarters . And finally next month 

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we're going to activate the theatre 

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fires , command the 56th fires brigade . 

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All of that together will significantly 

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thicken our ability to manage 

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competition but more importantly to on 

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ramp large forces to keep the theater 

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set for the conduct of large scale 

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operations . Um In addition to this 

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growth , we have had a significant 

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amount of modernization . Um we're 

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about to begin the a to upgrade to our 

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multiple launch rocket systems . We 

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have received the army's first for 

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striker , vehicle based short range air 

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defense systems . They're up and 

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running now in Germany . We have 

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fielded terrestrial electronic warfare 

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systems across our force and we have 

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had some innovative new Department of 

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the Army aerial collection systems put 

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into the theater that we are we are 

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working to integrate into the larger 

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UConn collection system . That's our 

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structure . More important is our 

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activity . I believe we have returned 

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to large scale exercises on the 

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continent and every year we make them 

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just a little bit bigger but more 

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important , just a little bit more 

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complex . Um These exercises go by a 

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variety of different names . The Signal 

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one has been defender series for the 

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last 2.5 years . Um but what they 

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really bring is multi core 

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enabled , reinforced from the 

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contiguous 48 states operations . 

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So when we came out of the Cold War , 

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we essentially turned the european 

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theater from a ford posture theater 

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into a reinforcement theater . And so 

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our ability to practice that 

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reinforcement and to enable that 

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reinforcement and to integrate it with 

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our allies to conduct large scale 

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ground operations is fundamental to our 

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our existence and our future success 

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here in that regard . I would like to 

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call out Major General James smith , 

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raise your hand there . James please 

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James smith commands the 21st theater 

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sustainment command which is the 

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backbone of the reception staging 

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onward movement system that we have 

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inside europe and joe Hilbert commands , 

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the seventh Army training command and 

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he performs the integration function . 

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So we have been rehearsing at micro 

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scale and at macro scale this reception 

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of a reinforcement integration and then 

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operations with our allies across the 

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entire theater in this regard . We're 

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quite similar to the U . S . Army 

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pacific . We have great challenges with 

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time and distance . We have great 

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challenges with integration of large 

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organizations on the fly , moving 

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directly into operations . And then 

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finally we have one big difference , a 

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lot of water , a lot of land . So I'll 

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pass it to charlie Flynn . We look 

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forward to your questions and comments . 

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I'll I'll sort of capitalize on a 

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number of things that chris laid out 

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frank . Thank you . Uh The panel for 

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for doing this into a U . S . A . And 

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it is good to see a lot of friends . So 

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I'll sort of frame this uh this way 

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I'll talk about the place , I'll talk 

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about the the adversaries . I'll talk 

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about some of the adversary 

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capabilities and then I'll sort of wrap 

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up my comments similarly to outlining 

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what we have in the theater , what 

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we're bringing to the theater and what 

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we intend to do with those capabilities 

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in the theater . So the place um 

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obviously Asia , the asian continent . 

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Now the connection to Eurasia . Uh And 

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as chris mentioned lots of water , lots 

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of air when you look at the map but 

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there is also a lot of people there , 

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six out of 10 today , seven out of 10 

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in the next decade . And those people 

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compete largely for water , food 

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and power , minerals to run their 

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countries and factories and energy 

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etcetera etcetera . And there is a lot 

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00:11:24,300 --> 00:11:26,480
of , a number of destabilizing 

274
00:11:26,480 --> 00:11:28,480
activities that are going on in the 

275
00:11:28,480 --> 00:11:31,570
region along the Mekong River 

276
00:11:32,340 --> 00:11:35,750
uh , with damning uh , a lot of 

277
00:11:35,750 --> 00:11:39,400
challenges in places like Miramar along 

278
00:11:39,400 --> 00:11:41,550
the line of actual control of India . 

279
00:11:41,940 --> 00:11:43,884
And I could go through a number of 

280
00:11:43,884 --> 00:11:46,150
incidents there , what I call the sort 

281
00:11:46,150 --> 00:11:48,750
of refer to as the soft land underbelly 

282
00:11:48,750 --> 00:11:51,360
of china from Vietnam to India or into 

283
00:11:51,830 --> 00:11:54,950
Pakistan . So that's one set . There's 

284
00:11:54,950 --> 00:11:57,410
a whole another host of challenges out 

285
00:11:57,410 --> 00:12:00,270
in Oshie Ana and the reach that some 

286
00:12:00,270 --> 00:12:03,950
countries are are probing into . 

287
00:12:04,010 --> 00:12:06,880
And then of course , um I think as many 

288
00:12:06,880 --> 00:12:08,658
of , you know , there's lots of 

289
00:12:08,658 --> 00:12:10,769
challenges going on in the east south 

290
00:12:10,769 --> 00:12:12,713
china sea , Taiwan straits off the 

291
00:12:12,713 --> 00:12:14,890
coast of Japan and then of course the 

292
00:12:14,900 --> 00:12:18,840
uh actor on in north Korea and all the 

293
00:12:18,850 --> 00:12:22,730
actions that they bring . Russia 

294
00:12:22,730 --> 00:12:25,460
is also an actor in the region . Um , 

295
00:12:25,470 --> 00:12:28,470
so we've got the range of uh 

296
00:12:28,480 --> 00:12:31,560
adversaries that are involved , not 

297
00:12:31,560 --> 00:12:34,860
just in the , in the pacific 

298
00:12:35,240 --> 00:12:37,670
ocean area , the indian ocean area , 

299
00:12:37,670 --> 00:12:39,670
but also up in the arctic , I often 

300
00:12:39,670 --> 00:12:42,910
refer to the arctic circle as Russia is 

301
00:12:42,920 --> 00:12:44,976
in the arctic circle looking out and 

302
00:12:44,976 --> 00:12:46,920
china is outside the arctic circle 

303
00:12:46,920 --> 00:12:49,253
looking in and attempting to move there . 

304
00:12:49,253 --> 00:12:51,531
So that's a quick summary of the place . 

305
00:12:51,531 --> 00:12:53,580
Lots of things going on . Lots of 

306
00:12:53,580 --> 00:12:55,940
challenges and I can go in more if 

307
00:12:55,940 --> 00:12:58,280
you've got questions on it . So 

308
00:12:58,290 --> 00:13:00,401
adversaries I mentioned a few of them 

309
00:13:00,401 --> 00:13:04,240
there , I'll just say that the two AD 

310
00:13:04,240 --> 00:13:07,730
arsenal that china has 

311
00:13:07,740 --> 00:13:10,870
built is in many ways 

312
00:13:12,440 --> 00:13:16,330
designed to attack our 

313
00:13:16,340 --> 00:13:19,140
air and naval assets . So I think what 

314
00:13:19,140 --> 00:13:21,870
land power can do is enable some of 

315
00:13:21,870 --> 00:13:24,550
those activities uh and some of those 

316
00:13:24,550 --> 00:13:27,040
capabilities that we want to maintain 

317
00:13:27,040 --> 00:13:31,010
by having a terrestrial based force 

318
00:13:31,020 --> 00:13:33,590
with a wide range of sensors to be able 

319
00:13:33,590 --> 00:13:36,320
to see sense , understand the 

320
00:13:36,320 --> 00:13:38,320
environment and the conditions that 

321
00:13:38,320 --> 00:13:40,431
were uh confronted with out there and 

322
00:13:40,431 --> 00:13:43,450
the complexities uh that go really from 

323
00:13:43,450 --> 00:13:45,339
the west coast of the continental 

324
00:13:45,339 --> 00:13:47,617
United States all the way into Eurasia . 

325
00:13:47,640 --> 00:13:51,130
Um So , you know , the the 

326
00:13:51,140 --> 00:13:55,110
adversary and capabilities that they're 

327
00:13:55,110 --> 00:13:58,150
presenting to the Joint Force create 

328
00:13:58,150 --> 00:14:01,260
challenges for us . But I do think that 

329
00:14:01,270 --> 00:14:03,590
again , some of the things that general 

330
00:14:03,590 --> 00:14:05,201
casually mentioned here with 

331
00:14:05,540 --> 00:14:08,920
capabilities that the army has brought 

332
00:14:08,920 --> 00:14:11,220
to bear in europe were attempted to do 

333
00:14:11,230 --> 00:14:13,452
a number of those things in the pacific 

334
00:14:13,452 --> 00:14:16,610
as well , just to name a few . So the 

335
00:14:16,620 --> 00:14:19,200
first multi domain task force is 

336
00:14:19,200 --> 00:14:21,144
established , a joint base . Lewis 

337
00:14:21,144 --> 00:14:23,370
mcchord has been for nearly two years . 

338
00:14:23,380 --> 00:14:26,560
Um And the fifth Security Force 

339
00:14:26,560 --> 00:14:28,227
Assistance Brigade , which is 

340
00:14:28,227 --> 00:14:30,780
established at Joint Base LeWIs mcchord 

341
00:14:30,800 --> 00:14:34,090
now in 10 countries in the region and 

342
00:14:34,100 --> 00:14:37,250
operating their co located with 

343
00:14:37,640 --> 00:14:40,870
First special forces group , part of 

344
00:14:40,880 --> 00:14:42,713
the United States so calm but an 

345
00:14:42,713 --> 00:14:45,950
enabling capability that is part of the 

346
00:14:45,950 --> 00:14:49,860
land power in the land domain extension 

347
00:14:49,870 --> 00:14:52,310
into the region . And then of course 

348
00:14:52,320 --> 00:14:56,210
the capabilities that reside in Hawaii 

349
00:14:56,210 --> 00:14:58,266
itself in Alaska . These three power 

350
00:14:58,266 --> 00:15:00,550
projection platforms that we use to 

351
00:15:00,550 --> 00:15:03,200
generate Readiness and put that 

352
00:15:03,200 --> 00:15:05,200
readiness in the region . In Hawaii 

353
00:15:05,200 --> 00:15:07,089
alone , including the Hawaii Army 

354
00:15:07,089 --> 00:15:08,922
National Guard , there's 10 flag 

355
00:15:08,922 --> 00:15:12,550
officer headquarters . Uh one of them 

356
00:15:12,550 --> 00:15:14,500
is commanded by Major General Dave 

357
00:15:14,500 --> 00:15:17,380
Wilson sitting right behind uh the 

358
00:15:17,390 --> 00:15:19,557
sustainment commander from europe . So 

359
00:15:19,557 --> 00:15:21,890
again , the theater , opening , theater , 

360
00:15:21,890 --> 00:15:24,110
distribution , theater sustainment , 

361
00:15:24,120 --> 00:15:27,160
largely the glue that binds the joint 

362
00:15:27,160 --> 00:15:30,090
force together is done often through 

363
00:15:30,100 --> 00:15:32,100
what I refer to as the foundational 

364
00:15:32,100 --> 00:15:34,110
capabilities that only the army 

365
00:15:34,110 --> 00:15:36,332
provides the Joint force Commander from 

366
00:15:36,332 --> 00:15:38,666
Civil Affairs to medical to sustainment , 

367
00:15:38,666 --> 00:15:40,610
integrated air , missile defense , 

368
00:15:41,140 --> 00:15:44,130
military Police activities , Corps of 

369
00:15:44,130 --> 00:15:45,980
Engineers . Again , I could go 

370
00:15:45,980 --> 00:15:48,036
contracting , I could go on and on . 

371
00:15:48,036 --> 00:15:51,250
But these , these capabilities that are 

372
00:15:51,260 --> 00:15:54,620
at the theater army level are really to 

373
00:15:54,620 --> 00:15:56,580
enable all of the joint force to 

374
00:15:56,590 --> 00:15:59,630
operate with freedom of manoeuvre , 

375
00:15:59,630 --> 00:16:01,490
freedom of action and be able to 

376
00:16:01,490 --> 00:16:05,190
capitalize on some of the situations 

377
00:16:05,190 --> 00:16:07,468
that happen day to day and competition . 

378
00:16:07,940 --> 00:16:10,850
And I'll say that uh from from the west 

379
00:16:10,850 --> 00:16:14,040
coast to Alaska to Hawaii to the forces 

380
00:16:14,040 --> 00:16:16,373
that we have forward in Japan and Korea . 

381
00:16:16,373 --> 00:16:19,730
Obviously in in uh in my a o r 

382
00:16:19,740 --> 00:16:23,670
the the the posture that we have um in 

383
00:16:23,670 --> 00:16:25,781
the northern , what I refer to as the 

384
00:16:25,781 --> 00:16:27,880
northern quarter of the region is 

385
00:16:27,880 --> 00:16:29,991
pretty strong and has been strong for 

386
00:16:29,991 --> 00:16:31,936
the better part of 70 years . From 

387
00:16:31,936 --> 00:16:34,047
south Korea to Japan to hawaii Alaska 

388
00:16:34,047 --> 00:16:36,440
and the west coast where we are trying 

389
00:16:36,440 --> 00:16:38,660
to do some unique things is in the 

390
00:16:38,670 --> 00:16:40,837
south east , west and central corridor 

391
00:16:40,837 --> 00:16:43,880
of the region . And again , I think 

392
00:16:43,890 --> 00:16:46,270
chris described quite well what they're 

393
00:16:46,270 --> 00:16:49,720
doing with defender europe this past 

394
00:16:49,720 --> 00:16:52,620
year . Uh we had a similar operation 

395
00:16:52,630 --> 00:16:56,360
called defender uh pacific the future 

396
00:16:56,360 --> 00:16:58,500
will continue to operate and call it 

397
00:16:58,510 --> 00:17:00,710
operation pathways different from 

398
00:17:00,710 --> 00:17:03,660
defender in europe . And I would just 

399
00:17:03,660 --> 00:17:06,350
say that the combined effects of having 

400
00:17:06,350 --> 00:17:09,430
an operation and exercise go on between 

401
00:17:09,440 --> 00:17:11,970
Cobra gold in uh in Thailand grew to 

402
00:17:11,970 --> 00:17:14,026
shield in Indonesia orient shield in 

403
00:17:14,026 --> 00:17:16,510
Japan talisman sabre in Australia 

404
00:17:16,520 --> 00:17:18,687
ballot Bataan in the Philippines . And 

405
00:17:18,687 --> 00:17:20,853
then some experimental operations that 

406
00:17:20,853 --> 00:17:23,076
were going on with army futures command 

407
00:17:23,076 --> 00:17:26,500
between Guam , Tinian SaiPan and palau 

408
00:17:26,530 --> 00:17:28,530
Over the better part of about three 

409
00:17:28,530 --> 00:17:30,474
months . We want to continue to do 

410
00:17:30,474 --> 00:17:33,840
those types of operations because the 

411
00:17:33,840 --> 00:17:35,784
amount of readiness that we get by 

412
00:17:35,784 --> 00:17:37,890
operating in the region in the 

413
00:17:37,890 --> 00:17:41,350
conditions and in the environment where 

414
00:17:41,360 --> 00:17:45,360
we are most likely to be gaining 

415
00:17:45,740 --> 00:17:49,060
uh increasing our joint readiness , 

416
00:17:49,590 --> 00:17:52,350
increasing confidence in what our 

417
00:17:52,360 --> 00:17:54,540
allies and partners need from us and 

418
00:17:54,540 --> 00:17:57,860
expect from us . And then by way of 

419
00:17:57,860 --> 00:18:01,270
denying key terrain from the PRC or any 

420
00:18:01,270 --> 00:18:03,650
other adversaries that is trying to 

421
00:18:03,660 --> 00:18:07,460
fracture or destabilize uh the 

422
00:18:07,470 --> 00:18:10,470
vast populations that have to live out 

423
00:18:10,470 --> 00:18:13,560
there and have to live 

424
00:18:14,140 --> 00:18:17,170
um you know , and and and continue to 

425
00:18:17,180 --> 00:18:19,240
to get along with one another , uh , 

426
00:18:19,250 --> 00:18:22,250
because of the competitive nature of 

427
00:18:22,260 --> 00:18:24,260
things that are happening , whether 

428
00:18:24,260 --> 00:18:26,690
it's in uh technology or whether it's 

429
00:18:26,690 --> 00:18:29,390
in uh power , water and food as I was 

430
00:18:29,390 --> 00:18:31,501
talking about earlier for the , which 

431
00:18:31,501 --> 00:18:33,612
really is generated out of the global 

432
00:18:33,612 --> 00:18:35,779
commons . So anyways , I like to say , 

433
00:18:35,779 --> 00:18:37,834
I look forward to your questions . I 

434
00:18:37,834 --> 00:18:39,779
hope that gave you a little bit of 

435
00:18:39,779 --> 00:18:43,120
sense of of the place , the 

436
00:18:43,120 --> 00:18:45,690
capabilities or the adversaries and the 

437
00:18:45,700 --> 00:18:47,870
adversaries capabilities and sort of 

438
00:18:47,870 --> 00:18:51,870
what the theater army is doing . I look 

439
00:18:51,870 --> 00:18:53,814
forward to your questions . Thanks 

440
00:18:53,814 --> 00:18:55,870
general . Thank you very much . Both 

441
00:18:55,870 --> 00:18:57,870
generals , thank you very much . Mr 

442
00:18:57,870 --> 00:19:00,080
Singh . Why don't you become take the 

443
00:19:00,080 --> 00:19:02,820
first civilian position , respond 

444
00:19:02,820 --> 00:19:04,931
either to what the general said or or 

445
00:19:04,931 --> 00:19:07,042
let us know what you brought with you 

446
00:19:07,042 --> 00:19:09,098
for us to think about . Okay , great 

447
00:19:09,098 --> 00:19:10,820
Francis , thanks so much . And 

448
00:19:10,820 --> 00:19:12,820
gentlemen hope I'm , there's a nice 

449
00:19:12,820 --> 00:19:14,764
sign up here saying pull the mikes 

450
00:19:14,764 --> 00:19:16,820
close and speak directly into the so 

451
00:19:16,820 --> 00:19:19,042
we'll try to do that across the board . 

452
00:19:19,042 --> 00:19:21,209
Thanks , thanks gentlemen for um , for 

453
00:19:21,209 --> 00:19:23,320
your remarks and for all you guys are 

454
00:19:23,320 --> 00:19:25,320
doing and all your men and women in 

455
00:19:25,320 --> 00:19:28,650
uniform are doing to try to pivot to uh , 

456
00:19:28,660 --> 00:19:31,670
really what is a new era of great power 

457
00:19:31,670 --> 00:19:33,790
competition ? I know it gets thrown 

458
00:19:33,790 --> 00:19:36,310
around a lot um , that , you know , 

459
00:19:36,310 --> 00:19:38,960
we're at this this moment of change . 

460
00:19:38,970 --> 00:19:41,720
Um , but essentially 

461
00:19:41,730 --> 00:19:45,500
what we're facing in europe and what 

462
00:19:45,500 --> 00:19:48,360
we're facing in the pacific , um 

463
00:19:48,840 --> 00:19:52,730
really are the potential for 

464
00:19:52,740 --> 00:19:56,600
major power adversaries uh to 

465
00:19:56,600 --> 00:19:59,950
shift our strategic reality in a way 

466
00:19:59,950 --> 00:20:02,460
that would affect many generations of 

467
00:20:02,460 --> 00:20:04,460
americans would affect our national 

468
00:20:04,460 --> 00:20:06,571
interests , not just in some abstract 

469
00:20:06,571 --> 00:20:08,740
way , but actually our ability to be 

470
00:20:08,740 --> 00:20:10,690
secure and be prosperous , going , 

471
00:20:10,700 --> 00:20:13,300
going , going forward . If , you know , 

472
00:20:13,300 --> 00:20:16,940
if china really does reorder the Asia 

473
00:20:16,940 --> 00:20:19,310
pacific or if Russia really does 

474
00:20:19,310 --> 00:20:22,300
succeed , you know , not just in um 

475
00:20:22,310 --> 00:20:24,890
dominating Eastern europe , but really 

476
00:20:24,890 --> 00:20:28,640
in managing to fragment NATO . Um and 

477
00:20:28,650 --> 00:20:31,450
and sort of exploit what we're seeing 

478
00:20:31,450 --> 00:20:35,220
is weaknesses in democratic Societies 

479
00:20:35,230 --> 00:20:38,020
all around the world . Those those 

480
00:20:38,030 --> 00:20:41,020
opportunities are are are viewed from 

481
00:20:41,020 --> 00:20:44,090
Beijing and Moscow as as real pivotal 

482
00:20:44,090 --> 00:20:46,257
21st century opportunities for them to 

483
00:20:46,257 --> 00:20:48,257
change their fundamental position . 

484
00:20:48,257 --> 00:20:50,423
Their fundamental position has been as 

485
00:20:50,423 --> 00:20:53,720
major but not uh great global 

486
00:20:53,720 --> 00:20:55,776
superpowers , major powers , but not 

487
00:20:55,776 --> 00:20:57,998
super powers . And and for for Russia , 

488
00:20:57,998 --> 00:21:00,109
it's about getting back for china and 

489
00:21:00,109 --> 00:21:02,442
way it's about getting back its stature . 

490
00:21:02,442 --> 00:21:04,498
It's something that the chinese have 

491
00:21:04,498 --> 00:21:06,553
taken deeply to heart about being uh 

492
00:21:06,553 --> 00:21:08,920
you know about being mistreated and 

493
00:21:08,930 --> 00:21:12,030
held down and disrespected for , you 

494
00:21:12,030 --> 00:21:14,252
know , a century . It's about regaining 

495
00:21:14,252 --> 00:21:16,086
that power , but it's also about 

496
00:21:16,086 --> 00:21:18,350
displacing or at least becoming a troop 

497
00:21:18,350 --> 00:21:21,200
here with the United States . And um 

498
00:21:21,210 --> 00:21:23,432
you know , Russia probably doesn't have 

499
00:21:23,432 --> 00:21:25,432
the prospect of really doing that , 

500
00:21:25,432 --> 00:21:27,543
China may have the prospect of really 

501
00:21:27,543 --> 00:21:29,599
doing that , but in both cases , the 

502
00:21:29,599 --> 00:21:31,821
challenge is not that they're trying to 

503
00:21:31,821 --> 00:21:34,690
meet some uh you know this peaceful 

504
00:21:34,690 --> 00:21:36,746
rise that you hear from china , it's 

505
00:21:36,746 --> 00:21:38,857
not they're trying to just meet their 

506
00:21:38,857 --> 00:21:41,490
aspirations . It's that part of the way 

507
00:21:41,490 --> 00:21:43,657
they want to meet those aspirations is 

508
00:21:43,657 --> 00:21:45,850
going to potentially make the world a 

509
00:21:45,860 --> 00:21:48,410
much more dangerous place and and make 

510
00:21:48,410 --> 00:21:52,260
the world truly hostile to the kind 

511
00:21:52,260 --> 00:21:55,960
of future we in the west and in 

512
00:21:55,960 --> 00:21:58,293
Western democracies want to see . Right . 

513
00:21:58,293 --> 00:22:01,070
So I think that one of the questions 

514
00:22:01,070 --> 00:22:03,490
becomes okay , what does warfare look 

515
00:22:03,490 --> 00:22:05,490
like ? What does it look like if it 

516
00:22:05,490 --> 00:22:08,480
goes bad ? Right . And I think there's 

517
00:22:08,480 --> 00:22:11,920
a tendency right now to focus in Asia 

518
00:22:11,920 --> 00:22:15,490
on maritime and error and in 

519
00:22:15,500 --> 00:22:18,750
in with regards to Russia and Asia with 

520
00:22:18,750 --> 00:22:21,040
regards to europe and Asia on , you 

521
00:22:21,040 --> 00:22:23,910
know , the sort of the critical future 

522
00:22:23,920 --> 00:22:26,270
aspects of , of , of conflict , which 

523
00:22:26,270 --> 00:22:28,326
is what I focus on myself actually , 

524
00:22:28,326 --> 00:22:30,840
technology , cyber information 

525
00:22:30,840 --> 00:22:33,790
capabilities , um a lot of gray zone 

526
00:22:33,790 --> 00:22:37,710
and hybrid hybrid warfare um 

527
00:22:37,720 --> 00:22:40,700
issues . But what you need to remember 

528
00:22:40,700 --> 00:22:44,410
is um when he 

529
00:22:44,410 --> 00:22:47,370
comes to deterrence and when it comes 

530
00:22:47,370 --> 00:22:50,310
to fighting and winning , if we end up 

531
00:22:50,320 --> 00:22:53,770
in conflict , land power 

532
00:22:54,240 --> 00:22:57,230
is absolutely essential and I think 

533
00:22:57,230 --> 00:22:59,010
it's easy to , it's easy to get 

534
00:22:59,010 --> 00:23:01,320
distracted and think it's not . And 

535
00:23:01,320 --> 00:23:05,010
we're fortunate that general Tivoli , 

536
00:23:05,010 --> 00:23:07,910
General Flynn and their and their men 

537
00:23:07,910 --> 00:23:10,132
and women in uniform are staying highly 

538
00:23:10,132 --> 00:23:12,380
focused on what it looks like to be 

539
00:23:12,380 --> 00:23:14,470
effective at deterring and to be 

540
00:23:14,470 --> 00:23:17,160
prepared to fight and win . If you end 

541
00:23:17,160 --> 00:23:19,960
up in a full scale conflict . Um , 

542
00:23:19,970 --> 00:23:22,137
those things are fully tied together . 

