1 00:00:00,040 --> 00:00:01,707 Well , good afternoon . I'm a 2 00:00:01,707 --> 00:00:03,984 Lieutenant General , Retired Jim Dubik , 3 00:00:03,984 --> 00:00:06,470 I'm your a U . S . A . Uh advertisement 4 00:00:06,480 --> 00:00:08,950 to start this uh , conference off . 5 00:00:09,710 --> 00:00:11,599 Thank you for joining us for this 6 00:00:11,599 --> 00:00:14,030 contemporary military forum entitled 7 00:00:14,040 --> 00:00:17,290 transforming land power to meet global 8 00:00:17,290 --> 00:00:19,234 challenges . We certainly have , I 9 00:00:19,234 --> 00:00:21,540 think the best panel of the day to talk 10 00:00:21,540 --> 00:00:24,180 about this as your professional 11 00:00:24,180 --> 00:00:26,040 association , the United States 12 00:00:26,050 --> 00:00:28,161 Association of the United States Army 13 00:00:28,540 --> 00:00:31,360 is proud to provide forums like this 14 00:00:31,740 --> 00:00:34,030 throughout the year that broaden the 15 00:00:34,030 --> 00:00:36,310 professional knowledge base of our 16 00:00:36,310 --> 00:00:38,910 professionals and those who support the 17 00:00:38,910 --> 00:00:41,520 army . That's right . A U . S . A will 18 00:00:41,530 --> 00:00:43,560 amplify the army's narrative to 19 00:00:43,560 --> 00:00:46,940 audiences inside the army and to help 20 00:00:46,940 --> 00:00:50,540 further the associations missions to be 21 00:00:50,550 --> 00:00:53,390 the voice of the army outside . Of 22 00:00:53,390 --> 00:00:55,820 course , we don't do this alone . This 23 00:00:55,830 --> 00:00:59,150 A USA relies on its members 24 00:01:00,140 --> 00:01:02,770 to help tell the army story and to help 25 00:01:02,770 --> 00:01:05,820 support our soldiers and families . A 26 00:01:05,820 --> 00:01:07,990 strong membership based therefore is 27 00:01:07,990 --> 00:01:11,590 vitally important for our advocacy to 28 00:01:11,600 --> 00:01:14,240 the Congress in the pentagon , defense 29 00:01:14,240 --> 00:01:17,100 industries , the public in communities 30 00:01:17,100 --> 00:01:20,790 across the country And in the 122 31 00:01:20,790 --> 00:01:23,550 chapters across the country if you 32 00:01:23,550 --> 00:01:26,130 remember , Great thank you . If you're 33 00:01:26,130 --> 00:01:29,160 not uh , move out right now and go join 34 00:01:31,040 --> 00:01:33,230 just one administrative announcement 35 00:01:33,240 --> 00:01:36,820 before we start the panel because of 36 00:01:36,820 --> 00:01:39,780 the current environment , we've had to 37 00:01:39,780 --> 00:01:41,970 reduce the capacity in each of these 38 00:01:41,980 --> 00:01:44,930 forums . So if you leave the room for 39 00:01:44,930 --> 00:01:48,040 some reason , please know that you may 40 00:01:48,040 --> 00:01:50,450 or may not be able to get back in that 41 00:01:50,450 --> 00:01:52,340 were attending , uh , the numbers 42 00:01:52,340 --> 00:01:55,600 outside . So with that I turn the 43 00:01:55,610 --> 00:01:57,554 channel over to Francis Rose , our 44 00:01:57,554 --> 00:01:59,666 moderator and I welcome all the panel 45 00:01:59,666 --> 00:02:01,721 members on behalf of the U . S . A . 46 00:02:01,721 --> 00:02:03,721 Good to see you . Thank you sir , I 47 00:02:03,721 --> 00:02:05,888 appreciate the warm welcome and thanks 48 00:02:05,888 --> 00:02:08,810 to all of you for coming . I'm really 49 00:02:08,810 --> 00:02:11,590 happy to be back in person . I missed 50 00:02:11,590 --> 00:02:13,479 seeing everyone last year . I'm a 51 00:02:13,479 --> 00:02:15,479 rookie compared to a lot of you , I 52 00:02:15,479 --> 00:02:17,760 imagine this is my sixth A . U . S . A . 53 00:02:18,240 --> 00:02:21,140 And so I always enjoy coming and seeing 54 00:02:21,140 --> 00:02:23,490 familiar faces and meeting new folks . 55 00:02:24,140 --> 00:02:26,860 Um the discussion at hand is 56 00:02:26,860 --> 00:02:28,860 tremendously important . I will not 57 00:02:28,860 --> 00:02:30,916 bore you with the headlines that I'm 58 00:02:30,916 --> 00:02:33,082 sure you have already followed that uh 59 00:02:33,082 --> 00:02:35,249 uh make the implications of what we're 60 00:02:35,249 --> 00:02:37,471 discussing here clear transforming land 61 00:02:37,471 --> 00:02:39,471 power to meet global challenges . I 62 00:02:39,471 --> 00:02:41,582 want to welcome my fellow panelists , 63 00:02:41,582 --> 00:02:43,650 uh general Christopher casually , 64 00:02:43,650 --> 00:02:46,870 General Charles Flynn Vikram Singh core , 65 00:02:46,870 --> 00:02:50,540 Ishaqi and Mackenzie Egland directly to 66 00:02:50,540 --> 00:02:54,210 my left . We have plenty of time for 67 00:02:54,220 --> 00:02:56,960 each of them to give some thoughts to 68 00:02:56,960 --> 00:03:00,550 begin the conversation . I will then I 69 00:03:00,550 --> 00:03:02,661 have a few things that I've scribbled 70 00:03:02,661 --> 00:03:04,940 down and uh that I want to ask them 71 00:03:04,940 --> 00:03:08,200 about and then I hope to set aside a 72 00:03:08,210 --> 00:03:10,099 fair amount of time for you to be 73 00:03:10,099 --> 00:03:12,266 involved too . We have the microphones 74 00:03:12,266 --> 00:03:14,480 that you see and there will be plenty 75 00:03:14,480 --> 00:03:16,647 of opportunity . So as you're thinking 76 00:03:16,647 --> 00:03:19,590 about um what you're hearing , I 77 00:03:19,590 --> 00:03:21,368 welcome you to jot them down or 78 00:03:21,368 --> 00:03:23,730 remember those thoughts and pose them 79 00:03:23,740 --> 00:03:25,760 to the members of the panel 80 00:03:27,240 --> 00:03:29,240 without further ado I'll start with 81 00:03:29,240 --> 00:03:31,351 General Qawwali welcome and thank you 82 00:03:31,351 --> 00:03:33,518 very much for participating and please 83 00:03:33,518 --> 00:03:35,351 take it away . Thank you Mr Rose 84 00:03:35,351 --> 00:03:37,518 appreciate it very much . It's good to 85 00:03:37,518 --> 00:03:37,210 be here . Thank you for the invitation 86 00:03:37,210 --> 00:03:39,432 to be on this panel . It's wonderful to 87 00:03:39,432 --> 00:03:41,654 be on a panel with such a distinguished 88 00:03:41,654 --> 00:03:43,766 colleagues and uh it's good to see so 89 00:03:43,766 --> 00:03:46,320 many friendly faces in the audience to 90 00:03:46,320 --> 00:03:48,540 include Andy Knight who I just saw for 91 00:03:48,540 --> 00:03:50,596 the first time in more than a year . 92 00:03:50,596 --> 00:03:52,373 One of my favorite soldiers and 93 00:03:52,373 --> 00:03:54,596 artillery men who was so good , we gave 94 00:03:54,596 --> 00:03:56,818 him command of an infantry company when 95 00:03:56,818 --> 00:03:58,929 he was a young officer . So it's good 96 00:03:58,929 --> 00:04:01,151 to be here . I've been a command of U . 97 00:04:01,151 --> 00:04:04,220 S . Army europe for the last 3.5 years 98 00:04:04,220 --> 00:04:07,560 as many as you know in the past year we 99 00:04:08,040 --> 00:04:11,670 um combined it with us army Africa and 100 00:04:11,680 --> 00:04:13,690 my headquarters adopted the Africa 101 00:04:13,690 --> 00:04:16,220 portfolio as well . But today I'd like 102 00:04:16,230 --> 00:04:18,286 just to dwell on U . S . Army europe 103 00:04:18,286 --> 00:04:20,508 for a moment and the efforts we've been 104 00:04:20,508 --> 00:04:24,460 taking there . So the most recent um uh 105 00:04:24,460 --> 00:04:28,140 huh National Defense strategy named 106 00:04:28,150 --> 00:04:31,080 adversaries . Uh not a very common 107 00:04:31,090 --> 00:04:33,312 thing but one that gave us a great deal 108 00:04:33,312 --> 00:04:35,850 of focus that focus built on the focus 109 00:04:35,850 --> 00:04:38,072 that we have started to generate in the 110 00:04:38,072 --> 00:04:40,294 wake of 2000 and eight in 2000 and 14 . 111 00:04:40,294 --> 00:04:43,430 Um the annexation of Crimea and um the 112 00:04:43,430 --> 00:04:45,920 incursion into Eastern Ukraine and 113 00:04:45,930 --> 00:04:48,650 essentially I think the big top line 114 00:04:48,660 --> 00:04:50,850 message from U . S . Army europe as we 115 00:04:50,860 --> 00:04:54,500 have been and are preparing training , 116 00:04:54,510 --> 00:04:56,830 organizing , training and equipping for 117 00:04:56,830 --> 00:04:59,650 large scale ground combat operations as 118 00:04:59,650 --> 00:05:03,030 a method of deterrence , but also 119 00:05:03,040 --> 00:05:06,260 because we deter by being prepared to 120 00:05:06,260 --> 00:05:09,760 win . Um So the history of U . S . Army 121 00:05:09,760 --> 00:05:11,816 europe as many of you know , started 122 00:05:11,816 --> 00:05:14,038 the Cold War , huge fraction of the U . 123 00:05:14,038 --> 00:05:15,927 S . Army was located for deployed 124 00:05:15,927 --> 00:05:17,990 inside europe um Over time after the 125 00:05:17,990 --> 00:05:19,823 Cold War we drew that down until 126 00:05:19,823 --> 00:05:22,540 finally in 2013 , the last U . S . 127 00:05:22,540 --> 00:05:25,360 Tanks left the european continent soon 128 00:05:25,360 --> 00:05:28,990 thereafter . Um uh the events of 129 00:05:28,990 --> 00:05:31,680 2014 transpired , we began to reverse 130 00:05:31,680 --> 00:05:33,570 that first with rotational 131 00:05:33,570 --> 00:05:35,570 organizations and armored brigade , 132 00:05:35,570 --> 00:05:37,403 combat team rotating heel to toe 133 00:05:37,403 --> 00:05:40,430 through europe since 2015 . Later , a 134 00:05:40,430 --> 00:05:42,597 combat aviation brigade in addition to 135 00:05:42,597 --> 00:05:45,100 that and a division headquarters minus . 136 00:05:45,100 --> 00:05:47,322 So that was rotational forces where the 137 00:05:47,322 --> 00:05:49,544 U . S . Is first attempt to thicken our 138 00:05:49,544 --> 00:05:51,660 stance there . But in the past couple 139 00:05:51,660 --> 00:05:54,610 of years we've had significant targeted , 140 00:05:54,620 --> 00:05:56,760 very specifically targeted but 141 00:05:56,760 --> 00:05:59,420 significant growth . First of all , the 142 00:05:59,430 --> 00:06:02,100 41st fires brigade , a rocket launcher 143 00:06:02,110 --> 00:06:04,054 brigade consisting of two launcher 144 00:06:04,054 --> 00:06:05,999 battalion stationed in Grafenwoehr 145 00:06:05,999 --> 00:06:07,610 Germany up and running fully 146 00:06:07,610 --> 00:06:09,840 operationally capable as of february of 147 00:06:09,850 --> 00:06:11,940 this year , a huge addition to our 148 00:06:11,940 --> 00:06:14,990 combat power on the continent of europe . 149 00:06:15,000 --> 00:06:17,310 Second , we created one of the army's 150 00:06:17,310 --> 00:06:19,670 first active component , short range 151 00:06:19,680 --> 00:06:21,791 air defense battalions , the fifth of 152 00:06:21,791 --> 00:06:24,013 the fourth Air defense artillery , it's 153 00:06:24,013 --> 00:06:25,958 located in Ansbach and a couple of 154 00:06:25,958 --> 00:06:28,150 other locations in in europe . Very 155 00:06:28,150 --> 00:06:30,970 importantly , the army re established 156 00:06:30,980 --> 00:06:34,790 the us 5th corps and aligned it against 157 00:06:34,800 --> 00:06:36,911 the european problems that Lieutenant 158 00:06:36,911 --> 00:06:39,022 General john kolasinski maybe in this 159 00:06:39,022 --> 00:06:41,110 room right now . There he is . John 160 00:06:41,110 --> 00:06:43,360 kolasinski uh is the commander of Fifth 161 00:06:43,360 --> 00:06:45,890 Corps just finished his final 162 00:06:45,890 --> 00:06:48,440 certification exercise to declare 163 00:06:48,440 --> 00:06:51,820 operational capability in only a year 164 00:06:51,830 --> 00:06:53,997 after being established at fort Knox . 165 00:06:53,997 --> 00:06:56,250 So a huge feet on the part of my 166 00:06:56,250 --> 00:06:58,361 Garrett's forces command and john you 167 00:06:58,361 --> 00:07:02,130 personally that operational layer of 168 00:07:02,130 --> 00:07:03,741 command and control will add 169 00:07:03,741 --> 00:07:05,908 immeasurably to our ability to prepare 170 00:07:05,908 --> 00:07:08,490 for operations on the continent . And 171 00:07:08,490 --> 00:07:10,760 most recently we activated the first , 172 00:07:10,770 --> 00:07:12,920 the Army's second multi domain task 173 00:07:12,920 --> 00:07:15,220 force . It will be headquartered in 174 00:07:15,310 --> 00:07:17,421 mines castel Germany just south of my 175 00:07:17,421 --> 00:07:19,532 headquarters . And finally next month 176 00:07:19,532 --> 00:07:21,532 we're going to activate the theatre 177 00:07:21,532 --> 00:07:23,810 fires , command the 56th fires brigade . 178 00:07:23,810 --> 00:07:26,032 All of that together will significantly 179 00:07:26,032 --> 00:07:28,620 thicken our ability to manage 180 00:07:28,620 --> 00:07:32,160 competition but more importantly to on 181 00:07:32,160 --> 00:07:35,550 ramp large forces to keep the theater 182 00:07:35,550 --> 00:07:38,980 set for the conduct of large scale 183 00:07:38,980 --> 00:07:41,970 operations . Um In addition to this 184 00:07:41,970 --> 00:07:43,990 growth , we have had a significant 185 00:07:43,990 --> 00:07:45,970 amount of modernization . Um we're 186 00:07:45,970 --> 00:07:49,080 about to begin the a to upgrade to our 187 00:07:49,080 --> 00:07:51,510 multiple launch rocket systems . We 188 00:07:51,510 --> 00:07:53,770 have received the army's first for 189 00:07:53,780 --> 00:07:56,460 striker , vehicle based short range air 190 00:07:56,460 --> 00:07:58,460 defense systems . They're up and 191 00:07:58,460 --> 00:08:01,250 running now in Germany . We have 192 00:08:01,250 --> 00:08:04,160 fielded terrestrial electronic warfare 193 00:08:04,160 --> 00:08:07,590 systems across our force and we have 194 00:08:07,600 --> 00:08:10,050 had some innovative new Department of 195 00:08:10,050 --> 00:08:13,610 the Army aerial collection systems put 196 00:08:13,610 --> 00:08:15,660 into the theater that we are we are 197 00:08:15,670 --> 00:08:17,726 working to integrate into the larger 198 00:08:17,726 --> 00:08:20,360 UConn collection system . That's our 199 00:08:20,360 --> 00:08:22,350 structure . More important is our 200 00:08:22,350 --> 00:08:24,461 activity . I believe we have returned 201 00:08:24,461 --> 00:08:26,450 to large scale exercises on the 202 00:08:26,450 --> 00:08:28,561 continent and every year we make them 203 00:08:28,561 --> 00:08:30,450 just a little bit bigger but more 204 00:08:30,450 --> 00:08:32,394 important , just a little bit more 205 00:08:32,394 --> 00:08:34,730 complex . Um These exercises go by a 206 00:08:34,730 --> 00:08:36,952 variety of different names . The Signal 207 00:08:36,952 --> 00:08:39,008 one has been defender series for the 208 00:08:39,008 --> 00:08:42,190 last 2.5 years . Um but what they 209 00:08:42,200 --> 00:08:44,950 really bring is multi core 210 00:08:46,130 --> 00:08:49,560 enabled , reinforced from the 211 00:08:49,570 --> 00:08:52,900 contiguous 48 states operations . 212 00:08:52,910 --> 00:08:55,550 So when we came out of the Cold War , 213 00:08:55,550 --> 00:08:57,494 we essentially turned the european 214 00:08:57,494 --> 00:08:59,494 theater from a ford posture theater 215 00:08:59,494 --> 00:09:02,090 into a reinforcement theater . And so 216 00:09:02,100 --> 00:09:03,711 our ability to practice that 217 00:09:03,711 --> 00:09:06,130 reinforcement and to enable that 218 00:09:06,140 --> 00:09:08,307 reinforcement and to integrate it with 219 00:09:08,307 --> 00:09:10,220 our allies to conduct large scale 220 00:09:10,220 --> 00:09:13,380 ground operations is fundamental to our 221 00:09:13,390 --> 00:09:15,446 our existence and our future success 222 00:09:15,446 --> 00:09:17,557 here in that regard . I would like to 223 00:09:17,557 --> 00:09:19,612 call out Major General James smith , 224 00:09:19,612 --> 00:09:21,668 raise your hand there . James please 225 00:09:21,668 --> 00:09:21,640 James smith commands the 21st theater 226 00:09:21,640 --> 00:09:24,380 sustainment command which is the 227 00:09:24,380 --> 00:09:26,800 backbone of the reception staging 228 00:09:26,810 --> 00:09:29,600 onward movement system that we have 229 00:09:29,610 --> 00:09:31,888 inside europe and joe Hilbert commands , 230 00:09:31,888 --> 00:09:33,999 the seventh Army training command and 231 00:09:33,999 --> 00:09:36,166 he performs the integration function . 232 00:09:36,166 --> 00:09:38,166 So we have been rehearsing at micro 233 00:09:38,166 --> 00:09:41,310 scale and at macro scale this reception 234 00:09:41,310 --> 00:09:44,030 of a reinforcement integration and then 235 00:09:44,040 --> 00:09:47,310 operations with our allies across the 236 00:09:47,310 --> 00:09:49,880 entire theater in this regard . We're 237 00:09:49,880 --> 00:09:51,990 quite similar to the U . S . Army 238 00:09:51,990 --> 00:09:54,580 pacific . We have great challenges with 239 00:09:54,580 --> 00:09:56,990 time and distance . We have great 240 00:09:56,990 --> 00:10:00,650 challenges with integration of large 241 00:10:00,660 --> 00:10:03,240 organizations on the fly , moving 242 00:10:03,240 --> 00:10:05,890 directly into operations . And then 243 00:10:05,890 --> 00:10:08,580 finally we have one big difference , a 244 00:10:08,580 --> 00:10:10,747 lot of water , a lot of land . So I'll 245 00:10:10,747 --> 00:10:12,691 pass it to charlie Flynn . We look 246 00:10:12,691 --> 00:10:14,969 forward to your questions and comments . 247 00:10:14,969 --> 00:10:16,858 I'll I'll sort of capitalize on a 248 00:10:16,858 --> 00:10:18,913 number of things that chris laid out 249 00:10:18,913 --> 00:10:21,540 frank . Thank you . Uh The panel for 250 00:10:21,550 --> 00:10:23,960 for doing this into a U . S . A . And 251 00:10:23,960 --> 00:10:26,182 it is good to see a lot of friends . So 252 00:10:26,182 --> 00:10:28,980 I'll sort of frame this uh this way 253 00:10:28,980 --> 00:10:31,091 I'll talk about the place , I'll talk 254 00:10:31,091 --> 00:10:33,800 about the the adversaries . I'll talk 255 00:10:33,800 --> 00:10:35,356 about some of the adversary 256 00:10:35,356 --> 00:10:37,950 capabilities and then I'll sort of wrap 257 00:10:37,950 --> 00:10:41,890 up my comments similarly to outlining 258 00:10:41,890 --> 00:10:44,340 what we have in the theater , what 259 00:10:44,340 --> 00:10:46,507 we're bringing to the theater and what 260 00:10:46,507 --> 00:10:48,729 we intend to do with those capabilities 261 00:10:48,729 --> 00:10:50,760 in the theater . So the place um 262 00:10:50,770 --> 00:10:54,660 obviously Asia , the asian continent . 263 00:10:55,340 --> 00:10:59,210 Now the connection to Eurasia . Uh And 264 00:10:59,220 --> 00:11:02,070 as chris mentioned lots of water , lots 265 00:11:02,070 --> 00:11:04,070 of air when you look at the map but 266 00:11:04,070 --> 00:11:06,181 there is also a lot of people there , 267 00:11:06,340 --> 00:11:08,720 six out of 10 today , seven out of 10 268 00:11:08,720 --> 00:11:10,930 in the next decade . And those people 269 00:11:10,930 --> 00:11:14,870 compete largely for water , food 270 00:11:14,880 --> 00:11:17,790 and power , minerals to run their 271 00:11:17,790 --> 00:11:20,650 countries and factories and energy 272 00:11:20,650 --> 00:11:24,290 etcetera etcetera . And there is a lot 273 00:11:24,300 --> 00:11:26,480 of , a number of destabilizing 274 00:11:26,480 --> 00:11:28,480 activities that are going on in the 275 00:11:28,480 --> 00:11:31,570 region along the Mekong River 276 00:11:32,340 --> 00:11:35,750 uh , with damning uh , a lot of 277 00:11:35,750 --> 00:11:39,400 challenges in places like Miramar along 278 00:11:39,400 --> 00:11:41,550 the line of actual control of India . 279 00:11:41,940 --> 00:11:43,884 And I could go through a number of 280 00:11:43,884 --> 00:11:46,150 incidents there , what I call the sort 281 00:11:46,150 --> 00:11:48,750 of refer to as the soft land underbelly 282 00:11:48,750 --> 00:11:51,360 of china from Vietnam to India or into 283 00:11:51,830 --> 00:11:54,950 Pakistan . So that's one set . There's 284 00:11:54,950 --> 00:11:57,410 a whole another host of challenges out 285 00:11:57,410 --> 00:12:00,270 in Oshie Ana and the reach that some 286 00:12:00,270 --> 00:12:03,950 countries are are probing into . 287 00:12:04,010 --> 00:12:06,880 And then of course , um I think as many 288 00:12:06,880 --> 00:12:08,658 of , you know , there's lots of 289 00:12:08,658 --> 00:12:10,769 challenges going on in the east south 290 00:12:10,769 --> 00:12:12,713 china sea , Taiwan straits off the 291 00:12:12,713 --> 00:12:14,890 coast of Japan and then of course the 292 00:12:14,900 --> 00:12:18,840 uh actor on in north Korea and all the 293 00:12:18,850 --> 00:12:22,730 actions that they bring . Russia 294 00:12:22,730 --> 00:12:25,460 is also an actor in the region . Um , 295 00:12:25,470 --> 00:12:28,470 so we've got the range of uh 296 00:12:28,480 --> 00:12:31,560 adversaries that are involved , not 297 00:12:31,560 --> 00:12:34,860 just in the , in the pacific 298 00:12:35,240 --> 00:12:37,670 ocean area , the indian ocean area , 299 00:12:37,670 --> 00:12:39,670 but also up in the arctic , I often 300 00:12:39,670 --> 00:12:42,910 refer to the arctic circle as Russia is 301 00:12:42,920 --> 00:12:44,976 in the arctic circle looking out and 302 00:12:44,976 --> 00:12:46,920 china is outside the arctic circle 303 00:12:46,920 --> 00:12:49,253 looking in and attempting to move there . 304 00:12:49,253 --> 00:12:51,531 So that's a quick summary of the place . 305 00:12:51,531 --> 00:12:53,580 Lots of things going on . Lots of 306 00:12:53,580 --> 00:12:55,940 challenges and I can go in more if 307 00:12:55,940 --> 00:12:58,280 you've got questions on it . So 308 00:12:58,290 --> 00:13:00,401 adversaries I mentioned a few of them 309 00:13:00,401 --> 00:13:04,240 there , I'll just say that the two AD 310 00:13:04,240 --> 00:13:07,730 arsenal that china has 311 00:13:07,740 --> 00:13:10,870 built is in many ways 312 00:13:12,440 --> 00:13:16,330 designed to attack our 313 00:13:16,340 --> 00:13:19,140 air and naval assets . So I think what 314 00:13:19,140 --> 00:13:21,870 land power can do is enable some of 315 00:13:21,870 --> 00:13:24,550 those activities uh and some of those 316 00:13:24,550 --> 00:13:27,040 capabilities that we want to maintain 317 00:13:27,040 --> 00:13:31,010 by having a terrestrial based force 318 00:13:31,020 --> 00:13:33,590 with a wide range of sensors to be able 319 00:13:33,590 --> 00:13:36,320 to see sense , understand the 320 00:13:36,320 --> 00:13:38,320 environment and the conditions that 321 00:13:38,320 --> 00:13:40,431 were uh confronted with out there and 322 00:13:40,431 --> 00:13:43,450 the complexities uh that go really from 323 00:13:43,450 --> 00:13:45,339 the west coast of the continental 324 00:13:45,339 --> 00:13:47,617 United States all the way into Eurasia . 325 00:13:47,640 --> 00:13:51,130 Um So , you know , the the 326 00:13:51,140 --> 00:13:55,110 adversary and capabilities that they're 327 00:13:55,110 --> 00:13:58,150 presenting to the Joint Force create 328 00:13:58,150 --> 00:14:01,260 challenges for us . But I do think that 329 00:14:01,270 --> 00:14:03,590 again , some of the things that general 330 00:14:03,590 --> 00:14:05,201 casually mentioned here with 331 00:14:05,540 --> 00:14:08,920 capabilities that the army has brought 332 00:14:08,920 --> 00:14:11,220 to bear in europe were attempted to do 333 00:14:11,230 --> 00:14:13,452 a number of those things in the pacific 334 00:14:13,452 --> 00:14:16,610 as well , just to name a few . So the 335 00:14:16,620 --> 00:14:19,200 first multi domain task force is 336 00:14:19,200 --> 00:14:21,144 established , a joint base . Lewis 337 00:14:21,144 --> 00:14:23,370 mcchord has been for nearly two years . 338 00:14:23,380 --> 00:14:26,560 Um And the fifth Security Force 339 00:14:26,560 --> 00:14:28,227 Assistance Brigade , which is 340 00:14:28,227 --> 00:14:30,780 established at Joint Base LeWIs mcchord 341 00:14:30,800 --> 00:14:34,090 now in 10 countries in the region and 342 00:14:34,100 --> 00:14:37,250 operating their co located with 343 00:14:37,640 --> 00:14:40,870 First special forces group , part of 344 00:14:40,880 --> 00:14:42,713 the United States so calm but an 345 00:14:42,713 --> 00:14:45,950 enabling capability that is part of the 346 00:14:45,950 --> 00:14:49,860 land power in the land domain extension 347 00:14:49,870 --> 00:14:52,310 into the region . And then of course 348 00:14:52,320 --> 00:14:56,210 the capabilities that reside in Hawaii 349 00:14:56,210 --> 00:14:58,266 itself in Alaska . These three power 350 00:14:58,266 --> 00:15:00,550 projection platforms that we use to 351 00:15:00,550 --> 00:15:03,200 generate Readiness and put that 352 00:15:03,200 --> 00:15:05,200 readiness in the region . In Hawaii 353 00:15:05,200 --> 00:15:07,089 alone , including the Hawaii Army 354 00:15:07,089 --> 00:15:08,922 National Guard , there's 10 flag 355 00:15:08,922 --> 00:15:12,550 officer headquarters . Uh one of them 356 00:15:12,550 --> 00:15:14,500 is commanded by Major General Dave 357 00:15:14,500 --> 00:15:17,380 Wilson sitting right behind uh the 358 00:15:17,390 --> 00:15:19,557 sustainment commander from europe . So 359 00:15:19,557 --> 00:15:21,890 again , the theater , opening , theater , 360 00:15:21,890 --> 00:15:24,110 distribution , theater sustainment , 361 00:15:24,120 --> 00:15:27,160 largely the glue that binds the joint 362 00:15:27,160 --> 00:15:30,090 force together is done often through 363 00:15:30,100 --> 00:15:32,100 what I refer to as the foundational 364 00:15:32,100 --> 00:15:34,110 capabilities that only the army 365 00:15:34,110 --> 00:15:36,332 provides the Joint force Commander from 366 00:15:36,332 --> 00:15:38,666 Civil Affairs to medical to sustainment , 367 00:15:38,666 --> 00:15:40,610 integrated air , missile defense , 368 00:15:41,140 --> 00:15:44,130 military Police activities , Corps of 369 00:15:44,130 --> 00:15:45,980 Engineers . Again , I could go 370 00:15:45,980 --> 00:15:48,036 contracting , I could go on and on . 371 00:15:48,036 --> 00:15:51,250 But these , these capabilities that are 372 00:15:51,260 --> 00:15:54,620 at the theater army level are really to 373 00:15:54,620 --> 00:15:56,580 enable all of the joint force to 374 00:15:56,590 --> 00:15:59,630 operate with freedom of manoeuvre , 375 00:15:59,630 --> 00:16:01,490 freedom of action and be able to 376 00:16:01,490 --> 00:16:05,190 capitalize on some of the situations 377 00:16:05,190 --> 00:16:07,468 that happen day to day and competition . 378 00:16:07,940 --> 00:16:10,850 And I'll say that uh from from the west 379 00:16:10,850 --> 00:16:14,040 coast to Alaska to Hawaii to the forces 380 00:16:14,040 --> 00:16:16,373 that we have forward in Japan and Korea . 381 00:16:16,373 --> 00:16:19,730 Obviously in in uh in my a o r 382 00:16:19,740 --> 00:16:23,670 the the the posture that we have um in 383 00:16:23,670 --> 00:16:25,781 the northern , what I refer to as the 384 00:16:25,781 --> 00:16:27,880 northern quarter of the region is 385 00:16:27,880 --> 00:16:29,991 pretty strong and has been strong for 386 00:16:29,991 --> 00:16:31,936 the better part of 70 years . From 387 00:16:31,936 --> 00:16:34,047 south Korea to Japan to hawaii Alaska 388 00:16:34,047 --> 00:16:36,440 and the west coast where we are trying 389 00:16:36,440 --> 00:16:38,660 to do some unique things is in the 390 00:16:38,670 --> 00:16:40,837 south east , west and central corridor 391 00:16:40,837 --> 00:16:43,880 of the region . And again , I think 392 00:16:43,890 --> 00:16:46,270 chris described quite well what they're 393 00:16:46,270 --> 00:16:49,720 doing with defender europe this past 394 00:16:49,720 --> 00:16:52,620 year . Uh we had a similar operation 395 00:16:52,630 --> 00:16:56,360 called defender uh pacific the future 396 00:16:56,360 --> 00:16:58,500 will continue to operate and call it 397 00:16:58,510 --> 00:17:00,710 operation pathways different from 398 00:17:00,710 --> 00:17:03,660 defender in europe . And I would just 399 00:17:03,660 --> 00:17:06,350 say that the combined effects of having 400 00:17:06,350 --> 00:17:09,430 an operation and exercise go on between 401 00:17:09,440 --> 00:17:11,970 Cobra gold in uh in Thailand grew to 402 00:17:11,970 --> 00:17:14,026 shield in Indonesia orient shield in 403 00:17:14,026 --> 00:17:16,510 Japan talisman sabre in Australia 404 00:17:16,520 --> 00:17:18,687 ballot Bataan in the Philippines . And 405 00:17:18,687 --> 00:17:20,853 then some experimental operations that 406 00:17:20,853 --> 00:17:23,076 were going on with army futures command 407 00:17:23,076 --> 00:17:26,500 between Guam , Tinian SaiPan and palau 408 00:17:26,530 --> 00:17:28,530 Over the better part of about three 409 00:17:28,530 --> 00:17:30,474 months . We want to continue to do 410 00:17:30,474 --> 00:17:33,840 those types of operations because the 411 00:17:33,840 --> 00:17:35,784 amount of readiness that we get by 412 00:17:35,784 --> 00:17:37,890 operating in the region in the 413 00:17:37,890 --> 00:17:41,350 conditions and in the environment where 414 00:17:41,360 --> 00:17:45,360 we are most likely to be gaining 415 00:17:45,740 --> 00:17:49,060 uh increasing our joint readiness , 416 00:17:49,590 --> 00:17:52,350 increasing confidence in what our 417 00:17:52,360 --> 00:17:54,540 allies and partners need from us and 418 00:17:54,540 --> 00:17:57,860 expect from us . And then by way of 419 00:17:57,860 --> 00:18:01,270 denying key terrain from the PRC or any 420 00:18:01,270 --> 00:18:03,650 other adversaries that is trying to 421 00:18:03,660 --> 00:18:07,460 fracture or destabilize uh the 422 00:18:07,470 --> 00:18:10,470 vast populations that have to live out 423 00:18:10,470 --> 00:18:13,560 there and have to live 424 00:18:14,140 --> 00:18:17,170 um you know , and and and continue to 425 00:18:17,180 --> 00:18:19,240 to get along with one another , uh , 426 00:18:19,250 --> 00:18:22,250 because of the competitive nature of 427 00:18:22,260 --> 00:18:24,260 things that are happening , whether 428 00:18:24,260 --> 00:18:26,690 it's in uh technology or whether it's 429 00:18:26,690 --> 00:18:29,390 in uh power , water and food as I was 430 00:18:29,390 --> 00:18:31,501 talking about earlier for the , which 431 00:18:31,501 --> 00:18:33,612 really is generated out of the global 432 00:18:33,612 --> 00:18:35,779 commons . So anyways , I like to say , 433 00:18:35,779 --> 00:18:37,834 I look forward to your questions . I 434 00:18:37,834 --> 00:18:39,779 hope that gave you a little bit of 435 00:18:39,779 --> 00:18:43,120 sense of of the place , the 436 00:18:43,120 --> 00:18:45,690 capabilities or the adversaries and the 437 00:18:45,700 --> 00:18:47,870 adversaries capabilities and sort of 438 00:18:47,870 --> 00:18:51,870 what the theater army is doing . I look 439 00:18:51,870 --> 00:18:53,814 forward to your questions . Thanks 440 00:18:53,814 --> 00:18:55,870 general . Thank you very much . Both 441 00:18:55,870 --> 00:18:57,870 generals , thank you very much . Mr 442 00:18:57,870 --> 00:19:00,080 Singh . Why don't you become take the 443 00:19:00,080 --> 00:19:02,820 first civilian position , respond 444 00:19:02,820 --> 00:19:04,931 either to what the general said or or 445 00:19:04,931 --> 00:19:07,042 let us know what you brought with you 446 00:19:07,042 --> 00:19:09,098 for us to think about . Okay , great 447 00:19:09,098 --> 00:19:10,820 Francis , thanks so much . And 448 00:19:10,820 --> 00:19:12,820 gentlemen hope I'm , there's a nice 449 00:19:12,820 --> 00:19:14,764 sign up here saying pull the mikes 450 00:19:14,764 --> 00:19:16,820 close and speak directly into the so 451 00:19:16,820 --> 00:19:19,042 we'll try to do that across the board . 452 00:19:19,042 --> 00:19:21,209 Thanks , thanks gentlemen for um , for 453 00:19:21,209 --> 00:19:23,320 your remarks and for all you guys are 454 00:19:23,320 --> 00:19:25,320 doing and all your men and women in 455 00:19:25,320 --> 00:19:28,650 uniform are doing to try to pivot to uh , 456 00:19:28,660 --> 00:19:31,670 really what is a new era of great power 457 00:19:31,670 --> 00:19:33,790 competition ? I know it gets thrown 458 00:19:33,790 --> 00:19:36,310 around a lot um , that , you know , 459 00:19:36,310 --> 00:19:38,960 we're at this this moment of change . 460 00:19:38,970 --> 00:19:41,720 Um , but essentially 461 00:19:41,730 --> 00:19:45,500 what we're facing in europe and what 462 00:19:45,500 --> 00:19:48,360 we're facing in the pacific , um 463 00:19:48,840 --> 00:19:52,730 really are the potential for 464 00:19:52,740 --> 00:19:56,600 major power adversaries uh to 465 00:19:56,600 --> 00:19:59,950 shift our strategic reality in a way 466 00:19:59,950 --> 00:20:02,460 that would affect many generations of 467 00:20:02,460 --> 00:20:04,460 americans would affect our national 468 00:20:04,460 --> 00:20:06,571 interests , not just in some abstract 469 00:20:06,571 --> 00:20:08,740 way , but actually our ability to be 470 00:20:08,740 --> 00:20:10,690 secure and be prosperous , going , 471 00:20:10,700 --> 00:20:13,300 going , going forward . If , you know , 472 00:20:13,300 --> 00:20:16,940 if china really does reorder the Asia 473 00:20:16,940 --> 00:20:19,310 pacific or if Russia really does 474 00:20:19,310 --> 00:20:22,300 succeed , you know , not just in um 475 00:20:22,310 --> 00:20:24,890 dominating Eastern europe , but really 476 00:20:24,890 --> 00:20:28,640 in managing to fragment NATO . Um and 477 00:20:28,650 --> 00:20:31,450 and sort of exploit what we're seeing 478 00:20:31,450 --> 00:20:35,220 is weaknesses in democratic Societies 479 00:20:35,230 --> 00:20:38,020 all around the world . Those those 480 00:20:38,030 --> 00:20:41,020 opportunities are are are viewed from 481 00:20:41,020 --> 00:20:44,090 Beijing and Moscow as as real pivotal 482 00:20:44,090 --> 00:20:46,257 21st century opportunities for them to 483 00:20:46,257 --> 00:20:48,257 change their fundamental position . 484 00:20:48,257 --> 00:20:50,423 Their fundamental position has been as 485 00:20:50,423 --> 00:20:53,720 major but not uh great global 486 00:20:53,720 --> 00:20:55,776 superpowers , major powers , but not 487 00:20:55,776 --> 00:20:57,998 super powers . And and for for Russia , 488 00:20:57,998 --> 00:21:00,109 it's about getting back for china and 489 00:21:00,109 --> 00:21:02,442 way it's about getting back its stature . 490 00:21:02,442 --> 00:21:04,498 It's something that the chinese have 491 00:21:04,498 --> 00:21:06,553 taken deeply to heart about being uh 492 00:21:06,553 --> 00:21:08,920 you know about being mistreated and 493 00:21:08,930 --> 00:21:12,030 held down and disrespected for , you 494 00:21:12,030 --> 00:21:14,252 know , a century . It's about regaining 495 00:21:14,252 --> 00:21:16,086 that power , but it's also about 496 00:21:16,086 --> 00:21:18,350 displacing or at least becoming a troop 497 00:21:18,350 --> 00:21:21,200 here with the United States . And um 498 00:21:21,210 --> 00:21:23,432 you know , Russia probably doesn't have 499 00:21:23,432 --> 00:21:25,432 the prospect of really doing that , 500 00:21:25,432 --> 00:21:27,543 China may have the prospect of really 501 00:21:27,543 --> 00:21:29,599 doing that , but in both cases , the 502 00:21:29,599 --> 00:21:31,821 challenge is not that they're trying to 503 00:21:31,821 --> 00:21:34,690 meet some uh you know this peaceful 504 00:21:34,690 --> 00:21:36,746 rise that you hear from china , it's 505 00:21:36,746 --> 00:21:38,857 not they're trying to just meet their 506 00:21:38,857 --> 00:21:41,490 aspirations . It's that part of the way 507 00:21:41,490 --> 00:21:43,657 they want to meet those aspirations is 508 00:21:43,657 --> 00:21:45,850 going to potentially make the world a 509 00:21:45,860 --> 00:21:48,410 much more dangerous place and and make 510 00:21:48,410 --> 00:21:52,260 the world truly hostile to the kind 511 00:21:52,260 --> 00:21:55,960 of future we in the west and in 512 00:21:55,960 --> 00:21:58,293 Western democracies want to see . Right . 513 00:21:58,293 --> 00:22:01,070 So I think that one of the questions 514 00:22:01,070 --> 00:22:03,490 becomes okay , what does warfare look 515 00:22:03,490 --> 00:22:05,490 like ? What does it look like if it 516 00:22:05,490 --> 00:22:08,480 goes bad ? Right . And I think there's 517 00:22:08,480 --> 00:22:11,920 a tendency right now to focus in Asia 518 00:22:11,920 --> 00:22:15,490 on maritime and error and in 519 00:22:15,500 --> 00:22:18,750 in with regards to Russia and Asia with 520 00:22:18,750 --> 00:22:21,040 regards to europe and Asia on , you 521 00:22:21,040 --> 00:22:23,910 know , the sort of the critical future 522 00:22:23,920 --> 00:22:26,270 aspects of , of , of conflict , which 523 00:22:26,270 --> 00:22:28,326 is what I focus on myself actually , 524 00:22:28,326 --> 00:22:30,840 technology , cyber information 525 00:22:30,840 --> 00:22:33,790 capabilities , um a lot of gray zone 526 00:22:33,790 --> 00:22:37,710 and hybrid hybrid warfare um 527 00:22:37,720 --> 00:22:40,700 issues . But what you need to remember 528 00:22:40,700 --> 00:22:44,410 is um when he 529 00:22:44,410 --> 00:22:47,370 comes to deterrence and when it comes 530 00:22:47,370 --> 00:22:50,310 to fighting and winning , if we end up 531 00:22:50,320 --> 00:22:53,770 in conflict , land power 532 00:22:54,240 --> 00:22:57,230 is absolutely essential and I think 533 00:22:57,230 --> 00:22:59,010 it's easy to , it's easy to get 534 00:22:59,010 --> 00:23:01,320 distracted and think it's not . And 535 00:23:01,320 --> 00:23:05,010 we're fortunate that general Tivoli , 536 00:23:05,010 --> 00:23:07,910 General Flynn and their and their men 537 00:23:07,910 --> 00:23:10,132 and women in uniform are staying highly 538 00:23:10,132 --> 00:23:12,380 focused on what it looks like to be 539 00:23:12,380 --> 00:23:14,470 effective at deterring and to be 540 00:23:14,470 --> 00:23:17,160 prepared to fight and win . If you end 541 00:23:17,160 --> 00:23:19,960 up in a full scale conflict . Um , 542 00:23:19,970 --> 00:23:22,137 those things are fully tied together . 