543
00:23:22,440 --> 00:23:26,100
If the adversary be that Beijing or or 

544
00:23:26,110 --> 00:23:28,166
be allowed to be the Russians or the 

545
00:23:28,166 --> 00:23:30,277
chinese , that's who I'm focused on . 

546
00:23:30,277 --> 00:23:34,250
Um , if they don't really believe that 

547
00:23:34,250 --> 00:23:37,570
we are willing and able to actually 

548
00:23:37,570 --> 00:23:40,760
deploy land forces in a conflict , 

549
00:23:41,640 --> 00:23:43,820
our deterrence is fundamentally 

550
00:23:43,820 --> 00:23:46,440
weakened . I in fact , I think I would 

551
00:23:46,440 --> 00:23:48,662
go so far as to say , I don't know that 

552
00:23:48,662 --> 00:23:51,210
um , that deterrence really holds up in 

553
00:23:51,210 --> 00:23:53,210
a situation where you don't believe 

554
00:23:53,210 --> 00:23:56,860
your adversary is willing to actually 

555
00:23:57,240 --> 00:24:00,020
deploy forces on the ground . It's 

556
00:24:00,020 --> 00:24:01,909
really hard to see . It stays too 

557
00:24:01,909 --> 00:24:04,960
abstract . So while wars get fought in 

558
00:24:04,960 --> 00:24:07,530
all theater , all domains at the end of 

559
00:24:07,530 --> 00:24:09,641
the day , the end of the day , you're 

560
00:24:09,641 --> 00:24:11,850
fighting for your your town's your 

561
00:24:11,850 --> 00:24:14,128
cities , your people , your population , 

562
00:24:14,128 --> 00:24:16,183
you're fighting for what's what's on 

563
00:24:16,183 --> 00:24:18,960
the ground . And so the army is at a 

564
00:24:18,960 --> 00:24:21,071
moment of having to figure out how it 

565
00:24:21,071 --> 00:24:24,750
fits into and support this new 

566
00:24:24,750 --> 00:24:28,350
era of conflict . Peacetime conflict , 

567
00:24:28,940 --> 00:24:31,230
the information operations , the cyber 

568
00:24:31,230 --> 00:24:35,000
operations , financial uh , tools that 

569
00:24:35,000 --> 00:24:37,480
are being used to uh , to , to , to 

570
00:24:37,490 --> 00:24:40,810
fragment and weakened societies , um , 

571
00:24:40,820 --> 00:24:42,987
irregular things . We've always called 

572
00:24:42,987 --> 00:24:44,931
irregular threats , Whether that's 

573
00:24:44,931 --> 00:24:47,740
trafficking in arms or narcotics or 

574
00:24:47,740 --> 00:24:50,610
terrorism , all of those things are 

575
00:24:50,610 --> 00:24:52,777
part of , uh , you know , what's going 

576
00:24:52,777 --> 00:24:54,999
to be a different picture . If you look 

577
00:24:54,999 --> 00:24:57,110
at look at conflict in the future and 

578
00:24:57,110 --> 00:24:59,277
the and the and the and the army has a 

579
00:24:59,277 --> 00:25:01,610
critical critical role across the board . 

580
00:25:01,610 --> 00:25:04,000
Just look at our recent challenges . Um 

581
00:25:04,010 --> 00:25:07,680
Covid who's been critical to the 

582
00:25:07,680 --> 00:25:11,320
covid fight across the board . Um you 

583
00:25:11,320 --> 00:25:15,190
know , natural disaster responses , C . 

584
00:25:15,190 --> 00:25:18,170
T . Terrorism threats across any 

585
00:25:18,170 --> 00:25:20,503
theater . Whether you're talking africa , 

586
00:25:20,503 --> 00:25:23,160
whether you're talking Asia , um the 

587
00:25:23,170 --> 00:25:25,980
you see the role that the army and 

588
00:25:25,980 --> 00:25:29,030
ground forces play in general , uh Neos , 

589
00:25:29,040 --> 00:25:31,760
uh just look at Afghanistan right now 

590
00:25:31,770 --> 00:25:35,660
and marines 82nd Airborne , you 

591
00:25:35,660 --> 00:25:38,400
know , required to make that happen 

592
00:25:38,410 --> 00:25:41,050
even though it is the it was great 

593
00:25:41,050 --> 00:25:43,530
tales flying in and out that got most 

594
00:25:43,530 --> 00:25:47,130
of the video coverage . Um It's um it's 

595
00:25:47,140 --> 00:25:50,860
deployed U . S . Marines that took the 

596
00:25:50,860 --> 00:25:53,670
casualties . And so at the end of the 

597
00:25:53,680 --> 00:25:56,450
land forces remain absolutely vital . 

598
00:25:56,450 --> 00:25:59,970
And I think that one of the 

599
00:25:59,980 --> 00:26:02,940
shift needs to be to developing the 

600
00:26:02,940 --> 00:26:05,200
technologies , developing the 

601
00:26:05,200 --> 00:26:07,550
capability in areas like cyber 

602
00:26:07,560 --> 00:26:09,782
developing the capability in areas like 

603
00:26:09,782 --> 00:26:11,893
sensors . Since you know , being able 

604
00:26:11,893 --> 00:26:13,449
to help us have operational 

605
00:26:13,449 --> 00:26:15,616
understanding of the environment we're 

606
00:26:15,616 --> 00:26:18,450
going into um and then 

607
00:26:19,040 --> 00:26:21,310
almost forgotten but something that 

608
00:26:21,320 --> 00:26:23,431
especially I think charlie you really 

609
00:26:23,431 --> 00:26:26,210
touched on um the enabling 

610
00:26:26,210 --> 00:26:28,230
relationships . Right ? So these 

611
00:26:28,230 --> 00:26:30,870
alliance , our alliance partnerships , 

612
00:26:31,340 --> 00:26:34,600
our our security assistance , 

613
00:26:34,610 --> 00:26:36,870
what you know , it's building 

614
00:26:36,870 --> 00:26:40,220
partnership capacity , um it's almost 

615
00:26:40,220 --> 00:26:43,670
an un it's almost it's almost uh a 

616
00:26:43,680 --> 00:26:46,710
intangible Uh in the big picture , 

617
00:26:46,720 --> 00:26:49,470
people sitting up and looking across 

618
00:26:49,470 --> 00:26:53,040
from the from from 60,000 ft are 

619
00:26:53,050 --> 00:26:55,410
sometimes miss the importance of all 

620
00:26:55,410 --> 00:26:57,577
the exercises were doing of increasing 

621
00:26:57,577 --> 00:26:59,521
the complexity of that activity of 

622
00:26:59,521 --> 00:27:01,132
building the fabric of those 

623
00:27:01,132 --> 00:27:04,160
relationships . A huge amount of that 

624
00:27:04,640 --> 00:27:06,473
happens obviously across all the 

625
00:27:06,473 --> 00:27:09,360
services , but a huge amount of it is , 

626
00:27:09,370 --> 00:27:12,170
is uh , is army , the army a huge 

627
00:27:12,170 --> 00:27:15,060
amount of it is a comment . You know , 

628
00:27:15,060 --> 00:27:17,227
it's what , it's what they always do . 

629
00:27:17,540 --> 00:27:20,460
It's what , um , it's what happens when 

630
00:27:20,460 --> 00:27:23,960
we do large scale maneuver exercises 

631
00:27:23,960 --> 00:27:26,071
with , you know , army to army . It's 

632
00:27:26,071 --> 00:27:27,738
what happens when we do joint 

633
00:27:27,738 --> 00:27:29,849
exercising training . Um , and it was 

634
00:27:29,849 --> 00:27:32,071
what happens in the classroom education 

635
00:27:32,071 --> 00:27:34,710
that we offer the programs that we 

636
00:27:34,710 --> 00:27:37,700
offer . Um , and it's important to 

637
00:27:37,700 --> 00:27:39,589
remember that while we think erin 

638
00:27:39,589 --> 00:27:41,800
maritime an awful lot , especially in 

639
00:27:41,800 --> 00:27:43,967
Asia and I'm in Asia guy , that's my , 

640
00:27:43,967 --> 00:27:46,189
my focus is china and china's influence 

641
00:27:46,189 --> 00:27:49,750
in the region . Um , we have a lot of 

642
00:27:49,760 --> 00:27:53,570
army centric partners now we make , I 

643
00:27:53,580 --> 00:27:55,691
feel that that's not exactly the best 

644
00:27:55,691 --> 00:27:58,050
that maybe they are imbalanced . You 

645
00:27:58,050 --> 00:28:00,870
know , taking Indonesia taken India . 

646
00:28:00,880 --> 00:28:03,830
Um , you know , are really critical 

647
00:28:03,830 --> 00:28:06,180
partners in the region , most of these 

648
00:28:06,190 --> 00:28:08,630
countries , most of these countries and 

649
00:28:08,630 --> 00:28:12,180
china itself actually are fairly army 

650
00:28:12,180 --> 00:28:14,124
focused and how they've structured 

651
00:28:14,124 --> 00:28:16,236
themselves for national defense . And 

652
00:28:16,236 --> 00:28:18,347
so it's important to go to where your 

653
00:28:18,347 --> 00:28:20,540
partners are and those relationships , 

654
00:28:20,540 --> 00:28:22,890
those army army to relationships are 

655
00:28:22,890 --> 00:28:24,946
really critical . So , you know , in 

656
00:28:24,946 --> 00:28:27,340
some , I just , I think that um , I 

657
00:28:27,340 --> 00:28:30,960
think that we , uh we are at the point 

658
00:28:30,970 --> 00:28:32,859
of shifting our attention and our 

659
00:28:32,859 --> 00:28:35,026
resources . We have a lot of very hard 

660
00:28:35,026 --> 00:28:37,340
choices to make from an investment 

661
00:28:37,340 --> 00:28:40,300
standpoint . Obviously we need new and 

662
00:28:40,300 --> 00:28:42,610
novel technologies across the board . 

663
00:28:42,620 --> 00:28:45,240
Obviously there are air maritime space 

664
00:28:45,240 --> 00:28:47,184
cyber capabilities that have to be 

665
00:28:47,184 --> 00:28:49,407
invested in . Um and I think one of the 

666
00:28:49,407 --> 00:28:52,140
key things is how integrating across 

667
00:28:52,140 --> 00:28:54,700
our planning and integrating across the 

668
00:28:54,700 --> 00:28:56,700
joint force so that we don't end up 

669
00:28:56,700 --> 00:28:58,922
making redundant investments across the 

670
00:28:58,922 --> 00:29:02,380
services or leaving gaps unfilled um is 

671
00:29:02,380 --> 00:29:05,780
going to be extremely critical um but 

672
00:29:05,790 --> 00:29:08,900
uh you know , make no mistake um where 

673
00:29:08,910 --> 00:29:10,950
where the army goes , so goes our 

674
00:29:10,950 --> 00:29:13,740
ability to deter and prevail in 

675
00:29:13,740 --> 00:29:15,684
conflicts in both these theaters . 

676
00:29:15,684 --> 00:29:18,018
Really look forward to the conversation . 

677
00:29:18,018 --> 00:29:20,750
Thanks guys . Vikram thanks very much . 

678
00:29:20,750 --> 00:29:24,110
Dr Corey Shockey is next and I have 

679
00:29:24,120 --> 00:29:26,176
done enough of these with you in the 

680
00:29:26,176 --> 00:29:29,000
past to know that while you're prepared 

681
00:29:29,000 --> 00:29:31,167
remarks , I'm sure quite instructive , 

682
00:29:31,640 --> 00:29:33,960
I would be very curious to know what 

683
00:29:33,960 --> 00:29:36,240
you have been very actively scribbling 

684
00:29:36,240 --> 00:29:38,640
in that book . So I invite you to 

685
00:29:38,640 --> 00:29:40,696
dispense with those remarks and just 

686
00:29:40,696 --> 00:29:42,862
share with us what you've scribbled in 

687
00:29:42,862 --> 00:29:45,870
the book if you would because because 

688
00:29:45,880 --> 00:29:48,290
frank and I are friends . He is very 

689
00:29:48,290 --> 00:29:50,940
nicely giving me get out of jail free 

690
00:29:50,940 --> 00:29:53,270
card for not having prepared remarks 

691
00:29:53,280 --> 00:29:55,210
and giving me just the fun of 

692
00:29:55,210 --> 00:29:57,210
responding to what I'm hearing . So 

693
00:29:57,210 --> 00:29:59,266
thank you for that my friend , I owe 

694
00:29:59,266 --> 00:30:01,900
you a drink . I'll take it . I was 

695
00:30:01,910 --> 00:30:05,050
struck listening to general casually 

696
00:30:05,440 --> 00:30:09,180
that um you had 

697
00:30:09,190 --> 00:30:11,360
actually nothing to say about africa , 

698
00:30:12,040 --> 00:30:15,330
which is given the nature of 

699
00:30:15,340 --> 00:30:19,070
chinese moves uh in Africa I 

700
00:30:19,070 --> 00:30:22,640
thought was striking and it strikes me 

701
00:30:22,650 --> 00:30:26,350
that that may be a useful fingerprint 

702
00:30:26,940 --> 00:30:30,150
about what we need to push 

703
00:30:30,150 --> 00:30:33,270
ourselves to think a new about 

704
00:30:34,040 --> 00:30:37,240
for example that the army's mission in 

705
00:30:37,240 --> 00:30:39,790
europe is large scale reinforcement 

706
00:30:39,800 --> 00:30:42,800
from the United States strikes me as 

707
00:30:42,810 --> 00:30:45,420
actually the wrong mission um 

708
00:30:45,430 --> 00:30:48,980
because there is no place in the 

709
00:30:48,980 --> 00:30:51,290
world where the United States has more 

710
00:30:51,290 --> 00:30:55,050
capable allies in larger numbers and 

711
00:30:55,050 --> 00:30:58,250
with more direct interest and more 

712
00:30:58,250 --> 00:31:01,160
direct focus similar to our focus . 

713
00:31:01,840 --> 00:31:05,410
And uh I think if General 

714
00:31:05,420 --> 00:31:07,760
Eisenhower were here , he would be 

715
00:31:07,760 --> 00:31:10,270
astonished that we still have troops 

716
00:31:10,270 --> 00:31:14,160
stationed in europe this long after 

717
00:31:14,540 --> 00:31:16,707
at the end of the Cold War and I'm not 

718
00:31:16,707 --> 00:31:19,120
arguing against the stationing of U . S . 

719
00:31:19,120 --> 00:31:21,064
Troops in europe , I favor it very 

720
00:31:21,064 --> 00:31:24,130
strongly , but I do think our major 

721
00:31:24,130 --> 00:31:26,480
mission in europe should be 

722
00:31:26,490 --> 00:31:29,300
orchestrating other armies into the 

723
00:31:29,300 --> 00:31:33,180
fight , not orchestrating our own from 

724
00:31:33,180 --> 00:31:35,236
the continental United States or any 

725
00:31:35,236 --> 00:31:38,940
place else . Um and that might be 

726
00:31:38,950 --> 00:31:41,700
worth some more thought . A second 

727
00:31:41,700 --> 00:31:45,300
thing is you come as a force provider 

728
00:31:45,300 --> 00:31:48,920
to other theaters because 

729
00:31:48,930 --> 00:31:51,760
I'm I think perhaps more confident than 

730
00:31:51,760 --> 00:31:54,090
general cavalier about the strength of 

731
00:31:54,090 --> 00:31:57,830
deterrence uh for a major ground 

732
00:31:57,830 --> 00:32:00,830
war in europe . And I'm I think a 

733
00:32:00,830 --> 00:32:04,170
little bit less confident um 

734
00:32:04,540 --> 00:32:08,370
about the need uh about 

735
00:32:08,370 --> 00:32:11,200
our ability to flow forces either from 

736
00:32:11,200 --> 00:32:13,610
europe and not just american forces , 

737
00:32:13,620 --> 00:32:15,787
right ? Because because we're going to 

738
00:32:15,787 --> 00:32:17,787
need to be the mobility for lots of 

739
00:32:17,787 --> 00:32:19,787
other people's forces . Should they 

740
00:32:19,787 --> 00:32:23,200
choose to join us in fights um in 

741
00:32:23,200 --> 00:32:26,580
Africa or in Asia . Um I was 

742
00:32:26,580 --> 00:32:29,870
heartened to hear General Flynn's uh 

743
00:32:29,880 --> 00:32:33,200
discussion about the army as an 

744
00:32:33,210 --> 00:32:36,840
enabler for joint operations 

745
00:32:36,850 --> 00:32:39,570
throughout the expanse of Asia . That 

746
00:32:39,570 --> 00:32:43,310
strikes me as as the right kind of uh 

747
00:32:43,320 --> 00:32:47,180
focus and also the armies day to 

748
00:32:47,180 --> 00:32:50,150
day in and out engagement with forces 

749
00:32:50,150 --> 00:32:53,460
in the region because it's going to be 

750
00:32:53,460 --> 00:32:56,560
a really hard slog to 

751
00:32:56,560 --> 00:33:00,440
align countries in Asia into thinking 

752
00:33:00,440 --> 00:33:02,590
about china , the way we are worried 

753
00:33:02,590 --> 00:33:06,460
about china and especially if , 

754
00:33:06,840 --> 00:33:10,720
you know , the test becomes the defense 

755
00:33:10,720 --> 00:33:13,890
of Taiwan our 

756
00:33:13,970 --> 00:33:17,910
advantage strategically um is our 

757
00:33:17,920 --> 00:33:20,640
operational burden which is getting 

758
00:33:20,650 --> 00:33:24,120
everybody else lined up on our side uh 

759
00:33:24,130 --> 00:33:27,270
and moving forward with us and that's a 

760
00:33:27,270 --> 00:33:30,910
whole lot of day to day hand holding . 

761
00:33:30,920 --> 00:33:33,060
As Vikram said , being worried about 

762
00:33:33,060 --> 00:33:35,227
problems that other people are worried 

763
00:33:35,227 --> 00:33:37,500
about instead of the problems that we 

764
00:33:37,500 --> 00:33:39,350
are worried about . Because most 

765
00:33:39,350 --> 00:33:41,730
militaries would love to have the 

766
00:33:41,730 --> 00:33:43,700
problems you all spend your time 

767
00:33:43,700 --> 00:33:45,940
worrying about instead of the problems 

768
00:33:45,950 --> 00:33:48,117
they have to spend their time worrying 

769
00:33:48,117 --> 00:33:50,380
about . Um which makes me happy that it 

770
00:33:50,380 --> 00:33:53,860
sounds like the new defense strategy in 

771
00:33:53,860 --> 00:33:56,290
the works or the new national security 

772
00:33:56,290 --> 00:33:58,390
strategy in the works will dispense 

773
00:33:58,400 --> 00:34:01,470
with great power competition as the 

774
00:34:01,470 --> 00:34:03,440
frame of reference because that 

775
00:34:03,440 --> 00:34:05,860
actually plays to china's advantage . 

776
00:34:05,870 --> 00:34:08,120
This notion that , you know , there are 

777
00:34:08,120 --> 00:34:11,370
rising great power and we're Sparta at 

778
00:34:11,370 --> 00:34:14,990
declining great power facing Athens in 

779
00:34:14,990 --> 00:34:18,790
their full agency and that's actually 

780
00:34:18,790 --> 00:34:22,120
not what we're doing . It's us and just 

781
00:34:22,120 --> 00:34:25,670
about everybody else , having agreed on 

782
00:34:25,670 --> 00:34:29,430
a set of rules about for example , 

783
00:34:29,430 --> 00:34:32,560
how ships on the ocean , open ocean 

784
00:34:32,560 --> 00:34:35,770
behave and the chinese wanting to 

785
00:34:35,770 --> 00:34:38,760
unilaterally change those rules to 

786
00:34:38,760 --> 00:34:41,280
their advantage and the disadvantage of 

787
00:34:41,290 --> 00:34:43,480
everyone else . So every time we talk 

788
00:34:43,480 --> 00:34:45,702
about great power competition , which I 

789
00:34:45,702 --> 00:34:48,340
grant you is a useful way for us to 

790
00:34:48,350 --> 00:34:50,860
organize ourselves , which is to say , 

791
00:34:50,870 --> 00:34:53,740
finally , finally , people prioritize 

792
00:34:53,750 --> 00:34:56,220
as Mackenzie Egland keeps telling us we 

793
00:34:56,220 --> 00:35:00,000
need to do and focus on 

794
00:35:00,000 --> 00:35:03,150
china . Um but that's actually not a 

795
00:35:03,150 --> 00:35:04,983
useful way to talk about it with 

796
00:35:04,983 --> 00:35:07,206
everybody else because it will make the 

797
00:35:07,206 --> 00:35:09,450
very cooperation we need harder to get 

798
00:35:09,460 --> 00:35:13,360
from those countries . Um uh 

799
00:35:13,370 --> 00:35:16,240
there is a beautiful little pamphlet 

800
00:35:16,250 --> 00:35:18,940
that I encourage for your thinking 

801
00:35:18,940 --> 00:35:21,051
about these problems . It was written 

802
00:35:21,051 --> 00:35:23,162
by an army Lieutenant Colonel name of 

803
00:35:23,162 --> 00:35:26,740
Red Reader In 1941 or 

804
00:35:26,740 --> 00:35:29,840
42 . General marshall sent him to the 

805
00:35:29,840 --> 00:35:32,690
pacific understanding . Of course that 

806
00:35:32,690 --> 00:35:35,340
once the army had won the war in europe , 

807
00:35:35,350 --> 00:35:37,350
we didn't have a force large enough 

808
00:35:37,350 --> 00:35:39,406
that we wouldn't have to swing it to 

809
00:35:39,406 --> 00:35:42,630
also win the war in the pacific , which 

810
00:35:42,630 --> 00:35:45,540
goes to the point that I think all 

811
00:35:45,540 --> 00:35:49,530
three speakers made that um That we're 

812
00:35:49,530 --> 00:35:52,190
not gonna have the luxury of optimizing 

813
00:35:52,190 --> 00:35:54,301
just one set of challenges . We don't 

814
00:35:54,301 --> 00:35:56,301
have a big enough military now . We 

815
00:35:56,301 --> 00:35:58,357
didn't have a big enough military in 

816
00:35:58,357 --> 00:36:00,134
1942 . And so the pamphlet that 

817
00:36:00,134 --> 00:36:02,079
Lieutenant Colonel Reader writes , 

818
00:36:02,430 --> 00:36:04,900
marshall sends him to interview all of 

819
00:36:04,910 --> 00:36:07,370
the marine commanders in the pacific to 

820
00:36:07,370 --> 00:36:10,940
figure out what they had done wrong and 

821
00:36:10,940 --> 00:36:13,162
what they figured out how to do right . 