543 00:23:22,440 --> 00:23:26,100 If the adversary be that Beijing or or 544 00:23:26,110 --> 00:23:28,166 be allowed to be the Russians or the 545 00:23:28,166 --> 00:23:30,277 chinese , that's who I'm focused on . 546 00:23:30,277 --> 00:23:34,250 Um , if they don't really believe that 547 00:23:34,250 --> 00:23:37,570 we are willing and able to actually 548 00:23:37,570 --> 00:23:40,760 deploy land forces in a conflict , 549 00:23:41,640 --> 00:23:43,820 our deterrence is fundamentally 550 00:23:43,820 --> 00:23:46,440 weakened . I in fact , I think I would 551 00:23:46,440 --> 00:23:48,662 go so far as to say , I don't know that 552 00:23:48,662 --> 00:23:51,210 um , that deterrence really holds up in 553 00:23:51,210 --> 00:23:53,210 a situation where you don't believe 554 00:23:53,210 --> 00:23:56,860 your adversary is willing to actually 555 00:23:57,240 --> 00:24:00,020 deploy forces on the ground . It's 556 00:24:00,020 --> 00:24:01,909 really hard to see . It stays too 557 00:24:01,909 --> 00:24:04,960 abstract . So while wars get fought in 558 00:24:04,960 --> 00:24:07,530 all theater , all domains at the end of 559 00:24:07,530 --> 00:24:09,641 the day , the end of the day , you're 560 00:24:09,641 --> 00:24:11,850 fighting for your your town's your 561 00:24:11,850 --> 00:24:14,128 cities , your people , your population , 562 00:24:14,128 --> 00:24:16,183 you're fighting for what's what's on 563 00:24:16,183 --> 00:24:18,960 the ground . And so the army is at a 564 00:24:18,960 --> 00:24:21,071 moment of having to figure out how it 565 00:24:21,071 --> 00:24:24,750 fits into and support this new 566 00:24:24,750 --> 00:24:28,350 era of conflict . Peacetime conflict , 567 00:24:28,940 --> 00:24:31,230 the information operations , the cyber 568 00:24:31,230 --> 00:24:35,000 operations , financial uh , tools that 569 00:24:35,000 --> 00:24:37,480 are being used to uh , to , to , to 570 00:24:37,490 --> 00:24:40,810 fragment and weakened societies , um , 571 00:24:40,820 --> 00:24:42,987 irregular things . We've always called 572 00:24:42,987 --> 00:24:44,931 irregular threats , Whether that's 573 00:24:44,931 --> 00:24:47,740 trafficking in arms or narcotics or 574 00:24:47,740 --> 00:24:50,610 terrorism , all of those things are 575 00:24:50,610 --> 00:24:52,777 part of , uh , you know , what's going 576 00:24:52,777 --> 00:24:54,999 to be a different picture . If you look 577 00:24:54,999 --> 00:24:57,110 at look at conflict in the future and 578 00:24:57,110 --> 00:24:59,277 the and the and the and the army has a 579 00:24:59,277 --> 00:25:01,610 critical critical role across the board . 580 00:25:01,610 --> 00:25:04,000 Just look at our recent challenges . Um 581 00:25:04,010 --> 00:25:07,680 Covid who's been critical to the 582 00:25:07,680 --> 00:25:11,320 covid fight across the board . Um you 583 00:25:11,320 --> 00:25:15,190 know , natural disaster responses , C . 584 00:25:15,190 --> 00:25:18,170 T . Terrorism threats across any 585 00:25:18,170 --> 00:25:20,503 theater . Whether you're talking africa , 586 00:25:20,503 --> 00:25:23,160 whether you're talking Asia , um the 587 00:25:23,170 --> 00:25:25,980 you see the role that the army and 588 00:25:25,980 --> 00:25:29,030 ground forces play in general , uh Neos , 589 00:25:29,040 --> 00:25:31,760 uh just look at Afghanistan right now 590 00:25:31,770 --> 00:25:35,660 and marines 82nd Airborne , you 591 00:25:35,660 --> 00:25:38,400 know , required to make that happen 592 00:25:38,410 --> 00:25:41,050 even though it is the it was great 593 00:25:41,050 --> 00:25:43,530 tales flying in and out that got most 594 00:25:43,530 --> 00:25:47,130 of the video coverage . Um It's um it's 595 00:25:47,140 --> 00:25:50,860 deployed U . S . Marines that took the 596 00:25:50,860 --> 00:25:53,670 casualties . And so at the end of the 597 00:25:53,680 --> 00:25:56,450 land forces remain absolutely vital . 598 00:25:56,450 --> 00:25:59,970 And I think that one of the 599 00:25:59,980 --> 00:26:02,940 shift needs to be to developing the 600 00:26:02,940 --> 00:26:05,200 technologies , developing the 601 00:26:05,200 --> 00:26:07,550 capability in areas like cyber 602 00:26:07,560 --> 00:26:09,782 developing the capability in areas like 603 00:26:09,782 --> 00:26:11,893 sensors . Since you know , being able 604 00:26:11,893 --> 00:26:13,449 to help us have operational 605 00:26:13,449 --> 00:26:15,616 understanding of the environment we're 606 00:26:15,616 --> 00:26:18,450 going into um and then 607 00:26:19,040 --> 00:26:21,310 almost forgotten but something that 608 00:26:21,320 --> 00:26:23,431 especially I think charlie you really 609 00:26:23,431 --> 00:26:26,210 touched on um the enabling 610 00:26:26,210 --> 00:26:28,230 relationships . Right ? So these 611 00:26:28,230 --> 00:26:30,870 alliance , our alliance partnerships , 612 00:26:31,340 --> 00:26:34,600 our our security assistance , 613 00:26:34,610 --> 00:26:36,870 what you know , it's building 614 00:26:36,870 --> 00:26:40,220 partnership capacity , um it's almost 615 00:26:40,220 --> 00:26:43,670 an un it's almost it's almost uh a 616 00:26:43,680 --> 00:26:46,710 intangible Uh in the big picture , 617 00:26:46,720 --> 00:26:49,470 people sitting up and looking across 618 00:26:49,470 --> 00:26:53,040 from the from from 60,000 ft are 619 00:26:53,050 --> 00:26:55,410 sometimes miss the importance of all 620 00:26:55,410 --> 00:26:57,577 the exercises were doing of increasing 621 00:26:57,577 --> 00:26:59,521 the complexity of that activity of 622 00:26:59,521 --> 00:27:01,132 building the fabric of those 623 00:27:01,132 --> 00:27:04,160 relationships . A huge amount of that 624 00:27:04,640 --> 00:27:06,473 happens obviously across all the 625 00:27:06,473 --> 00:27:09,360 services , but a huge amount of it is , 626 00:27:09,370 --> 00:27:12,170 is uh , is army , the army a huge 627 00:27:12,170 --> 00:27:15,060 amount of it is a comment . You know , 628 00:27:15,060 --> 00:27:17,227 it's what , it's what they always do . 629 00:27:17,540 --> 00:27:20,460 It's what , um , it's what happens when 630 00:27:20,460 --> 00:27:23,960 we do large scale maneuver exercises 631 00:27:23,960 --> 00:27:26,071 with , you know , army to army . It's 632 00:27:26,071 --> 00:27:27,738 what happens when we do joint 633 00:27:27,738 --> 00:27:29,849 exercising training . Um , and it was 634 00:27:29,849 --> 00:27:32,071 what happens in the classroom education 635 00:27:32,071 --> 00:27:34,710 that we offer the programs that we 636 00:27:34,710 --> 00:27:37,700 offer . Um , and it's important to 637 00:27:37,700 --> 00:27:39,589 remember that while we think erin 638 00:27:39,589 --> 00:27:41,800 maritime an awful lot , especially in 639 00:27:41,800 --> 00:27:43,967 Asia and I'm in Asia guy , that's my , 640 00:27:43,967 --> 00:27:46,189 my focus is china and china's influence 641 00:27:46,189 --> 00:27:49,750 in the region . Um , we have a lot of 642 00:27:49,760 --> 00:27:53,570 army centric partners now we make , I 643 00:27:53,580 --> 00:27:55,691 feel that that's not exactly the best 644 00:27:55,691 --> 00:27:58,050 that maybe they are imbalanced . You 645 00:27:58,050 --> 00:28:00,870 know , taking Indonesia taken India . 646 00:28:00,880 --> 00:28:03,830 Um , you know , are really critical 647 00:28:03,830 --> 00:28:06,180 partners in the region , most of these 648 00:28:06,190 --> 00:28:08,630 countries , most of these countries and 649 00:28:08,630 --> 00:28:12,180 china itself actually are fairly army 650 00:28:12,180 --> 00:28:14,124 focused and how they've structured 651 00:28:14,124 --> 00:28:16,236 themselves for national defense . And 652 00:28:16,236 --> 00:28:18,347 so it's important to go to where your 653 00:28:18,347 --> 00:28:20,540 partners are and those relationships , 654 00:28:20,540 --> 00:28:22,890 those army army to relationships are 655 00:28:22,890 --> 00:28:24,946 really critical . So , you know , in 656 00:28:24,946 --> 00:28:27,340 some , I just , I think that um , I 657 00:28:27,340 --> 00:28:30,960 think that we , uh we are at the point 658 00:28:30,970 --> 00:28:32,859 of shifting our attention and our 659 00:28:32,859 --> 00:28:35,026 resources . We have a lot of very hard 660 00:28:35,026 --> 00:28:37,340 choices to make from an investment 661 00:28:37,340 --> 00:28:40,300 standpoint . Obviously we need new and 662 00:28:40,300 --> 00:28:42,610 novel technologies across the board . 663 00:28:42,620 --> 00:28:45,240 Obviously there are air maritime space 664 00:28:45,240 --> 00:28:47,184 cyber capabilities that have to be 665 00:28:47,184 --> 00:28:49,407 invested in . Um and I think one of the 666 00:28:49,407 --> 00:28:52,140 key things is how integrating across 667 00:28:52,140 --> 00:28:54,700 our planning and integrating across the 668 00:28:54,700 --> 00:28:56,700 joint force so that we don't end up 669 00:28:56,700 --> 00:28:58,922 making redundant investments across the 670 00:28:58,922 --> 00:29:02,380 services or leaving gaps unfilled um is 671 00:29:02,380 --> 00:29:05,780 going to be extremely critical um but 672 00:29:05,790 --> 00:29:08,900 uh you know , make no mistake um where 673 00:29:08,910 --> 00:29:10,950 where the army goes , so goes our 674 00:29:10,950 --> 00:29:13,740 ability to deter and prevail in 675 00:29:13,740 --> 00:29:15,684 conflicts in both these theaters . 676 00:29:15,684 --> 00:29:18,018 Really look forward to the conversation . 677 00:29:18,018 --> 00:29:20,750 Thanks guys . Vikram thanks very much . 678 00:29:20,750 --> 00:29:24,110 Dr Corey Shockey is next and I have 679 00:29:24,120 --> 00:29:26,176 done enough of these with you in the 680 00:29:26,176 --> 00:29:29,000 past to know that while you're prepared 681 00:29:29,000 --> 00:29:31,167 remarks , I'm sure quite instructive , 682 00:29:31,640 --> 00:29:33,960 I would be very curious to know what 683 00:29:33,960 --> 00:29:36,240 you have been very actively scribbling 684 00:29:36,240 --> 00:29:38,640 in that book . So I invite you to 685 00:29:38,640 --> 00:29:40,696 dispense with those remarks and just 686 00:29:40,696 --> 00:29:42,862 share with us what you've scribbled in 687 00:29:42,862 --> 00:29:45,870 the book if you would because because 688 00:29:45,880 --> 00:29:48,290 frank and I are friends . He is very 689 00:29:48,290 --> 00:29:50,940 nicely giving me get out of jail free 690 00:29:50,940 --> 00:29:53,270 card for not having prepared remarks 691 00:29:53,280 --> 00:29:55,210 and giving me just the fun of 692 00:29:55,210 --> 00:29:57,210 responding to what I'm hearing . So 693 00:29:57,210 --> 00:29:59,266 thank you for that my friend , I owe 694 00:29:59,266 --> 00:30:01,900 you a drink . I'll take it . I was 695 00:30:01,910 --> 00:30:05,050 struck listening to general casually 696 00:30:05,440 --> 00:30:09,180 that um you had 697 00:30:09,190 --> 00:30:11,360 actually nothing to say about africa , 698 00:30:12,040 --> 00:30:15,330 which is given the nature of 699 00:30:15,340 --> 00:30:19,070 chinese moves uh in Africa I 700 00:30:19,070 --> 00:30:22,640 thought was striking and it strikes me 701 00:30:22,650 --> 00:30:26,350 that that may be a useful fingerprint 702 00:30:26,940 --> 00:30:30,150 about what we need to push 703 00:30:30,150 --> 00:30:33,270 ourselves to think a new about 704 00:30:34,040 --> 00:30:37,240 for example that the army's mission in 705 00:30:37,240 --> 00:30:39,790 europe is large scale reinforcement 706 00:30:39,800 --> 00:30:42,800 from the United States strikes me as 707 00:30:42,810 --> 00:30:45,420 actually the wrong mission um 708 00:30:45,430 --> 00:30:48,980 because there is no place in the 709 00:30:48,980 --> 00:30:51,290 world where the United States has more 710 00:30:51,290 --> 00:30:55,050 capable allies in larger numbers and 711 00:30:55,050 --> 00:30:58,250 with more direct interest and more 712 00:30:58,250 --> 00:31:01,160 direct focus similar to our focus . 713 00:31:01,840 --> 00:31:05,410 And uh I think if General 714 00:31:05,420 --> 00:31:07,760 Eisenhower were here , he would be 715 00:31:07,760 --> 00:31:10,270 astonished that we still have troops 716 00:31:10,270 --> 00:31:14,160 stationed in europe this long after 717 00:31:14,540 --> 00:31:16,707 at the end of the Cold War and I'm not 718 00:31:16,707 --> 00:31:19,120 arguing against the stationing of U . S . 719 00:31:19,120 --> 00:31:21,064 Troops in europe , I favor it very 720 00:31:21,064 --> 00:31:24,130 strongly , but I do think our major 721 00:31:24,130 --> 00:31:26,480 mission in europe should be 722 00:31:26,490 --> 00:31:29,300 orchestrating other armies into the 723 00:31:29,300 --> 00:31:33,180 fight , not orchestrating our own from 724 00:31:33,180 --> 00:31:35,236 the continental United States or any 725 00:31:35,236 --> 00:31:38,940 place else . Um and that might be 726 00:31:38,950 --> 00:31:41,700 worth some more thought . A second 727 00:31:41,700 --> 00:31:45,300 thing is you come as a force provider 728 00:31:45,300 --> 00:31:48,920 to other theaters because 729 00:31:48,930 --> 00:31:51,760 I'm I think perhaps more confident than 730 00:31:51,760 --> 00:31:54,090 general cavalier about the strength of 731 00:31:54,090 --> 00:31:57,830 deterrence uh for a major ground 732 00:31:57,830 --> 00:32:00,830 war in europe . And I'm I think a 733 00:32:00,830 --> 00:32:04,170 little bit less confident um 734 00:32:04,540 --> 00:32:08,370 about the need uh about 735 00:32:08,370 --> 00:32:11,200 our ability to flow forces either from 736 00:32:11,200 --> 00:32:13,610 europe and not just american forces , 737 00:32:13,620 --> 00:32:15,787 right ? Because because we're going to 738 00:32:15,787 --> 00:32:17,787 need to be the mobility for lots of 739 00:32:17,787 --> 00:32:19,787 other people's forces . Should they 740 00:32:19,787 --> 00:32:23,200 choose to join us in fights um in 741 00:32:23,200 --> 00:32:26,580 Africa or in Asia . Um I was 742 00:32:26,580 --> 00:32:29,870 heartened to hear General Flynn's uh 743 00:32:29,880 --> 00:32:33,200 discussion about the army as an 744 00:32:33,210 --> 00:32:36,840 enabler for joint operations 745 00:32:36,850 --> 00:32:39,570 throughout the expanse of Asia . That 746 00:32:39,570 --> 00:32:43,310 strikes me as as the right kind of uh 747 00:32:43,320 --> 00:32:47,180 focus and also the armies day to 748 00:32:47,180 --> 00:32:50,150 day in and out engagement with forces 749 00:32:50,150 --> 00:32:53,460 in the region because it's going to be 750 00:32:53,460 --> 00:32:56,560 a really hard slog to 751 00:32:56,560 --> 00:33:00,440 align countries in Asia into thinking 752 00:33:00,440 --> 00:33:02,590 about china , the way we are worried 753 00:33:02,590 --> 00:33:06,460 about china and especially if , 754 00:33:06,840 --> 00:33:10,720 you know , the test becomes the defense 755 00:33:10,720 --> 00:33:13,890 of Taiwan our 756 00:33:13,970 --> 00:33:17,910 advantage strategically um is our 757 00:33:17,920 --> 00:33:20,640 operational burden which is getting 758 00:33:20,650 --> 00:33:24,120 everybody else lined up on our side uh 759 00:33:24,130 --> 00:33:27,270 and moving forward with us and that's a 760 00:33:27,270 --> 00:33:30,910 whole lot of day to day hand holding . 761 00:33:30,920 --> 00:33:33,060 As Vikram said , being worried about 762 00:33:33,060 --> 00:33:35,227 problems that other people are worried 763 00:33:35,227 --> 00:33:37,500 about instead of the problems that we 764 00:33:37,500 --> 00:33:39,350 are worried about . Because most 765 00:33:39,350 --> 00:33:41,730 militaries would love to have the 766 00:33:41,730 --> 00:33:43,700 problems you all spend your time 767 00:33:43,700 --> 00:33:45,940 worrying about instead of the problems 768 00:33:45,950 --> 00:33:48,117 they have to spend their time worrying 769 00:33:48,117 --> 00:33:50,380 about . Um which makes me happy that it 770 00:33:50,380 --> 00:33:53,860 sounds like the new defense strategy in 771 00:33:53,860 --> 00:33:56,290 the works or the new national security 772 00:33:56,290 --> 00:33:58,390 strategy in the works will dispense 773 00:33:58,400 --> 00:34:01,470 with great power competition as the 774 00:34:01,470 --> 00:34:03,440 frame of reference because that 775 00:34:03,440 --> 00:34:05,860 actually plays to china's advantage . 776 00:34:05,870 --> 00:34:08,120 This notion that , you know , there are 777 00:34:08,120 --> 00:34:11,370 rising great power and we're Sparta at 778 00:34:11,370 --> 00:34:14,990 declining great power facing Athens in 779 00:34:14,990 --> 00:34:18,790 their full agency and that's actually 780 00:34:18,790 --> 00:34:22,120 not what we're doing . It's us and just 781 00:34:22,120 --> 00:34:25,670 about everybody else , having agreed on 782 00:34:25,670 --> 00:34:29,430 a set of rules about for example , 783 00:34:29,430 --> 00:34:32,560 how ships on the ocean , open ocean 784 00:34:32,560 --> 00:34:35,770 behave and the chinese wanting to 785 00:34:35,770 --> 00:34:38,760 unilaterally change those rules to 786 00:34:38,760 --> 00:34:41,280 their advantage and the disadvantage of 787 00:34:41,290 --> 00:34:43,480 everyone else . So every time we talk 788 00:34:43,480 --> 00:34:45,702 about great power competition , which I 789 00:34:45,702 --> 00:34:48,340 grant you is a useful way for us to 790 00:34:48,350 --> 00:34:50,860 organize ourselves , which is to say , 791 00:34:50,870 --> 00:34:53,740 finally , finally , people prioritize 792 00:34:53,750 --> 00:34:56,220 as Mackenzie Egland keeps telling us we 793 00:34:56,220 --> 00:35:00,000 need to do and focus on 794 00:35:00,000 --> 00:35:03,150 china . Um but that's actually not a 795 00:35:03,150 --> 00:35:04,983 useful way to talk about it with 796 00:35:04,983 --> 00:35:07,206 everybody else because it will make the 797 00:35:07,206 --> 00:35:09,450 very cooperation we need harder to get 798 00:35:09,460 --> 00:35:13,360 from those countries . Um uh 799 00:35:13,370 --> 00:35:16,240 there is a beautiful little pamphlet 800 00:35:16,250 --> 00:35:18,940 that I encourage for your thinking 801 00:35:18,940 --> 00:35:21,051 about these problems . It was written 802 00:35:21,051 --> 00:35:23,162 by an army Lieutenant Colonel name of 803 00:35:23,162 --> 00:35:26,740 Red Reader In 1941 or 804 00:35:26,740 --> 00:35:29,840 42 . General marshall sent him to the 805 00:35:29,840 --> 00:35:32,690 pacific understanding . Of course that 806 00:35:32,690 --> 00:35:35,340 once the army had won the war in europe , 807 00:35:35,350 --> 00:35:37,350 we didn't have a force large enough 808 00:35:37,350 --> 00:35:39,406 that we wouldn't have to swing it to 809 00:35:39,406 --> 00:35:42,630 also win the war in the pacific , which 810 00:35:42,630 --> 00:35:45,540 goes to the point that I think all 811 00:35:45,540 --> 00:35:49,530 three speakers made that um That we're 812 00:35:49,530 --> 00:35:52,190 not gonna have the luxury of optimizing 813 00:35:52,190 --> 00:35:54,301 just one set of challenges . We don't 814 00:35:54,301 --> 00:35:56,301 have a big enough military now . We 815 00:35:56,301 --> 00:35:58,357 didn't have a big enough military in 816 00:35:58,357 --> 00:36:00,134 1942 . And so the pamphlet that 817 00:36:00,134 --> 00:36:02,079 Lieutenant Colonel Reader writes , 818 00:36:02,430 --> 00:36:04,900 marshall sends him to interview all of 819 00:36:04,910 --> 00:36:07,370 the marine commanders in the pacific to 820 00:36:07,370 --> 00:36:10,940 figure out what they had done wrong and 821 00:36:10,940 --> 00:36:13,162 what they figured out how to do right . 822 00:36:13,162 --> 00:36:15,460 So that the army could actually train 823 00:36:15,460 --> 00:36:18,100 soldiers while you were swinging from 824 00:36:18,100 --> 00:36:20,030 europe to the pacific for the 825 00:36:20,030 --> 00:36:22,030 challenges of the pacific , because 826 00:36:22,030 --> 00:36:23,919 they're different kinds of wars , 827 00:36:24,530 --> 00:36:26,640 because obviously you have different 828 00:36:26,650 --> 00:36:30,090 kinds of adversaries . And if I 829 00:36:30,090 --> 00:36:33,630 were , if I were worrying about the 830 00:36:33,630 --> 00:36:35,730 war , we would have to fight in the 831 00:36:35,730 --> 00:36:38,190 pacific . It would look to me a lot 832 00:36:38,190 --> 00:36:41,820 like the early thinking about war in 833 00:36:41,820 --> 00:36:44,270 the nuclear age , namely what in the 834 00:36:44,270 --> 00:36:46,381 Eisenhower administration , they call 835 00:36:46,381 --> 00:36:49,610 broken back warfare , where at first 836 00:36:49,610 --> 00:36:52,610 you have all of the high tech 837 00:36:52,610 --> 00:36:55,370 spiffy , the kind of war Vikram was 838 00:36:55,370 --> 00:36:58,750 talking about . Um and then all that 839 00:36:58,750 --> 00:37:01,200 stuff gets destroyed and you have to 840 00:37:01,200 --> 00:37:04,980 have grit and soldiering to 841 00:37:04,980 --> 00:37:07,147 carry you through when everything else 842 00:37:07,147 --> 00:37:09,690 has already gone . Because that's what 843 00:37:09,690 --> 00:37:12,390 I in my judgment at war with china 844 00:37:12,400 --> 00:37:15,750 would look like moreover , that's what 845 00:37:15,760 --> 00:37:18,280 allies need from us because they are 846 00:37:18,280 --> 00:37:20,502 not going to have the spiciness that we 847 00:37:20,502 --> 00:37:23,220 have in toys were playing with and they 848 00:37:23,220 --> 00:37:25,387 may not even have a common operational 849 00:37:25,387 --> 00:37:29,000 picture , which means getting them into 850 00:37:29,000 --> 00:37:32,070 the fight is going to be a really hard 851 00:37:32,080 --> 00:37:34,920 part of the problem last couple of 852 00:37:34,920 --> 00:37:38,110 things ? Um , we are doing a pretty 853 00:37:38,110 --> 00:37:40,930 good job as a government and especially 854 00:37:40,930 --> 00:37:44,260 as a defense establishment in gearing 855 00:37:44,260 --> 00:37:47,530 up for managing a broad 856 00:37:47,530 --> 00:37:50,580 shouldered , aggressive , repressive 857 00:37:50,580 --> 00:37:52,790 china , right ? We're not doing half 858 00:37:52,800 --> 00:37:54,411 bad about that . I went back 859 00:37:54,411 --> 00:37:56,633 incidentally not long ago and read that 860 00:37:56,633 --> 00:37:59,920 2016 national Security strategy and I 861 00:37:59,920 --> 00:38:02,730 restrict that . It's not actually a 862 00:38:02,730 --> 00:38:04,730 great power competition china's 863 00:38:04,730 --> 00:38:07,860 strategy mostly , that's what D . O . D . 864 00:38:07,860 --> 00:38:10,870 Did in the transition from the national 865 00:38:10,870 --> 00:38:12,759 security strategy to the National 866 00:38:12,759 --> 00:38:14,926 Defense strategy . And it was really a 867 00:38:14,926 --> 00:38:18,800 nice magic trick that even I pay pretty 868 00:38:18,800 --> 00:38:20,633 close attention to this . Didn't 869 00:38:20,633 --> 00:38:24,190 realize how much more focused the NDS 870 00:38:24,190 --> 00:38:26,600 was than the national Security strategy 871 00:38:26,600 --> 00:38:29,430 was on china . And , and we've done a 872 00:38:29,430 --> 00:38:32,330 really good job . Mackenzie will , will 873 00:38:32,330 --> 00:38:34,790 point out where well among the many 874 00:38:34,790 --> 00:38:38,390 things Mackenzie will do uh , is I hope 875 00:38:38,390 --> 00:38:41,350 point out the necessity of greater 876 00:38:41,350 --> 00:38:44,430 prioritization and the budget gaps of 877 00:38:44,430 --> 00:38:46,597 achieving it . But it looks to me like 878 00:38:46,597 --> 00:38:48,652 the gears are meshing . What I think 879 00:38:48,652 --> 00:38:51,220 we're not thinking enough about is the 880 00:38:51,220 --> 00:38:53,840 problems attendant on a failing china , 881 00:38:54,420 --> 00:38:56,642 because it looks to me like that's what 882 00:38:56,642 --> 00:39:00,410 we are already facing . So what is 883 00:39:00,420 --> 00:39:03,750 propelling china now is the momentum of 884 00:39:03,750 --> 00:39:07,020 a rise that has stalled , Where 885 00:39:07,020 --> 00:39:09,242 pro-market reforms stopped happening in 886 00:39:09,242 --> 00:39:12,900 2002 ? Where , you know , ask yourself 887 00:39:12,900 --> 00:39:15,011 why is china making the moves they're 888 00:39:15,011 --> 00:39:17,760 making now because why not just wait 889 00:39:17,770 --> 00:39:19,826 till they had won the A . I . Race . 890 00:39:19,826 --> 00:39:21,437 Why not wait until the trump 891 00:39:21,437 --> 00:39:23,548 administration has actually collapsed 892 00:39:23,548 --> 00:39:25,437 America's alliances . They're not 893 00:39:25,437 --> 00:39:29,220 waiting for any of that and it's at 894 00:39:29,220 --> 00:39:32,670 least worth considering um that they're 895 00:39:32,670 --> 00:39:35,610 trying to take advantage of a window of 896 00:39:35,610 --> 00:39:37,940 opportunity that they feel is closing . 897 00:39:39,020 --> 00:39:42,970 Um And uhh the last 898 00:39:42,970 --> 00:39:46,850 thing that occurs to me listening to 899 00:39:46,860 --> 00:39:50,360 my military colleagues is that we need 900 00:39:50,360 --> 00:39:53,330 to help um there 901 00:39:53,920 --> 00:39:56,810 biden administration understand to a 902 00:39:56,810 --> 00:39:58,921 greater degree than I think the trump 903 00:39:58,921 --> 00:40:01,360 administration understood that military 904 00:40:01,360 --> 00:40:04,310 deployments aren't a proxy for 905 00:40:04,310 --> 00:40:07,170 credibility and that coming out of the 906 00:40:07,170 --> 00:40:09,280 policy decisions we have made in 907 00:40:09,280 --> 00:40:12,850 Afghanistan and are likely to make in 908 00:40:12,850 --> 00:40:16,500 Iraq and Syria that we actually need 909 00:40:16,500 --> 00:40:18,650 them to get serious about the 910 00:40:18,650 --> 00:40:21,160 relentless diplomacy and civilian 911 00:40:21,160 --> 00:40:24,440 leadership of these problems . Um 912 00:40:24,450 --> 00:40:27,730 rather than expecting the arrival of 913 00:40:27,740 --> 00:40:30,570 ship pulling into port or an exercise 914 00:40:30,580 --> 00:40:33,720 to be all we do in order to signal 915 00:40:33,720 --> 00:40:37,120 credibility because as I think general 916 00:40:37,120 --> 00:40:40,400 casually started um deterrence is the 917 00:40:40,400 --> 00:40:44,090 actual game we're in I think 918 00:40:44,090 --> 00:40:46,620 rather than some pointed comment , I 919 00:40:46,620 --> 00:40:50,280 will just say follow that thank you 920 00:40:50,290 --> 00:40:54,270 Francis . Um I I've 921 00:40:54,270 --> 00:40:56,326 learned a lot actually just being up 922 00:40:56,326 --> 00:40:59,050 here for the half hour so far and I'm 923 00:40:59,060 --> 00:41:01,990 I'm I'm glad that on this panel we have 924 00:41:01,990 --> 00:41:04,157 agreement where I don't think there is 925 00:41:04,157 --> 00:41:06,157 much else in D . C . On a couple of 926 00:41:06,157 --> 00:41:08,490 questions and so what do I mean by that ? 927 00:41:08,490 --> 00:41:11,250 So I think there are several sets of 928 00:41:11,250 --> 00:41:15,110 big unanswered questions by civilians 929 00:41:15,110 --> 00:41:18,640 that The army needs clarity on two 930 00:41:19,110 --> 00:41:22,730 two to continue to keep the 931 00:41:22,730 --> 00:41:24,897 unsteady peace I guess is what I would 932 00:41:24,897 --> 00:41:27,730 say . And well , it may seem like there 933 00:41:27,730 --> 00:41:29,841 is agreement in Washington because of 934 00:41:29,841 --> 00:41:31,952 the remarks that we've made on this . 935 00:41:31,952 --> 00:41:35,770 Um there's an absence of of clarity 936 00:41:35,770 --> 00:41:37,603 because I think partly these are 937 00:41:37,603 --> 00:41:39,603 politically hard questions . And so 938 00:41:39,603 --> 00:41:41,714 when you bring that element into it , 939 00:41:41,714 --> 00:41:43,992 it just it just gets things get harder . 940 00:41:43,992 --> 00:41:45,770 And so what are some of the big 941 00:41:45,770 --> 00:41:48,030 unanswered questions ? Well , when if 942 00:41:48,030 --> 00:41:50,252 I'm a force planner for D . O . D . And 943 00:41:50,252 --> 00:41:52,030 I look around the world , is it 944 00:41:52,030 --> 00:41:53,974 deterrence in competition or is it 945 00:41:53,974 --> 00:41:55,752 winning the war fight ? Because 946 00:41:55,752 --> 00:41:58,030 increasing while there is some overlap . 947 00:41:58,030 --> 00:41:59,900 Sure , the number of plans are 948 00:41:59,900 --> 00:42:01,900 different than the day to day grind 949 00:42:01,910 --> 00:42:04,132 that the generals have to deal with the 950 00:42:04,132 --> 00:42:06,021 presence assurance , deterrence , 951 00:42:06,021 --> 00:42:08,021 dissuasion , persuasion and all the 952 00:42:08,021 --> 00:42:10,200 other not conflict missions that 953 00:42:10,200 --> 00:42:12,311 they're doing every single day around 954 00:42:12,311 --> 00:42:14,256 the world with just as many forces 955 00:42:14,256 --> 00:42:16,367 forward at the height of the war . So 956 00:42:16,367 --> 00:42:18,589 what are they doing ? They're doing all 957 00:42:18,589 --> 00:42:20,644 that other stuff . But the number of 958 00:42:20,644 --> 00:42:22,700 plans are what we size and structure 959 00:42:22,700 --> 00:42:25,033 and build the Defense Department budget , 960 00:42:25,033 --> 00:42:27,390 the Defense Department around . And so 961 00:42:27,390 --> 00:42:29,446 while there's many plans , of course 962 00:42:29,446 --> 00:42:31,930 some are preferential and 963 00:42:32,900 --> 00:42:35,290 uh it's it's increasingly unclear and 964 00:42:35,290 --> 00:42:37,346 the overlap isn't gonna be enough to 965 00:42:37,346 --> 00:42:39,568 get us there right where you have , you 966 00:42:39,568 --> 00:42:41,679 know , do you want specialized forces 967 00:42:41,679 --> 00:42:43,901 are general purpose and and how much of 968 00:42:43,901 --> 00:42:45,846 what , which kind ? Um And if it's 969 00:42:45,846 --> 00:42:48,320 deterrence as as the name of the game , 970 00:42:48,900 --> 00:42:50,844 is it by denial or by punishment ? 971 00:42:50,844 --> 00:42:53,430 Because uh those are also again , 972 00:42:53,440 --> 00:42:56,300 they're different solutions , different 973 00:42:56,300 --> 00:42:59,540 services , different risk horizons um 974 00:42:59,550 --> 00:43:01,328 or different risk appetites and 975 00:43:01,328 --> 00:43:03,439 different time horizons . When you're 976 00:43:03,439 --> 00:43:05,800 talking about how how exactly what 977 00:43:05,810 --> 00:43:08,430 deterrent looks like in these 978 00:43:09,500 --> 00:43:13,110 problem sets . And then 979 00:43:14,300 --> 00:43:17,740 thinking about if it's the war fight as 980 00:43:17,740 --> 00:43:19,690 opposed to the competition slash 981 00:43:19,690 --> 00:43:22,570 deterrent slash presence ? What happens ? 982 00:43:22,580 --> 00:43:24,691 I guess Cory said it pretty well what 983 00:43:24,691 --> 00:43:27,040 happens ? What if war is just more than 984 00:43:27,040 --> 00:43:29,207 the giant missile exchange ? Which you 985 00:43:29,207 --> 00:43:31,429 know increasingly is what I hear around 986 00:43:31,429 --> 00:43:34,930 town uh when that's over and the battle 987 00:43:34,930 --> 00:43:36,819 is not , we're not pretty good at 988 00:43:36,819 --> 00:43:38,986 ending wars . I think we just saw that 989 00:43:38,986 --> 00:43:41,041 in Afghanistan . Unfortunately , you 990 00:43:41,041 --> 00:43:42,874 know , we don't do treaties . An 991 00:43:42,874 --> 00:43:44,930 armistice is anymore . So um what if 992 00:43:44,930 --> 00:43:47,730 that doesn't end it then ? 993 00:43:48,500 --> 00:43:52,420 Is war still uh more than giant 994 00:43:52,420 --> 00:43:54,640 missile salvos and exchanges ? Is it a 995 00:43:54,640 --> 00:43:56,720 battle of people in wills ? I think 996 00:43:56,730 --> 00:43:59,750 this group would agree , but in 997 00:43:59,750 --> 00:44:01,980 Washington , it's hard to that costs a 998 00:44:01,980 --> 00:44:03,980 lot of money when we're starting to 999 00:44:03,980 --> 00:44:06,960 talk about people and wills ah and then 1000 00:44:06,960 --> 00:44:09,390 on the threat priority ? Just listening 1001 00:44:09,400 --> 00:44:13,000 to it was a really good panel set up , 1002 00:44:13,000 --> 00:44:15,111 not because we're on a bit because of 1003 00:44:15,111 --> 00:44:17,111 the two generals in the two theater 1004 00:44:17,111 --> 00:44:19,640 perspectives that they bring . Is it a 1005 00:44:19,640 --> 00:44:21,640 three Theater four sizing construct 1006 00:44:21,640 --> 00:44:23,751 that we're talking about ? You know , 1007 00:44:23,751 --> 00:44:26,510 basically balance of power slash um , 1008 00:44:27,290 --> 00:44:30,940 you know , deterrence in europe and 1009 00:44:30,940 --> 00:44:33,051 Asia with an economy of force mission 1010 00:44:33,051 --> 00:44:35,162 in the , in the Middle East . Is that 1011 00:44:35,162 --> 00:44:38,930 that the essential job de jure of the 1012 00:44:38,930 --> 00:44:41,152 department And if so we're doing it all 1013 00:44:41,152 --> 00:44:43,263 wrong because this court has heard me 1014 00:44:43,263 --> 00:44:45,319 say that's a trillion dollar defense 1015 00:44:45,319 --> 00:44:47,319 budget . I think it's actually what 1016 00:44:47,319 --> 00:44:49,374 we're doing on the ground , but it's 1017 00:44:49,374 --> 00:44:51,430 not what we say we're going to do in 1018 00:44:51,430 --> 00:44:53,652 paper and , and and in budgeting . So I 1019 00:44:53,652 --> 00:44:55,763 close it out by saying , um , again , 1020 00:44:55,763 --> 00:44:57,874 Corey said , we don't have the luxury 1021 00:44:57,874 --> 00:44:59,986 to optimize to one challenge . Amen . 1022 00:45:00,490 --> 00:45:02,546 Uh , I agree with that . Even though 1023 00:45:02,546 --> 00:45:04,712 I'm calling for priorities of course . 1024 00:45:04,790 --> 00:45:07,530 Um , but who is doing that ? The Marine 1025 00:45:07,530 --> 00:45:10,240 Corps three core there that served 1026 00:45:10,240 --> 00:45:14,050 there ? No , no , they can do things 1027 00:45:14,050 --> 00:45:15,994 that the other chiefs can't do the 1028 00:45:15,994 --> 00:45:18,161 commandant and get away with it . It's 1029 00:45:18,161 --> 00:45:20,330 remarkable . Uh , so force designed 1030 00:45:20,330 --> 00:45:23,110 2030 , uh , you know , it's , it's 1031 00:45:23,110 --> 00:45:25,110 lauded all over town is as being a 1032 00:45:25,110 --> 00:45:27,400 brilliant , you know , goering sacred 1033 00:45:27,400 --> 00:45:30,540 cows , uh , forward looking all the 1034 00:45:30,540 --> 00:45:33,160 right answers document . Um , and that 1035 00:45:33,160 --> 00:45:35,104 may be true or is it just really , 1036 00:45:35,104 --> 00:45:37,410 really , really risky business to 1037 00:45:37,410 --> 00:45:39,740 specialise in this luxury of one 1038 00:45:39,740 --> 00:45:42,720 problem , one challenge , one enemy . 1039 00:45:43,290 --> 00:45:45,340 And while you're doing that shift 1040 00:45:45,350 --> 00:45:47,410 burden of responsibility onto other 1041 00:45:47,410 --> 00:45:49,850 services namely the United States Army 1042 00:45:49,860 --> 00:45:52,840 for what you're giving up our armor , 1043 00:45:52,990 --> 00:45:56,980 artillery rotary wing capability 1044 00:45:56,990 --> 00:45:59,720 specifically helicopters . So when the 1045 00:45:59,720 --> 00:46:01,942 Marine Corps gets rid of it all , who's 1046 00:46:01,942 --> 00:46:05,270 gonna pick up that bill the army ? But 1047 00:46:05,280 --> 00:46:07,970 I didn't hear any brilliant exchange by 1048 00:46:07,970 --> 00:46:10,081 civilians in Washington . Like making 1049 00:46:10,081 --> 00:46:12,137 that overt choice . As far as I know 1050 00:46:12,137 --> 00:46:14,192 there's no agreement with the chiefs 1051 00:46:14,192 --> 00:46:16,303 that this was the agreement . So it's 1052 00:46:16,303 --> 00:46:18,192 just and and and the commandant's 1053 00:46:18,192 --> 00:46:20,526 moving forward . It's already happening . 