822
00:36:13,162 --> 00:36:15,460
So that the army could actually train 

823
00:36:15,460 --> 00:36:18,100
soldiers while you were swinging from 

824
00:36:18,100 --> 00:36:20,030
europe to the pacific for the 

825
00:36:20,030 --> 00:36:22,030
challenges of the pacific , because 

826
00:36:22,030 --> 00:36:23,919
they're different kinds of wars , 

827
00:36:24,530 --> 00:36:26,640
because obviously you have different 

828
00:36:26,650 --> 00:36:30,090
kinds of adversaries . And if I 

829
00:36:30,090 --> 00:36:33,630
were , if I were worrying about the 

830
00:36:33,630 --> 00:36:35,730
war , we would have to fight in the 

831
00:36:35,730 --> 00:36:38,190
pacific . It would look to me a lot 

832
00:36:38,190 --> 00:36:41,820
like the early thinking about war in 

833
00:36:41,820 --> 00:36:44,270
the nuclear age , namely what in the 

834
00:36:44,270 --> 00:36:46,381
Eisenhower administration , they call 

835
00:36:46,381 --> 00:36:49,610
broken back warfare , where at first 

836
00:36:49,610 --> 00:36:52,610
you have all of the high tech 

837
00:36:52,610 --> 00:36:55,370
spiffy , the kind of war Vikram was 

838
00:36:55,370 --> 00:36:58,750
talking about . Um and then all that 

839
00:36:58,750 --> 00:37:01,200
stuff gets destroyed and you have to 

840
00:37:01,200 --> 00:37:04,980
have grit and soldiering to 

841
00:37:04,980 --> 00:37:07,147
carry you through when everything else 

842
00:37:07,147 --> 00:37:09,690
has already gone . Because that's what 

843
00:37:09,690 --> 00:37:12,390
I in my judgment at war with china 

844
00:37:12,400 --> 00:37:15,750
would look like moreover , that's what 

845
00:37:15,760 --> 00:37:18,280
allies need from us because they are 

846
00:37:18,280 --> 00:37:20,502
not going to have the spiciness that we 

847
00:37:20,502 --> 00:37:23,220
have in toys were playing with and they 

848
00:37:23,220 --> 00:37:25,387
may not even have a common operational 

849
00:37:25,387 --> 00:37:29,000
picture , which means getting them into 

850
00:37:29,000 --> 00:37:32,070
the fight is going to be a really hard 

851
00:37:32,080 --> 00:37:34,920
part of the problem last couple of 

852
00:37:34,920 --> 00:37:38,110
things ? Um , we are doing a pretty 

853
00:37:38,110 --> 00:37:40,930
good job as a government and especially 

854
00:37:40,930 --> 00:37:44,260
as a defense establishment in gearing 

855
00:37:44,260 --> 00:37:47,530
up for managing a broad 

856
00:37:47,530 --> 00:37:50,580
shouldered , aggressive , repressive 

857
00:37:50,580 --> 00:37:52,790
china , right ? We're not doing half 

858
00:37:52,800 --> 00:37:54,411
bad about that . I went back 

859
00:37:54,411 --> 00:37:56,633
incidentally not long ago and read that 

860
00:37:56,633 --> 00:37:59,920
2016 national Security strategy and I 

861
00:37:59,920 --> 00:38:02,730
restrict that . It's not actually a 

862
00:38:02,730 --> 00:38:04,730
great power competition china's 

863
00:38:04,730 --> 00:38:07,860
strategy mostly , that's what D . O . D . 

864
00:38:07,860 --> 00:38:10,870
Did in the transition from the national 

865
00:38:10,870 --> 00:38:12,759
security strategy to the National 

866
00:38:12,759 --> 00:38:14,926
Defense strategy . And it was really a 

867
00:38:14,926 --> 00:38:18,800
nice magic trick that even I pay pretty 

868
00:38:18,800 --> 00:38:20,633
close attention to this . Didn't 

869
00:38:20,633 --> 00:38:24,190
realize how much more focused the NDS 

870
00:38:24,190 --> 00:38:26,600
was than the national Security strategy 

871
00:38:26,600 --> 00:38:29,430
was on china . And , and we've done a 

872
00:38:29,430 --> 00:38:32,330
really good job . Mackenzie will , will 

873
00:38:32,330 --> 00:38:34,790
point out where well among the many 

874
00:38:34,790 --> 00:38:38,390
things Mackenzie will do uh , is I hope 

875
00:38:38,390 --> 00:38:41,350
point out the necessity of greater 

876
00:38:41,350 --> 00:38:44,430
prioritization and the budget gaps of 

877
00:38:44,430 --> 00:38:46,597
achieving it . But it looks to me like 

878
00:38:46,597 --> 00:38:48,652
the gears are meshing . What I think 

879
00:38:48,652 --> 00:38:51,220
we're not thinking enough about is the 

880
00:38:51,220 --> 00:38:53,840
problems attendant on a failing china , 

881
00:38:54,420 --> 00:38:56,642
because it looks to me like that's what 

882
00:38:56,642 --> 00:39:00,410
we are already facing . So what is 

883
00:39:00,420 --> 00:39:03,750
propelling china now is the momentum of 

884
00:39:03,750 --> 00:39:07,020
a rise that has stalled , Where 

885
00:39:07,020 --> 00:39:09,242
pro-market reforms stopped happening in 

886
00:39:09,242 --> 00:39:12,900
2002 ? Where , you know , ask yourself 

887
00:39:12,900 --> 00:39:15,011
why is china making the moves they're 

888
00:39:15,011 --> 00:39:17,760
making now because why not just wait 

889
00:39:17,770 --> 00:39:19,826
till they had won the A . I . Race . 

890
00:39:19,826 --> 00:39:21,437
Why not wait until the trump 

891
00:39:21,437 --> 00:39:23,548
administration has actually collapsed 

892
00:39:23,548 --> 00:39:25,437
America's alliances . They're not 

893
00:39:25,437 --> 00:39:29,220
waiting for any of that and it's at 

894
00:39:29,220 --> 00:39:32,670
least worth considering um that they're 

895
00:39:32,670 --> 00:39:35,610
trying to take advantage of a window of 

896
00:39:35,610 --> 00:39:37,940
opportunity that they feel is closing . 

897
00:39:39,020 --> 00:39:42,970
Um And uhh the last 

898
00:39:42,970 --> 00:39:46,850
thing that occurs to me listening to 

899
00:39:46,860 --> 00:39:50,360
my military colleagues is that we need 

900
00:39:50,360 --> 00:39:53,330
to help um there 

901
00:39:53,920 --> 00:39:56,810
biden administration understand to a 

902
00:39:56,810 --> 00:39:58,921
greater degree than I think the trump 

903
00:39:58,921 --> 00:40:01,360
administration understood that military 

904
00:40:01,360 --> 00:40:04,310
deployments aren't a proxy for 

905
00:40:04,310 --> 00:40:07,170
credibility and that coming out of the 

906
00:40:07,170 --> 00:40:09,280
policy decisions we have made in 

907
00:40:09,280 --> 00:40:12,850
Afghanistan and are likely to make in 

908
00:40:12,850 --> 00:40:16,500
Iraq and Syria that we actually need 

909
00:40:16,500 --> 00:40:18,650
them to get serious about the 

910
00:40:18,650 --> 00:40:21,160
relentless diplomacy and civilian 

911
00:40:21,160 --> 00:40:24,440
leadership of these problems . Um 

912
00:40:24,450 --> 00:40:27,730
rather than expecting the arrival of 

913
00:40:27,740 --> 00:40:30,570
ship pulling into port or an exercise 

914
00:40:30,580 --> 00:40:33,720
to be all we do in order to signal 

915
00:40:33,720 --> 00:40:37,120
credibility because as I think general 

916
00:40:37,120 --> 00:40:40,400
casually started um deterrence is the 

917
00:40:40,400 --> 00:40:44,090
actual game we're in I think 

918
00:40:44,090 --> 00:40:46,620
rather than some pointed comment , I 

919
00:40:46,620 --> 00:40:50,280
will just say follow that thank you 

920
00:40:50,290 --> 00:40:54,270
Francis . Um I I've 

921
00:40:54,270 --> 00:40:56,326
learned a lot actually just being up 

922
00:40:56,326 --> 00:40:59,050
here for the half hour so far and I'm 

923
00:40:59,060 --> 00:41:01,990
I'm I'm glad that on this panel we have 

924
00:41:01,990 --> 00:41:04,157
agreement where I don't think there is 

925
00:41:04,157 --> 00:41:06,157
much else in D . C . On a couple of 

926
00:41:06,157 --> 00:41:08,490
questions and so what do I mean by that ? 

927
00:41:08,490 --> 00:41:11,250
So I think there are several sets of 

928
00:41:11,250 --> 00:41:15,110
big unanswered questions by civilians 

929
00:41:15,110 --> 00:41:18,640
that The army needs clarity on two 

930
00:41:19,110 --> 00:41:22,730
two to continue to keep the 

931
00:41:22,730 --> 00:41:24,897
unsteady peace I guess is what I would 

932
00:41:24,897 --> 00:41:27,730
say . And well , it may seem like there 

933
00:41:27,730 --> 00:41:29,841
is agreement in Washington because of 

934
00:41:29,841 --> 00:41:31,952
the remarks that we've made on this . 

935
00:41:31,952 --> 00:41:35,770
Um there's an absence of of clarity 

936
00:41:35,770 --> 00:41:37,603
because I think partly these are 

937
00:41:37,603 --> 00:41:39,603
politically hard questions . And so 

938
00:41:39,603 --> 00:41:41,714
when you bring that element into it , 

939
00:41:41,714 --> 00:41:43,992
it just it just gets things get harder . 

940
00:41:43,992 --> 00:41:45,770
And so what are some of the big 

941
00:41:45,770 --> 00:41:48,030
unanswered questions ? Well , when if 

942
00:41:48,030 --> 00:41:50,252
I'm a force planner for D . O . D . And 

943
00:41:50,252 --> 00:41:52,030
I look around the world , is it 

944
00:41:52,030 --> 00:41:53,974
deterrence in competition or is it 

945
00:41:53,974 --> 00:41:55,752
winning the war fight ? Because 

946
00:41:55,752 --> 00:41:58,030
increasing while there is some overlap . 

947
00:41:58,030 --> 00:41:59,900
Sure , the number of plans are 

948
00:41:59,900 --> 00:42:01,900
different than the day to day grind 

949
00:42:01,910 --> 00:42:04,132
that the generals have to deal with the 

950
00:42:04,132 --> 00:42:06,021
presence assurance , deterrence , 

951
00:42:06,021 --> 00:42:08,021
dissuasion , persuasion and all the 

952
00:42:08,021 --> 00:42:10,200
other not conflict missions that 

953
00:42:10,200 --> 00:42:12,311
they're doing every single day around 

954
00:42:12,311 --> 00:42:14,256
the world with just as many forces 

955
00:42:14,256 --> 00:42:16,367
forward at the height of the war . So 

956
00:42:16,367 --> 00:42:18,589
what are they doing ? They're doing all 

957
00:42:18,589 --> 00:42:20,644
that other stuff . But the number of 

958
00:42:20,644 --> 00:42:22,700
plans are what we size and structure 

959
00:42:22,700 --> 00:42:25,033
and build the Defense Department budget , 

960
00:42:25,033 --> 00:42:27,390
the Defense Department around . And so 

961
00:42:27,390 --> 00:42:29,446
while there's many plans , of course 

962
00:42:29,446 --> 00:42:31,930
some are preferential and 

963
00:42:32,900 --> 00:42:35,290
uh it's it's increasingly unclear and 

964
00:42:35,290 --> 00:42:37,346
the overlap isn't gonna be enough to 

965
00:42:37,346 --> 00:42:39,568
get us there right where you have , you 

966
00:42:39,568 --> 00:42:41,679
know , do you want specialized forces 

967
00:42:41,679 --> 00:42:43,901
are general purpose and and how much of 

968
00:42:43,901 --> 00:42:45,846
what , which kind ? Um And if it's 

969
00:42:45,846 --> 00:42:48,320
deterrence as as the name of the game , 

970
00:42:48,900 --> 00:42:50,844
is it by denial or by punishment ? 

971
00:42:50,844 --> 00:42:53,430
Because uh those are also again , 

972
00:42:53,440 --> 00:42:56,300
they're different solutions , different 

973
00:42:56,300 --> 00:42:59,540
services , different risk horizons um 

974
00:42:59,550 --> 00:43:01,328
or different risk appetites and 

975
00:43:01,328 --> 00:43:03,439
different time horizons . When you're 

976
00:43:03,439 --> 00:43:05,800
talking about how how exactly what 

977
00:43:05,810 --> 00:43:08,430
deterrent looks like in these 

978
00:43:09,500 --> 00:43:13,110
problem sets . And then 

979
00:43:14,300 --> 00:43:17,740
thinking about if it's the war fight as 

980
00:43:17,740 --> 00:43:19,690
opposed to the competition slash 

981
00:43:19,690 --> 00:43:22,570
deterrent slash presence ? What happens ? 

982
00:43:22,580 --> 00:43:24,691
I guess Cory said it pretty well what 

983
00:43:24,691 --> 00:43:27,040
happens ? What if war is just more than 

984
00:43:27,040 --> 00:43:29,207
the giant missile exchange ? Which you 

985
00:43:29,207 --> 00:43:31,429
know increasingly is what I hear around 

986
00:43:31,429 --> 00:43:34,930
town uh when that's over and the battle 

987
00:43:34,930 --> 00:43:36,819
is not , we're not pretty good at 

988
00:43:36,819 --> 00:43:38,986
ending wars . I think we just saw that 

989
00:43:38,986 --> 00:43:41,041
in Afghanistan . Unfortunately , you 

990
00:43:41,041 --> 00:43:42,874
know , we don't do treaties . An 

991
00:43:42,874 --> 00:43:44,930
armistice is anymore . So um what if 

992
00:43:44,930 --> 00:43:47,730
that doesn't end it then ? 

993
00:43:48,500 --> 00:43:52,420
Is war still uh more than giant 

994
00:43:52,420 --> 00:43:54,640
missile salvos and exchanges ? Is it a 

995
00:43:54,640 --> 00:43:56,720
battle of people in wills ? I think 

996
00:43:56,730 --> 00:43:59,750
this group would agree , but in 

997
00:43:59,750 --> 00:44:01,980
Washington , it's hard to that costs a 

998
00:44:01,980 --> 00:44:03,980
lot of money when we're starting to 

999
00:44:03,980 --> 00:44:06,960
talk about people and wills ah and then 

1000
00:44:06,960 --> 00:44:09,390
on the threat priority ? Just listening 

1001
00:44:09,400 --> 00:44:13,000
to it was a really good panel set up , 

1002
00:44:13,000 --> 00:44:15,111
not because we're on a bit because of 

1003
00:44:15,111 --> 00:44:17,111
the two generals in the two theater 

1004
00:44:17,111 --> 00:44:19,640
perspectives that they bring . Is it a 

1005
00:44:19,640 --> 00:44:21,640
three Theater four sizing construct 

1006
00:44:21,640 --> 00:44:23,751
that we're talking about ? You know , 

1007
00:44:23,751 --> 00:44:26,510
basically balance of power slash um , 

1008
00:44:27,290 --> 00:44:30,940
you know , deterrence in europe and 

1009
00:44:30,940 --> 00:44:33,051
Asia with an economy of force mission 

1010
00:44:33,051 --> 00:44:35,162
in the , in the Middle East . Is that 

1011
00:44:35,162 --> 00:44:38,930
that the essential job de jure of the 

1012
00:44:38,930 --> 00:44:41,152
department And if so we're doing it all 

1013
00:44:41,152 --> 00:44:43,263
wrong because this court has heard me 

1014
00:44:43,263 --> 00:44:45,319
say that's a trillion dollar defense 

1015
00:44:45,319 --> 00:44:47,319
budget . I think it's actually what 

1016
00:44:47,319 --> 00:44:49,374
we're doing on the ground , but it's 

1017
00:44:49,374 --> 00:44:51,430
not what we say we're going to do in 

1018
00:44:51,430 --> 00:44:53,652
paper and , and and in budgeting . So I 

1019
00:44:53,652 --> 00:44:55,763
close it out by saying , um , again , 

1020
00:44:55,763 --> 00:44:57,874
Corey said , we don't have the luxury 

1021
00:44:57,874 --> 00:44:59,986
to optimize to one challenge . Amen . 

1022
00:45:00,490 --> 00:45:02,546
Uh , I agree with that . Even though 

1023
00:45:02,546 --> 00:45:04,712
I'm calling for priorities of course . 

1024
00:45:04,790 --> 00:45:07,530
Um , but who is doing that ? The Marine 

1025
00:45:07,530 --> 00:45:10,240
Corps three core there that served 

1026
00:45:10,240 --> 00:45:14,050
there ? No , no , they can do things 

1027
00:45:14,050 --> 00:45:15,994
that the other chiefs can't do the 

1028
00:45:15,994 --> 00:45:18,161
commandant and get away with it . It's 

1029
00:45:18,161 --> 00:45:20,330
remarkable . Uh , so force designed 

1030
00:45:20,330 --> 00:45:23,110
2030 , uh , you know , it's , it's 

1031
00:45:23,110 --> 00:45:25,110
lauded all over town is as being a 

1032
00:45:25,110 --> 00:45:27,400
brilliant , you know , goering sacred 

1033
00:45:27,400 --> 00:45:30,540
cows , uh , forward looking all the 

1034
00:45:30,540 --> 00:45:33,160
right answers document . Um , and that 

1035
00:45:33,160 --> 00:45:35,104
may be true or is it just really , 

1036
00:45:35,104 --> 00:45:37,410
really , really risky business to 

1037
00:45:37,410 --> 00:45:39,740
specialise in this luxury of one 

1038
00:45:39,740 --> 00:45:42,720
problem , one challenge , one enemy . 

1039
00:45:43,290 --> 00:45:45,340
And while you're doing that shift 

1040
00:45:45,350 --> 00:45:47,410
burden of responsibility onto other 

1041
00:45:47,410 --> 00:45:49,850
services namely the United States Army 

1042
00:45:49,860 --> 00:45:52,840
for what you're giving up our armor , 

1043
00:45:52,990 --> 00:45:56,980
artillery rotary wing capability 

1044
00:45:56,990 --> 00:45:59,720
specifically helicopters . So when the 

1045
00:45:59,720 --> 00:46:01,942
Marine Corps gets rid of it all , who's 

1046
00:46:01,942 --> 00:46:05,270
gonna pick up that bill the army ? But 

1047
00:46:05,280 --> 00:46:07,970
I didn't hear any brilliant exchange by 

1048
00:46:07,970 --> 00:46:10,081
civilians in Washington . Like making 

1049
00:46:10,081 --> 00:46:12,137
that overt choice . As far as I know 

1050
00:46:12,137 --> 00:46:14,192
there's no agreement with the chiefs 

1051
00:46:14,192 --> 00:46:16,303
that this was the agreement . So it's 

1052
00:46:16,303 --> 00:46:18,192
just and and and the commandant's 

1053
00:46:18,192 --> 00:46:20,526
moving forward . It's already happening . 

1054
00:46:20,526 --> 00:46:22,581
So what does this what does this tax 

1055
00:46:22,581 --> 00:46:24,748
mean on the army ? The army is already 

1056
00:46:24,748 --> 00:46:26,914
getting taxed with you know , pandemic 

1057
00:46:26,914 --> 00:46:28,914
relief in response , more climate , 

1058
00:46:28,914 --> 00:46:31,470
everything uh in an additional domestic 

1059
00:46:31,480 --> 00:46:34,740
missions border housing of 

1060
00:46:34,740 --> 00:46:38,150
60,000 afghan refugees , uh citizens 

1061
00:46:38,150 --> 00:46:40,780
and S . I . V . S . And other personnel 

1062
00:46:40,780 --> 00:46:42,891
at us military bases list goes on and 

1063
00:46:42,891 --> 00:46:46,790
on and on and so uh I 

1064
00:46:46,790 --> 00:46:48,846
guess I would conclude by saying you 

1065
00:46:48,846 --> 00:46:50,734
know that that sounds smart force 

1066
00:46:50,734 --> 00:46:53,870
designed 2030 you know people like to 

1067
00:46:53,870 --> 00:46:56,037
say well we never fought at the folder 

1068
00:46:56,037 --> 00:46:58,530
gap Francis but guess what we did do we 

1069
00:46:58,530 --> 00:47:00,900
fought proxies of our enemies and world 

1070
00:47:00,900 --> 00:47:03,430
War One and during the Cold War 

1071
00:47:03,440 --> 00:47:05,840
everywhere else around the world and in 

1072
00:47:05,850 --> 00:47:08,940
the small messy wars . And I think 

1073
00:47:08,940 --> 00:47:10,829
we'll continue to see that in the 

1074
00:47:10,829 --> 00:47:14,570
future with china and with Russia . Uh 

1075
00:47:14,580 --> 00:47:18,500
but but we're not being honest about 

1076
00:47:18,500 --> 00:47:21,180
that I guess is what I'm saying . So my 

1077
00:47:21,180 --> 00:47:23,630
watchword is honesty today . Thanks . 

1078
00:47:23,640 --> 00:47:27,080
Um I have a note by the way . Um you've 

1079
00:47:27,080 --> 00:47:29,136
been invited to be on a panel called 

1080
00:47:29,136 --> 00:47:32,290
the future of the Marine Corps . They 

1081
00:47:32,300 --> 00:47:34,189
would very much like to hear your 

1082
00:47:34,189 --> 00:47:36,380
thoughts about what that looks . So I 

1083
00:47:36,390 --> 00:47:38,279
um when I spoke to the commandant 

1084
00:47:38,279 --> 00:47:40,680
privately recently um he shook my hand , 

1085
00:47:40,680 --> 00:47:42,680
said hello I was on my panel and he 

1086
00:47:42,680 --> 00:47:44,624
shook my hand and said goodbye . I 

1087
00:47:44,624 --> 00:47:47,320
think that's something up . You all 

1088
00:47:47,320 --> 00:47:50,700
have used uh your opportunities to talk 

1089
00:47:50,700 --> 00:47:53,040
at some length or other about allies 

1090
00:47:53,040 --> 00:47:54,984
and partners . And I would like to 

1091
00:47:54,984 --> 00:47:57,151
start with general cavalier in general 

1092
00:47:57,151 --> 00:48:00,000
Flynn uh and and raise a point that I 

1093
00:48:00,000 --> 00:48:02,000
think Corey might have brought up . 

1094
00:48:02,000 --> 00:48:03,778
What is the expectation in your 

1095
00:48:03,778 --> 00:48:05,556
interaction with our allies and 

1096
00:48:05,556 --> 00:48:07,850
partners , what they have regarding 

1097
00:48:07,860 --> 00:48:09,749
land power in the future from the 

1098
00:48:09,749 --> 00:48:11,860
United States . General Kohli went go 

1099
00:48:11,860 --> 00:48:14,590
first please . Yeah . Our um 

1100
00:48:14,770 --> 00:48:17,440
expectations derived directly from our 

1101
00:48:17,440 --> 00:48:19,970
planning efforts . And um our 

1102
00:48:19,980 --> 00:48:22,036
expectations can be measured both in 

1103
00:48:22,036 --> 00:48:24,540
terms of quantity and quality of forces 

1104
00:48:24,540 --> 00:48:28,090
available you know . Um So 

1105
00:48:28,100 --> 00:48:30,550
I have to study the actual force that's 

1106
00:48:30,550 --> 00:48:33,500
on the ground um um facing 

1107
00:48:33,970 --> 00:48:37,760
the NATO alliance and it is a very very 

1108
00:48:37,760 --> 00:48:40,330
significant force that cannot be 

1109
00:48:40,340 --> 00:48:42,980
assumed away or wished away and its 

1110
00:48:42,990 --> 00:48:45,190
proximity to the borders of the 

1111
00:48:45,190 --> 00:48:47,460
alliance in some cases and and not that 

1112
00:48:47,460 --> 00:48:50,040
far removed in others . So there's a 

1113
00:48:50,040 --> 00:48:53,510
time and distance um 

1114
00:48:53,700 --> 00:48:57,550
consideration that goes to 

1115
00:48:57,550 --> 00:49:00,520
the readiness , the availability , the 

1116
00:49:00,520 --> 00:49:02,687
quantity and the quality of the allied 

1117
00:49:02,687 --> 00:49:06,550
forces that would face it . So what we 

1118
00:49:06,550 --> 00:49:09,180
actually , you know , expect is uh 

1119
00:49:09,190 --> 00:49:11,246
probably shouldn't be discussed very 

1120
00:49:11,246 --> 00:49:13,468
much in this forum but it's quite a bit 

1121
00:49:13,468 --> 00:49:16,290
and it does rely on us 

1122
00:49:17,170 --> 00:49:20,910
enablement at the higher end . Um 

1123
00:49:20,920 --> 00:49:23,320
And of course to get it into the fight 

1124
00:49:23,330 --> 00:49:25,710
to facilitate it into the fight . As a 

1125
00:49:25,720 --> 00:49:28,510
doctor Shockey described , it requires 

1126
00:49:28,520 --> 00:49:31,060
us presence , us participation in U . S . 

1127
00:49:31,060 --> 00:49:34,320
Leadership . So there's a reason forces 

1128
00:49:34,320 --> 00:49:36,264
remain on the continent . American 

1129
00:49:36,264 --> 00:49:38,098
forces remain on the continent . 

1130
00:49:38,098 --> 00:49:39,709
There's a reason we practice 

1131
00:49:39,709 --> 00:49:41,764
reinforcement because you can't wish 

1132
00:49:41,764 --> 00:49:43,764
away the force that's opposing us . 

1133
00:49:43,764 --> 00:49:46,950
It's there , it's really there and it 

1134
00:49:46,950 --> 00:49:49,680
requires a force that is capable of 

1135
00:49:49,680 --> 00:49:52,380
defeating it in its own domain as well 

1136
00:49:52,380 --> 00:49:54,547
as across multiple domains . So that's 

1137
00:49:54,547 --> 00:49:56,713
what that's kind of what we work on in 

1138
00:49:56,713 --> 00:50:00,470
terms of how that plays out . Um 

1139
00:50:00,480 --> 00:50:03,540
Mr rose across our interactions with 

1140
00:50:03,540 --> 00:50:07,430
our allies . Um We rehearse you know 

1141
00:50:07,440 --> 00:50:10,580
the parts , we um practice the things 

1142
00:50:10,580 --> 00:50:12,802
we think we would have to do in a large 

1143
00:50:12,802 --> 00:50:14,960
scale fight um with our allies . We 

1144
00:50:14,960 --> 00:50:17,071
rehearse them very frequently . I see 

1145
00:50:17,071 --> 00:50:19,490
adam yolks there from the polish army . 