1054 00:46:20,526 --> 00:46:22,581 So what does this what does this tax 1055 00:46:22,581 --> 00:46:24,748 mean on the army ? The army is already 1056 00:46:24,748 --> 00:46:26,914 getting taxed with you know , pandemic 1057 00:46:26,914 --> 00:46:28,914 relief in response , more climate , 1058 00:46:28,914 --> 00:46:31,470 everything uh in an additional domestic 1059 00:46:31,480 --> 00:46:34,740 missions border housing of 1060 00:46:34,740 --> 00:46:38,150 60,000 afghan refugees , uh citizens 1061 00:46:38,150 --> 00:46:40,780 and S . I . V . S . And other personnel 1062 00:46:40,780 --> 00:46:42,891 at us military bases list goes on and 1063 00:46:42,891 --> 00:46:46,790 on and on and so uh I 1064 00:46:46,790 --> 00:46:48,846 guess I would conclude by saying you 1065 00:46:48,846 --> 00:46:50,734 know that that sounds smart force 1066 00:46:50,734 --> 00:46:53,870 designed 2030 you know people like to 1067 00:46:53,870 --> 00:46:56,037 say well we never fought at the folder 1068 00:46:56,037 --> 00:46:58,530 gap Francis but guess what we did do we 1069 00:46:58,530 --> 00:47:00,900 fought proxies of our enemies and world 1070 00:47:00,900 --> 00:47:03,430 War One and during the Cold War 1071 00:47:03,440 --> 00:47:05,840 everywhere else around the world and in 1072 00:47:05,850 --> 00:47:08,940 the small messy wars . And I think 1073 00:47:08,940 --> 00:47:10,829 we'll continue to see that in the 1074 00:47:10,829 --> 00:47:14,570 future with china and with Russia . Uh 1075 00:47:14,580 --> 00:47:18,500 but but we're not being honest about 1076 00:47:18,500 --> 00:47:21,180 that I guess is what I'm saying . So my 1077 00:47:21,180 --> 00:47:23,630 watchword is honesty today . Thanks . 1078 00:47:23,640 --> 00:47:27,080 Um I have a note by the way . Um you've 1079 00:47:27,080 --> 00:47:29,136 been invited to be on a panel called 1080 00:47:29,136 --> 00:47:32,290 the future of the Marine Corps . They 1081 00:47:32,300 --> 00:47:34,189 would very much like to hear your 1082 00:47:34,189 --> 00:47:36,380 thoughts about what that looks . So I 1083 00:47:36,390 --> 00:47:38,279 um when I spoke to the commandant 1084 00:47:38,279 --> 00:47:40,680 privately recently um he shook my hand , 1085 00:47:40,680 --> 00:47:42,680 said hello I was on my panel and he 1086 00:47:42,680 --> 00:47:44,624 shook my hand and said goodbye . I 1087 00:47:44,624 --> 00:47:47,320 think that's something up . You all 1088 00:47:47,320 --> 00:47:50,700 have used uh your opportunities to talk 1089 00:47:50,700 --> 00:47:53,040 at some length or other about allies 1090 00:47:53,040 --> 00:47:54,984 and partners . And I would like to 1091 00:47:54,984 --> 00:47:57,151 start with general cavalier in general 1092 00:47:57,151 --> 00:48:00,000 Flynn uh and and raise a point that I 1093 00:48:00,000 --> 00:48:02,000 think Corey might have brought up . 1094 00:48:02,000 --> 00:48:03,778 What is the expectation in your 1095 00:48:03,778 --> 00:48:05,556 interaction with our allies and 1096 00:48:05,556 --> 00:48:07,850 partners , what they have regarding 1097 00:48:07,860 --> 00:48:09,749 land power in the future from the 1098 00:48:09,749 --> 00:48:11,860 United States . General Kohli went go 1099 00:48:11,860 --> 00:48:14,590 first please . Yeah . Our um 1100 00:48:14,770 --> 00:48:17,440 expectations derived directly from our 1101 00:48:17,440 --> 00:48:19,970 planning efforts . And um our 1102 00:48:19,980 --> 00:48:22,036 expectations can be measured both in 1103 00:48:22,036 --> 00:48:24,540 terms of quantity and quality of forces 1104 00:48:24,540 --> 00:48:28,090 available you know . Um So 1105 00:48:28,100 --> 00:48:30,550 I have to study the actual force that's 1106 00:48:30,550 --> 00:48:33,500 on the ground um um facing 1107 00:48:33,970 --> 00:48:37,760 the NATO alliance and it is a very very 1108 00:48:37,760 --> 00:48:40,330 significant force that cannot be 1109 00:48:40,340 --> 00:48:42,980 assumed away or wished away and its 1110 00:48:42,990 --> 00:48:45,190 proximity to the borders of the 1111 00:48:45,190 --> 00:48:47,460 alliance in some cases and and not that 1112 00:48:47,460 --> 00:48:50,040 far removed in others . So there's a 1113 00:48:50,040 --> 00:48:53,510 time and distance um 1114 00:48:53,700 --> 00:48:57,550 consideration that goes to 1115 00:48:57,550 --> 00:49:00,520 the readiness , the availability , the 1116 00:49:00,520 --> 00:49:02,687 quantity and the quality of the allied 1117 00:49:02,687 --> 00:49:06,550 forces that would face it . So what we 1118 00:49:06,550 --> 00:49:09,180 actually , you know , expect is uh 1119 00:49:09,190 --> 00:49:11,246 probably shouldn't be discussed very 1120 00:49:11,246 --> 00:49:13,468 much in this forum but it's quite a bit 1121 00:49:13,468 --> 00:49:16,290 and it does rely on us 1122 00:49:17,170 --> 00:49:20,910 enablement at the higher end . Um 1123 00:49:20,920 --> 00:49:23,320 And of course to get it into the fight 1124 00:49:23,330 --> 00:49:25,710 to facilitate it into the fight . As a 1125 00:49:25,720 --> 00:49:28,510 doctor Shockey described , it requires 1126 00:49:28,520 --> 00:49:31,060 us presence , us participation in U . S . 1127 00:49:31,060 --> 00:49:34,320 Leadership . So there's a reason forces 1128 00:49:34,320 --> 00:49:36,264 remain on the continent . American 1129 00:49:36,264 --> 00:49:38,098 forces remain on the continent . 1130 00:49:38,098 --> 00:49:39,709 There's a reason we practice 1131 00:49:39,709 --> 00:49:41,764 reinforcement because you can't wish 1132 00:49:41,764 --> 00:49:43,764 away the force that's opposing us . 1133 00:49:43,764 --> 00:49:46,950 It's there , it's really there and it 1134 00:49:46,950 --> 00:49:49,680 requires a force that is capable of 1135 00:49:49,680 --> 00:49:52,380 defeating it in its own domain as well 1136 00:49:52,380 --> 00:49:54,547 as across multiple domains . So that's 1137 00:49:54,547 --> 00:49:56,713 what that's kind of what we work on in 1138 00:49:56,713 --> 00:50:00,470 terms of how that plays out . Um 1139 00:50:00,480 --> 00:50:03,540 Mr rose across our interactions with 1140 00:50:03,540 --> 00:50:07,430 our allies . Um We rehearse you know 1141 00:50:07,440 --> 00:50:10,580 the parts , we um practice the things 1142 00:50:10,580 --> 00:50:12,802 we think we would have to do in a large 1143 00:50:12,802 --> 00:50:14,960 scale fight um with our allies . We 1144 00:50:14,960 --> 00:50:17,071 rehearse them very frequently . I see 1145 00:50:17,071 --> 00:50:19,490 adam yolks there from the polish army . 1146 00:50:19,860 --> 00:50:21,820 We have participated together in 1147 00:50:21,820 --> 00:50:24,153 numerous wet gap crossings for instance , 1148 00:50:24,153 --> 00:50:26,640 bridging operations . Very complicated 1149 00:50:26,640 --> 00:50:29,330 things in which all of our forces would 1150 00:50:29,330 --> 00:50:31,790 have to pull assets successfully to 1151 00:50:31,790 --> 00:50:35,460 negotiate the number of obstacles that 1152 00:50:35,460 --> 00:50:39,190 we would face in operations . We 1153 00:50:39,190 --> 00:50:41,000 practice parachuting operations 1154 00:50:41,000 --> 00:50:43,230 together for rapid contingency response 1155 00:50:43,230 --> 00:50:45,640 to include preparing to bring forces 1156 00:50:45,640 --> 00:50:48,490 over from us army pacific and 1157 00:50:48,490 --> 00:50:51,420 parachuting into our area . Um So the 1158 00:50:51,420 --> 00:50:53,660 things that we anticipate having to do 1159 00:50:53,660 --> 00:50:55,800 in large scale fight drive our 1160 00:50:55,810 --> 00:50:57,532 interaction with our allies on 1161 00:50:57,532 --> 00:50:59,670 exercises and our preparatory 1162 00:50:59,670 --> 00:51:02,100 interactions with our allies are 1163 00:51:02,110 --> 00:51:04,332 determined by what we expect to do with 1164 00:51:04,332 --> 00:51:06,499 them and exercises . Um So it all kind 1165 00:51:06,499 --> 00:51:08,554 of comes together um You know from I 1166 00:51:08,554 --> 00:51:10,666 met as Dr Singh talked about a moment 1167 00:51:10,666 --> 00:51:12,888 ago all the way through the large scale 1168 00:51:12,888 --> 00:51:15,110 exercises that we do . Everything we do 1169 00:51:15,110 --> 00:51:17,110 in U . S . Army europe is done with 1170 00:51:17,110 --> 00:51:19,166 allies . In fact it's hard for me to 1171 00:51:19,166 --> 00:51:21,360 think of any activity we conduct that 1172 00:51:21,360 --> 00:51:23,460 is not conducted with our with our 1173 00:51:23,460 --> 00:51:25,480 allies and in some cases special 1174 00:51:25,480 --> 00:51:27,910 partners as well . General thanks 1175 00:51:27,910 --> 00:51:30,330 general Flynn . So a lot of a lot of 1176 00:51:30,330 --> 00:51:33,210 similarities . So I won't re grind a 1177 00:51:33,210 --> 00:51:35,432 number of things that chris mentioned . 1178 00:51:35,432 --> 00:51:38,250 I will say where there is 1179 00:51:38,260 --> 00:51:41,490 a binding um 1180 00:51:41,960 --> 00:51:44,760 collective security arrangement and 1181 00:51:44,770 --> 00:51:48,340 forces uh that as chris 1182 00:51:48,340 --> 00:51:50,396 described are working day in and day 1183 00:51:50,396 --> 00:51:54,350 out . Um We have a little bit of 1184 00:51:54,350 --> 00:51:57,650 a different challenge in across the 1185 00:51:57,650 --> 00:52:00,620 indo pacific while we do have some 1186 00:52:00,620 --> 00:52:04,480 partners that uh you know we have 1187 00:52:04,480 --> 00:52:07,810 treaties and obligations that we will 1188 00:52:07,810 --> 00:52:10,980 meet . There are others that are 1189 00:52:11,950 --> 00:52:15,250 yeah there are our work with them 1190 00:52:15,630 --> 00:52:19,460 requires to meet them I 1191 00:52:19,470 --> 00:52:21,692 think as dr shock you mentioned to meet 1192 00:52:21,692 --> 00:52:24,470 them forward and be forward with them 1193 00:52:24,940 --> 00:52:28,050 and seek ways to for them to 1194 00:52:28,050 --> 00:52:31,890 identify the things that they would 1195 00:52:31,890 --> 00:52:34,450 like our help with . And then 1196 00:52:34,450 --> 00:52:36,672 conversely the things that we can learn 1197 00:52:36,672 --> 00:52:40,430 from them . Uh As dr Shockey was 1198 00:52:40,430 --> 00:52:43,600 talking I thought of a few years back , 1199 00:52:43,610 --> 00:52:45,610 I remember taking a corps commander 1200 00:52:45,610 --> 00:52:47,860 from a country in Southeast Asia into 1201 00:52:47,860 --> 00:52:51,720 one of our ops centers . And when 1202 00:52:51,720 --> 00:52:54,050 we walked out I was sort of feeling 1203 00:52:54,050 --> 00:52:56,050 very proud about all the technology 1204 00:52:56,050 --> 00:52:58,530 that we had there and I said you know 1205 00:52:58,540 --> 00:53:00,630 general , what do you think ? And he 1206 00:53:00,630 --> 00:53:03,180 said I think we'll never be like that . 1207 00:53:04,450 --> 00:53:08,390 And then we continued to walk and he 1208 00:53:08,400 --> 00:53:10,344 stopped and he pointed over to the 1209 00:53:10,344 --> 00:53:12,456 jungle and he said but that's not why 1210 00:53:12,456 --> 00:53:15,030 you need us . And so I think that that 1211 00:53:15,040 --> 00:53:18,680 was an illustration to me of the 1212 00:53:18,690 --> 00:53:21,900 help and assistance that we can give to 1213 00:53:21,900 --> 00:53:25,690 them because there were things mm in 1214 00:53:25,690 --> 00:53:28,180 the command post that added value to 1215 00:53:28,650 --> 00:53:30,872 the operation that we happen to be on . 1216 00:53:31,350 --> 00:53:33,572 But there were also things that we need 1217 00:53:33,572 --> 00:53:36,220 to learn from them . And I think that 1218 00:53:36,220 --> 00:53:38,970 that I know that curses team is doing 1219 00:53:38,970 --> 00:53:42,310 that every day . We um everything that 1220 00:53:42,310 --> 00:53:44,143 we're trying to do in the end of 1221 00:53:44,143 --> 00:53:46,700 pacific is with our allies and partners . 1222 00:53:46,710 --> 00:53:49,780 Everything uh and the more we we do 1223 00:53:49,780 --> 00:53:53,080 that I think the more uh confidence 1224 00:53:53,080 --> 00:53:56,840 that they gain by by being alongside us 1225 00:53:56,850 --> 00:53:58,906 by learning from one another , by us 1226 00:53:58,906 --> 00:54:01,650 reaching out to them to find out what 1227 00:54:01,660 --> 00:54:05,260 is it that they need from us . And then , 1228 00:54:05,740 --> 00:54:08,110 conversely , what is it that they offer 1229 00:54:08,110 --> 00:54:10,920 to us that we need to learn inside of 1230 00:54:10,920 --> 00:54:13,087 our own formations , because there are 1231 00:54:13,087 --> 00:54:14,770 an enormous amount of skilled 1232 00:54:14,770 --> 00:54:17,050 professionals out there in the region 1233 00:54:17,060 --> 00:54:20,170 that we can benefit from . And uh so I 1234 00:54:20,170 --> 00:54:22,337 think , you know , in addition to what 1235 00:54:22,337 --> 00:54:24,503 chris is saying , uh one other comment 1236 00:54:24,503 --> 00:54:27,730 that I wanted to sort of emphasize that 1237 00:54:27,730 --> 00:54:31,230 chris mentioned on the other side , Um 1238 00:54:31,240 --> 00:54:34,570 there is a known adversary , multiple 1239 00:54:34,570 --> 00:54:36,737 known adversaries . I mean , you can't 1240 00:54:36,737 --> 00:54:38,903 discount the 10,000 tubes of artillery 1241 00:54:38,903 --> 00:54:42,000 that are facing down into south Korea , 1242 00:54:42,010 --> 00:54:45,080 so it's there uh and we 1243 00:54:45,090 --> 00:54:48,740 uh while we may size for competitive 1244 00:54:48,740 --> 00:54:52,050 activities , these these are real 1245 00:54:52,050 --> 00:54:55,610 numbers with real forces and they 1246 00:54:55,620 --> 00:54:58,400 really could do something . And so we 1247 00:54:58,400 --> 00:55:02,270 have this um delicate balance 1248 00:55:02,270 --> 00:55:04,270 that we have to walk about doing a 1249 00:55:04,270 --> 00:55:07,370 range of competitive activities that 1250 00:55:07,370 --> 00:55:11,170 are direct and indirect in support of 1251 00:55:11,170 --> 00:55:13,660 our allies and partners , but we also 1252 00:55:13,660 --> 00:55:16,710 have to be able to execute in the event 1253 00:55:16,710 --> 00:55:18,766 that something goes terribly wrong . 1254 00:55:18,766 --> 00:55:22,260 And so uh that's what I think that uh 1255 00:55:22,740 --> 00:55:26,050 we're faced with each day and every 1256 00:55:26,050 --> 00:55:29,020 night and uh and we have to be very 1257 00:55:29,020 --> 00:55:31,187 pragmatic about our ability to respond 1258 00:55:31,187 --> 00:55:33,190 to that general thank you . And 1259 00:55:33,190 --> 00:55:36,250 similarly , charlie , I think it 1260 00:55:36,260 --> 00:55:39,840 befalls you and me to distinguish 1261 00:55:39,840 --> 00:55:42,830 between the way we aspire to fight 1262 00:55:42,830 --> 00:55:44,920 someday in the future and the way we 1263 00:55:44,920 --> 00:55:47,300 have to prepare to fight with what we 1264 00:55:47,300 --> 00:55:49,540 have right now and those aren't 1265 00:55:49,540 --> 00:55:51,540 necessarily the same thing and it's 1266 00:55:51,540 --> 00:55:53,707 easy for us in academic discussions to 1267 00:55:53,707 --> 00:55:56,190 conflate those sometimes . So we kind 1268 00:55:56,190 --> 00:55:58,246 of are the place where you have to , 1269 00:55:58,246 --> 00:56:00,357 where we got to consort those two and 1270 00:56:00,357 --> 00:56:02,579 make sure we're able to prepare for the 1271 00:56:02,579 --> 00:56:04,746 ladder while we were able currently to 1272 00:56:04,746 --> 00:56:06,579 execute the former . That's it . 1273 00:56:06,579 --> 00:56:09,340 General thanks Corey . Since you 1274 00:56:09,350 --> 00:56:11,294 started this discussion about what 1275 00:56:11,294 --> 00:56:14,680 allies need from us , what should they 1276 00:56:14,680 --> 00:56:18,270 expect from us or what should we be 1277 00:56:18,270 --> 00:56:21,410 able to contribute to them and what is 1278 00:56:21,410 --> 00:56:23,360 reasonable for us to expect ? As 1279 00:56:23,370 --> 00:56:25,481 general Flynn said that's not why you 1280 00:56:25,481 --> 00:56:28,990 need us . What should we um What's 1281 00:56:28,990 --> 00:56:31,157 reasonable for us to think that we can 1282 00:56:31,157 --> 00:56:34,930 gain from them ? Uh That's a great 1283 00:56:34,930 --> 00:56:37,050 question and I think the answer like 1284 00:56:37,060 --> 00:56:39,116 with any good question is it depends 1285 00:56:39,430 --> 00:56:41,900 right , It depends on whether you have 1286 00:56:41,910 --> 00:56:45,530 a defense treaty with them . Um 1287 00:56:45,540 --> 00:56:49,060 We in europe we have tried to blur the 1288 00:56:49,060 --> 00:56:51,171 line between those countries that are 1289 00:56:51,171 --> 00:56:53,282 NATO members and those countries that 1290 00:56:53,282 --> 00:56:56,450 we just want to defend . And the 1291 00:56:56,450 --> 00:56:59,360 Russians have driven the cost way up to 1292 00:56:59,360 --> 00:57:03,350 keeping that line blurry . Um and I 1293 00:57:03,350 --> 00:57:06,390 think we should expect adversaries in 1294 00:57:06,400 --> 00:57:09,640 Asia to try and do the same , which is 1295 00:57:09,640 --> 00:57:11,830 why the quality is such an interesting 1296 00:57:11,840 --> 00:57:15,530 innovation because it 1297 00:57:15,530 --> 00:57:17,697 does blur the line and interesting and 1298 00:57:17,697 --> 00:57:19,752 important ways . I think Aucas blurs 1299 00:57:19,752 --> 00:57:21,919 the line and interesting and important 1300 00:57:21,919 --> 00:57:25,630 ways . Um And we 1301 00:57:25,630 --> 00:57:29,540 should uh it is to our advantage 1302 00:57:29,550 --> 00:57:33,120 to have those lines blurry . But the 1303 00:57:33,120 --> 00:57:35,750 problem is when your marker gets called 1304 00:57:35,750 --> 00:57:37,972 in on that stuff , you actually have to 1305 00:57:37,972 --> 00:57:40,930 be willing to do it . And I was 1306 00:57:40,930 --> 00:57:43,820 pleasantly surprised at how far forward 1307 00:57:43,820 --> 00:57:45,709 the biden administration has been 1308 00:57:45,709 --> 00:57:48,750 leaning on Taiwan for example . Ah 1309 00:57:49,130 --> 00:57:52,770 But as General Flynn 1310 00:57:52,770 --> 00:57:55,160 said that's it . These are nontrivial 1311 00:57:55,160 --> 00:57:57,216 challenges when you actually have to 1312 00:57:57,216 --> 00:58:01,210 execute um on them and 1313 00:58:01,520 --> 00:58:05,160 and what I would want if I were an 1314 00:58:05,160 --> 00:58:08,710 american ally is a lot less 1315 00:58:08,710 --> 00:58:11,530 nonsense from us . Right ? A lot less 1316 00:58:11,530 --> 00:58:14,340 grandiose statements . A lot more 1317 00:58:14,340 --> 00:58:16,600 practical nuts and bolts under what 1318 00:58:16,600 --> 00:58:19,410 conditions can you rely on these things ? 1319 00:58:19,420 --> 00:58:22,540 Let's codify them in war plans . Um , 1320 00:58:23,120 --> 00:58:25,700 you can't reliably deliver the United 1321 00:58:25,700 --> 00:58:28,090 States unless the Congress is engaged 1322 00:58:28,100 --> 00:58:32,000 in the activity . So agreements that 1323 00:58:32,000 --> 00:58:34,560 don't have congressional ratification 1324 00:58:34,570 --> 00:58:37,230 aren't really agreements and that the 1325 00:58:37,230 --> 00:58:39,200 increasing seesawing of executive 1326 00:58:39,200 --> 00:58:42,240 orders across administrations only 1327 00:58:42,240 --> 00:58:44,407 reinforces that for allies . So what I 1328 00:58:44,407 --> 00:58:46,462 would want from the United States is 1329 00:58:46,462 --> 00:58:48,573 less nonsense and more practicality . 