1146
00:50:19,860 --> 00:50:21,820
We have participated together in 

1147
00:50:21,820 --> 00:50:24,153
numerous wet gap crossings for instance , 

1148
00:50:24,153 --> 00:50:26,640
bridging operations . Very complicated 

1149
00:50:26,640 --> 00:50:29,330
things in which all of our forces would 

1150
00:50:29,330 --> 00:50:31,790
have to pull assets successfully to 

1151
00:50:31,790 --> 00:50:35,460
negotiate the number of obstacles that 

1152
00:50:35,460 --> 00:50:39,190
we would face in operations . We 

1153
00:50:39,190 --> 00:50:41,000
practice parachuting operations 

1154
00:50:41,000 --> 00:50:43,230
together for rapid contingency response 

1155
00:50:43,230 --> 00:50:45,640
to include preparing to bring forces 

1156
00:50:45,640 --> 00:50:48,490
over from us army pacific and 

1157
00:50:48,490 --> 00:50:51,420
parachuting into our area . Um So the 

1158
00:50:51,420 --> 00:50:53,660
things that we anticipate having to do 

1159
00:50:53,660 --> 00:50:55,800
in large scale fight drive our 

1160
00:50:55,810 --> 00:50:57,532
interaction with our allies on 

1161
00:50:57,532 --> 00:50:59,670
exercises and our preparatory 

1162
00:50:59,670 --> 00:51:02,100
interactions with our allies are 

1163
00:51:02,110 --> 00:51:04,332
determined by what we expect to do with 

1164
00:51:04,332 --> 00:51:06,499
them and exercises . Um So it all kind 

1165
00:51:06,499 --> 00:51:08,554
of comes together um You know from I 

1166
00:51:08,554 --> 00:51:10,666
met as Dr Singh talked about a moment 

1167
00:51:10,666 --> 00:51:12,888
ago all the way through the large scale 

1168
00:51:12,888 --> 00:51:15,110
exercises that we do . Everything we do 

1169
00:51:15,110 --> 00:51:17,110
in U . S . Army europe is done with 

1170
00:51:17,110 --> 00:51:19,166
allies . In fact it's hard for me to 

1171
00:51:19,166 --> 00:51:21,360
think of any activity we conduct that 

1172
00:51:21,360 --> 00:51:23,460
is not conducted with our with our 

1173
00:51:23,460 --> 00:51:25,480
allies and in some cases special 

1174
00:51:25,480 --> 00:51:27,910
partners as well . General thanks 

1175
00:51:27,910 --> 00:51:30,330
general Flynn . So a lot of a lot of 

1176
00:51:30,330 --> 00:51:33,210
similarities . So I won't re grind a 

1177
00:51:33,210 --> 00:51:35,432
number of things that chris mentioned . 

1178
00:51:35,432 --> 00:51:38,250
I will say where there is 

1179
00:51:38,260 --> 00:51:41,490
a binding um 

1180
00:51:41,960 --> 00:51:44,760
collective security arrangement and 

1181
00:51:44,770 --> 00:51:48,340
forces uh that as chris 

1182
00:51:48,340 --> 00:51:50,396
described are working day in and day 

1183
00:51:50,396 --> 00:51:54,350
out . Um We have a little bit of 

1184
00:51:54,350 --> 00:51:57,650
a different challenge in across the 

1185
00:51:57,650 --> 00:52:00,620
indo pacific while we do have some 

1186
00:52:00,620 --> 00:52:04,480
partners that uh you know we have 

1187
00:52:04,480 --> 00:52:07,810
treaties and obligations that we will 

1188
00:52:07,810 --> 00:52:10,980
meet . There are others that are 

1189
00:52:11,950 --> 00:52:15,250
yeah there are our work with them 

1190
00:52:15,630 --> 00:52:19,460
requires to meet them I 

1191
00:52:19,470 --> 00:52:21,692
think as dr shock you mentioned to meet 

1192
00:52:21,692 --> 00:52:24,470
them forward and be forward with them 

1193
00:52:24,940 --> 00:52:28,050
and seek ways to for them to 

1194
00:52:28,050 --> 00:52:31,890
identify the things that they would 

1195
00:52:31,890 --> 00:52:34,450
like our help with . And then 

1196
00:52:34,450 --> 00:52:36,672
conversely the things that we can learn 

1197
00:52:36,672 --> 00:52:40,430
from them . Uh As dr Shockey was 

1198
00:52:40,430 --> 00:52:43,600
talking I thought of a few years back , 

1199
00:52:43,610 --> 00:52:45,610
I remember taking a corps commander 

1200
00:52:45,610 --> 00:52:47,860
from a country in Southeast Asia into 

1201
00:52:47,860 --> 00:52:51,720
one of our ops centers . And when 

1202
00:52:51,720 --> 00:52:54,050
we walked out I was sort of feeling 

1203
00:52:54,050 --> 00:52:56,050
very proud about all the technology 

1204
00:52:56,050 --> 00:52:58,530
that we had there and I said you know 

1205
00:52:58,540 --> 00:53:00,630
general , what do you think ? And he 

1206
00:53:00,630 --> 00:53:03,180
said I think we'll never be like that . 

1207
00:53:04,450 --> 00:53:08,390
And then we continued to walk and he 

1208
00:53:08,400 --> 00:53:10,344
stopped and he pointed over to the 

1209
00:53:10,344 --> 00:53:12,456
jungle and he said but that's not why 

1210
00:53:12,456 --> 00:53:15,030
you need us . And so I think that that 

1211
00:53:15,040 --> 00:53:18,680
was an illustration to me of the 

1212
00:53:18,690 --> 00:53:21,900
help and assistance that we can give to 

1213
00:53:21,900 --> 00:53:25,690
them because there were things mm in 

1214
00:53:25,690 --> 00:53:28,180
the command post that added value to 

1215
00:53:28,650 --> 00:53:30,872
the operation that we happen to be on . 

1216
00:53:31,350 --> 00:53:33,572
But there were also things that we need 

1217
00:53:33,572 --> 00:53:36,220
to learn from them . And I think that 

1218
00:53:36,220 --> 00:53:38,970
that I know that curses team is doing 

1219
00:53:38,970 --> 00:53:42,310
that every day . We um everything that 

1220
00:53:42,310 --> 00:53:44,143
we're trying to do in the end of 

1221
00:53:44,143 --> 00:53:46,700
pacific is with our allies and partners . 

1222
00:53:46,710 --> 00:53:49,780
Everything uh and the more we we do 

1223
00:53:49,780 --> 00:53:53,080
that I think the more uh confidence 

1224
00:53:53,080 --> 00:53:56,840
that they gain by by being alongside us 

1225
00:53:56,850 --> 00:53:58,906
by learning from one another , by us 

1226
00:53:58,906 --> 00:54:01,650
reaching out to them to find out what 

1227
00:54:01,660 --> 00:54:05,260
is it that they need from us . And then , 

1228
00:54:05,740 --> 00:54:08,110
conversely , what is it that they offer 

1229
00:54:08,110 --> 00:54:10,920
to us that we need to learn inside of 

1230
00:54:10,920 --> 00:54:13,087
our own formations , because there are 

1231
00:54:13,087 --> 00:54:14,770
an enormous amount of skilled 

1232
00:54:14,770 --> 00:54:17,050
professionals out there in the region 

1233
00:54:17,060 --> 00:54:20,170
that we can benefit from . And uh so I 

1234
00:54:20,170 --> 00:54:22,337
think , you know , in addition to what 

1235
00:54:22,337 --> 00:54:24,503
chris is saying , uh one other comment 

1236
00:54:24,503 --> 00:54:27,730
that I wanted to sort of emphasize that 

1237
00:54:27,730 --> 00:54:31,230
chris mentioned on the other side , Um 

1238
00:54:31,240 --> 00:54:34,570
there is a known adversary , multiple 

1239
00:54:34,570 --> 00:54:36,737
known adversaries . I mean , you can't 

1240
00:54:36,737 --> 00:54:38,903
discount the 10,000 tubes of artillery 

1241
00:54:38,903 --> 00:54:42,000
that are facing down into south Korea , 

1242
00:54:42,010 --> 00:54:45,080
so it's there uh and we 

1243
00:54:45,090 --> 00:54:48,740
uh while we may size for competitive 

1244
00:54:48,740 --> 00:54:52,050
activities , these these are real 

1245
00:54:52,050 --> 00:54:55,610
numbers with real forces and they 

1246
00:54:55,620 --> 00:54:58,400
really could do something . And so we 

1247
00:54:58,400 --> 00:55:02,270
have this um delicate balance 

1248
00:55:02,270 --> 00:55:04,270
that we have to walk about doing a 

1249
00:55:04,270 --> 00:55:07,370
range of competitive activities that 

1250
00:55:07,370 --> 00:55:11,170
are direct and indirect in support of 

1251
00:55:11,170 --> 00:55:13,660
our allies and partners , but we also 

1252
00:55:13,660 --> 00:55:16,710
have to be able to execute in the event 

1253
00:55:16,710 --> 00:55:18,766
that something goes terribly wrong . 

1254
00:55:18,766 --> 00:55:22,260
And so uh that's what I think that uh 

1255
00:55:22,740 --> 00:55:26,050
we're faced with each day and every 

1256
00:55:26,050 --> 00:55:29,020
night and uh and we have to be very 

1257
00:55:29,020 --> 00:55:31,187
pragmatic about our ability to respond 

1258
00:55:31,187 --> 00:55:33,190
to that general thank you . And 

1259
00:55:33,190 --> 00:55:36,250
similarly , charlie , I think it 

1260
00:55:36,260 --> 00:55:39,840
befalls you and me to distinguish 

1261
00:55:39,840 --> 00:55:42,830
between the way we aspire to fight 

1262
00:55:42,830 --> 00:55:44,920
someday in the future and the way we 

1263
00:55:44,920 --> 00:55:47,300
have to prepare to fight with what we 

1264
00:55:47,300 --> 00:55:49,540
have right now and those aren't 

1265
00:55:49,540 --> 00:55:51,540
necessarily the same thing and it's 

1266
00:55:51,540 --> 00:55:53,707
easy for us in academic discussions to 

1267
00:55:53,707 --> 00:55:56,190
conflate those sometimes . So we kind 

1268
00:55:56,190 --> 00:55:58,246
of are the place where you have to , 

1269
00:55:58,246 --> 00:56:00,357
where we got to consort those two and 

1270
00:56:00,357 --> 00:56:02,579
make sure we're able to prepare for the 

1271
00:56:02,579 --> 00:56:04,746
ladder while we were able currently to 

1272
00:56:04,746 --> 00:56:06,579
execute the former . That's it . 

1273
00:56:06,579 --> 00:56:09,340
General thanks Corey . Since you 

1274
00:56:09,350 --> 00:56:11,294
started this discussion about what 

1275
00:56:11,294 --> 00:56:14,680
allies need from us , what should they 

1276
00:56:14,680 --> 00:56:18,270
expect from us or what should we be 

1277
00:56:18,270 --> 00:56:21,410
able to contribute to them and what is 

1278
00:56:21,410 --> 00:56:23,360
reasonable for us to expect ? As 

1279
00:56:23,370 --> 00:56:25,481
general Flynn said that's not why you 

1280
00:56:25,481 --> 00:56:28,990
need us . What should we um What's 

1281
00:56:28,990 --> 00:56:31,157
reasonable for us to think that we can 

1282
00:56:31,157 --> 00:56:34,930
gain from them ? Uh That's a great 

1283
00:56:34,930 --> 00:56:37,050
question and I think the answer like 

1284
00:56:37,060 --> 00:56:39,116
with any good question is it depends 

1285
00:56:39,430 --> 00:56:41,900
right , It depends on whether you have 

1286
00:56:41,910 --> 00:56:45,530
a defense treaty with them . Um 

1287
00:56:45,540 --> 00:56:49,060
We in europe we have tried to blur the 

1288
00:56:49,060 --> 00:56:51,171
line between those countries that are 

1289
00:56:51,171 --> 00:56:53,282
NATO members and those countries that 

1290
00:56:53,282 --> 00:56:56,450
we just want to defend . And the 

1291
00:56:56,450 --> 00:56:59,360
Russians have driven the cost way up to 

1292
00:56:59,360 --> 00:57:03,350
keeping that line blurry . Um and I 

1293
00:57:03,350 --> 00:57:06,390
think we should expect adversaries in 

1294
00:57:06,400 --> 00:57:09,640
Asia to try and do the same , which is 

1295
00:57:09,640 --> 00:57:11,830
why the quality is such an interesting 

1296
00:57:11,840 --> 00:57:15,530
innovation because it 

1297
00:57:15,530 --> 00:57:17,697
does blur the line and interesting and 

1298
00:57:17,697 --> 00:57:19,752
important ways . I think Aucas blurs 

1299
00:57:19,752 --> 00:57:21,919
the line and interesting and important 

1300
00:57:21,919 --> 00:57:25,630
ways . Um And we 

1301
00:57:25,630 --> 00:57:29,540
should uh it is to our advantage 

1302
00:57:29,550 --> 00:57:33,120
to have those lines blurry . But the 

1303
00:57:33,120 --> 00:57:35,750
problem is when your marker gets called 

1304
00:57:35,750 --> 00:57:37,972
in on that stuff , you actually have to 

1305
00:57:37,972 --> 00:57:40,930
be willing to do it . And I was 

1306
00:57:40,930 --> 00:57:43,820
pleasantly surprised at how far forward 

1307
00:57:43,820 --> 00:57:45,709
the biden administration has been 

1308
00:57:45,709 --> 00:57:48,750
leaning on Taiwan for example . Ah 

1309
00:57:49,130 --> 00:57:52,770
But as General Flynn 

1310
00:57:52,770 --> 00:57:55,160
said that's it . These are nontrivial 

1311
00:57:55,160 --> 00:57:57,216
challenges when you actually have to 

1312
00:57:57,216 --> 00:58:01,210
execute um on them and 

1313
00:58:01,520 --> 00:58:05,160
and what I would want if I were an 

1314
00:58:05,160 --> 00:58:08,710
american ally is a lot less 

1315
00:58:08,710 --> 00:58:11,530
nonsense from us . Right ? A lot less 

1316
00:58:11,530 --> 00:58:14,340
grandiose statements . A lot more 

1317
00:58:14,340 --> 00:58:16,600
practical nuts and bolts under what 

1318
00:58:16,600 --> 00:58:19,410
conditions can you rely on these things ? 

1319
00:58:19,420 --> 00:58:22,540
Let's codify them in war plans . Um , 

1320
00:58:23,120 --> 00:58:25,700
you can't reliably deliver the United 

1321
00:58:25,700 --> 00:58:28,090
States unless the Congress is engaged 

1322
00:58:28,100 --> 00:58:32,000
in the activity . So agreements that 

1323
00:58:32,000 --> 00:58:34,560
don't have congressional ratification 

1324
00:58:34,570 --> 00:58:37,230
aren't really agreements and that the 

1325
00:58:37,230 --> 00:58:39,200
increasing seesawing of executive 

1326
00:58:39,200 --> 00:58:42,240
orders across administrations only 

1327
00:58:42,240 --> 00:58:44,407
reinforces that for allies . So what I 

1328
00:58:44,407 --> 00:58:46,462
would want from the United States is 

1329
00:58:46,462 --> 00:58:48,573
less nonsense and more practicality . 

1330
00:58:48,620 --> 00:58:50,509
What I think they have a right to 

1331
00:58:50,509 --> 00:58:53,490
expect from the United States is 

1332
00:58:53,490 --> 00:58:56,040
clarity about what we can and can't do 

1333
00:58:56,720 --> 00:58:59,790
and honesty about as Mackenzie was 

1334
00:58:59,790 --> 00:59:02,720
saying honesty about what we will and 

1335
00:59:02,720 --> 00:59:05,670
won't do uh which is a hard 

1336
00:59:05,670 --> 00:59:08,720
conversation to have right because 

1337
00:59:08,730 --> 00:59:10,952
there are lots of things we may want to 

1338
00:59:10,952 --> 00:59:13,520
do that we won't do when push comes to 

1339
00:59:13,520 --> 00:59:17,480
shove . Uh and making the 

1340
00:59:17,480 --> 00:59:19,910
best of that is I mean the United 

1341
00:59:19,910 --> 00:59:21,966
States is a difficult Ally . Were an 

1342
00:59:21,966 --> 00:59:24,400
unreliable ally , even though that's 

1343
00:59:24,400 --> 00:59:26,122
not how we like to think about 

1344
00:59:26,122 --> 00:59:28,170
ourselves , right ? We think about 

1345
00:59:28,170 --> 00:59:30,840
ourselves even in the context of World 

1346
00:59:30,840 --> 00:59:34,260
War Two as the war winning ally and 

1347
00:59:34,260 --> 00:59:36,371
what we looked like to the british is 

1348
00:59:36,371 --> 00:59:38,482
somebody who wouldn't show up for 3.5 

1349
00:59:38,482 --> 00:59:40,770
years and we look like that to a lot of 

1350
00:59:40,770 --> 00:59:44,370
continental Europeans too . So I think 

1351
00:59:44,380 --> 00:59:47,610
um less uh chest thumping 

1352
00:59:47,610 --> 00:59:50,630
triumphalism out of the United States 

1353
00:59:50,630 --> 00:59:52,660
and a lot more good old fashioned 

1354
00:59:52,660 --> 00:59:55,880
strategy , which is so Shockey's theory 

1355
00:59:55,880 --> 00:59:57,750
of strategy is that every good 

1356
00:59:57,750 --> 01:00:00,540
strategist is fundamentally a desperate 

1357
01:00:00,550 --> 01:00:03,810
paranoiac because strategist spend all 

1358
01:00:03,810 --> 01:00:06,032
their time thinking about , oh my God , 

1359
01:00:06,032 --> 01:00:08,100
what if that a trap door opens 

1360
01:00:08,100 --> 01:00:10,322
underneath my chair and I fall into the 

1361
01:00:10,322 --> 01:00:12,378
sewer underneath this building . How 

1362
01:00:12,378 --> 01:00:14,656
did you know that ? We had one of them ? 

1363
01:00:14,656 --> 01:00:16,711
Well , I think you don't because you 

1364
01:00:16,711 --> 01:00:18,878
would have exercised the button by now 

1365
01:00:18,878 --> 01:00:20,878
frank , you know ? Um lastly what I 

1366
01:00:20,878 --> 01:00:23,990
think we can expect from allies . I 

1367
01:00:23,990 --> 01:00:25,990
hated the way President Obama would 

1368
01:00:25,990 --> 01:00:28,157
always say we can't care about it more 

1369
01:00:28,157 --> 01:00:32,130
than they do because that um 

1370
01:00:32,710 --> 01:00:35,940
that rings of the arrogance of a 

1371
01:00:35,940 --> 01:00:37,980
country that's never had to face an 

1372
01:00:37,980 --> 01:00:41,220
overwhelming challenge . And we ought 

1373
01:00:41,220 --> 01:00:44,260
to ask ourselves what , you know , the 

1374
01:00:44,270 --> 01:00:46,103
people of my great home state of 

1375
01:00:46,103 --> 01:00:48,580
California would do if they were facing 

1376
01:00:48,580 --> 01:00:51,560
a 10-1 challenge of conquest and we 

1377
01:00:51,560 --> 01:00:54,620
should be actually nicer and more 

1378
01:00:54,630 --> 01:00:58,140
reassuring about even if 

1379
01:00:58,610 --> 01:01:02,490
we can't defend your territory from 

1380
01:01:02,490 --> 01:01:04,323
the outset , we will help you re 

1381
01:01:04,323 --> 01:01:08,160
conquer it eventually . Because that's 

1382
01:01:08,310 --> 01:01:10,421
reassurance . I would want to fire an 

1383
01:01:10,421 --> 01:01:13,250
american ally big . What do you think 

1384
01:01:13,250 --> 01:01:16,380
is uh is the right exchange between 

1385
01:01:16,390 --> 01:01:18,440
allies and partners and the United 

1386
01:01:18,440 --> 01:01:20,580
States regarding the topic at hand of 

1387
01:01:20,580 --> 01:01:23,220
land power ? Uh huh . I'm sorry , 

1388
01:01:23,230 --> 01:01:26,730
I was gonna I was gonna jump in while 

1389
01:01:26,730 --> 01:01:29,800
you were talking to go for it . I think 

1390
01:01:29,800 --> 01:01:33,680
that Corey said something that I think 

1391
01:01:33,680 --> 01:01:35,902
it's pretty provocative which is in and 

1392
01:01:35,902 --> 01:01:37,902
really important , which is that we 

1393
01:01:37,902 --> 01:01:40,124
tend we tend to dress it up in a lot of 

1394
01:01:40,124 --> 01:01:42,180
pomp and circumstance . This are you 

1395
01:01:42,180 --> 01:01:45,850
know are you know the alliances 

1396
01:01:45,850 --> 01:01:48,230
and they're unbreakable and they are , 

1397
01:01:48,240 --> 01:01:50,462
you know , you know these these forever 

1398
01:01:50,462 --> 01:01:53,080
commitments um because everybody knows 

1399
01:01:53,080 --> 01:01:55,440
that alliances are not uh forever 

1400
01:01:55,440 --> 01:01:57,750
commitments and that they are um 

1401
01:01:57,760 --> 01:02:00,490
they're there sometimes , you know , 

1402
01:02:00,500 --> 01:02:02,500
very successful . They're more like 

1403
01:02:02,500 --> 01:02:04,556
marriages and a lot of ways with all 

1404
01:02:04,556 --> 01:02:06,389
the work that goes into having a 

1405
01:02:06,389 --> 01:02:08,667
marriage be successful , It's not just , 

1406
01:02:08,667 --> 01:02:10,770
you know , you're you you sign the 

1407
01:02:10,770 --> 01:02:12,840
treaty and now you're forever more , 

1408
01:02:12,850 --> 01:02:14,794
you know , gonna be there for each 

1409
01:02:14,794 --> 01:02:18,080
other . Um and I think that what we 

1410
01:02:18,090 --> 01:02:21,120
what we have is something really 

1411
01:02:21,600 --> 01:02:24,900
uh Uniquely important which is that we 

1412
01:02:24,900 --> 01:02:26,678
have this network of allies and 

1413
01:02:26,678 --> 01:02:28,622
partners . It is our strength back 

1414
01:02:28,622 --> 01:02:30,789
again , the same . Corey said it's not 

1415
01:02:30,789 --> 01:02:33,011
us versus China and us versus Russia in 

1416
01:02:33,011 --> 01:02:34,956
a lot of these shaping of the 21st 

1417
01:02:34,956 --> 01:02:37,390
century . It's us and a whole bunch of 

1418
01:02:37,390 --> 01:02:39,880
other countries who kind of share a 

1419
01:02:39,880 --> 01:02:42,047
vision of what we would like the world 

1420
01:02:42,047 --> 01:02:44,720
to look like . And Russia and china 

1421
01:02:44,730 --> 01:02:48,030
having revisionist ideas to one degree 

1422
01:02:48,030 --> 01:02:50,220
or another about a lot of those things 

1423
01:02:50,230 --> 01:02:52,119
around which there's pretty broad 

1424
01:02:52,119 --> 01:02:53,786
consensus and the rest of the 

1425
01:02:53,786 --> 01:02:56,120
international community . But then what 

1426
01:02:56,120 --> 01:02:59,530
we forget is the day today for those 

1427
01:02:59,530 --> 01:03:01,290
allies and partners looks very 

1428
01:03:01,290 --> 01:03:05,250
different for every ally and partner 

1429
01:03:05,250 --> 01:03:08,520
we have in the Asia pacific china is an 

1430
01:03:08,520 --> 01:03:12,250
overmatch right china is crushes them 

1431
01:03:12,250 --> 01:03:15,810
very quickly . And so their perspective 

1432
01:03:15,810 --> 01:03:18,080
on what they can do in terms of showing 

1433
01:03:18,080 --> 01:03:20,290
spine and standing up to china and 

1434
01:03:20,290 --> 01:03:23,160
talking truth . Um that looks very 

1435
01:03:23,160 --> 01:03:25,790
different for them for every one of the 

1436
01:03:25,800 --> 01:03:27,911
countries in Ozzie and china is their 

1437
01:03:27,911 --> 01:03:30,022
largest trading partner for every and 

1438
01:03:30,022 --> 01:03:32,820
for even big powers like India , you 

1439
01:03:32,820 --> 01:03:35,040
know , India is not catching up to 

1440
01:03:35,040 --> 01:03:37,380
china guys . Like it's not catching up 

1441
01:03:37,380 --> 01:03:39,491
on fighters . It's not catching up on 

1442
01:03:39,491 --> 01:03:42,180
submarines . It's not , you know , now . 

1443
01:03:42,190 --> 01:03:44,412
So so then you start to have to look at 

1444
01:03:44,412 --> 01:03:46,780
the little things . What are the little 

1445
01:03:46,780 --> 01:03:49,002
things the little things are , how does 

1446
01:03:49,002 --> 01:03:51,670
how does the Taiwan respond to 

1447
01:03:51,680 --> 01:03:55,110
aggression from Beijing in terms of 

1448
01:03:55,110 --> 01:03:57,277
like what we've seen recently with all 

1449
01:03:57,277 --> 01:03:59,388
of the , you know , all of the ages , 

1450
01:03:59,388 --> 01:04:01,332
you know , encouraging how does in 

1451
01:04:01,332 --> 01:04:04,920
India stand up to a go on incident 

1452
01:04:04,930 --> 01:04:07,580
where it has uh it has soldiers killed 

1453
01:04:07,580 --> 01:04:10,010
for the first time in 45 years on its 

1454
01:04:10,010 --> 01:04:12,660
disputed land border with china . Right ? 

1455
01:04:12,670 --> 01:04:15,210
How did and then what do they those 

1456
01:04:15,210 --> 01:04:17,321
allies and partners , how does how do 

1457
01:04:17,321 --> 01:04:19,543
partners in the south china sea respond 

1458
01:04:19,543 --> 01:04:22,910
essentially , china's extension of its 

1459
01:04:23,290 --> 01:04:26,310
um of its dominance to the first island 

1460
01:04:26,310 --> 01:04:28,800
chain . Right , uh you know , south 

1461
01:04:28,800 --> 01:04:31,290
China Sea and and and further east . 

1462
01:04:31,300 --> 01:04:33,580
How did they respond and and look to 

1463
01:04:33,580 --> 01:04:37,160
handling that ? And then how do we help 

1464
01:04:37,170 --> 01:04:40,940
back up ? What works uh for those 

1465
01:04:40,940 --> 01:04:43,430
allies and partners ? Because one of 

1466
01:04:43,430 --> 01:04:45,319
the things you can't do to have a 

1467
01:04:45,319 --> 01:04:48,710
successful alliance is to expect more 

1468
01:04:48,710 --> 01:04:51,840
than your partners are capable of doing 

1469
01:04:51,850 --> 01:04:54,590
right . You need to figure out how you 

1470
01:04:54,590 --> 01:04:56,646
partner effectively and play to each 

1471
01:04:56,646 --> 01:04:58,830
other's strengths . What I do think we 

1472
01:04:58,840 --> 01:05:01,200
need to expect from our allies and 

1473
01:05:01,200 --> 01:05:03,870
partners though , you know , to , you 

1474
01:05:03,870 --> 01:05:05,926
know , to to , you know , to channel 

1475
01:05:05,926 --> 01:05:08,259
some of that . What you're hearing from , 

1476
01:05:08,259 --> 01:05:10,259
you know , President Obama and I've 

1477
01:05:10,259 --> 01:05:12,426
heard from leaders , political leaders 

1478
01:05:12,426 --> 01:05:14,481
on both ends of the spectrum about , 

1479
01:05:14,481 --> 01:05:16,648
you know , getting allies to step up . 

1480
01:05:16,648 --> 01:05:18,648
I think what we need to expect from 

1481
01:05:18,648 --> 01:05:21,240
them is um is the same kind of clarity 

1482
01:05:21,250 --> 01:05:24,410
about how they want to face these 

1483
01:05:24,410 --> 01:05:26,466
challenges because when you shut the 

1484
01:05:26,466 --> 01:05:28,577
door , they all agree that they don't 

1485
01:05:28,577 --> 01:05:32,390
like the coercion and the uh you know , 

1486
01:05:32,390 --> 01:05:34,446
and the pressure that's coming along 

1487
01:05:34,446 --> 01:05:36,668
with , you know , the B Ri projects and 

1488
01:05:36,668 --> 01:05:38,950
the ability of the chinese to turn turn 

1489
01:05:38,950 --> 01:05:41,172
the screws on them . The willingness of 

1490
01:05:41,172 --> 01:05:43,283
the chinese to do economic coercion , 

1491
01:05:43,290 --> 01:05:45,346
you know , like what we've seen with 

1492
01:05:45,346 --> 01:05:47,680
Australia um , over a long period of 

1493
01:05:47,680 --> 01:05:50,380
time now they don't like it , but they 

1494
01:05:50,380 --> 01:05:53,230
also , you know , they know they can't 

1495
01:05:53,230 --> 01:05:55,520
count on us to , you know , essentially 

1496
01:05:55,530 --> 01:05:57,810
save them completely . So they need to 

1497
01:05:57,810 --> 01:06:00,460
understand like what's the strategy for 

1498
01:06:00,460 --> 01:06:02,780
mitigating , managing and deterring the 

1499
01:06:02,780 --> 01:06:05,900
worst possible outcomes from the 

1500
01:06:05,910 --> 01:06:08,220
assertiveness of uh , their big 

1501
01:06:08,220 --> 01:06:10,053
neighbors , who they are also so 

1502
01:06:10,053 --> 01:06:13,250
dependent on . Thanks for that . I want 

1503
01:06:13,250 --> 01:06:14,972
to give you a chance to answer 

1504
01:06:14,972 --> 01:06:17,139
Mackenzie to wrap up this part , but I 

1505
01:06:17,139 --> 01:06:19,194
want to let you know that when she's 

1506
01:06:19,194 --> 01:06:21,570
finished , we're ready for questions 

1507
01:06:21,570 --> 01:06:23,570
from the audience . So if you would 

1508
01:06:23,570 --> 01:06:25,792
like to ask a question , you're welcome 

1509
01:06:25,792 --> 01:06:27,792
to go to one of the microphones and 

1510
01:06:27,792 --> 01:06:29,403
we'll begin that part of the 

1511
01:06:29,403 --> 01:06:32,960
conversation . Go ahead , please . Uh , 

1512
01:06:32,970 --> 01:06:35,100
I want to go back to a comment by 

1513
01:06:35,580 --> 01:06:38,790
General Karbouly , which I think was 

1514
01:06:39,180 --> 01:06:41,400
the honesty about which I'm preaching 

1515
01:06:41,400 --> 01:06:43,600
is needed . And 

1516
01:06:44,780 --> 01:06:48,220
but not enough of which is , you know , 

1517
01:06:48,230 --> 01:06:49,952
essentially boiled down to all 

1518
01:06:49,952 --> 01:06:52,570
paraphrase what you said into the first 

1519
01:06:52,570 --> 01:06:54,903
part of it is what Donald Rumsfeld said . 

1520
01:06:54,903 --> 01:06:57,014
So right , you go to the war with the 

1521
01:06:57,014 --> 01:06:59,070
army , you have , so you're going to 

1522
01:06:59,070 --> 01:06:58,850
fight is tonight with the army , you 

1523
01:06:58,850 --> 01:07:01,860
have , but yes , we have to aspire to 

1524
01:07:01,870 --> 01:07:04,850
what changes are ahead and the force of 

1525
01:07:04,850 --> 01:07:08,280
the future , so to speak . Um , but in 

1526
01:07:08,280 --> 01:07:11,940
this disconnected town , this 

1527
01:07:11,950 --> 01:07:15,790
Washington , it's increasingly 

1528
01:07:15,800 --> 01:07:19,300
uh , the emphasis is on 

1529
01:07:19,880 --> 01:07:22,440
in terms of planning and programming 

1530
01:07:22,440 --> 01:07:24,670
and buying . The emphasis is on the war 

1531
01:07:24,670 --> 01:07:27,420
we want to fight in the future and it 

1532
01:07:27,420 --> 01:07:30,300
comes out capacity of the forest today . 

1533
01:07:30,980 --> 01:07:33,830
And that's the fundamental budgetary 

1534
01:07:33,840 --> 01:07:36,062
and political tradeoffs that's happened 

1535
01:07:36,062 --> 01:07:38,340
now I'd say the last five fiscal years . 

1536
01:07:38,340 --> 01:07:40,460
So it's not even exclusive to one 

1537
01:07:40,460 --> 01:07:44,170
administration or another . And I think 

1538
01:07:44,170 --> 01:07:47,090
that has pretty that can have obviously 

1539
01:07:47,090 --> 01:07:48,920
pretty disastrous and dangerous 

1540
01:07:48,920 --> 01:07:52,550
outcomes because the focus for example 

1541
01:07:52,550 --> 01:07:55,240
the fate accompli scenario with Taiwan 

1542
01:07:55,240 --> 01:07:58,350
and preventing that . But I think 

1543
01:07:58,360 --> 01:08:00,416
Russia is increasingly demonstrating 

1544
01:08:00,416 --> 01:08:02,680
capability and exercise and willingness 

1545
01:08:02,680 --> 01:08:04,569
that it could perform the fate of 

1546
01:08:04,569 --> 01:08:07,480
company in the Baltics tonight . And we 

1547
01:08:07,480 --> 01:08:09,591
only talking watching about one other 

1548
01:08:09,591 --> 01:08:12,290
one fate accompli . Uh , and so 

1549
01:08:14,070 --> 01:08:18,020
this this willingness to take risk 

1550
01:08:18,020 --> 01:08:20,187
in the present moment for the future . 

1551
01:08:20,187 --> 01:08:22,187
That doesn't ever seem to quite get 

1552
01:08:22,187 --> 01:08:24,470
here are quite fully get here As a 

1553
01:08:24,470 --> 01:08:26,692
Sucker's bet . But it's the one-century 

1554
01:08:26,692 --> 01:08:28,970
keeps taking because it sounds smarter . 

1555
01:08:28,970 --> 01:08:31,026
Like force designed 2030 or like the 

1556
01:08:31,026 --> 01:08:32,859
kill Jane or like any other pick 

1557
01:08:32,859 --> 01:08:34,914
similar argumentation . It's just it 

1558
01:08:34,914 --> 01:08:36,803
sounds smarter . It definitely is 

1559
01:08:36,803 --> 01:08:39,210
sexier . It's cooler . Um , but when 

1560
01:08:39,220 --> 01:08:41,490
until that Skynet , so to speak is in 

1561
01:08:41,490 --> 01:08:43,490
hand , I'm not willing to take that 

1562
01:08:43,490 --> 01:08:46,180
risk . And so um it's not about allies , 

1563
01:08:46,180 --> 01:08:49,260
but about kind of what were the 

1564
01:08:49,260 --> 01:08:51,630
assumptions that we project on them and 

1565
01:08:51,630 --> 01:08:53,630
and and I think the wrong ones that 

1566
01:08:53,630 --> 01:08:55,852
we're projecting . Thank you for that . 

1567
01:08:55,852 --> 01:08:59,180
Um Corey , you want to follow on or 

1568
01:08:59,180 --> 01:09:02,680
just cheering her on ? Excellent . 

1569
01:09:03,070 --> 01:09:05,460
Um I want to ask General cavalier and 

1570
01:09:05,460 --> 01:09:07,682
General Flynn you both talked about the 

1571
01:09:07,682 --> 01:09:11,120
similarities between your commands and 

1572
01:09:11,120 --> 01:09:13,180
you touched on the differences but I 

1573
01:09:13,180 --> 01:09:16,190
wonder if each of you would explore the 

1574
01:09:16,190 --> 01:09:19,380
differences between your commands in 

1575
01:09:19,380 --> 01:09:21,690
whatever way you would choose for a few 

1576
01:09:21,690 --> 01:09:23,634
moments and maybe General Karbouly 

1577
01:09:23,634 --> 01:09:27,400
would go first please . Um 

1578
01:09:28,770 --> 01:09:30,600
Yeah I would say 

1579
01:09:33,270 --> 01:09:36,990
the first difference is um 

1580
01:09:39,470 --> 01:09:41,990
the geographic proximity of another 

1581
01:09:41,990 --> 01:09:45,520
combatant command to the european 

1582
01:09:45,520 --> 01:09:48,720
theater . Specifically africom . 

1583
01:09:48,730 --> 01:09:51,900
So I think it was a very big advance 

1584
01:09:52,570 --> 01:09:55,240
that we incorporated the africa 

1585
01:09:55,240 --> 01:09:57,790
portfolio into the U . S . Army europe 

1586
01:09:57,790 --> 01:10:01,180
portfolio because it allows us to think 

1587
01:10:01,660 --> 01:10:05,160
in a large scale conflict . It allows 

1588
01:10:05,160 --> 01:10:07,327
us to think of the mediterranean basis 

1589
01:10:07,327 --> 01:10:09,630
as a single theater of operations , 

1590
01:10:09,630 --> 01:10:13,060
which it basically always has been . Um 

1591
01:10:13,080 --> 01:10:15,860
I mean from the punic wars . Right . So 

1592
01:10:15,870 --> 01:10:19,490
um I think that's a difference . So 

1593
01:10:19,500 --> 01:10:22,230
charlie does have other theaters but 

1594
01:10:22,240 --> 01:10:25,620
these are landmasses that are managed 

1595
01:10:25,630 --> 01:10:27,450
by different parts of different 

1596
01:10:27,460 --> 01:10:29,870
organizational structures that abut 

1597
01:10:29,870 --> 01:10:32,530
each other in very close proximity . So 

1598
01:10:32,530 --> 01:10:34,752
I think that's one difference . I think 

1599
01:10:34,752 --> 01:10:37,500
a second differences is the nature of 

1600
01:10:37,610 --> 01:10:41,190
the potential adversaries um 

1601
01:10:41,560 --> 01:10:45,410
uh the military problem that presents 

1602
01:10:45,420 --> 01:10:48,810
in the case of europe , there's a very 

1603
01:10:48,810 --> 01:10:52,370
big mass challenge that is 

1604
01:10:53,360 --> 01:10:56,930
approximate to our forces on land . Um 

1605
01:10:56,940 --> 01:10:59,590
So there's not a water gap that has to 

1606
01:10:59,590 --> 01:11:02,270
be crossed . There's not a there's not 

1607
01:11:02,270 --> 01:11:04,492
an air gap that has to be crossed . But 

1608
01:11:04,492 --> 01:11:06,720
there is a continuous landmass that has 

1609
01:11:06,730 --> 01:11:10,190
two large potentially opposing land 

1610
01:11:10,190 --> 01:11:12,357
forces . And I think I think those are 

1611
01:11:12,357 --> 01:11:14,468
two from a military perspective and a 

1612
01:11:14,468 --> 01:11:16,301
military technical perspective , 

1613
01:11:16,301 --> 01:11:18,468
operationally , those are very salient 

1614
01:11:18,468 --> 01:11:22,400
differences . Um So a couple things . 

1615
01:11:22,690 --> 01:11:26,520
one as I mentioned earlier , so 

1616
01:11:26,520 --> 01:11:29,890
we have a challenge with the practical 

1617
01:11:29,890 --> 01:11:32,670
application of forces on the korean 

1618
01:11:32,670 --> 01:11:34,726
peninsula . And then we have another 

1619
01:11:34,726 --> 01:11:38,520
challenge with again , 

1620
01:11:38,520 --> 01:11:40,660
the sort of the geometry of the 

1621
01:11:40,660 --> 01:11:43,850
geography that we have uh in Asia and 

1622
01:11:43,850 --> 01:11:46,170
the rest of the theater . I think one 

1623
01:11:46,180 --> 01:11:50,160
other point I'd like to um add that's a 

1624
01:11:50,170 --> 01:11:53,650
bit of a difference is that um we have 

1625
01:11:53,650 --> 01:11:55,870
to support the 13 States , territories 

1626
01:11:55,870 --> 01:11:57,759
and possessions out to the second 

1627
01:11:57,759 --> 01:12:00,500
island chain . And that's under the 

1628
01:12:00,500 --> 01:12:02,444
Indo pak um Commander for homeland 

1629
01:12:02,444 --> 01:12:04,500
defense and defense support to civil 

1630
01:12:04,500 --> 01:12:07,960
authority . We also have forces in 

1631
01:12:07,960 --> 01:12:10,170
Alaska that are part of northern 

1632
01:12:10,170 --> 01:12:12,880
command and their defense support to 

1633
01:12:12,880 --> 01:12:15,190
civil authority and homeland defense . 

1634
01:12:15,190 --> 01:12:18,370
So uh those , I would just say there's 

1635
01:12:18,380 --> 01:12:21,060
there's two combatant commands that uh 

1636
01:12:21,070 --> 01:12:23,237
my under my T . J . Flick role we have 

1637
01:12:23,237 --> 01:12:25,670
to support because we have assigned 

1638
01:12:25,670 --> 01:12:27,690
forces in Indo pak . Um but they're 

1639
01:12:27,700 --> 01:12:31,660
they're they're uh position Alaska . 

1640
01:12:32,770 --> 01:12:36,490
And then we have obviously forces 

1641
01:12:36,500 --> 01:12:39,510
that must be able to defend the 

1642
01:12:39,520 --> 01:12:41,742
homeland out to the second island chain 

1643
01:12:41,742 --> 01:12:44,250
and then of course the korean theater 

1644
01:12:44,250 --> 01:12:46,480
of operations and then the rest of the 

1645
01:12:46,490 --> 01:12:50,150
car . So um there's there's sort of 

1646
01:12:50,150 --> 01:12:53,170
four areas within the A . R that we 

1647
01:12:53,170 --> 01:12:56,270
have to be concerned about and they 

1648
01:12:56,270 --> 01:12:59,010
have different capabilities that are 

1649
01:12:59,010 --> 01:13:01,450
required for different response times , 

1650
01:13:01,450 --> 01:13:05,290
different adversaries on on 

1651
01:13:05,290 --> 01:13:07,290
the other side of the field , so to 

1652
01:13:07,290 --> 01:13:11,130
speak . Um so that I think is 

1653
01:13:11,140 --> 01:13:13,970
a difference that we have between 

1654
01:13:14,750 --> 01:13:18,360
uh chris's challenges in europe and 

1655
01:13:18,360 --> 01:13:21,810
Africa and mine across the end of 

1656
01:13:21,810 --> 01:13:23,977
pacific charlie , I'd like to I'd like 

1657
01:13:23,977 --> 01:13:27,040
to underline that last one . So it's uh 

1658
01:13:27,050 --> 01:13:29,161
you know , from my perspective , as a 

1659
01:13:29,161 --> 01:13:31,430
commander , um when I think about the 

1660
01:13:31,430 --> 01:13:33,390
additional responsibilities that 

1661
01:13:33,390 --> 01:13:36,370
charlie has to defend us territories 

1662
01:13:36,370 --> 01:13:39,160
and us sovereign territory , 

1663
01:13:39,680 --> 01:13:42,540
that's a big difference . That's a big 

1664
01:13:42,540 --> 01:13:45,740
difference . And then finally one last 

1665
01:13:45,740 --> 01:13:47,740
difference that I neglected to talk 

1666
01:13:47,740 --> 01:13:49,851
about but is in the military sphere , 

1667
01:13:50,050 --> 01:13:53,430
Most of Europe is governed by an 

1668
01:13:53,430 --> 01:13:55,940
alliance by by the NATO Alliance , 

1669
01:13:55,940 --> 01:13:58,570
which brings military advantages to it . 

1670
01:13:58,580 --> 01:14:00,469
You know , you have standards for 

1671
01:14:00,469 --> 01:14:02,247
procedures , you have technical 

1672
01:14:02,247 --> 01:14:04,302
standards and things like that . And 

1673
01:14:04,302 --> 01:14:06,720
you commanded 25th idea of the Pacific 

1674
01:14:06,720 --> 01:14:09,970
just after Charlie did . Um And I'm 

1675
01:14:09,970 --> 01:14:12,137
sorry for what I did to the division , 

1676
01:14:12,137 --> 01:14:14,930
but you made it much better 

1677
01:14:14,940 --> 01:14:18,380
but uh it's hard to overstate what have 

1678
01:14:18,380 --> 01:14:20,330
benefited is to have a standing 

1679
01:14:20,330 --> 01:14:22,497
alliance that's more than , you know , 

1680
01:14:22,497 --> 01:14:24,274
70 years old and that and where 

1681
01:14:24,274 --> 01:14:26,670
procedures and understandings have been 

1682
01:14:26,670 --> 01:14:28,726
worked out at a military operational 

1683
01:14:28,726 --> 01:14:30,837
and tactical level . Thank you . That 

1684
01:14:30,837 --> 01:14:33,460
is another very important point . That 

1685
01:14:33,470 --> 01:14:37,260
is not part of the fabric uh 

1686
01:14:38,040 --> 01:14:41,480
across the end of pacific so but the 

1687
01:14:41,480 --> 01:14:45,190
value of land power out there 

1688
01:14:45,200 --> 01:14:47,340
and again , back to the beginning , I 

1689
01:14:47,340 --> 01:14:48,951
think some of those enabling 

1690
01:14:48,951 --> 01:14:50,970
capabilities that theater armies 

1691
01:14:50,970 --> 01:14:54,500
provide , there are a bit of an 

1692
01:14:54,500 --> 01:14:57,920
epoxy that kind of binds the security 

1693
01:14:57,920 --> 01:15:01,870
architecture together because 

1694
01:15:01,950 --> 01:15:05,780
it's more than just ah lethal 

1695
01:15:05,780 --> 01:15:08,200
applications . There are other tools 

1696
01:15:08,200 --> 01:15:10,570
that both of course this theory your 

1697
01:15:10,570 --> 01:15:14,260
army has available that are 

1698
01:15:14,270 --> 01:15:18,040
both for crisis for 

1699
01:15:18,050 --> 01:15:20,106
competition activities , but they're 

1700
01:15:20,106 --> 01:15:23,990
also there for war and I think 

1701
01:15:23,990 --> 01:15:26,360
that they that that 

1702
01:15:28,420 --> 01:15:31,870
those that suite of capabilities that 

1703
01:15:32,240 --> 01:15:34,600
armies provide at scale 

1704
01:15:36,040 --> 01:15:40,000
and can provide a campaign quality 

1705
01:15:40,010 --> 01:15:43,050
to it is important 

1706
01:15:44,440 --> 01:15:47,850
because it's not about a period of 

1707
01:15:47,850 --> 01:15:50,680
time , it's about being able to sustain 

1708
01:15:50,680 --> 01:15:54,480
it over time so that you keep pressure 

1709
01:15:54,490 --> 01:15:57,610
and you continue to foster and build 

1710
01:15:57,620 --> 01:16:00,580
and grow and enhance 

1711
01:16:00,780 --> 01:16:03,880
these relationships that are absolutely 

1712
01:16:03,880 --> 01:16:07,880
essential as a counterweight uh to all 

1713
01:16:07,880 --> 01:16:09,550
of the uh 

1714
01:16:10,330 --> 01:16:13,610
complimentary competing and 

1715
01:16:13,610 --> 01:16:16,700
compounding problems that the 

1716
01:16:16,710 --> 01:16:19,330
adversaries are thrown at . Us generals , 

1717
01:16:19,330 --> 01:16:21,497
thank you very much for that . Tell us 

1718
01:16:21,497 --> 01:16:23,663
your name and who you're with and then 

1719
01:16:23,663 --> 01:16:25,774
fire away . Hi this is Megan Eckstein 

1720
01:16:25,774 --> 01:16:27,886
with defense news . Um I'm gonna risk 

1721
01:16:27,886 --> 01:16:29,997
poking the bear by bringing up Marine 

1722
01:16:29,997 --> 01:16:32,108
Corps force design again . Um but for 

1723
01:16:32,108 --> 01:16:34,052
the two generals , I was curious , 

1724
01:16:34,052 --> 01:16:35,997
obviously Mackenzie mentioned that 

1725
01:16:35,997 --> 01:16:38,219
there could be additional burden on the 

1726
01:16:38,219 --> 01:16:40,386
army with the Marine Corps pulling out 

1727
01:16:40,386 --> 01:16:42,552
of certain mission areas . Um Mr Singh 

1728
01:16:42,552 --> 01:16:44,774
also mentioned the idea of , you know , 

1729
01:16:44,774 --> 01:16:46,941
overlaps and gaps between the army and 

1730
01:16:46,941 --> 01:16:49,108
Marine Corps . And I wonder if perhaps 

1731
01:16:49,108 --> 01:16:51,330
there's an opportunity now for you guys 

1732
01:16:51,330 --> 01:16:51,050
to not have to worry about those issues 

1733
01:16:51,050 --> 01:16:53,217
and just kind of focus on the missions 

1734
01:16:53,217 --> 01:16:55,383
as you'd like to do them . So I wonder 

1735
01:16:55,383 --> 01:16:57,606
if we could just get some color for how 

1736
01:16:57,606 --> 01:16:59,717
this is playing out in your theater . 