1330 00:58:48,620 --> 00:58:50,509 What I think they have a right to 1331 00:58:50,509 --> 00:58:53,490 expect from the United States is 1332 00:58:53,490 --> 00:58:56,040 clarity about what we can and can't do 1333 00:58:56,720 --> 00:58:59,790 and honesty about as Mackenzie was 1334 00:58:59,790 --> 00:59:02,720 saying honesty about what we will and 1335 00:59:02,720 --> 00:59:05,670 won't do uh which is a hard 1336 00:59:05,670 --> 00:59:08,720 conversation to have right because 1337 00:59:08,730 --> 00:59:10,952 there are lots of things we may want to 1338 00:59:10,952 --> 00:59:13,520 do that we won't do when push comes to 1339 00:59:13,520 --> 00:59:17,480 shove . Uh and making the 1340 00:59:17,480 --> 00:59:19,910 best of that is I mean the United 1341 00:59:19,910 --> 00:59:21,966 States is a difficult Ally . Were an 1342 00:59:21,966 --> 00:59:24,400 unreliable ally , even though that's 1343 00:59:24,400 --> 00:59:26,122 not how we like to think about 1344 00:59:26,122 --> 00:59:28,170 ourselves , right ? We think about 1345 00:59:28,170 --> 00:59:30,840 ourselves even in the context of World 1346 00:59:30,840 --> 00:59:34,260 War Two as the war winning ally and 1347 00:59:34,260 --> 00:59:36,371 what we looked like to the british is 1348 00:59:36,371 --> 00:59:38,482 somebody who wouldn't show up for 3.5 1349 00:59:38,482 --> 00:59:40,770 years and we look like that to a lot of 1350 00:59:40,770 --> 00:59:44,370 continental Europeans too . So I think 1351 00:59:44,380 --> 00:59:47,610 um less uh chest thumping 1352 00:59:47,610 --> 00:59:50,630 triumphalism out of the United States 1353 00:59:50,630 --> 00:59:52,660 and a lot more good old fashioned 1354 00:59:52,660 --> 00:59:55,880 strategy , which is so Shockey's theory 1355 00:59:55,880 --> 00:59:57,750 of strategy is that every good 1356 00:59:57,750 --> 01:00:00,540 strategist is fundamentally a desperate 1357 01:00:00,550 --> 01:00:03,810 paranoiac because strategist spend all 1358 01:00:03,810 --> 01:00:06,032 their time thinking about , oh my God , 1359 01:00:06,032 --> 01:00:08,100 what if that a trap door opens 1360 01:00:08,100 --> 01:00:10,322 underneath my chair and I fall into the 1361 01:00:10,322 --> 01:00:12,378 sewer underneath this building . How 1362 01:00:12,378 --> 01:00:14,656 did you know that ? We had one of them ? 1363 01:00:14,656 --> 01:00:16,711 Well , I think you don't because you 1364 01:00:16,711 --> 01:00:18,878 would have exercised the button by now 1365 01:00:18,878 --> 01:00:20,878 frank , you know ? Um lastly what I 1366 01:00:20,878 --> 01:00:23,990 think we can expect from allies . I 1367 01:00:23,990 --> 01:00:25,990 hated the way President Obama would 1368 01:00:25,990 --> 01:00:28,157 always say we can't care about it more 1369 01:00:28,157 --> 01:00:32,130 than they do because that um 1370 01:00:32,710 --> 01:00:35,940 that rings of the arrogance of a 1371 01:00:35,940 --> 01:00:37,980 country that's never had to face an 1372 01:00:37,980 --> 01:00:41,220 overwhelming challenge . And we ought 1373 01:00:41,220 --> 01:00:44,260 to ask ourselves what , you know , the 1374 01:00:44,270 --> 01:00:46,103 people of my great home state of 1375 01:00:46,103 --> 01:00:48,580 California would do if they were facing 1376 01:00:48,580 --> 01:00:51,560 a 10-1 challenge of conquest and we 1377 01:00:51,560 --> 01:00:54,620 should be actually nicer and more 1378 01:00:54,630 --> 01:00:58,140 reassuring about even if 1379 01:00:58,610 --> 01:01:02,490 we can't defend your territory from 1380 01:01:02,490 --> 01:01:04,323 the outset , we will help you re 1381 01:01:04,323 --> 01:01:08,160 conquer it eventually . Because that's 1382 01:01:08,310 --> 01:01:10,421 reassurance . I would want to fire an 1383 01:01:10,421 --> 01:01:13,250 american ally big . What do you think 1384 01:01:13,250 --> 01:01:16,380 is uh is the right exchange between 1385 01:01:16,390 --> 01:01:18,440 allies and partners and the United 1386 01:01:18,440 --> 01:01:20,580 States regarding the topic at hand of 1387 01:01:20,580 --> 01:01:23,220 land power ? Uh huh . I'm sorry , 1388 01:01:23,230 --> 01:01:26,730 I was gonna I was gonna jump in while 1389 01:01:26,730 --> 01:01:29,800 you were talking to go for it . I think 1390 01:01:29,800 --> 01:01:33,680 that Corey said something that I think 1391 01:01:33,680 --> 01:01:35,902 it's pretty provocative which is in and 1392 01:01:35,902 --> 01:01:37,902 really important , which is that we 1393 01:01:37,902 --> 01:01:40,124 tend we tend to dress it up in a lot of 1394 01:01:40,124 --> 01:01:42,180 pomp and circumstance . This are you 1395 01:01:42,180 --> 01:01:45,850 know are you know the alliances 1396 01:01:45,850 --> 01:01:48,230 and they're unbreakable and they are , 1397 01:01:48,240 --> 01:01:50,462 you know , you know these these forever 1398 01:01:50,462 --> 01:01:53,080 commitments um because everybody knows 1399 01:01:53,080 --> 01:01:55,440 that alliances are not uh forever 1400 01:01:55,440 --> 01:01:57,750 commitments and that they are um 1401 01:01:57,760 --> 01:02:00,490 they're there sometimes , you know , 1402 01:02:00,500 --> 01:02:02,500 very successful . They're more like 1403 01:02:02,500 --> 01:02:04,556 marriages and a lot of ways with all 1404 01:02:04,556 --> 01:02:06,389 the work that goes into having a 1405 01:02:06,389 --> 01:02:08,667 marriage be successful , It's not just , 1406 01:02:08,667 --> 01:02:10,770 you know , you're you you sign the 1407 01:02:10,770 --> 01:02:12,840 treaty and now you're forever more , 1408 01:02:12,850 --> 01:02:14,794 you know , gonna be there for each 1409 01:02:14,794 --> 01:02:18,080 other . Um and I think that what we 1410 01:02:18,090 --> 01:02:21,120 what we have is something really 1411 01:02:21,600 --> 01:02:24,900 uh Uniquely important which is that we 1412 01:02:24,900 --> 01:02:26,678 have this network of allies and 1413 01:02:26,678 --> 01:02:28,622 partners . It is our strength back 1414 01:02:28,622 --> 01:02:30,789 again , the same . Corey said it's not 1415 01:02:30,789 --> 01:02:33,011 us versus China and us versus Russia in 1416 01:02:33,011 --> 01:02:34,956 a lot of these shaping of the 21st 1417 01:02:34,956 --> 01:02:37,390 century . It's us and a whole bunch of 1418 01:02:37,390 --> 01:02:39,880 other countries who kind of share a 1419 01:02:39,880 --> 01:02:42,047 vision of what we would like the world 1420 01:02:42,047 --> 01:02:44,720 to look like . And Russia and china 1421 01:02:44,730 --> 01:02:48,030 having revisionist ideas to one degree 1422 01:02:48,030 --> 01:02:50,220 or another about a lot of those things 1423 01:02:50,230 --> 01:02:52,119 around which there's pretty broad 1424 01:02:52,119 --> 01:02:53,786 consensus and the rest of the 1425 01:02:53,786 --> 01:02:56,120 international community . But then what 1426 01:02:56,120 --> 01:02:59,530 we forget is the day today for those 1427 01:02:59,530 --> 01:03:01,290 allies and partners looks very 1428 01:03:01,290 --> 01:03:05,250 different for every ally and partner 1429 01:03:05,250 --> 01:03:08,520 we have in the Asia pacific china is an 1430 01:03:08,520 --> 01:03:12,250 overmatch right china is crushes them 1431 01:03:12,250 --> 01:03:15,810 very quickly . And so their perspective 1432 01:03:15,810 --> 01:03:18,080 on what they can do in terms of showing 1433 01:03:18,080 --> 01:03:20,290 spine and standing up to china and 1434 01:03:20,290 --> 01:03:23,160 talking truth . Um that looks very 1435 01:03:23,160 --> 01:03:25,790 different for them for every one of the 1436 01:03:25,800 --> 01:03:27,911 countries in Ozzie and china is their 1437 01:03:27,911 --> 01:03:30,022 largest trading partner for every and 1438 01:03:30,022 --> 01:03:32,820 for even big powers like India , you 1439 01:03:32,820 --> 01:03:35,040 know , India is not catching up to 1440 01:03:35,040 --> 01:03:37,380 china guys . Like it's not catching up 1441 01:03:37,380 --> 01:03:39,491 on fighters . It's not catching up on 1442 01:03:39,491 --> 01:03:42,180 submarines . It's not , you know , now . 1443 01:03:42,190 --> 01:03:44,412 So so then you start to have to look at 1444 01:03:44,412 --> 01:03:46,780 the little things . What are the little 1445 01:03:46,780 --> 01:03:49,002 things the little things are , how does 1446 01:03:49,002 --> 01:03:51,670 how does the Taiwan respond to 1447 01:03:51,680 --> 01:03:55,110 aggression from Beijing in terms of 1448 01:03:55,110 --> 01:03:57,277 like what we've seen recently with all 1449 01:03:57,277 --> 01:03:59,388 of the , you know , all of the ages , 1450 01:03:59,388 --> 01:04:01,332 you know , encouraging how does in 1451 01:04:01,332 --> 01:04:04,920 India stand up to a go on incident 1452 01:04:04,930 --> 01:04:07,580 where it has uh it has soldiers killed 1453 01:04:07,580 --> 01:04:10,010 for the first time in 45 years on its 1454 01:04:10,010 --> 01:04:12,660 disputed land border with china . Right ? 1455 01:04:12,670 --> 01:04:15,210 How did and then what do they those 1456 01:04:15,210 --> 01:04:17,321 allies and partners , how does how do 1457 01:04:17,321 --> 01:04:19,543 partners in the south china sea respond 1458 01:04:19,543 --> 01:04:22,910 essentially , china's extension of its 1459 01:04:23,290 --> 01:04:26,310 um of its dominance to the first island 1460 01:04:26,310 --> 01:04:28,800 chain . Right , uh you know , south 1461 01:04:28,800 --> 01:04:31,290 China Sea and and and further east . 1462 01:04:31,300 --> 01:04:33,580 How did they respond and and look to 1463 01:04:33,580 --> 01:04:37,160 handling that ? And then how do we help 1464 01:04:37,170 --> 01:04:40,940 back up ? What works uh for those 1465 01:04:40,940 --> 01:04:43,430 allies and partners ? Because one of 1466 01:04:43,430 --> 01:04:45,319 the things you can't do to have a 1467 01:04:45,319 --> 01:04:48,710 successful alliance is to expect more 1468 01:04:48,710 --> 01:04:51,840 than your partners are capable of doing 1469 01:04:51,850 --> 01:04:54,590 right . You need to figure out how you 1470 01:04:54,590 --> 01:04:56,646 partner effectively and play to each 1471 01:04:56,646 --> 01:04:58,830 other's strengths . What I do think we 1472 01:04:58,840 --> 01:05:01,200 need to expect from our allies and 1473 01:05:01,200 --> 01:05:03,870 partners though , you know , to , you 1474 01:05:03,870 --> 01:05:05,926 know , to to , you know , to channel 1475 01:05:05,926 --> 01:05:08,259 some of that . What you're hearing from , 1476 01:05:08,259 --> 01:05:10,259 you know , President Obama and I've 1477 01:05:10,259 --> 01:05:12,426 heard from leaders , political leaders 1478 01:05:12,426 --> 01:05:14,481 on both ends of the spectrum about , 1479 01:05:14,481 --> 01:05:16,648 you know , getting allies to step up . 1480 01:05:16,648 --> 01:05:18,648 I think what we need to expect from 1481 01:05:18,648 --> 01:05:21,240 them is um is the same kind of clarity 1482 01:05:21,250 --> 01:05:24,410 about how they want to face these 1483 01:05:24,410 --> 01:05:26,466 challenges because when you shut the 1484 01:05:26,466 --> 01:05:28,577 door , they all agree that they don't 1485 01:05:28,577 --> 01:05:32,390 like the coercion and the uh you know , 1486 01:05:32,390 --> 01:05:34,446 and the pressure that's coming along 1487 01:05:34,446 --> 01:05:36,668 with , you know , the B Ri projects and 1488 01:05:36,668 --> 01:05:38,950 the ability of the chinese to turn turn 1489 01:05:38,950 --> 01:05:41,172 the screws on them . The willingness of 1490 01:05:41,172 --> 01:05:43,283 the chinese to do economic coercion , 1491 01:05:43,290 --> 01:05:45,346 you know , like what we've seen with 1492 01:05:45,346 --> 01:05:47,680 Australia um , over a long period of 1493 01:05:47,680 --> 01:05:50,380 time now they don't like it , but they 1494 01:05:50,380 --> 01:05:53,230 also , you know , they know they can't 1495 01:05:53,230 --> 01:05:55,520 count on us to , you know , essentially 1496 01:05:55,530 --> 01:05:57,810 save them completely . So they need to 1497 01:05:57,810 --> 01:06:00,460 understand like what's the strategy for 1498 01:06:00,460 --> 01:06:02,780 mitigating , managing and deterring the 1499 01:06:02,780 --> 01:06:05,900 worst possible outcomes from the 1500 01:06:05,910 --> 01:06:08,220 assertiveness of uh , their big 1501 01:06:08,220 --> 01:06:10,053 neighbors , who they are also so 1502 01:06:10,053 --> 01:06:13,250 dependent on . Thanks for that . I want 1503 01:06:13,250 --> 01:06:14,972 to give you a chance to answer 1504 01:06:14,972 --> 01:06:17,139 Mackenzie to wrap up this part , but I 1505 01:06:17,139 --> 01:06:19,194 want to let you know that when she's 1506 01:06:19,194 --> 01:06:21,570 finished , we're ready for questions 1507 01:06:21,570 --> 01:06:23,570 from the audience . So if you would 1508 01:06:23,570 --> 01:06:25,792 like to ask a question , you're welcome 1509 01:06:25,792 --> 01:06:27,792 to go to one of the microphones and 1510 01:06:27,792 --> 01:06:29,403 we'll begin that part of the 1511 01:06:29,403 --> 01:06:32,960 conversation . Go ahead , please . Uh , 1512 01:06:32,970 --> 01:06:35,100 I want to go back to a comment by 1513 01:06:35,580 --> 01:06:38,790 General Karbouly , which I think was 1514 01:06:39,180 --> 01:06:41,400 the honesty about which I'm preaching 1515 01:06:41,400 --> 01:06:43,600 is needed . And 1516 01:06:44,780 --> 01:06:48,220 but not enough of which is , you know , 1517 01:06:48,230 --> 01:06:49,952 essentially boiled down to all 1518 01:06:49,952 --> 01:06:52,570 paraphrase what you said into the first 1519 01:06:52,570 --> 01:06:54,903 part of it is what Donald Rumsfeld said . 1520 01:06:54,903 --> 01:06:57,014 So right , you go to the war with the 1521 01:06:57,014 --> 01:06:59,070 army , you have , so you're going to 1522 01:06:59,070 --> 01:06:58,850 fight is tonight with the army , you 1523 01:06:58,850 --> 01:07:01,860 have , but yes , we have to aspire to 1524 01:07:01,870 --> 01:07:04,850 what changes are ahead and the force of 1525 01:07:04,850 --> 01:07:08,280 the future , so to speak . Um , but in 1526 01:07:08,280 --> 01:07:11,940 this disconnected town , this 1527 01:07:11,950 --> 01:07:15,790 Washington , it's increasingly 1528 01:07:15,800 --> 01:07:19,300 uh , the emphasis is on 1529 01:07:19,880 --> 01:07:22,440 in terms of planning and programming 1530 01:07:22,440 --> 01:07:24,670 and buying . The emphasis is on the war 1531 01:07:24,670 --> 01:07:27,420 we want to fight in the future and it 1532 01:07:27,420 --> 01:07:30,300 comes out capacity of the forest today . 1533 01:07:30,980 --> 01:07:33,830 And that's the fundamental budgetary 1534 01:07:33,840 --> 01:07:36,062 and political tradeoffs that's happened 1535 01:07:36,062 --> 01:07:38,340 now I'd say the last five fiscal years . 1536 01:07:38,340 --> 01:07:40,460 So it's not even exclusive to one 1537 01:07:40,460 --> 01:07:44,170 administration or another . And I think 1538 01:07:44,170 --> 01:07:47,090 that has pretty that can have obviously 1539 01:07:47,090 --> 01:07:48,920 pretty disastrous and dangerous 1540 01:07:48,920 --> 01:07:52,550 outcomes because the focus for example 1541 01:07:52,550 --> 01:07:55,240 the fate accompli scenario with Taiwan 1542 01:07:55,240 --> 01:07:58,350 and preventing that . But I think 1543 01:07:58,360 --> 01:08:00,416 Russia is increasingly demonstrating 1544 01:08:00,416 --> 01:08:02,680 capability and exercise and willingness 1545 01:08:02,680 --> 01:08:04,569 that it could perform the fate of 1546 01:08:04,569 --> 01:08:07,480 company in the Baltics tonight . And we 1547 01:08:07,480 --> 01:08:09,591 only talking watching about one other 1548 01:08:09,591 --> 01:08:12,290 one fate accompli . Uh , and so 1549 01:08:14,070 --> 01:08:18,020 this this willingness to take risk 1550 01:08:18,020 --> 01:08:20,187 in the present moment for the future . 1551 01:08:20,187 --> 01:08:22,187 That doesn't ever seem to quite get 1552 01:08:22,187 --> 01:08:24,470 here are quite fully get here As a 1553 01:08:24,470 --> 01:08:26,692 Sucker's bet . But it's the one-century 1554 01:08:26,692 --> 01:08:28,970 keeps taking because it sounds smarter . 1555 01:08:28,970 --> 01:08:31,026 Like force designed 2030 or like the 1556 01:08:31,026 --> 01:08:32,859 kill Jane or like any other pick 1557 01:08:32,859 --> 01:08:34,914 similar argumentation . It's just it 1558 01:08:34,914 --> 01:08:36,803 sounds smarter . It definitely is 1559 01:08:36,803 --> 01:08:39,210 sexier . It's cooler . Um , but when 1560 01:08:39,220 --> 01:08:41,490 until that Skynet , so to speak is in 1561 01:08:41,490 --> 01:08:43,490 hand , I'm not willing to take that 1562 01:08:43,490 --> 01:08:46,180 risk . And so um it's not about allies , 1563 01:08:46,180 --> 01:08:49,260 but about kind of what were the 1564 01:08:49,260 --> 01:08:51,630 assumptions that we project on them and 1565 01:08:51,630 --> 01:08:53,630 and and I think the wrong ones that 1566 01:08:53,630 --> 01:08:55,852 we're projecting . Thank you for that . 1567 01:08:55,852 --> 01:08:59,180 Um Corey , you want to follow on or 1568 01:08:59,180 --> 01:09:02,680 just cheering her on ? Excellent . 1569 01:09:03,070 --> 01:09:05,460 Um I want to ask General cavalier and 1570 01:09:05,460 --> 01:09:07,682 General Flynn you both talked about the 1571 01:09:07,682 --> 01:09:11,120 similarities between your commands and 1572 01:09:11,120 --> 01:09:13,180 you touched on the differences but I 1573 01:09:13,180 --> 01:09:16,190 wonder if each of you would explore the 1574 01:09:16,190 --> 01:09:19,380 differences between your commands in 1575 01:09:19,380 --> 01:09:21,690 whatever way you would choose for a few 1576 01:09:21,690 --> 01:09:23,634 moments and maybe General Karbouly 1577 01:09:23,634 --> 01:09:27,400 would go first please . Um 1578 01:09:28,770 --> 01:09:30,600 Yeah I would say 1579 01:09:33,270 --> 01:09:36,990 the first difference is um 1580 01:09:39,470 --> 01:09:41,990 the geographic proximity of another 1581 01:09:41,990 --> 01:09:45,520 combatant command to the european 1582 01:09:45,520 --> 01:09:48,720 theater . Specifically africom . 1583 01:09:48,730 --> 01:09:51,900 So I think it was a very big advance 1584 01:09:52,570 --> 01:09:55,240 that we incorporated the africa 1585 01:09:55,240 --> 01:09:57,790 portfolio into the U . S . Army europe 1586 01:09:57,790 --> 01:10:01,180 portfolio because it allows us to think 1587 01:10:01,660 --> 01:10:05,160 in a large scale conflict . It allows 1588 01:10:05,160 --> 01:10:07,327 us to think of the mediterranean basis 1589 01:10:07,327 --> 01:10:09,630 as a single theater of operations , 1590 01:10:09,630 --> 01:10:13,060 which it basically always has been . Um 1591 01:10:13,080 --> 01:10:15,860 I mean from the punic wars . Right . So 1592 01:10:15,870 --> 01:10:19,490 um I think that's a difference . So 1593 01:10:19,500 --> 01:10:22,230 charlie does have other theaters but 1594 01:10:22,240 --> 01:10:25,620 these are landmasses that are managed 1595 01:10:25,630 --> 01:10:27,450 by different parts of different 1596 01:10:27,460 --> 01:10:29,870 organizational structures that abut 1597 01:10:29,870 --> 01:10:32,530 each other in very close proximity . So 1598 01:10:32,530 --> 01:10:34,752 I think that's one difference . I think 1599 01:10:34,752 --> 01:10:37,500 a second differences is the nature of 1600 01:10:37,610 --> 01:10:41,190 the potential adversaries um 1601 01:10:41,560 --> 01:10:45,410 uh the military problem that presents 1602 01:10:45,420 --> 01:10:48,810 in the case of europe , there's a very 1603 01:10:48,810 --> 01:10:52,370 big mass challenge that is 1604 01:10:53,360 --> 01:10:56,930 approximate to our forces on land . Um 1605 01:10:56,940 --> 01:10:59,590 So there's not a water gap that has to 1606 01:10:59,590 --> 01:11:02,270 be crossed . There's not a there's not 1607 01:11:02,270 --> 01:11:04,492 an air gap that has to be crossed . But 1608 01:11:04,492 --> 01:11:06,720 there is a continuous landmass that has 1609 01:11:06,730 --> 01:11:10,190 two large potentially opposing land 1610 01:11:10,190 --> 01:11:12,357 forces . And I think I think those are 1611 01:11:12,357 --> 01:11:14,468 two from a military perspective and a 1612 01:11:14,468 --> 01:11:16,301 military technical perspective , 1613 01:11:16,301 --> 01:11:18,468 operationally , those are very salient 1614 01:11:18,468 --> 01:11:22,400 differences . Um So a couple things . 1615 01:11:22,690 --> 01:11:26,520 one as I mentioned earlier , so 1616 01:11:26,520 --> 01:11:29,890 we have a challenge with the practical 1617 01:11:29,890 --> 01:11:32,670 application of forces on the korean 1618 01:11:32,670 --> 01:11:34,726 peninsula . And then we have another 1619 01:11:34,726 --> 01:11:38,520 challenge with again , 1620 01:11:38,520 --> 01:11:40,660 the sort of the geometry of the 1621 01:11:40,660 --> 01:11:43,850 geography that we have uh in Asia and 1622 01:11:43,850 --> 01:11:46,170 the rest of the theater . I think one 1623 01:11:46,180 --> 01:11:50,160 other point I'd like to um add that's a 1624 01:11:50,170 --> 01:11:53,650 bit of a difference is that um we have 1625 01:11:53,650 --> 01:11:55,870 to support the 13 States , territories 1626 01:11:55,870 --> 01:11:57,759 and possessions out to the second 1627 01:11:57,759 --> 01:12:00,500 island chain . And that's under the 1628 01:12:00,500 --> 01:12:02,444 Indo pak um Commander for homeland 1629 01:12:02,444 --> 01:12:04,500 defense and defense support to civil 1630 01:12:04,500 --> 01:12:07,960 authority . We also have forces in 1631 01:12:07,960 --> 01:12:10,170 Alaska that are part of northern 1632 01:12:10,170 --> 01:12:12,880 command and their defense support to 1633 01:12:12,880 --> 01:12:15,190 civil authority and homeland defense . 1634 01:12:15,190 --> 01:12:18,370 So uh those , I would just say there's 1635 01:12:18,380 --> 01:12:21,060 there's two combatant commands that uh 1636 01:12:21,070 --> 01:12:23,237 my under my T . J . Flick role we have 1637 01:12:23,237 --> 01:12:25,670 to support because we have assigned 1638 01:12:25,670 --> 01:12:27,690 forces in Indo pak . Um but they're 1639 01:12:27,700 --> 01:12:31,660 they're they're uh position Alaska . 1640 01:12:32,770 --> 01:12:36,490 And then we have obviously forces 1641 01:12:36,500 --> 01:12:39,510 that must be able to defend the 1642 01:12:39,520 --> 01:12:41,742 homeland out to the second island chain 1643 01:12:41,742 --> 01:12:44,250 and then of course the korean theater 1644 01:12:44,250 --> 01:12:46,480 of operations and then the rest of the 1645 01:12:46,490 --> 01:12:50,150 car . So um there's there's sort of 1646 01:12:50,150 --> 01:12:53,170 four areas within the A . R that we 1647 01:12:53,170 --> 01:12:56,270 have to be concerned about and they 1648 01:12:56,270 --> 01:12:59,010 have different capabilities that are 1649 01:12:59,010 --> 01:13:01,450 required for different response times , 1650 01:13:01,450 --> 01:13:05,290 different adversaries on on 1651 01:13:05,290 --> 01:13:07,290 the other side of the field , so to 1652 01:13:07,290 --> 01:13:11,130 speak . Um so that I think is 1653 01:13:11,140 --> 01:13:13,970 a difference that we have between 1654 01:13:14,750 --> 01:13:18,360 uh chris's challenges in europe and 1655 01:13:18,360 --> 01:13:21,810 Africa and mine across the end of 1656 01:13:21,810 --> 01:13:23,977 pacific charlie , I'd like to I'd like 1657 01:13:23,977 --> 01:13:27,040 to underline that last one . So it's uh 1658 01:13:27,050 --> 01:13:29,161 you know , from my perspective , as a 1659 01:13:29,161 --> 01:13:31,430 commander , um when I think about the 1660 01:13:31,430 --> 01:13:33,390 additional responsibilities that 1661 01:13:33,390 --> 01:13:36,370 charlie has to defend us territories 1662 01:13:36,370 --> 01:13:39,160 and us sovereign territory , 1663 01:13:39,680 --> 01:13:42,540 that's a big difference . That's a big 1664 01:13:42,540 --> 01:13:45,740 difference . And then finally one last 1665 01:13:45,740 --> 01:13:47,740 difference that I neglected to talk 1666 01:13:47,740 --> 01:13:49,851 about but is in the military sphere , 1667 01:13:50,050 --> 01:13:53,430 Most of Europe is governed by an 1668 01:13:53,430 --> 01:13:55,940 alliance by by the NATO Alliance , 1669 01:13:55,940 --> 01:13:58,570 which brings military advantages to it . 1670 01:13:58,580 --> 01:14:00,469 You know , you have standards for 1671 01:14:00,469 --> 01:14:02,247 procedures , you have technical 1672 01:14:02,247 --> 01:14:04,302 standards and things like that . And 1673 01:14:04,302 --> 01:14:06,720 you commanded 25th idea of the Pacific 1674 01:14:06,720 --> 01:14:09,970 just after Charlie did . Um And I'm 1675 01:14:09,970 --> 01:14:12,137 sorry for what I did to the division , 1676 01:14:12,137 --> 01:14:14,930 but you made it much better 1677 01:14:14,940 --> 01:14:18,380 but uh it's hard to overstate what have 1678 01:14:18,380 --> 01:14:20,330 benefited is to have a standing 1679 01:14:20,330 --> 01:14:22,497 alliance that's more than , you know , 1680 01:14:22,497 --> 01:14:24,274 70 years old and that and where 1681 01:14:24,274 --> 01:14:26,670 procedures and understandings have been 1682 01:14:26,670 --> 01:14:28,726 worked out at a military operational 1683 01:14:28,726 --> 01:14:30,837 and tactical level . Thank you . That 1684 01:14:30,837 --> 01:14:33,460 is another very important point . That 1685 01:14:33,470 --> 01:14:37,260 is not part of the fabric uh 1686 01:14:38,040 --> 01:14:41,480 across the end of pacific so but the 1687 01:14:41,480 --> 01:14:45,190 value of land power out there 1688 01:14:45,200 --> 01:14:47,340 and again , back to the beginning , I 1689 01:14:47,340 --> 01:14:48,951 think some of those enabling 1690 01:14:48,951 --> 01:14:50,970 capabilities that theater armies 1691 01:14:50,970 --> 01:14:54,500 provide , there are a bit of an 1692 01:14:54,500 --> 01:14:57,920 epoxy that kind of binds the security 1693 01:14:57,920 --> 01:15:01,870 architecture together because 1694 01:15:01,950 --> 01:15:05,780 it's more than just ah lethal 1695 01:15:05,780 --> 01:15:08,200 applications . There are other tools 1696 01:15:08,200 --> 01:15:10,570 that both of course this theory your 1697 01:15:10,570 --> 01:15:14,260 army has available that are 1698 01:15:14,270 --> 01:15:18,040 both for crisis for 1699 01:15:18,050 --> 01:15:20,106 competition activities , but they're 1700 01:15:20,106 --> 01:15:23,990 also there for war and I think 1701 01:15:23,990 --> 01:15:26,360 that they that that 1702 01:15:28,420 --> 01:15:31,870 those that suite of capabilities that 1703 01:15:32,240 --> 01:15:34,600 armies provide at scale 1704 01:15:36,040 --> 01:15:40,000 and can provide a campaign quality 1705 01:15:40,010 --> 01:15:43,050 to it is important 1706 01:15:44,440 --> 01:15:47,850 because it's not about a period of 1707 01:15:47,850 --> 01:15:50,680 time , it's about being able to sustain 1708 01:15:50,680 --> 01:15:54,480 it over time so that you keep pressure 1709 01:15:54,490 --> 01:15:57,610 and you continue to foster and build 1710 01:15:57,620 --> 01:16:00,580 and grow and enhance 1711 01:16:00,780 --> 01:16:03,880 these relationships that are absolutely 1712 01:16:03,880 --> 01:16:07,880 essential as a counterweight uh to all 1713 01:16:07,880 --> 01:16:09,550 of the uh 1714 01:16:10,330 --> 01:16:13,610 complimentary competing and 1715 01:16:13,610 --> 01:16:16,700 compounding problems that the 1716 01:16:16,710 --> 01:16:19,330 adversaries are thrown at . Us generals , 1717 01:16:19,330 --> 01:16:21,497 thank you very much for that . Tell us 1718 01:16:21,497 --> 01:16:23,663 your name and who you're with and then 1719 01:16:23,663 --> 01:16:25,774 fire away . Hi this is Megan Eckstein 1720 01:16:25,774 --> 01:16:27,886 with defense news . Um I'm gonna risk 1721 01:16:27,886 --> 01:16:29,997 poking the bear by bringing up Marine 1722 01:16:29,997 --> 01:16:32,108 Corps force design again . Um but for 1723 01:16:32,108 --> 01:16:34,052 the two generals , I was curious , 1724 01:16:34,052 --> 01:16:35,997 obviously Mackenzie mentioned that 1725 01:16:35,997 --> 01:16:38,219 there could be additional burden on the 1726 01:16:38,219 --> 01:16:40,386 army with the Marine Corps pulling out 1727 01:16:40,386 --> 01:16:42,552 of certain mission areas . Um Mr Singh 1728 01:16:42,552 --> 01:16:44,774 also mentioned the idea of , you know , 1729 01:16:44,774 --> 01:16:46,941 overlaps and gaps between the army and 1730 01:16:46,941 --> 01:16:49,108 Marine Corps . And I wonder if perhaps 1731 01:16:49,108 --> 01:16:51,330 there's an opportunity now for you guys 1732 01:16:51,330 --> 01:16:51,050 to not have to worry about those issues 1733 01:16:51,050 --> 01:16:53,217 and just kind of focus on the missions 1734 01:16:53,217 --> 01:16:55,383 as you'd like to do them . So I wonder 1735 01:16:55,383 --> 01:16:57,606 if we could just get some color for how 1736 01:16:57,606 --> 01:16:59,717 this is playing out in your theater . 1737 01:16:59,717 --> 01:16:59,680 Are you seeing any changes yet ? And 1738 01:16:59,680 --> 01:17:01,624 how are you coordinating with your 1739 01:17:01,624 --> 01:17:03,791 Marine Corps counterparts just to make 1740 01:17:03,791 --> 01:17:05,902 sure that the transition as they pull 1741 01:17:05,902 --> 01:17:07,791 out of the missions go smoothly . 1742 01:17:07,791 --> 01:17:09,958 Question , I'll hit that first charlie 1743 01:17:09,958 --> 01:17:12,640 because our a r it's very simple , so 1744 01:17:12,650 --> 01:17:15,180 our interaction derives from , you know , 1745 01:17:15,180 --> 01:17:18,450 our planning efforts . Um I felt no 1746 01:17:18,450 --> 01:17:20,730 effect from that whatsoever right now , 1747 01:17:20,740 --> 01:17:23,360 I'm in constant contact with them are 1748 01:17:23,360 --> 01:17:26,720 for your commander about um 1749 01:17:26,730 --> 01:17:29,710 are planning efforts and it just has 1750 01:17:29,710 --> 01:17:33,320 not had any bearing yet . The nature of 1751 01:17:33,320 --> 01:17:36,740 our mutual activities isn't such that 1752 01:17:37,130 --> 01:17:39,270 that those forced design changes are 1753 01:17:39,270 --> 01:17:41,326 going to have that big in effect . I 1754 01:17:41,326 --> 01:17:44,250 haven't either . Um and I would also 1755 01:17:44,250 --> 01:17:46,390 say that even the things that we're 1756 01:17:46,390 --> 01:17:48,740 doing today to prepare for the future , 1757 01:17:49,230 --> 01:17:52,250 our complimentary there mel our work 1758 01:17:52,250 --> 01:17:56,230 and our Mdt uh capabilities 1759 01:17:56,240 --> 01:17:58,980 are there , they're going to be helpful 1760 01:17:58,980 --> 01:18:02,570 for one another . So in my view , the 1761 01:18:02,570 --> 01:18:04,650 mar for pack , the sock pack 1762 01:18:05,120 --> 01:18:08,320 relationship between those land 1763 01:18:08,330 --> 01:18:10,750 capabilities , um 1764 01:18:11,320 --> 01:18:14,530 our our complimentary uh 1765 01:18:15,020 --> 01:18:17,200 and through the operations and 1766 01:18:17,200 --> 01:18:19,422 exercises that are going on every day . 1767 01:18:19,422 --> 01:18:22,280 I think that there's there's no 1768 01:18:22,280 --> 01:18:24,447 daylight between the things that we're 1769 01:18:24,447 --> 01:18:26,650 working on out there . Thank you . 1770 01:18:27,320 --> 01:18:29,580 Thank you for the question . Um we do 1771 01:18:29,580 --> 01:18:31,580 have time for more questions if you 1772 01:18:31,580 --> 01:18:33,636 want to go to the microphone and ask 1773 01:18:33,636 --> 01:18:36,270 one in the meantime , um vic you wrote 1774 01:18:36,280 --> 01:18:38,890 recently about technology and and I 1775 01:18:38,890 --> 01:18:41,060 have this keeping the technological 1776 01:18:41,060 --> 01:18:43,540 edge is no longer a foregone conclusion , 1777 01:18:43,550 --> 01:18:45,606 but we can hold it if we focus , you 1778 01:18:45,606 --> 01:18:47,828 talked about technology earlier in your 1779 01:18:48,520 --> 01:18:51,730 remarks , what's the intersection 1780 01:18:51,740 --> 01:18:54,370 of the changes that land power is 1781 01:18:54,370 --> 01:18:56,670 undergoing talked about here and the 1782 01:18:56,670 --> 01:18:59,420 technological edge that the military in 1783 01:18:59,420 --> 01:19:01,642 general in the army in particular wants 1784 01:19:01,642 --> 01:19:03,753 to maintain . You know , some some of 1785 01:19:03,753 --> 01:19:05,920 this is , you know , high tech cutting 1786 01:19:05,920 --> 01:19:08,031 edge tech questions and some of it is 1787 01:19:08,031 --> 01:19:10,198 just adaptation sort of mid tech . But 1788 01:19:10,198 --> 01:19:12,200 how do you use it ? And so Armenia 1789 01:19:12,200 --> 01:19:15,030 Azerbaijan , why why were what the , 1790 01:19:15,520 --> 01:19:17,298 what the forces they would have 1791 01:19:17,298 --> 01:19:19,076 expected irrelevant . It wasn't 1792 01:19:19,076 --> 01:19:21,298 something wasn't Supertec , it was just 1793 01:19:21,298 --> 01:19:23,670 drones and the creative and sort of 1794 01:19:23,680 --> 01:19:27,250 mass use of drones to disrupt 1795 01:19:27,260 --> 01:19:29,970 what someone with what one force would 1796 01:19:29,970 --> 01:19:31,914 have thought was , it's relatively 1797 01:19:31,914 --> 01:19:34,137 robust land capabilities . Right ? So , 1798 01:19:34,137 --> 01:19:37,910 um what , what we face right now is um 1799 01:19:37,920 --> 01:19:40,220 is sort of a critical moment in the 1800 01:19:40,220 --> 01:19:42,910 sense that We've just gotten used to 1801 01:19:42,910 --> 01:19:46,890 since the early 1990s being um , 1802 01:19:46,900 --> 01:19:50,620 you know , pretty far ahead . And 1803 01:19:50,630 --> 01:19:53,950 um in in most technology and innovation 1804 01:19:53,950 --> 01:19:57,330 areas . Um and I would say we also were 1805 01:19:57,330 --> 01:19:59,219 used to being pretty far ahead in 1806 01:19:59,219 --> 01:20:01,219 innovating how we think about using 1807 01:20:01,219 --> 01:20:02,997 military forces . So we we have 1808 01:20:02,997 --> 01:20:05,052 generally been fairly future focused 1809 01:20:05,052 --> 01:20:07,310 and tried to think of creative new ways 1810 01:20:07,310 --> 01:20:11,230 to to to to to employ our forces . So 1811 01:20:11,410 --> 01:20:14,960 in two streams , Our inventiveness and 1812 01:20:14,960 --> 01:20:16,960 how we're going to use our forces , 1813 01:20:16,960 --> 01:20:19,238 we've we've tended to be very creative . 1814 01:20:19,238 --> 01:20:21,460 I think that's that's um that's trained 1815 01:20:21,460 --> 01:20:24,150 dramatically since the early 1990s . So 1816 01:20:24,150 --> 01:20:28,120 in the early 2020s , um you know , 1817 01:20:28,510 --> 01:20:32,150 we're pretty far ahead and we have what 1818 01:20:32,150 --> 01:20:34,261 it takes to keep the edge of the high 1819 01:20:34,261 --> 01:20:37,420 end tech space that highly dependent on 1820 01:20:37,420 --> 01:20:41,230 continuing to draw global talent um and 1821 01:20:41,230 --> 01:20:44,740 to resource R and D uh in ways that we 1822 01:20:44,740 --> 01:20:46,962 have historically done , and we've sort 1823 01:20:46,962 --> 01:20:49,129 of always done in a crunch . So if you 1824 01:20:49,129 --> 01:20:51,351 think race to the moon , we race to the 1825 01:20:51,351 --> 01:20:53,240 moon , if you think now , I think 1826 01:20:53,240 --> 01:20:55,407 there's a reasonable chance that we'll 1827 01:20:55,407 --> 01:20:55,260 try to put the pedal to the metal and 1828 01:20:55,260 --> 01:20:57,427 really invest in those things . But if 1829 01:20:57,427 --> 01:20:59,538 we if we turn away from globe getting 1830 01:20:59,538 --> 01:21:01,760 global talent , which has been critical 1831 01:21:01,760 --> 01:21:03,927 to every technological leap that we've 1832 01:21:03,927 --> 01:21:05,982 made . Uh we would find ourselves in 1833 01:21:05,982 --> 01:21:08,250 real trouble and the fact is um friends 1834 01:21:08,250 --> 01:21:10,760 and foes are closer than we realize you 1835 01:21:10,760 --> 01:21:12,927 mean even the Russians in some in some 1836 01:21:12,927 --> 01:21:15,290 areas and certainly the chinese um in 1837 01:21:15,290 --> 01:21:18,340 areas like Ai and quantum computing are 1838 01:21:18,350 --> 01:21:20,800 closer than we would be comfortable 1839 01:21:20,810 --> 01:21:23,280 with objects in the rear view mirror 1840 01:21:23,280 --> 01:21:26,720 are closer than they appear . But but 1841 01:21:26,730 --> 01:21:28,897 in terms of adaptation in terms of not 1842 01:21:28,897 --> 01:21:32,730 getting caught off guard By what 1843 01:21:32,730 --> 01:21:34,952 20 years ago would have been , you know 1844 01:21:34,952 --> 01:21:37,250 the famous like Oh we you know our 1845 01:21:37,250 --> 01:21:39,420 ships could be could be could be taken 1846 01:21:39,420 --> 01:21:42,040 on by swarming Iranian little fast 1847 01:21:42,040 --> 01:21:43,929 boats or something like that . Or 1848 01:21:43,929 --> 01:21:45,929 there's uh well that what does that 1849 01:21:45,929 --> 01:21:47,873 look like now that for land forces 1850 01:21:47,873 --> 01:21:49,984 that's become really critical because 1851 01:21:49,984 --> 01:21:52,930 new uh new technologies 1852 01:21:52,940 --> 01:21:56,830 are going to uh going to be employed in 1853 01:21:56,830 --> 01:21:59,580 creative ways um in ways that could 1854 01:21:59,580 --> 01:22:02,640 really affect what we thought was good 1855 01:22:02,640 --> 01:22:05,630 planning . So um getting ahead of that 1856 01:22:05,640 --> 01:22:09,390 is about exercising and and war gaming 1857 01:22:09,390 --> 01:22:11,940 and you know and having outside 1858 01:22:11,940 --> 01:22:14,140 perspectives , having people come you 1859 01:22:14,140 --> 01:22:16,910 know and really do good red on blue 1860 01:22:16,910 --> 01:22:20,510 practice to illicit what an adversary 1861 01:22:20,510 --> 01:22:23,420 may do um in an asymmetric way that we 1862 01:22:23,420 --> 01:22:25,698 are not yet prepared for general Flynn . 