1737
01:16:59,717 --> 01:16:59,680
Are you seeing any changes yet ? And 

1738
01:16:59,680 --> 01:17:01,624
how are you coordinating with your 

1739
01:17:01,624 --> 01:17:03,791
Marine Corps counterparts just to make 

1740
01:17:03,791 --> 01:17:05,902
sure that the transition as they pull 

1741
01:17:05,902 --> 01:17:07,791
out of the missions go smoothly . 

1742
01:17:07,791 --> 01:17:09,958
Question , I'll hit that first charlie 

1743
01:17:09,958 --> 01:17:12,640
because our a r it's very simple , so 

1744
01:17:12,650 --> 01:17:15,180
our interaction derives from , you know , 

1745
01:17:15,180 --> 01:17:18,450
our planning efforts . Um I felt no 

1746
01:17:18,450 --> 01:17:20,730
effect from that whatsoever right now , 

1747
01:17:20,740 --> 01:17:23,360
I'm in constant contact with them are 

1748
01:17:23,360 --> 01:17:26,720
for your commander about um 

1749
01:17:26,730 --> 01:17:29,710
are planning efforts and it just has 

1750
01:17:29,710 --> 01:17:33,320
not had any bearing yet . The nature of 

1751
01:17:33,320 --> 01:17:36,740
our mutual activities isn't such that 

1752
01:17:37,130 --> 01:17:39,270
that those forced design changes are 

1753
01:17:39,270 --> 01:17:41,326
going to have that big in effect . I 

1754
01:17:41,326 --> 01:17:44,250
haven't either . Um and I would also 

1755
01:17:44,250 --> 01:17:46,390
say that even the things that we're 

1756
01:17:46,390 --> 01:17:48,740
doing today to prepare for the future , 

1757
01:17:49,230 --> 01:17:52,250
our complimentary there mel our work 

1758
01:17:52,250 --> 01:17:56,230
and our Mdt uh capabilities 

1759
01:17:56,240 --> 01:17:58,980
are there , they're going to be helpful 

1760
01:17:58,980 --> 01:18:02,570
for one another . So in my view , the 

1761
01:18:02,570 --> 01:18:04,650
mar for pack , the sock pack 

1762
01:18:05,120 --> 01:18:08,320
relationship between those land 

1763
01:18:08,330 --> 01:18:10,750
capabilities , um 

1764
01:18:11,320 --> 01:18:14,530
our our complimentary uh 

1765
01:18:15,020 --> 01:18:17,200
and through the operations and 

1766
01:18:17,200 --> 01:18:19,422
exercises that are going on every day . 

1767
01:18:19,422 --> 01:18:22,280
I think that there's there's no 

1768
01:18:22,280 --> 01:18:24,447
daylight between the things that we're 

1769
01:18:24,447 --> 01:18:26,650
working on out there . Thank you . 

1770
01:18:27,320 --> 01:18:29,580
Thank you for the question . Um we do 

1771
01:18:29,580 --> 01:18:31,580
have time for more questions if you 

1772
01:18:31,580 --> 01:18:33,636
want to go to the microphone and ask 

1773
01:18:33,636 --> 01:18:36,270
one in the meantime , um vic you wrote 

1774
01:18:36,280 --> 01:18:38,890
recently about technology and and I 

1775
01:18:38,890 --> 01:18:41,060
have this keeping the technological 

1776
01:18:41,060 --> 01:18:43,540
edge is no longer a foregone conclusion , 

1777
01:18:43,550 --> 01:18:45,606
but we can hold it if we focus , you 

1778
01:18:45,606 --> 01:18:47,828
talked about technology earlier in your 

1779
01:18:48,520 --> 01:18:51,730
remarks , what's the intersection 

1780
01:18:51,740 --> 01:18:54,370
of the changes that land power is 

1781
01:18:54,370 --> 01:18:56,670
undergoing talked about here and the 

1782
01:18:56,670 --> 01:18:59,420
technological edge that the military in 

1783
01:18:59,420 --> 01:19:01,642
general in the army in particular wants 

1784
01:19:01,642 --> 01:19:03,753
to maintain . You know , some some of 

1785
01:19:03,753 --> 01:19:05,920
this is , you know , high tech cutting 

1786
01:19:05,920 --> 01:19:08,031
edge tech questions and some of it is 

1787
01:19:08,031 --> 01:19:10,198
just adaptation sort of mid tech . But 

1788
01:19:10,198 --> 01:19:12,200
how do you use it ? And so Armenia 

1789
01:19:12,200 --> 01:19:15,030
Azerbaijan , why why were what the , 

1790
01:19:15,520 --> 01:19:17,298
what the forces they would have 

1791
01:19:17,298 --> 01:19:19,076
expected irrelevant . It wasn't 

1792
01:19:19,076 --> 01:19:21,298
something wasn't Supertec , it was just 

1793
01:19:21,298 --> 01:19:23,670
drones and the creative and sort of 

1794
01:19:23,680 --> 01:19:27,250
mass use of drones to disrupt 

1795
01:19:27,260 --> 01:19:29,970
what someone with what one force would 

1796
01:19:29,970 --> 01:19:31,914
have thought was , it's relatively 

1797
01:19:31,914 --> 01:19:34,137
robust land capabilities . Right ? So , 

1798
01:19:34,137 --> 01:19:37,910
um what , what we face right now is um 

1799
01:19:37,920 --> 01:19:40,220
is sort of a critical moment in the 

1800
01:19:40,220 --> 01:19:42,910
sense that We've just gotten used to 

1801
01:19:42,910 --> 01:19:46,890
since the early 1990s being um , 

1802
01:19:46,900 --> 01:19:50,620
you know , pretty far ahead . And 

1803
01:19:50,630 --> 01:19:53,950
um in in most technology and innovation 

1804
01:19:53,950 --> 01:19:57,330
areas . Um and I would say we also were 

1805
01:19:57,330 --> 01:19:59,219
used to being pretty far ahead in 

1806
01:19:59,219 --> 01:20:01,219
innovating how we think about using 

1807
01:20:01,219 --> 01:20:02,997
military forces . So we we have 

1808
01:20:02,997 --> 01:20:05,052
generally been fairly future focused 

1809
01:20:05,052 --> 01:20:07,310
and tried to think of creative new ways 

1810
01:20:07,310 --> 01:20:11,230
to to to to to employ our forces . So 

1811
01:20:11,410 --> 01:20:14,960
in two streams , Our inventiveness and 

1812
01:20:14,960 --> 01:20:16,960
how we're going to use our forces , 

1813
01:20:16,960 --> 01:20:19,238
we've we've tended to be very creative . 

1814
01:20:19,238 --> 01:20:21,460
I think that's that's um that's trained 

1815
01:20:21,460 --> 01:20:24,150
dramatically since the early 1990s . So 

1816
01:20:24,150 --> 01:20:28,120
in the early 2020s , um you know , 

1817
01:20:28,510 --> 01:20:32,150
we're pretty far ahead and we have what 

1818
01:20:32,150 --> 01:20:34,261
it takes to keep the edge of the high 

1819
01:20:34,261 --> 01:20:37,420
end tech space that highly dependent on 

1820
01:20:37,420 --> 01:20:41,230
continuing to draw global talent um and 

1821
01:20:41,230 --> 01:20:44,740
to resource R and D uh in ways that we 

1822
01:20:44,740 --> 01:20:46,962
have historically done , and we've sort 

1823
01:20:46,962 --> 01:20:49,129
of always done in a crunch . So if you 

1824
01:20:49,129 --> 01:20:51,351
think race to the moon , we race to the 

1825
01:20:51,351 --> 01:20:53,240
moon , if you think now , I think 

1826
01:20:53,240 --> 01:20:55,407
there's a reasonable chance that we'll 

1827
01:20:55,407 --> 01:20:55,260
try to put the pedal to the metal and 

1828
01:20:55,260 --> 01:20:57,427
really invest in those things . But if 

1829
01:20:57,427 --> 01:20:59,538
we if we turn away from globe getting 

1830
01:20:59,538 --> 01:21:01,760
global talent , which has been critical 

1831
01:21:01,760 --> 01:21:03,927
to every technological leap that we've 

1832
01:21:03,927 --> 01:21:05,982
made . Uh we would find ourselves in 

1833
01:21:05,982 --> 01:21:08,250
real trouble and the fact is um friends 

1834
01:21:08,250 --> 01:21:10,760
and foes are closer than we realize you 

1835
01:21:10,760 --> 01:21:12,927
mean even the Russians in some in some 

1836
01:21:12,927 --> 01:21:15,290
areas and certainly the chinese um in 

1837
01:21:15,290 --> 01:21:18,340
areas like Ai and quantum computing are 

1838
01:21:18,350 --> 01:21:20,800
closer than we would be comfortable 

1839
01:21:20,810 --> 01:21:23,280
with objects in the rear view mirror 

1840
01:21:23,280 --> 01:21:26,720
are closer than they appear . But but 

1841
01:21:26,730 --> 01:21:28,897
in terms of adaptation in terms of not 

1842
01:21:28,897 --> 01:21:32,730
getting caught off guard By what 

1843
01:21:32,730 --> 01:21:34,952
20 years ago would have been , you know 

1844
01:21:34,952 --> 01:21:37,250
the famous like Oh we you know our 

1845
01:21:37,250 --> 01:21:39,420
ships could be could be could be taken 

1846
01:21:39,420 --> 01:21:42,040
on by swarming Iranian little fast 

1847
01:21:42,040 --> 01:21:43,929
boats or something like that . Or 

1848
01:21:43,929 --> 01:21:45,929
there's uh well that what does that 

1849
01:21:45,929 --> 01:21:47,873
look like now that for land forces 

1850
01:21:47,873 --> 01:21:49,984
that's become really critical because 

1851
01:21:49,984 --> 01:21:52,930
new uh new technologies 

1852
01:21:52,940 --> 01:21:56,830
are going to uh going to be employed in 

1853
01:21:56,830 --> 01:21:59,580
creative ways um in ways that could 

1854
01:21:59,580 --> 01:22:02,640
really affect what we thought was good 

1855
01:22:02,640 --> 01:22:05,630
planning . So um getting ahead of that 

1856
01:22:05,640 --> 01:22:09,390
is about exercising and and war gaming 

1857
01:22:09,390 --> 01:22:11,940
and you know and having outside 

1858
01:22:11,940 --> 01:22:14,140
perspectives , having people come you 

1859
01:22:14,140 --> 01:22:16,910
know and really do good red on blue 

1860
01:22:16,910 --> 01:22:20,510
practice to illicit what an adversary 

1861
01:22:20,510 --> 01:22:23,420
may do um in an asymmetric way that we 

1862
01:22:23,420 --> 01:22:25,698
are not yet prepared for general Flynn . 

1863
01:22:25,698 --> 01:22:28,270
I just may take a different tact and 

1864
01:22:28,280 --> 01:22:30,620
maybe chris wants to ads and see uh 

1865
01:22:31,300 --> 01:22:33,530
he's got a a new couple of new 

1866
01:22:33,530 --> 01:22:36,980
organizations in his formations in 

1867
01:22:36,980 --> 01:22:39,330
europe . So uh 

1868
01:22:41,000 --> 01:22:44,420
not to discount the enormous value of 

1869
01:22:44,420 --> 01:22:48,250
technology from Vikram but I would 

1870
01:22:48,250 --> 01:22:52,150
say that one thing that I'm I 

1871
01:22:52,160 --> 01:22:55,040
was in my last job I was aware of as 

1872
01:22:55,040 --> 01:22:57,240
the 357 , but it's become even more 

1873
01:22:57,240 --> 01:23:00,420
clear to me being out in the pacific 

1874
01:23:00,420 --> 01:23:04,300
now . So the , the multi domain task 

1875
01:23:04,300 --> 01:23:06,320
force , the organization itself , 

1876
01:23:07,200 --> 01:23:09,850
Having the organization up for nearly 

1877
01:23:09,850 --> 01:23:13,120
two years and learning 

1878
01:23:13,600 --> 01:23:16,540
um and exercising and getting the 

1879
01:23:16,540 --> 01:23:19,030
leaders there and getting the skill 

1880
01:23:19,030 --> 01:23:21,430
development and building a facility , 

1881
01:23:21,430 --> 01:23:24,690
all the sort of doctoral PF integration 

1882
01:23:24,690 --> 01:23:26,134
that has to go on with an 

1883
01:23:26,134 --> 01:23:29,420
organizational adjustments And having 

1884
01:23:29,420 --> 01:23:33,320
that in front of the capabilities that 

1885
01:23:33,320 --> 01:23:37,090
will land in the formation , say in 23 

1886
01:23:37,090 --> 01:23:40,190
24 25 . I think this is really 

1887
01:23:40,190 --> 01:23:43,120
important . I think that we're learning 

1888
01:23:43,700 --> 01:23:47,620
and uh discovering and 

1889
01:23:48,300 --> 01:23:50,910
succeeding and failing and doing all 

1890
01:23:50,910 --> 01:23:53,170
those things with that formation and 

1891
01:23:53,170 --> 01:23:55,360
other formations like theater fires 

1892
01:23:55,360 --> 01:23:59,150
commands and um the information 

1893
01:23:59,150 --> 01:24:02,800
effects group . The point I'm making is 

1894
01:24:02,800 --> 01:24:05,950
I think that in the army's case 

1895
01:24:06,770 --> 01:24:08,714
that having these organizations in 

1896
01:24:08,714 --> 01:24:12,260
front of the platform , 

1897
01:24:12,270 --> 01:24:15,600
technology , weapons development is a 

1898
01:24:15,600 --> 01:24:17,767
good thing because if the reverse were 

1899
01:24:17,767 --> 01:24:19,822
true , we would just feel the weapon 

1900
01:24:19,822 --> 01:24:21,544
and we'd have to take a legacy 

1901
01:24:21,544 --> 01:24:24,230
organization and figure it out . And I 

1902
01:24:24,230 --> 01:24:28,210
don't think that that has a proved well 

1903
01:24:28,220 --> 01:24:31,240
in the past . And so I think that what 

1904
01:24:31,250 --> 01:24:33,610
we're doing and this is an area where 

1905
01:24:34,090 --> 01:24:37,810
we're sharing because chris is multi 

1906
01:24:37,810 --> 01:24:40,570
domain task force just deployed or is 

1907
01:24:40,570 --> 01:24:44,180
beginning to stand up in europe and 

1908
01:24:44,180 --> 01:24:46,124
he's got other organizations as he 

1909
01:24:46,124 --> 01:24:48,720
mentioned in his opening remarks that 

1910
01:24:48,730 --> 01:24:52,580
are essential to uh to his 

1911
01:24:52,580 --> 01:24:55,240
capabilities being forward , this is 

1912
01:24:55,250 --> 01:24:57,690
this is an area that I think is really 

1913
01:24:57,690 --> 01:25:00,080
important . I'm not discounting the 

1914
01:25:00,080 --> 01:25:02,970
technological development and the 

1915
01:25:02,980 --> 01:25:05,300
importance of that . What I am saying 

1916
01:25:05,300 --> 01:25:07,010
is I think the organizational 

1917
01:25:07,010 --> 01:25:08,788
adjustments are absolutely more 

1918
01:25:08,788 --> 01:25:11,630
important and they give us an agility 

1919
01:25:11,640 --> 01:25:13,600
in the future that we need to be 

1920
01:25:13,600 --> 01:25:16,500
working on today and pulling into our 

1921
01:25:16,510 --> 01:25:20,080
exercises and rehearsals and um and our 

1922
01:25:20,080 --> 01:25:22,080
own formation is to learn how we're 

1923
01:25:22,080 --> 01:25:24,590
gonna do this . I agree with that last 

1924
01:25:24,590 --> 01:25:27,280
point , especially charlie . Um you 

1925
01:25:27,280 --> 01:25:30,470
know , Mr Singh , your your your points 

1926
01:25:30,470 --> 01:25:34,070
about technology raise , 

1927
01:25:34,080 --> 01:25:36,470
raise something in my mind frequently 

1928
01:25:36,470 --> 01:25:38,740
when we talk about striving 

1929
01:25:38,740 --> 01:25:41,220
technologically we reach pretty deep 

1930
01:25:41,220 --> 01:25:43,360
into the future for technologies that 

1931
01:25:43,370 --> 01:25:46,780
don't yet exist . And um we try to plan 

1932
01:25:46,780 --> 01:25:48,947
around that , but that becomes sort of 

1933
01:25:48,947 --> 01:25:51,002
future casting where we're hoping we 

1934
01:25:51,002 --> 01:25:53,169
choose the right technology and get it 

1935
01:25:53,169 --> 01:25:55,391
right and meanwhile , right in front of 

1936
01:25:55,391 --> 01:25:58,910
us . Um other folks are 

1937
01:25:58,910 --> 01:26:02,600
using existing medium level 

1938
01:26:02,600 --> 01:26:05,880
technologies in innovative new ways 

1939
01:26:05,890 --> 01:26:08,070
that create a disproportionately 

1940
01:26:08,070 --> 01:26:11,200
beneficial effect for them . I think of 

1941
01:26:11,880 --> 01:26:14,570
uh Azerbaijan during the recent Nagorno 

1942
01:26:14,570 --> 01:26:16,292
Karabakh war with the juice of 

1943
01:26:16,292 --> 01:26:18,014
loitering munitions and pretty 

1944
01:26:18,014 --> 01:26:20,090
rudimentary drones , um not super 

1945
01:26:20,090 --> 01:26:22,750
sophisticated medium level technology , 

1946
01:26:22,760 --> 01:26:26,200
but but very well combined , present a 

1947
01:26:26,200 --> 01:26:29,030
whole different problem set and we've 

1948
01:26:29,030 --> 01:26:31,086
seen innumerable , other examples of 

1949
01:26:31,086 --> 01:26:33,308
the Russian federation tends to be very 

1950
01:26:33,308 --> 01:26:35,474
good at it . Um so when we think about 

1951
01:26:35,474 --> 01:26:37,980
technology you know I just think uh we 

1952
01:26:37,980 --> 01:26:40,230
have to think deep of course and shoot 

1953
01:26:40,240 --> 01:26:42,296
far but we also have to think of the 

1954
01:26:42,296 --> 01:26:44,407
increments of technology between here 

1955
01:26:44,407 --> 01:26:46,407
and there because they bring pretty 

1956
01:26:46,407 --> 01:26:48,629
significant changes with them as well . 

1957
01:26:48,629 --> 01:26:50,740
Usually at a much better cost point . 

1958
01:26:50,740 --> 01:26:54,140
Thanks general sir . Thanks john climb 

1959
01:26:54,140 --> 01:26:56,630
johnson controls as you shape your 

1960
01:26:56,630 --> 01:27:00,150
battle space . What role do you need 

1961
01:27:00,160 --> 01:27:02,710
installations to play ? And especially 

1962
01:27:02,710 --> 01:27:04,377
connected technologies on the 

1963
01:27:04,377 --> 01:27:07,750
installation to a to support what 

1964
01:27:07,750 --> 01:27:09,694
you're doing with the multi domain 

1965
01:27:10,080 --> 01:27:13,310
force . Thanks . Um 

1966
01:27:14,280 --> 01:27:16,600
so a little bit 

1967
01:27:17,580 --> 01:27:21,060
um some some of the challenges 

1968
01:27:21,060 --> 01:27:24,420
that general casually have in 

1969
01:27:24,420 --> 01:27:27,660
europe . I we obviously have similar 

1970
01:27:27,660 --> 01:27:29,771
ones informed it gets a little harder 

1971
01:27:29,771 --> 01:27:32,650
in a foreign country . Uh because we're 

1972
01:27:32,650 --> 01:27:34,710
obviously you know we've got to work 

1973
01:27:35,280 --> 01:27:38,790
with with Japan and 

1974
01:27:38,790 --> 01:27:42,120
Korea on what are those protective 

1975
01:27:42,120 --> 01:27:46,100
measures we want to take because we 

1976
01:27:46,100 --> 01:27:48,267
just have to work with the governments 

1977
01:27:48,267 --> 01:27:51,300
to do that . I would tell you that . Um 

1978
01:27:52,280 --> 01:27:56,280
And the areas where uh the largest 

1979
01:27:56,280 --> 01:27:58,610
part the bulk of our forces are on the 

1980
01:27:58,610 --> 01:28:01,260
west coast and in Alaska and Hawaii um 

1981
01:28:01,270 --> 01:28:05,230
we're going to need um the ability 

1982
01:28:05,230 --> 01:28:08,740
to protect our signature uh protect 

1983
01:28:08,740 --> 01:28:11,690
our our I . T . Backbone 

1984
01:28:12,170 --> 01:28:15,840
um protect our networks . Man I'm not 

1985
01:28:15,840 --> 01:28:17,896
telling you anything that you're not 

1986
01:28:17,896 --> 01:28:20,450
already aware of but what I would say 

1987
01:28:20,450 --> 01:28:23,150
is that the ability to there's going to 

1988
01:28:23,150 --> 01:28:27,090
be a requirement two uh 

1989
01:28:27,100 --> 01:28:30,810
provide capabilities that are going to 

1990
01:28:30,820 --> 01:28:34,270
uh not be available to do things 

1991
01:28:34,280 --> 01:28:36,780
forward in the region . And I don't 

1992
01:28:36,780 --> 01:28:38,947
think all of these things are going to 

1993
01:28:38,947 --> 01:28:41,450
be solved again by technology alone . I 

1994
01:28:41,450 --> 01:28:43,672
think what we're going to need to do is 

1995
01:28:43,672 --> 01:28:46,990
have distributed points of presence 

1996
01:28:47,570 --> 01:28:49,790
for our network throughout the region 

1997
01:28:50,470 --> 01:28:52,660
and much like the network has to be 

1998
01:28:52,660 --> 01:28:54,771
distributed with points of presence . 

1999
01:28:54,771 --> 01:28:56,604
We're also going to have to have 

2000
01:28:56,604 --> 01:29:00,420
distributed locations of material and I 

2001
01:29:00,430 --> 01:29:02,597
don't think this is going to require a 

2002
01:29:02,597 --> 01:29:04,830
lot of military construction . I think 

2003
01:29:04,830 --> 01:29:08,100
it was going to require is taking the 

2004
01:29:08,670 --> 01:29:10,781
really the rainbow of agreements that 

2005
01:29:10,781 --> 01:29:13,070
we do have because there are a wide 

2006
01:29:13,070 --> 01:29:15,126
range of agreements out there with a 

2007
01:29:15,126 --> 01:29:17,220
number of countries and sometimes we 

2008
01:29:17,220 --> 01:29:21,000
don't even recognize the ability that 

2009
01:29:21,000 --> 01:29:23,670
we have through these agreements that 

2010
01:29:23,670 --> 01:29:26,340
are already in place uh to do some 

2011
01:29:26,340 --> 01:29:28,340
things to better position to better 

2012
01:29:28,340 --> 01:29:30,970
posture to better enable uh even the 

2013
01:29:30,970 --> 01:29:33,190
allies and partners that we can have 

2014
01:29:33,190 --> 01:29:35,920
those agreements with . So I'm not of 

2015
01:29:35,920 --> 01:29:39,210
the belief that that 

2016
01:29:39,220 --> 01:29:41,650
I'm of the belief we have to protect 

2017
01:29:41,660 --> 01:29:43,827
our power projection platforms and the 

2018
01:29:43,827 --> 01:29:45,993
locations where we are forward . But I 

2019
01:29:45,993 --> 01:29:49,480
do think a distributed arrangement of 

2020
01:29:49,480 --> 01:29:52,730
materials commanding control um and 

2021
01:29:52,730 --> 01:29:55,160
protection of our our network 

2022
01:29:55,160 --> 01:29:57,382
architecture and the points of presence 

2023
01:29:57,382 --> 01:30:00,010
presidents required to have operational 

2024
01:30:00,010 --> 01:30:03,830
reach is where we need some help and 

2025
01:30:03,840 --> 01:30:07,720
it's it's not central 

2026
01:30:07,720 --> 01:30:09,942
sometimes in the debate but it needs to 

2027
01:30:09,942 --> 01:30:12,200
become more and more again back to my 

2028
01:30:12,200 --> 01:30:15,290
homeland problem . Um I have a similar 

2029
01:30:15,290 --> 01:30:17,760
situation that , you know , those are 

2030
01:30:17,760 --> 01:30:19,982
american citizens out there and we need 

2031
01:30:19,982 --> 01:30:22,149
to protect those american citizens and 

2032
01:30:22,149 --> 01:30:25,020
be able to provide them a secure place 

2033
01:30:25,020 --> 01:30:28,590
to live work from even though things 

2034
01:30:28,590 --> 01:30:32,340
may be um in a crisis 

2035
01:30:32,340 --> 01:30:34,750
situation . Thanks . I think the first 

2036
01:30:34,750 --> 01:30:37,520
thing we have to do is to recognize 

2037
01:30:37,530 --> 01:30:41,030
that bases to include our garrisons 

2038
01:30:41,040 --> 01:30:42,890
are part of our operational 

2039
01:30:42,890 --> 01:30:46,170
infrastructure . So I previously during 

2040
01:30:46,170 --> 01:30:49,910
some remarks made an inaccurate um 

2041
01:30:49,920 --> 01:30:52,790
distinction between user packs A . O . 

2042
01:30:52,790 --> 01:30:56,640
R . And the european hor um 

2043
01:30:56,650 --> 01:30:58,800
there is one place in user pack where 

2044
01:30:58,800 --> 01:31:02,130
two opposing forces , land forces are 

2045
01:31:02,140 --> 01:31:04,730
in direct land uh contact with each 

2046
01:31:04,730 --> 01:31:07,008
other , that's on the korean peninsula , 

2047
01:31:07,008 --> 01:31:09,820
similar to europe um on the korean 

2048
01:31:09,820 --> 01:31:11,890
peninsula , the basing structure as 

2049
01:31:11,890 --> 01:31:14,112
part of the operational thought process 

2050
01:31:14,112 --> 01:31:16,334
and part of the operational arrangement 

2051
01:31:16,334 --> 01:31:18,390
in europe . It is also um that's the 

2052
01:31:18,390 --> 01:31:20,612
first point I would make , I think it's 

2053
01:31:20,612 --> 01:31:20,480
an important distinction . It's not 

2054
01:31:20,480 --> 01:31:22,810
something that we've always um thought 

2055
01:31:22,810 --> 01:31:24,921
about when we think about our basis , 

2056
01:31:24,921 --> 01:31:26,977
we think about them as garrisons and 

2057
01:31:26,977 --> 01:31:29,143
communities , but in fact they're much 

2058
01:31:29,143 --> 01:31:31,366
more than that . Um Once you get into a 

2059
01:31:31,366 --> 01:31:33,477
theater of operations . Um The second 

2060
01:31:33,477 --> 01:31:35,730
thing is , you know dr Shockey earlier 

2061
01:31:35,730 --> 01:31:38,310
spoke about the challenges of um 

2062
01:31:38,320 --> 01:31:42,030
deployment and reinforcement . Um 

2063
01:31:42,040 --> 01:31:44,590
that's that that contested 

2064
01:31:44,600 --> 01:31:47,210
reinforcement is an important thing . 

2065
01:31:47,220 --> 01:31:49,720
Um and we're not always as well 

2066
01:31:49,720 --> 01:31:52,270
prepared for it as we should be from 

2067
01:31:52,280 --> 01:31:54,790
home station across the lines of 

2068
01:31:54,790 --> 01:31:57,200
communication and then at the ports of 

2069
01:31:57,200 --> 01:31:59,320
demarcation from there to the 

2070
01:31:59,320 --> 01:32:02,670
operational area ? Those are areas 

2071
01:32:02,670 --> 01:32:04,837
where we have to treat it separately , 

2072
01:32:04,837 --> 01:32:06,892
but we have to think about contested 

2073
01:32:06,892 --> 01:32:08,948
logistics deployment , um and onward 

2074
01:32:08,948 --> 01:32:11,710
movement from from beginning to end and 

2075
01:32:11,710 --> 01:32:13,710
our installations are a key part of 

2076
01:32:13,710 --> 01:32:15,599
that the whole way all the way we 

2077
01:32:15,599 --> 01:32:17,710
harden them and protect them in every 

2078
01:32:17,710 --> 01:32:19,877
domain . General , thank you very much 

2079
01:32:19,877 --> 01:32:22,410
for the response to that question . Um 

2080
01:32:22,420 --> 01:32:26,300
we have about 20 minutes or so left and 

2081
01:32:26,310 --> 01:32:28,720
I think it would be useful at this 

2082
01:32:28,720 --> 01:32:31,530
point just to ask each of you if 

2083
01:32:31,530 --> 01:32:34,080
there's some point or points that you 

2084
01:32:34,080 --> 01:32:37,400
wanted the audience to take away today 

2085
01:32:37,410 --> 01:32:39,700
that you haven't had a chance to say 

2086
01:32:39,700 --> 01:32:41,756
and they haven't had a chance to ask 

2087
01:32:41,756 --> 01:32:43,811
you . So rather than starting at the 

2088
01:32:43,811 --> 01:32:46,033
other end , I'm gonna start near me and 

2089
01:32:46,033 --> 01:32:49,630
ask you to begin that Mackenzie . Um 

2090
01:32:49,640 --> 01:32:51,980
well , I want to talk about 

2091
01:32:51,980 --> 01:32:53,980
installations for a minute actually 

2092
01:32:53,980 --> 01:32:55,702
because they are part of power 

2093
01:32:55,702 --> 01:32:57,980
projection and often are overlooked . 

2094
01:32:57,980 --> 01:33:00,080
And uh you know , installations have 

2095
01:33:00,080 --> 01:33:03,530
been a bill payer for 20 

2096
01:33:03,530 --> 01:33:06,270
years in every budget uh 

2097
01:33:07,350 --> 01:33:09,710
for to fund other pressing needs , 

2098
01:33:09,710 --> 01:33:11,766
which I understand why those choices 

2099
01:33:11,766 --> 01:33:14,650
are made , but increasingly money is 

2100
01:33:14,650 --> 01:33:16,880
going to have to be poured back into 

2101
01:33:16,890 --> 01:33:19,330
installations in particular because of , 

2102
01:33:19,340 --> 01:33:22,020
partly because of the decay . But you 

2103
01:33:22,020 --> 01:33:24,920
know , if you look at the pentagon 

2104
01:33:24,920 --> 01:33:27,330
leaderships , you know , sort of Top 10 

2105
01:33:27,330 --> 01:33:30,020
Technologies list and you know , what 

2106
01:33:30,020 --> 01:33:31,964
are the what are the game changing 

2107
01:33:31,964 --> 01:33:34,076
capabilities ? What do you often hear 

2108
01:33:34,076 --> 01:33:36,340
most about whether that's artificial 

2109
01:33:36,340 --> 01:33:38,640
intelligence , big data , quantum 

2110
01:33:38,640 --> 01:33:41,140
computing , hypersonic weapons or 

2111
01:33:41,140 --> 01:33:43,790
directed energy , all of these very 

2112
01:33:43,790 --> 01:33:45,901
different capabilities have one thing 

2113
01:33:45,901 --> 01:33:49,510
in common . They need more energy . 

2114
01:33:50,550 --> 01:33:52,661
And if you don't we're gonna get that 

2115
01:33:52,661 --> 01:33:54,717
energy , you're gonna get it from an 

2116
01:33:54,717 --> 01:33:54,650
installation or from a foreign country . 

2117
01:33:54,650 --> 01:33:57,190
And so if you're not talking about how 

2118
01:33:57,190 --> 01:33:59,301
to get more energy than we've already 

2119
01:33:59,301 --> 01:34:03,170
lost . All right , Corey . 

2120
01:34:03,940 --> 01:34:07,920
Uh So I can 

2121
01:34:07,920 --> 01:34:11,900
think of two things . The first is that 

2122
01:34:11,910 --> 01:34:15,030
is one that the army can't do anything 

2123
01:34:15,030 --> 01:34:18,080
about . But I think ought to be shaping 

2124
01:34:18,080 --> 01:34:20,080
all of our consciousness , which is 

2125
01:34:20,080 --> 01:34:23,330
that the gap between what we say we 

2126
01:34:23,330 --> 01:34:25,497
have the ability to do and what we are 

2127
01:34:25,497 --> 01:34:29,280
actually Funding in our defense budget 

2128
01:34:29,290 --> 01:34:33,190
has been growing in a hair raising 

2129
01:34:33,190 --> 01:34:37,020
way for about 15 years . Um 

2130
01:34:37,200 --> 01:34:40,460
And uh the 

2131
01:34:40,470 --> 01:34:43,480
challenge for the Defense Department is 

2132
01:34:43,480 --> 01:34:47,450
how to be a team playing part of 

2133
01:34:47,450 --> 01:34:49,120
an administration when the 

2134
01:34:49,120 --> 01:34:50,990
administration is purporting the 

2135
01:34:50,990 --> 01:34:53,880
fallacy that the budget is sufficient 

2136
01:34:53,880 --> 01:34:57,730
to execute the strategy and that's a 

2137
01:34:57,730 --> 01:35:01,070
difficult civil military challenge 

2138
01:35:01,080 --> 01:35:03,720
when you're doing it in public . But 

2139
01:35:03,720 --> 01:35:06,540
it's also just a practical challenge 

2140
01:35:06,550 --> 01:35:10,100
for uh the day to day operations of the 

2141
01:35:10,100 --> 01:35:12,470
military . So I guess the thing that 

2142
01:35:12,470 --> 01:35:15,390
keeps me up at night is the gap between 

2143
01:35:15,390 --> 01:35:19,100
strategy and funding that 

2144
01:35:19,370 --> 01:35:21,537
the constructed hopefully constructive 

2145
01:35:21,537 --> 01:35:24,440
suggestion I would offer is that I've 

2146
01:35:24,440 --> 01:35:26,800
never understood why administrations 

2147
01:35:26,810 --> 01:35:29,770
allow D . O . D . To do a national 

2148
01:35:29,770 --> 01:35:33,360
defense strategy . Um I 

2149
01:35:34,040 --> 01:35:37,080
I mean I wouldn't if if the reckless 

2150
01:35:37,080 --> 01:35:39,780
american public elected me to uh 

2151
01:35:39,790 --> 01:35:41,957
president , I wouldn't let D . O . D . 

2152
01:35:41,957 --> 01:35:44,750
Do that because it gives Congress the 

2153
01:35:44,750 --> 01:35:47,070
way to grade the administration's 

2154
01:35:47,070 --> 01:35:49,100
homework . Does the budget actually 

2155
01:35:49,100 --> 01:35:52,980
match the strategy ? What what I would 

2156
01:35:52,980 --> 01:35:56,820
love to see D . O . D . Do Is instead 

2157
01:35:56,820 --> 01:36:00,040
of purporting that here is a strategy 

2158
01:36:00,050 --> 01:36:03,940
and by the way we need 3-5% year on 

2159
01:36:03,940 --> 01:36:07,300
year growth in GDP to execute it right ? 

2160
01:36:07,310 --> 01:36:09,588
Like why does the administration let D . 

2161
01:36:09,588 --> 01:36:12,400
O . D . Say we're banking on continuous 

2162
01:36:12,410 --> 01:36:15,110
increases in spending in order to carry 

2163
01:36:15,110 --> 01:36:17,650
this out . What I'd love to see D . O . 

2164
01:36:17,650 --> 01:36:21,640
D . Do is strategies namely 

2165
01:36:21,650 --> 01:36:24,310
if we have a trillion dollar defense 

2166
01:36:24,310 --> 01:36:26,421
budget , which Mackenzie Egland tells 

2167
01:36:26,421 --> 01:36:28,477
me is what we need to actually carry 

2168
01:36:28,477 --> 01:36:30,366
out our strategy here is the best 

2169
01:36:30,366 --> 01:36:32,532
strategy for that . If you're going to 

2170
01:36:32,532 --> 01:36:35,450
constrain us to $740 billion a year , 

2171
01:36:35,630 --> 01:36:37,797
here's the best strategy I can come up 

2172
01:36:37,797 --> 01:36:39,852
with to protect and advance american 

2173
01:36:39,852 --> 01:36:42,100
interests . And if you're actually 

2174
01:36:42,110 --> 01:36:45,410
gonna , I don't know , put a $40 

2175
01:36:45,410 --> 01:36:47,690
billion , I'm pulling that as a rabbit 

2176
01:36:47,690 --> 01:36:50,770
out of my hat uh $40 billion 

2177
01:36:51,120 --> 01:36:54,420
green energy requirement into the D . O . 

2178
01:36:54,420 --> 01:36:56,620
D . Budget because it's important to 

2179
01:36:56,620 --> 01:36:58,453
the president , even if it's not 

2180
01:36:58,453 --> 01:37:00,840
important to these guys ability to 

2181
01:37:00,840 --> 01:37:04,310
carry out their missions . Uh then 

2182
01:37:04,320 --> 01:37:06,487
here's the best strategy I can come up 

2183
01:37:06,487 --> 01:37:08,653
with because if those three strategies 

2184
01:37:08,653 --> 01:37:10,598
are the same strategies , they are 

2185
01:37:10,598 --> 01:37:12,970
fundamentally dishonest vic . I'm gonna 

2186
01:37:12,970 --> 01:37:16,260
take a pause and invite you to give 

2187
01:37:16,260 --> 01:37:18,427
your conclusion here in a moment . I'm 

2188
01:37:18,427 --> 01:37:20,482
going to go to this gentleman here . 

2189
01:37:20,482 --> 01:37:22,649
Just give us your name who you're with 

2190
01:37:22,649 --> 01:37:24,482
and go for it . Thank you . Mark 

2191
01:37:24,482 --> 01:37:26,593
Faulkner , I'm with the Institute for 

2192
01:37:26,593 --> 01:37:28,538
Defense and Business . My question 

2193
01:37:28,538 --> 01:37:30,593
concerns deterrence and all All five 

2194
01:37:30,593 --> 01:37:32,427
panel members have have spoke to 

2195
01:37:32,427 --> 01:37:34,260
deterrents are service component 

2196
01:37:34,260 --> 01:37:35,982
commanders from an operational 

2197
01:37:35,982 --> 01:37:38,204
perspective that battle , space and our 

2198
01:37:38,204 --> 01:37:40,260
other subject matter experts . So my 

2199
01:37:40,260 --> 01:37:42,371
you know , the importance of maritime 

2200
01:37:42,371 --> 01:37:44,204
and naval forces lately has been 

2201
01:37:44,204 --> 01:37:46,371
getting a lot of attention and I would 

2202
01:37:46,371 --> 01:37:48,482
I would argue more than more than the 

2203
01:37:48,482 --> 01:37:50,482
other components . So , my question 

2204
01:37:50,482 --> 01:37:52,649
really for for our generals as well as 

2205
01:37:52,649 --> 01:37:54,593
our subject , our experts is as it 

2206
01:37:54,593 --> 01:37:57,240
relates to forward deployed land forces , 

2207
01:37:57,380 --> 01:37:59,658
permanent forward deployed land forces . 

2208
01:38:00,120 --> 01:38:02,740
Do we have it right . If generals could 

2209
01:38:02,740 --> 01:38:04,796
speak from a theater perspective and 

2210
01:38:04,796 --> 01:38:08,090
then others , is it right . Do we need 

2211
01:38:08,090 --> 01:38:11,340
more to be a greater deterrent or 

2212
01:38:12,120 --> 01:38:14,176
you know , our our large scale joint 

2213
01:38:14,176 --> 01:38:16,231
exercises sufficient going forward . 

2214
01:38:16,231 --> 01:38:18,231
Thank you . Thanks for the question 

2215
01:38:18,231 --> 01:38:20,398
generals , would you like to take that 

2216
01:38:20,398 --> 01:38:24,180
1/1 . Um I would just 

2217
01:38:24,190 --> 01:38:26,420
answer with the rather obvious response 

2218
01:38:26,420 --> 01:38:29,210
that we constantly evaluate that and 

2219
01:38:29,210 --> 01:38:31,266
then the decision on how much we put 

2220
01:38:31,266 --> 01:38:33,321
forward and how much we we don't put 

2221
01:38:33,321 --> 01:38:35,266
forward depends on an awful lot of 

2222
01:38:35,266 --> 01:38:37,370
things um some of which are non 

2223
01:38:37,370 --> 01:38:39,940
military in nature , you know , as 

2224
01:38:39,940 --> 01:38:42,470
considerations . The second thing I'd 

2225
01:38:42,470 --> 01:38:44,637
point out is that it is important when 

2226
01:38:44,637 --> 01:38:48,430
we think about four um ford posture , 

2227
01:38:48,820 --> 01:38:51,970
to distinguish between like in my case , 

2228
01:38:51,980 --> 01:38:54,060
on the other side of the atlantic or 

2229
01:38:54,060 --> 01:38:56,282
did you have something more specific in 

2230
01:38:56,282 --> 01:38:58,338
mind ? Because once you get onto the 

2231
01:38:58,338 --> 01:39:01,840
continent , the more specific you get , 

2232
01:39:01,850 --> 01:39:03,820
the more bound you become to a 

2233
01:39:03,820 --> 01:39:07,220
particularly imagined um adversary 

2234
01:39:07,220 --> 01:39:09,380
course of action . Right ? So you've 

2235
01:39:09,380 --> 01:39:11,430
got to the art of it is to be far 

2236
01:39:11,430 --> 01:39:13,652
enough forward to be responsive but not 

2237
01:39:13,652 --> 01:39:15,652
so far forward to be committed to a 

2238
01:39:15,652 --> 01:39:18,320
single uh possibility . Um So there's a 

2239
01:39:18,320 --> 01:39:20,740
balance in there , just as there's a 

2240
01:39:20,750 --> 01:39:22,870
balance in the decision to do ford 

2241
01:39:22,870 --> 01:39:25,000
posture in the first place . The last 

2242
01:39:25,000 --> 01:39:26,944
point I'd make with regard to ford 

2243
01:39:26,944 --> 01:39:28,722
posture and deterrence is it is 

2244
01:39:28,722 --> 01:39:30,778
possible to posture too much forward 

2245
01:39:30,778 --> 01:39:32,611
and to become provocative and to 

2246
01:39:32,611 --> 01:39:34,667
destabilize your deterrence . Um and 

2247
01:39:34,667 --> 01:39:37,250
and therefore the calibration of how 

2248
01:39:37,250 --> 01:39:41,170
much power is how far forward and and 

2249
01:39:41,180 --> 01:39:43,013
and what level of readiness it's 

2250
01:39:43,013 --> 01:39:45,236
maintained is all part of the deterrent 

2251
01:39:45,236 --> 01:39:48,300
question in the first place , I would 

2252
01:39:48,460 --> 01:39:50,740
add on the readiness part that chris 

2253
01:39:50,750 --> 01:39:54,660
mentioned about because um we do 

2254
01:39:54,660 --> 01:39:56,920
have to calibrate it . There are 

2255
01:39:56,930 --> 01:39:59,510
mentioned materials that could be an 

2256
01:39:59,510 --> 01:40:01,510
element that we have in distributed 

2257
01:40:01,510 --> 01:40:03,780
locations . I think one of the 

2258
01:40:03,780 --> 01:40:06,200
important parts and this is actually 

2259
01:40:06,200 --> 01:40:08,980
what I was going to say in closing is 

2260
01:40:08,980 --> 01:40:11,620
that when we're forward 

2261
01:40:12,210 --> 01:40:15,120
uh than the joint training 

2262
01:40:15,810 --> 01:40:19,170
and the joint readiness and the joint 

2263
01:40:19,180 --> 01:40:22,510
and coalition and or ally and partner 

2264
01:40:22,520 --> 01:40:24,580
confidence that's gained by being 

2265
01:40:24,580 --> 01:40:27,620
forward has an element of deterrent 

2266
01:40:28,310 --> 01:40:32,240
deterrence in it . And I think that 

2267
01:40:32,250 --> 01:40:36,130
that's sometimes it's kind of uh 

2268
01:40:36,710 --> 01:40:39,200
may be overlooked a little bit in 

2269
01:40:39,210 --> 01:40:41,540
posture discussions because people talk 

2270
01:40:41,990 --> 01:40:45,220
more about hard things uh than some of 

2271
01:40:45,220 --> 01:40:49,100
the sort of off access intangibles 

2272
01:40:49,100 --> 01:40:51,330
that you gain by having capabilities 

2273
01:40:51,330 --> 01:40:53,960
forward , exercising forward , 

2274
01:40:53,960 --> 01:40:55,320
rehearsing forward , 

2275
01:40:55,710 --> 01:40:59,500
understanding the culture , the road 

2276
01:40:59,500 --> 01:41:01,880
networks , the bridge is just all , all 

2277
01:41:01,880 --> 01:41:05,670
of that learning that goes on by 

2278
01:41:05,680 --> 01:41:08,060
american soldier , sailor , airmen and 

2279
01:41:08,060 --> 01:41:11,630
marines in addition to the allies and 

2280
01:41:11,630 --> 01:41:13,800
partners that were operating forward 

2281
01:41:13,800 --> 01:41:16,900
that uh , in and of itself I think has 

2282
01:41:16,900 --> 01:41:19,170
an enormous deterrent value and it can 

2283
01:41:19,170 --> 01:41:21,180
be from the small to the large as 

2284
01:41:21,180 --> 01:41:23,402
christmas pointing out right . It's a , 

2285
01:41:23,402 --> 01:41:25,930
it's not a one for one kind of thing , 

2286
01:41:25,940 --> 01:41:28,960
it can be a different equation that can 

2287
01:41:28,960 --> 01:41:32,450
solve some of that calculus Subject 

2288
01:41:32,450 --> 01:41:35,260
Matter . You are itching . Can I one 

2289
01:41:35,260 --> 01:41:38,890
point to that , so that um , Uh , 

2290
01:41:38,900 --> 01:41:41,067
during the Eisenhower administration , 

2291
01:41:41,067 --> 01:41:43,650
I think it's in the 1956 debates over 

2292
01:41:43,650 --> 01:41:45,706
the basic national security policy , 

2293
01:41:45,706 --> 01:41:47,928
they achieve a staff of the army brings 

2294
01:41:47,928 --> 01:41:51,550
up that we need to be flowing forces to 

2295
01:41:51,550 --> 01:41:53,970
Europe . If a crisis over Berlin 

2296
01:41:53,980 --> 01:41:57,250
actually occurs in Eisenhower actually 

2297
01:41:57,250 --> 01:42:00,680
says he should be impeached if he was 

2298
01:42:00,680 --> 01:42:03,780
flowing american forces to europe in a 

2299
01:42:03,780 --> 01:42:06,380
Berlin crisis because the army would be 

2300
01:42:06,380 --> 01:42:09,860
needed to restore order in Baltimore 

2301
01:42:09,870 --> 01:42:12,600
after the nuclear exchange , which 

2302
01:42:12,600 --> 01:42:14,870
tells you right . Like that tells you 

2303
01:42:14,870 --> 01:42:18,530
his commitment to Berlin , which is , 

2304
01:42:18,540 --> 01:42:20,650
it doesn't matter if forces are in 

2305
01:42:20,650 --> 01:42:23,990
theater because we're going to go all 

2306
01:42:23,990 --> 01:42:26,046
the way up the escalation ladder for 

2307
01:42:26,046 --> 01:42:29,320
the defense of Berlin . Most american 

2308
01:42:29,320 --> 01:42:31,530
presidents can't pull off that party 

2309
01:42:31,530 --> 01:42:34,550
trick that much credibility with that 

2310
01:42:34,550 --> 01:42:37,830
little stuff forward . And so what 

2311
01:42:37,840 --> 01:42:39,951
forward Stationing and forces does in 

2312
01:42:39,951 --> 01:42:41,562
addition to all of the great 

2313
01:42:41,562 --> 01:42:44,550
operational advantages is it plants the 

2314
01:42:44,550 --> 01:42:46,600
flag that we are actually going to 

2315
01:42:46,600 --> 01:42:49,940
fight for this territory ? And that 

2316
01:42:49,940 --> 01:42:53,630
matters hugely . I'm not a big fan of 

2317
01:42:53,640 --> 01:42:55,584
deterrence by punishment because I 

2318
01:42:55,584 --> 01:42:57,700
don't think it actually deters nearly 

2319
01:42:57,700 --> 01:42:59,700
as well as having the ability to do 

2320
01:42:59,700 --> 01:43:02,150
what you say you're going to do . Um , 

2321
01:43:02,160 --> 01:43:04,550
and so , uh , I think we should 

2322
01:43:04,550 --> 01:43:06,900
actually have a big enough army to have 

2323
01:43:06,900 --> 01:43:09,650
forward deployed forces in places we 

2324
01:43:09,650 --> 01:43:12,830
actually intend to defend . McKenzie , 

2325
01:43:13,600 --> 01:43:17,330
bravo . Mhm That was well said I 

2326
01:43:19,960 --> 01:43:22,680
All right , vic , why don't you answer 

2327
01:43:22,680 --> 01:43:24,960
the question ? And then you can give us 

2328
01:43:24,960 --> 01:43:26,960
any other thoughts that you have to 

2329
01:43:26,960 --> 01:43:29,430
share ? Uh , great thanks Francis for 

2330
01:43:29,440 --> 01:43:31,551
leading us through all of this . Uh , 

2331
01:43:31,551 --> 01:43:33,773
it's been , it's been a real pleasure . 

2332
01:43:33,773 --> 01:43:35,940
I'm , I'm , I'm right there with Corey 

2333
01:43:35,940 --> 01:43:38,330
on , uh , I think , I think , you know , 

2334
01:43:38,330 --> 01:43:40,940
you can , people see our global posture 

2335
01:43:40,940 --> 01:43:43,550
is somewhat sometimes as a , as 

2336
01:43:43,550 --> 01:43:46,350
something that's anachronistic . Um , 

2337
01:43:46,360 --> 01:43:49,100
the fact is we have left the places 

2338
01:43:49,100 --> 01:43:51,044
we've lost and we've stayed in the 

2339
01:43:51,044 --> 01:43:53,400
places we've won . And I , um , and I 

2340
01:43:53,400 --> 01:43:55,800
actually think that suggests that going , 

2341
01:43:55,810 --> 01:43:58,930
being in places that we care about uh , 

2342
01:43:58,940 --> 01:44:01,530
has more of a signaling effect than we 

2343
01:44:01,530 --> 01:44:04,390
might realize . And so I think the 

2344
01:44:04,390 --> 01:44:06,920
thing to look at on posture is , is 

2345
01:44:06,920 --> 01:44:08,864
that the right amount in the right 

2346
01:44:08,864 --> 01:44:10,753
places ? Are we , is it the right 

2347
01:44:10,753 --> 01:44:12,864
forces in the right places ? Um , and 

2348
01:44:12,864 --> 01:44:15,087
they have , and it has obviously it has 

2349
01:44:15,087 --> 01:44:17,740
a practical element , which is what 

2350
01:44:17,750 --> 01:44:21,140
both are , both , both generals were 

2351
01:44:21,140 --> 01:44:23,251
referring to , which is , it's , it's 

2352
01:44:23,251 --> 01:44:25,362
about , you know , what we need to be 

2353
01:44:25,362 --> 01:44:27,640
able to do with those partners , right ? 

2354
01:44:27,640 --> 01:44:29,862
So it's about the day to day work . But 

2355
01:44:29,862 --> 01:44:31,980
um , but thinking through that , uh , 

2356
01:44:31,990 --> 01:44:34,790
the value of the skin in the game I 

2357
01:44:34,790 --> 01:44:38,380
think is , is really high . Um , and uh , 

2358
01:44:38,390 --> 01:44:40,612
and , and , and you know , so I would , 

2359
01:44:40,612 --> 01:44:42,446
I would , I would definitely not 

2360
01:44:42,446 --> 01:44:44,557
advocate , you know , bringing people 

2361
01:44:44,557 --> 01:44:46,779
home . I didn't like it when we brought 

2362
01:44:46,779 --> 01:44:49,112
people home from europe . Uh , you know , 

2363
01:44:49,112 --> 01:44:51,279
a decade , a decade ago , I thought we 

2364
01:44:51,279 --> 01:44:53,501
should leave people leave , leave a lot 

2365
01:44:53,501 --> 01:44:55,668
of those , uh , those units in place . 

2366
01:44:55,668 --> 01:44:57,834
Um , it's also , uh , it's also really 

2367
01:44:57,834 --> 01:44:59,557
cost effective , um , which is 

2368
01:44:59,557 --> 01:45:01,723
something if you do asia a lot and you 

2369
01:45:01,723 --> 01:45:04,450
look at either , you know , just Japan 

2370
01:45:04,450 --> 01:45:06,790
and Korea or you look at , you know , 

2371
01:45:06,800 --> 01:45:09,150
rotating forces to Darwin when we were 

2372
01:45:09,160 --> 01:45:11,430
that was my that was on my watch doing 

2373
01:45:11,430 --> 01:45:15,340
those negotiations . Um you know , it's 

2374
01:45:15,350 --> 01:45:18,050
it's good for us from an operational 

2375
01:45:18,060 --> 01:45:20,660
standpoint . So I think there's a lot , 

2376
01:45:20,660 --> 01:45:23,020
there's a lot to be said for that . Um 

2377
01:45:23,690 --> 01:45:26,090
you know , on the technology front II 

2378
01:45:26,100 --> 01:45:28,110
in closing the things I would the 

2379
01:45:28,110 --> 01:45:31,260
things I would flag and uh general 

2380
01:45:31,260 --> 01:45:33,460
casually mentioned , I mentioned the 

2381
01:45:33,460 --> 01:45:35,460
Azerbaijan situation as well , like 

2382
01:45:35,460 --> 01:45:37,571
these low , you know , these like mid 

2383
01:45:37,571 --> 01:45:41,050
level adaptations . Um We need to 

2384
01:45:41,050 --> 01:45:43,960
think uh we need to focus on our on the 

2385
01:45:43,960 --> 01:45:45,960
creativity , the thing that's gonna 

2386
01:45:45,960 --> 01:45:49,080
keep us ahead or things like um okay , 

2387
01:45:49,090 --> 01:45:51,250
you , you know , we've been trying to 

2388
01:45:51,250 --> 01:45:53,790
secure our networks forever . Well , 

2389
01:45:53,800 --> 01:45:55,890
there's a good effort underway right 

2390
01:45:55,890 --> 01:45:58,057
now to look at what about data centric 

2391
01:45:58,390 --> 01:46:00,680
uh security . What about what about 

2392
01:46:00,680 --> 01:46:02,791
using encryption and other tools that 

2393
01:46:02,791 --> 01:46:05,450
we are ? No . And have advanced on 

2394
01:46:05,450 --> 01:46:08,530
quite a bit to have things flow out and 

2395
01:46:08,530 --> 01:46:11,600
be able to be more network agnostic um 

2396
01:46:11,600 --> 01:46:13,711
but be secured and only be accessible 

2397
01:46:13,711 --> 01:46:16,044
to the right people in the right places . 

2398
01:46:16,044 --> 01:46:17,989
Um and there's there's a there's a 

2399
01:46:17,989 --> 01:46:20,044
there's a good effort underway right 

2400
01:46:20,044 --> 01:46:22,044
now to look at that , that would be 

2401
01:46:22,044 --> 01:46:23,989
critical for allies and partners . 

2402
01:46:23,989 --> 01:46:25,822
Imagine if the thing you need to 

2403
01:46:25,822 --> 01:46:28,760
descend knew that it was a secret rail 

2404
01:46:28,760 --> 01:46:31,050
Canada thing and that somebody in 

2405
01:46:31,050 --> 01:46:33,217
Canada could look at it . But somebody 

2406
01:46:33,217 --> 01:46:35,383
else somewhere else . Couldn't Right . 

2407
01:46:35,383 --> 01:46:37,494
This is this is not um that that kind 

2408
01:46:37,494 --> 01:46:39,383
of stuff is not science fiction . 

2409
01:46:39,383 --> 01:46:41,494
There's uh there's uh there's a great 

2410
01:46:41,494 --> 01:46:44,590
company um uh that's involved in those 

2411
01:46:44,590 --> 01:46:46,534
efforts right now that has already 

2412
01:46:46,534 --> 01:46:48,757
figured out how to I won't name it . So 

2413
01:46:48,757 --> 01:46:50,812
I'm not plugging somebody but uh but 

2414
01:46:50,812 --> 01:46:52,979
has already figured out like how to do 

2415
01:46:52,979 --> 01:46:52,860
real time encryption of video with 

2416
01:46:52,860 --> 01:46:55,230
those kinds of attributes uh , at 

2417
01:46:55,240 --> 01:46:58,040
creation . So video is born , it's 

2418
01:46:58,040 --> 01:47:00,240
transmitted . It can only be looked at 

2419
01:47:00,240 --> 01:47:02,184
by people that it's supposed to be 

2420
01:47:02,184 --> 01:47:04,296
looked at . These kinds of things are 

2421
01:47:04,296 --> 01:47:06,073
like shifting how we think from 

2422
01:47:06,073 --> 01:47:08,018
securing our perimeter in terms of 

2423
01:47:08,018 --> 01:47:09,851
networks , which has proven very 

2424
01:47:09,851 --> 01:47:11,907
difficult to saying , let's make the 

2425
01:47:11,907 --> 01:47:14,018
things within the network secure . If 

2426
01:47:14,018 --> 01:47:16,184
we can get there , our ability to work 

2427
01:47:16,184 --> 01:47:18,351
with allies and partners is boosted in 

2428
01:47:18,351 --> 01:47:20,518
our overall security . All of a sudden 

2429
01:47:20,518 --> 01:47:22,629
something could be transmitted . Um , 

2430
01:47:22,629 --> 01:47:24,518
you know , more agnostic to which 

2431
01:47:24,518 --> 01:47:26,670
system it's it's resting on that . I 

2432
01:47:26,670 --> 01:47:28,781
noticed my G6 wasn't in the room when 

2433
01:47:28,781 --> 01:47:32,510
you said that victims too bad . 

2434
01:47:32,520 --> 01:47:35,110
Um , you know , another joke , 

2435
01:47:35,120 --> 01:47:38,750
a joke get right on it . All 

2436
01:47:38,750 --> 01:47:42,200
right . They can put you in touch the 

2437
01:47:42,210 --> 01:47:44,266
the you know , there's other there's 

2438
01:47:44,266 --> 01:47:46,210
other there's other things we were 

2439
01:47:46,210 --> 01:47:48,432
talking about installations earlier . I 

2440
01:47:48,432 --> 01:47:50,210
mean , again , there's a lot of 

2441
01:47:50,210 --> 01:47:52,432
commercial technologies out there right 

2442
01:47:52,432 --> 01:47:54,543
now that are that are that that would 

2443
01:47:54,543 --> 01:47:56,432
transform how you do installation 

2444
01:47:56,432 --> 01:47:58,599
security for other people that where , 

2445
01:47:58,599 --> 01:48:00,710
where the building knows who's in the 

2446
01:48:00,710 --> 01:48:02,766
building , where the badges no , you 

2447
01:48:02,766 --> 01:48:04,932
know what direction people are going , 

2448
01:48:04,932 --> 01:48:07,154
where , you know , you know , there's a 

2449
01:48:07,154 --> 01:48:09,377
there's a there's a far greater ability 

2450
01:48:09,377 --> 01:48:11,266
and much more portable security . 

2451
01:48:11,266 --> 01:48:13,432
There's a lot of things happening that 

2452
01:48:13,432 --> 01:48:15,488
we could that we could grab onto and 

2453
01:48:15,488 --> 01:48:17,543
for for land forces in particular at 

2454
01:48:17,543 --> 01:48:19,654
the end of the day , land forces have 

2455
01:48:19,654 --> 01:48:22,250
to operate in the contested territory . 

2456
01:48:22,310 --> 01:48:25,360
Like physically they're flying over it , 

2457
01:48:25,360 --> 01:48:27,693
they're not sailing near it there in it . 

2458
01:48:28,170 --> 01:48:31,600
And so figuring out how to operate more 

2459
01:48:31,600 --> 01:48:33,690
securely and more contested , 

2460
01:48:33,690 --> 01:48:35,801
complicated environments . That's got 

2461
01:48:35,801 --> 01:48:38,590
to be uh , just a fundamental focus of 

2462
01:48:38,590 --> 01:48:42,140
how we keep our keep land power 

2463
01:48:42,140 --> 01:48:44,410
capabilities relevant and effective 

2464
01:48:44,420 --> 01:48:47,460
going forward . Gentlemen , before you 

2465
01:48:47,470 --> 01:48:49,780
say your closing remarks , one more 

2466
01:48:49,780 --> 01:48:51,947
question from the audience . Thank you 

2467
01:48:51,947 --> 01:48:54,970
sir , for your patients . My name is 

2468
01:48:54,970 --> 01:48:57,026
Cornell . Albertina had the military 

2469
01:48:57,026 --> 01:48:59,530
attache from Spain and I would like to 

2470
01:48:59,530 --> 01:49:02,960
know your views on the possibility of 

2471
01:49:02,970 --> 01:49:05,840
uh , cooperation or coordination 

2472
01:49:05,850 --> 01:49:09,110
between Russia and china in their 

2473
01:49:09,120 --> 01:49:11,740
competition against the U . S , 

2474
01:49:11,920 --> 01:49:15,730
particularly in africa where the force 

2475
01:49:15,730 --> 01:49:19,490
posture is not so so strong . Thank you . 

2476
01:49:19,970 --> 01:49:22,320
That's a terrific question and Corey , 

2477
01:49:22,320 --> 01:49:24,542
I'm glad I'm not in between you and the 

2478
01:49:24,542 --> 01:49:26,690
microphone or I would be physically 

2479
01:49:26,690 --> 01:49:30,190
harmed . Uh , so I 

2480
01:49:30,200 --> 01:49:33,620
think we too often look at 

2481
01:49:33,620 --> 01:49:35,600
singular potential adversaries and 

2482
01:49:35,600 --> 01:49:37,740
don't worry enough about cooperation 

2483
01:49:37,740 --> 01:49:41,670
among potential adversaries and uh even 

2484
01:49:41,670 --> 01:49:43,790
if there is a long term reason to 

2485
01:49:43,790 --> 01:49:47,000
believe the Russians will bridle at 

2486
01:49:47,010 --> 01:49:50,660
being , you know , um mar a 

2487
01:49:50,660 --> 01:49:54,050
marginal small support to china's power . 

2488
01:49:54,160 --> 01:49:57,040
They have really strong common interest 

2489
01:49:57,050 --> 01:49:59,460
in wanting to break up the existing 

2490
01:49:59,470 --> 01:50:03,430
order uh and wanting to create um 

2491
01:50:03,440 --> 01:50:05,870
payment vehicles that are outside the 

2492
01:50:05,870 --> 01:50:08,660
dollar zone , right ? The Petro yuan 

2493
01:50:08,660 --> 01:50:10,549
and the way that the Russians are 

2494
01:50:10,660 --> 01:50:12,771
playing around with crypto to try and 

2495
01:50:12,771 --> 01:50:15,330
prevent um sanctions from being able to 

2496
01:50:15,330 --> 01:50:19,090
bite them . They have a lot 

2497
01:50:19,100 --> 01:50:22,850
of common interests in , for example , 

2498
01:50:22,860 --> 01:50:26,540
uh containing Japan's burgeoning power 

2499
01:50:26,550 --> 01:50:30,420
and activism in the region . They 

2500
01:50:30,430 --> 01:50:32,590
could stumble over conflicting 

2501
01:50:32,590 --> 01:50:34,757
interests in Central Asia , but that's 

2502
01:50:34,757 --> 01:50:37,880
a long time coming . And the the 

2503
01:50:37,890 --> 01:50:40,090
problems we imagine them having with 

2504
01:50:40,090 --> 01:50:42,300
each other when we were imagining this 

2505
01:50:42,300 --> 01:50:45,630
15 years ago was the demographic boom 

2506
01:50:45,630 --> 01:50:49,590
of China moving into empty , sent uh 

2507
01:50:49,600 --> 01:50:52,650
central Asia and into the Russian east 

2508
01:50:52,660 --> 01:50:56,120
and now that has collapsed . So mostly 

2509
01:50:56,120 --> 01:50:58,064
strategic failures are failures of 

2510
01:50:58,064 --> 01:51:00,810
imagination . And I agree with you that 

2511
01:51:00,810 --> 01:51:03,330
we don't we aren't exercising enough 

2512
01:51:03,340 --> 01:51:05,660
imagination about what their 

2513
01:51:05,660 --> 01:51:08,260
cooperation could mean . One other 

2514
01:51:08,260 --> 01:51:10,420
point though , there's a scholar at 

2515
01:51:10,420 --> 01:51:12,531
stanford University , also associated 

2516
01:51:12,531 --> 01:51:15,960
with Ai Oriana Skylar mastro who is 

2517
01:51:15,960 --> 01:51:19,750
doing very detailed research on the 

2518
01:51:19,750 --> 01:51:22,810
kinds of specific military cooperation 

2519
01:51:22,810 --> 01:51:26,280
they have going and the degree of 

2520
01:51:26,290 --> 01:51:29,560
interconnectedness it portends . Um so 

2521
01:51:29,570 --> 01:51:32,980
it's a really good source for making um 

2522
01:51:33,560 --> 01:51:35,890
for making serious judgments about the 

2523
01:51:35,890 --> 01:51:38,112
degree of cooperation and what it could 

2524
01:51:38,112 --> 01:51:40,223
mean . Um With all due respect to vic 

2525
01:51:40,223 --> 01:51:42,446
and Mackenzie for the purpose of time , 

2526
01:51:42,446 --> 01:51:44,890
I'm going to defer to the generals and 

2527
01:51:44,900 --> 01:51:46,910
invite you to either close general 

2528
01:51:46,910 --> 01:51:49,740
Flynn or answer the question from the 

2529
01:51:49,750 --> 01:51:53,640
last questioner . I'll just wrap up 

2530
01:51:53,650 --> 01:51:55,650
by saying thanks . I appreciate the 

2531
01:51:55,650 --> 01:51:58,830
discussion . Uh and I'm thankful for 

2532
01:51:58,830 --> 01:52:00,886
all of you and your interests in the 

2533
01:52:00,886 --> 01:52:02,886
challenges that we have . Thank you 

2534
01:52:03,350 --> 01:52:06,340
General Cobolli . Um First Colonel with 

2535
01:52:06,340 --> 01:52:09,670
regard to your question um uh 

2536
01:52:10,050 --> 01:52:13,750
Sometimes it might be better for 

2537
01:52:13,850 --> 01:52:17,800
me in uniform not to consider Too 

2538
01:52:17,800 --> 01:52:20,040
much about what will they cooperate ? 

2539
01:52:20,040 --> 01:52:22,096
Well they're not but just to observe 

2540
01:52:22,096 --> 01:52:25,940
that clearly the action of one could 

2541
01:52:25,940 --> 01:52:28,310
produce opportunities for the other . 

2542
01:52:29,050 --> 01:52:32,700
And would the other have the agility 

2543
01:52:32,710 --> 01:52:35,410
and the ability to take advantage of 

2544
01:52:35,410 --> 01:52:37,521
that opportunity ? That's what I have 

2545
01:52:37,521 --> 01:52:39,632
to think about . So that might be one 

2546
01:52:39,632 --> 01:52:41,743
way to look at it . Um with regard to 

2547
01:52:41,743 --> 01:52:43,966
closing comments . Um One thing that we 

2548
01:52:43,966 --> 01:52:46,077
didn't get a chance to touch on but I 

2549
01:52:46,077 --> 01:52:48,188
would like to briefly is the question 

2550
01:52:48,188 --> 01:52:51,290
of interoperability and I bring it up 

2551
01:52:51,300 --> 01:52:54,210
because many panel members have raised 

2552
01:52:54,220 --> 01:52:57,850
the um point that our allies are our 

2553
01:52:57,850 --> 01:52:59,980
strength . Our allies are a source of 

2554
01:52:59,980 --> 01:53:02,380
strength . Our allies can substitute 

2555
01:53:02,380 --> 01:53:06,270
complement um work with our forces in 

2556
01:53:06,270 --> 01:53:08,550
many , many cases . I think this is 

2557
01:53:08,550 --> 01:53:11,370
very important but it really works best 

2558
01:53:11,450 --> 01:53:13,228
when we have a certain level of 

2559
01:53:13,228 --> 01:53:15,283
interoperability together so that we 

2560
01:53:15,283 --> 01:53:17,490
can function at a military technical 

2561
01:53:17,490 --> 01:53:20,620
leather level together . Um we divide 

2562
01:53:20,630 --> 01:53:23,870
interoperability into three categories . 

2563
01:53:23,870 --> 01:53:25,890
Right ? Human interoperability , 

2564
01:53:25,900 --> 01:53:28,330
procedural interoperability and 

2565
01:53:28,340 --> 01:53:31,210
technical interoperability . I would 

2566
01:53:31,210 --> 01:53:33,910
like to focus on the undervalued first 

2567
01:53:33,910 --> 01:53:36,840
one . Human interoperability . We 

2568
01:53:36,850 --> 01:53:38,906
undervalue it sometimes because it's 

2569
01:53:38,906 --> 01:53:41,990
squishy and it's subjective and it's 

2570
01:53:41,990 --> 01:53:44,670
not as easy as saying my radio does not 

2571
01:53:44,670 --> 01:53:46,392
talk to your radio . We have a 

2572
01:53:46,392 --> 01:53:48,226
technical problem or you do this 

2573
01:53:48,226 --> 01:53:50,114
differently than I do . We have a 

2574
01:53:50,114 --> 01:53:52,281
procedural problem . But in fact it is 

2575
01:53:52,281 --> 01:53:54,337
really , I think both in both of our 

2576
01:53:54,337 --> 01:53:56,840
theaters . Human interoperability , 

2577
01:53:56,840 --> 01:54:00,780
cognitive commonality is really 

2578
01:54:00,790 --> 01:54:03,310
the thing that will allow us to bridge 

2579
01:54:03,310 --> 01:54:06,360
gaps in the other two domains of 

2580
01:54:06,370 --> 01:54:08,910
interoperability and in that regard . I 

2581
01:54:08,910 --> 01:54:10,966
would like , hey charlie , would you 

2582
01:54:10,966 --> 01:54:12,910
stand up and introduce your deputy 

2583
01:54:12,910 --> 01:54:11,870
please ? 

2584
01:54:16,940 --> 01:54:17,940
Yes . 

2585
01:54:24,940 --> 01:54:27,200
Thank you john would you stand up and 

2586
01:54:27,210 --> 01:54:28,543
introduce your deputy ? 

2587
01:54:37,340 --> 01:54:39,860
What ? These are just too small 

2588
01:54:39,860 --> 01:54:43,650
examples all over the world and all 

2589
01:54:43,660 --> 01:54:45,740
over the United States . We have 

2590
01:54:45,750 --> 01:54:48,580
officers from close allies serving side 

2591
01:54:48,580 --> 01:54:50,740
by side with us and we have our 

2592
01:54:50,740 --> 01:54:52,796
officers and their formation serving 

2593
01:54:52,796 --> 01:54:55,018
side by side with them . And I just saw 

2594
01:54:55,018 --> 01:54:57,184
both of you sitting there and I wanted 

2595
01:54:57,184 --> 01:54:59,407
to call attention to the important fact 

2596
01:54:59,407 --> 01:55:01,351
that you're not just in our army . 

2597
01:55:01,351 --> 01:55:03,351
You're also at a usa thank you very 

2598
01:55:03,351 --> 01:55:05,684
much . I'm gonna take advantage on that . 

2599
01:55:05,684 --> 01:55:08,370
So I have a deputy from Australia 

2600
01:55:08,840 --> 01:55:12,080
actually interestingly enough . The 

2601
01:55:12,080 --> 01:55:14,247
chief of the Australian army today was 

2602
01:55:14,247 --> 01:55:16,690
the first deputy in the United States 

2603
01:55:16,690 --> 01:55:20,680
Army pacific command recber um There's 

2604
01:55:20,680 --> 01:55:22,791
a new Zealand deputy and the division 

2605
01:55:22,791 --> 01:55:26,140
that chris and I uh commanded formally . 

2606
01:55:26,150 --> 01:55:28,970
And then we have a Canadian deputy at 

2607
01:55:28,980 --> 01:55:32,950
both first corps in Washington 

2608
01:55:32,950 --> 01:55:35,260
State and Canadian deputy in the United 

2609
01:55:35,260 --> 01:55:38,540
States Army Alaska . So again , another 

2610
01:55:38,550 --> 01:55:42,010
illustration that chris pointed out and 

2611
01:55:42,010 --> 01:55:44,066
I couldn't agree with you more about 

2612
01:55:44,066 --> 01:55:46,450
the the human interoperability and 

2613
01:55:46,460 --> 01:55:49,780
actually with the pandemic , it's even 

2614
01:55:49,790 --> 01:55:52,850
more important that we get that and 

2615
01:55:52,850 --> 01:55:55,072
regain that with some of the separation 

2616
01:55:55,072 --> 01:55:57,239
that occurred naturally because of the 

2617
01:55:57,239 --> 01:55:59,570
pandemic . So thanks uh thanks to all 

2618
01:55:59,570 --> 01:56:01,790
of you for joining this conversation 

2619
01:56:01,790 --> 01:56:04,160
today . Grateful for your time . Thanks 

2620
01:56:04,160 --> 01:56:06,327
to a U . S . A . It is wonderful to be 

2621
01:56:06,327 --> 01:56:08,640
back in person and thanks to all of you 

2622
01:56:08,640 --> 01:56:09,670
for your attention .