1863 01:22:25,698 --> 01:22:28,270 I just may take a different tact and 1864 01:22:28,280 --> 01:22:30,620 maybe chris wants to ads and see uh 1865 01:22:31,300 --> 01:22:33,530 he's got a a new couple of new 1866 01:22:33,530 --> 01:22:36,980 organizations in his formations in 1867 01:22:36,980 --> 01:22:39,330 europe . So uh 1868 01:22:41,000 --> 01:22:44,420 not to discount the enormous value of 1869 01:22:44,420 --> 01:22:48,250 technology from Vikram but I would 1870 01:22:48,250 --> 01:22:52,150 say that one thing that I'm I 1871 01:22:52,160 --> 01:22:55,040 was in my last job I was aware of as 1872 01:22:55,040 --> 01:22:57,240 the 357 , but it's become even more 1873 01:22:57,240 --> 01:23:00,420 clear to me being out in the pacific 1874 01:23:00,420 --> 01:23:04,300 now . So the , the multi domain task 1875 01:23:04,300 --> 01:23:06,320 force , the organization itself , 1876 01:23:07,200 --> 01:23:09,850 Having the organization up for nearly 1877 01:23:09,850 --> 01:23:13,120 two years and learning 1878 01:23:13,600 --> 01:23:16,540 um and exercising and getting the 1879 01:23:16,540 --> 01:23:19,030 leaders there and getting the skill 1880 01:23:19,030 --> 01:23:21,430 development and building a facility , 1881 01:23:21,430 --> 01:23:24,690 all the sort of doctoral PF integration 1882 01:23:24,690 --> 01:23:26,134 that has to go on with an 1883 01:23:26,134 --> 01:23:29,420 organizational adjustments And having 1884 01:23:29,420 --> 01:23:33,320 that in front of the capabilities that 1885 01:23:33,320 --> 01:23:37,090 will land in the formation , say in 23 1886 01:23:37,090 --> 01:23:40,190 24 25 . I think this is really 1887 01:23:40,190 --> 01:23:43,120 important . I think that we're learning 1888 01:23:43,700 --> 01:23:47,620 and uh discovering and 1889 01:23:48,300 --> 01:23:50,910 succeeding and failing and doing all 1890 01:23:50,910 --> 01:23:53,170 those things with that formation and 1891 01:23:53,170 --> 01:23:55,360 other formations like theater fires 1892 01:23:55,360 --> 01:23:59,150 commands and um the information 1893 01:23:59,150 --> 01:24:02,800 effects group . The point I'm making is 1894 01:24:02,800 --> 01:24:05,950 I think that in the army's case 1895 01:24:06,770 --> 01:24:08,714 that having these organizations in 1896 01:24:08,714 --> 01:24:12,260 front of the platform , 1897 01:24:12,270 --> 01:24:15,600 technology , weapons development is a 1898 01:24:15,600 --> 01:24:17,767 good thing because if the reverse were 1899 01:24:17,767 --> 01:24:19,822 true , we would just feel the weapon 1900 01:24:19,822 --> 01:24:21,544 and we'd have to take a legacy 1901 01:24:21,544 --> 01:24:24,230 organization and figure it out . And I 1902 01:24:24,230 --> 01:24:28,210 don't think that that has a proved well 1903 01:24:28,220 --> 01:24:31,240 in the past . And so I think that what 1904 01:24:31,250 --> 01:24:33,610 we're doing and this is an area where 1905 01:24:34,090 --> 01:24:37,810 we're sharing because chris is multi 1906 01:24:37,810 --> 01:24:40,570 domain task force just deployed or is 1907 01:24:40,570 --> 01:24:44,180 beginning to stand up in europe and 1908 01:24:44,180 --> 01:24:46,124 he's got other organizations as he 1909 01:24:46,124 --> 01:24:48,720 mentioned in his opening remarks that 1910 01:24:48,730 --> 01:24:52,580 are essential to uh to his 1911 01:24:52,580 --> 01:24:55,240 capabilities being forward , this is 1912 01:24:55,250 --> 01:24:57,690 this is an area that I think is really 1913 01:24:57,690 --> 01:25:00,080 important . I'm not discounting the 1914 01:25:00,080 --> 01:25:02,970 technological development and the 1915 01:25:02,980 --> 01:25:05,300 importance of that . What I am saying 1916 01:25:05,300 --> 01:25:07,010 is I think the organizational 1917 01:25:07,010 --> 01:25:08,788 adjustments are absolutely more 1918 01:25:08,788 --> 01:25:11,630 important and they give us an agility 1919 01:25:11,640 --> 01:25:13,600 in the future that we need to be 1920 01:25:13,600 --> 01:25:16,500 working on today and pulling into our 1921 01:25:16,510 --> 01:25:20,080 exercises and rehearsals and um and our 1922 01:25:20,080 --> 01:25:22,080 own formation is to learn how we're 1923 01:25:22,080 --> 01:25:24,590 gonna do this . I agree with that last 1924 01:25:24,590 --> 01:25:27,280 point , especially charlie . Um you 1925 01:25:27,280 --> 01:25:30,470 know , Mr Singh , your your your points 1926 01:25:30,470 --> 01:25:34,070 about technology raise , 1927 01:25:34,080 --> 01:25:36,470 raise something in my mind frequently 1928 01:25:36,470 --> 01:25:38,740 when we talk about striving 1929 01:25:38,740 --> 01:25:41,220 technologically we reach pretty deep 1930 01:25:41,220 --> 01:25:43,360 into the future for technologies that 1931 01:25:43,370 --> 01:25:46,780 don't yet exist . And um we try to plan 1932 01:25:46,780 --> 01:25:48,947 around that , but that becomes sort of 1933 01:25:48,947 --> 01:25:51,002 future casting where we're hoping we 1934 01:25:51,002 --> 01:25:53,169 choose the right technology and get it 1935 01:25:53,169 --> 01:25:55,391 right and meanwhile , right in front of 1936 01:25:55,391 --> 01:25:58,910 us . Um other folks are 1937 01:25:58,910 --> 01:26:02,600 using existing medium level 1938 01:26:02,600 --> 01:26:05,880 technologies in innovative new ways 1939 01:26:05,890 --> 01:26:08,070 that create a disproportionately 1940 01:26:08,070 --> 01:26:11,200 beneficial effect for them . I think of 1941 01:26:11,880 --> 01:26:14,570 uh Azerbaijan during the recent Nagorno 1942 01:26:14,570 --> 01:26:16,292 Karabakh war with the juice of 1943 01:26:16,292 --> 01:26:18,014 loitering munitions and pretty 1944 01:26:18,014 --> 01:26:20,090 rudimentary drones , um not super 1945 01:26:20,090 --> 01:26:22,750 sophisticated medium level technology , 1946 01:26:22,760 --> 01:26:26,200 but but very well combined , present a 1947 01:26:26,200 --> 01:26:29,030 whole different problem set and we've 1948 01:26:29,030 --> 01:26:31,086 seen innumerable , other examples of 1949 01:26:31,086 --> 01:26:33,308 the Russian federation tends to be very 1950 01:26:33,308 --> 01:26:35,474 good at it . Um so when we think about 1951 01:26:35,474 --> 01:26:37,980 technology you know I just think uh we 1952 01:26:37,980 --> 01:26:40,230 have to think deep of course and shoot 1953 01:26:40,240 --> 01:26:42,296 far but we also have to think of the 1954 01:26:42,296 --> 01:26:44,407 increments of technology between here 1955 01:26:44,407 --> 01:26:46,407 and there because they bring pretty 1956 01:26:46,407 --> 01:26:48,629 significant changes with them as well . 1957 01:26:48,629 --> 01:26:50,740 Usually at a much better cost point . 1958 01:26:50,740 --> 01:26:54,140 Thanks general sir . Thanks john climb 1959 01:26:54,140 --> 01:26:56,630 johnson controls as you shape your 1960 01:26:56,630 --> 01:27:00,150 battle space . What role do you need 1961 01:27:00,160 --> 01:27:02,710 installations to play ? And especially 1962 01:27:02,710 --> 01:27:04,377 connected technologies on the 1963 01:27:04,377 --> 01:27:07,750 installation to a to support what 1964 01:27:07,750 --> 01:27:09,694 you're doing with the multi domain 1965 01:27:10,080 --> 01:27:13,310 force . Thanks . Um 1966 01:27:14,280 --> 01:27:16,600 so a little bit 1967 01:27:17,580 --> 01:27:21,060 um some some of the challenges 1968 01:27:21,060 --> 01:27:24,420 that general casually have in 1969 01:27:24,420 --> 01:27:27,660 europe . I we obviously have similar 1970 01:27:27,660 --> 01:27:29,771 ones informed it gets a little harder 1971 01:27:29,771 --> 01:27:32,650 in a foreign country . Uh because we're 1972 01:27:32,650 --> 01:27:34,710 obviously you know we've got to work 1973 01:27:35,280 --> 01:27:38,790 with with Japan and 1974 01:27:38,790 --> 01:27:42,120 Korea on what are those protective 1975 01:27:42,120 --> 01:27:46,100 measures we want to take because we 1976 01:27:46,100 --> 01:27:48,267 just have to work with the governments 1977 01:27:48,267 --> 01:27:51,300 to do that . I would tell you that . Um 1978 01:27:52,280 --> 01:27:56,280 And the areas where uh the largest 1979 01:27:56,280 --> 01:27:58,610 part the bulk of our forces are on the 1980 01:27:58,610 --> 01:28:01,260 west coast and in Alaska and Hawaii um 1981 01:28:01,270 --> 01:28:05,230 we're going to need um the ability 1982 01:28:05,230 --> 01:28:08,740 to protect our signature uh protect 1983 01:28:08,740 --> 01:28:11,690 our our I . T . Backbone 1984 01:28:12,170 --> 01:28:15,840 um protect our networks . Man I'm not 1985 01:28:15,840 --> 01:28:17,896 telling you anything that you're not 1986 01:28:17,896 --> 01:28:20,450 already aware of but what I would say 1987 01:28:20,450 --> 01:28:23,150 is that the ability to there's going to 1988 01:28:23,150 --> 01:28:27,090 be a requirement two uh 1989 01:28:27,100 --> 01:28:30,810 provide capabilities that are going to 1990 01:28:30,820 --> 01:28:34,270 uh not be available to do things 1991 01:28:34,280 --> 01:28:36,780 forward in the region . And I don't 1992 01:28:36,780 --> 01:28:38,947 think all of these things are going to 1993 01:28:38,947 --> 01:28:41,450 be solved again by technology alone . I 1994 01:28:41,450 --> 01:28:43,672 think what we're going to need to do is 1995 01:28:43,672 --> 01:28:46,990 have distributed points of presence 1996 01:28:47,570 --> 01:28:49,790 for our network throughout the region 1997 01:28:50,470 --> 01:28:52,660 and much like the network has to be 1998 01:28:52,660 --> 01:28:54,771 distributed with points of presence . 1999 01:28:54,771 --> 01:28:56,604 We're also going to have to have 2000 01:28:56,604 --> 01:29:00,420 distributed locations of material and I 2001 01:29:00,430 --> 01:29:02,597 don't think this is going to require a 2002 01:29:02,597 --> 01:29:04,830 lot of military construction . I think 2003 01:29:04,830 --> 01:29:08,100 it was going to require is taking the 2004 01:29:08,670 --> 01:29:10,781 really the rainbow of agreements that 2005 01:29:10,781 --> 01:29:13,070 we do have because there are a wide 2006 01:29:13,070 --> 01:29:15,126 range of agreements out there with a 2007 01:29:15,126 --> 01:29:17,220 number of countries and sometimes we 2008 01:29:17,220 --> 01:29:21,000 don't even recognize the ability that 2009 01:29:21,000 --> 01:29:23,670 we have through these agreements that 2010 01:29:23,670 --> 01:29:26,340 are already in place uh to do some 2011 01:29:26,340 --> 01:29:28,340 things to better position to better 2012 01:29:28,340 --> 01:29:30,970 posture to better enable uh even the 2013 01:29:30,970 --> 01:29:33,190 allies and partners that we can have 2014 01:29:33,190 --> 01:29:35,920 those agreements with . So I'm not of 2015 01:29:35,920 --> 01:29:39,210 the belief that that 2016 01:29:39,220 --> 01:29:41,650 I'm of the belief we have to protect 2017 01:29:41,660 --> 01:29:43,827 our power projection platforms and the 2018 01:29:43,827 --> 01:29:45,993 locations where we are forward . But I 2019 01:29:45,993 --> 01:29:49,480 do think a distributed arrangement of 2020 01:29:49,480 --> 01:29:52,730 materials commanding control um and 2021 01:29:52,730 --> 01:29:55,160 protection of our our network 2022 01:29:55,160 --> 01:29:57,382 architecture and the points of presence 2023 01:29:57,382 --> 01:30:00,010 presidents required to have operational 2024 01:30:00,010 --> 01:30:03,830 reach is where we need some help and 2025 01:30:03,840 --> 01:30:07,720 it's it's not central 2026 01:30:07,720 --> 01:30:09,942 sometimes in the debate but it needs to 2027 01:30:09,942 --> 01:30:12,200 become more and more again back to my 2028 01:30:12,200 --> 01:30:15,290 homeland problem . Um I have a similar 2029 01:30:15,290 --> 01:30:17,760 situation that , you know , those are 2030 01:30:17,760 --> 01:30:19,982 american citizens out there and we need 2031 01:30:19,982 --> 01:30:22,149 to protect those american citizens and 2032 01:30:22,149 --> 01:30:25,020 be able to provide them a secure place 2033 01:30:25,020 --> 01:30:28,590 to live work from even though things 2034 01:30:28,590 --> 01:30:32,340 may be um in a crisis 2035 01:30:32,340 --> 01:30:34,750 situation . Thanks . I think the first 2036 01:30:34,750 --> 01:30:37,520 thing we have to do is to recognize 2037 01:30:37,530 --> 01:30:41,030 that bases to include our garrisons 2038 01:30:41,040 --> 01:30:42,890 are part of our operational 2039 01:30:42,890 --> 01:30:46,170 infrastructure . So I previously during 2040 01:30:46,170 --> 01:30:49,910 some remarks made an inaccurate um 2041 01:30:49,920 --> 01:30:52,790 distinction between user packs A . O . 2042 01:30:52,790 --> 01:30:56,640 R . And the european hor um 2043 01:30:56,650 --> 01:30:58,800 there is one place in user pack where 2044 01:30:58,800 --> 01:31:02,130 two opposing forces , land forces are 2045 01:31:02,140 --> 01:31:04,730 in direct land uh contact with each 2046 01:31:04,730 --> 01:31:07,008 other , that's on the korean peninsula , 2047 01:31:07,008 --> 01:31:09,820 similar to europe um on the korean 2048 01:31:09,820 --> 01:31:11,890 peninsula , the basing structure as 2049 01:31:11,890 --> 01:31:14,112 part of the operational thought process 2050 01:31:14,112 --> 01:31:16,334 and part of the operational arrangement 2051 01:31:16,334 --> 01:31:18,390 in europe . It is also um that's the 2052 01:31:18,390 --> 01:31:20,612 first point I would make , I think it's 2053 01:31:20,612 --> 01:31:20,480 an important distinction . It's not 2054 01:31:20,480 --> 01:31:22,810 something that we've always um thought 2055 01:31:22,810 --> 01:31:24,921 about when we think about our basis , 2056 01:31:24,921 --> 01:31:26,977 we think about them as garrisons and 2057 01:31:26,977 --> 01:31:29,143 communities , but in fact they're much 2058 01:31:29,143 --> 01:31:31,366 more than that . Um Once you get into a 2059 01:31:31,366 --> 01:31:33,477 theater of operations . Um The second 2060 01:31:33,477 --> 01:31:35,730 thing is , you know dr Shockey earlier 2061 01:31:35,730 --> 01:31:38,310 spoke about the challenges of um 2062 01:31:38,320 --> 01:31:42,030 deployment and reinforcement . Um 2063 01:31:42,040 --> 01:31:44,590 that's that that contested 2064 01:31:44,600 --> 01:31:47,210 reinforcement is an important thing . 2065 01:31:47,220 --> 01:31:49,720 Um and we're not always as well 2066 01:31:49,720 --> 01:31:52,270 prepared for it as we should be from 2067 01:31:52,280 --> 01:31:54,790 home station across the lines of 2068 01:31:54,790 --> 01:31:57,200 communication and then at the ports of 2069 01:31:57,200 --> 01:31:59,320 demarcation from there to the 2070 01:31:59,320 --> 01:32:02,670 operational area ? Those are areas 2071 01:32:02,670 --> 01:32:04,837 where we have to treat it separately , 2072 01:32:04,837 --> 01:32:06,892 but we have to think about contested 2073 01:32:06,892 --> 01:32:08,948 logistics deployment , um and onward 2074 01:32:08,948 --> 01:32:11,710 movement from from beginning to end and 2075 01:32:11,710 --> 01:32:13,710 our installations are a key part of 2076 01:32:13,710 --> 01:32:15,599 that the whole way all the way we 2077 01:32:15,599 --> 01:32:17,710 harden them and protect them in every 2078 01:32:17,710 --> 01:32:19,877 domain . General , thank you very much 2079 01:32:19,877 --> 01:32:22,410 for the response to that question . Um 2080 01:32:22,420 --> 01:32:26,300 we have about 20 minutes or so left and 2081 01:32:26,310 --> 01:32:28,720 I think it would be useful at this 2082 01:32:28,720 --> 01:32:31,530 point just to ask each of you if 2083 01:32:31,530 --> 01:32:34,080 there's some point or points that you 2084 01:32:34,080 --> 01:32:37,400 wanted the audience to take away today 2085 01:32:37,410 --> 01:32:39,700 that you haven't had a chance to say 2086 01:32:39,700 --> 01:32:41,756 and they haven't had a chance to ask 2087 01:32:41,756 --> 01:32:43,811 you . So rather than starting at the 2088 01:32:43,811 --> 01:32:46,033 other end , I'm gonna start near me and 2089 01:32:46,033 --> 01:32:49,630 ask you to begin that Mackenzie . Um 2090 01:32:49,640 --> 01:32:51,980 well , I want to talk about 2091 01:32:51,980 --> 01:32:53,980 installations for a minute actually 2092 01:32:53,980 --> 01:32:55,702 because they are part of power 2093 01:32:55,702 --> 01:32:57,980 projection and often are overlooked . 2094 01:32:57,980 --> 01:33:00,080 And uh you know , installations have 2095 01:33:00,080 --> 01:33:03,530 been a bill payer for 20 2096 01:33:03,530 --> 01:33:06,270 years in every budget uh 2097 01:33:07,350 --> 01:33:09,710 for to fund other pressing needs , 2098 01:33:09,710 --> 01:33:11,766 which I understand why those choices 2099 01:33:11,766 --> 01:33:14,650 are made , but increasingly money is 2100 01:33:14,650 --> 01:33:16,880 going to have to be poured back into 2101 01:33:16,890 --> 01:33:19,330 installations in particular because of , 2102 01:33:19,340 --> 01:33:22,020 partly because of the decay . But you 2103 01:33:22,020 --> 01:33:24,920 know , if you look at the pentagon 2104 01:33:24,920 --> 01:33:27,330 leaderships , you know , sort of Top 10 2105 01:33:27,330 --> 01:33:30,020 Technologies list and you know , what 2106 01:33:30,020 --> 01:33:31,964 are the what are the game changing 2107 01:33:31,964 --> 01:33:34,076 capabilities ? What do you often hear 2108 01:33:34,076 --> 01:33:36,340 most about whether that's artificial 2109 01:33:36,340 --> 01:33:38,640 intelligence , big data , quantum 2110 01:33:38,640 --> 01:33:41,140 computing , hypersonic weapons or 2111 01:33:41,140 --> 01:33:43,790 directed energy , all of these very 2112 01:33:43,790 --> 01:33:45,901 different capabilities have one thing 2113 01:33:45,901 --> 01:33:49,510 in common . They need more energy . 2114 01:33:50,550 --> 01:33:52,661 And if you don't we're gonna get that 2115 01:33:52,661 --> 01:33:54,717 energy , you're gonna get it from an 2116 01:33:54,717 --> 01:33:54,650 installation or from a foreign country . 2117 01:33:54,650 --> 01:33:57,190 And so if you're not talking about how 2118 01:33:57,190 --> 01:33:59,301 to get more energy than we've already 2119 01:33:59,301 --> 01:34:03,170 lost . All right , Corey . 2120 01:34:03,940 --> 01:34:07,920 Uh So I can 2121 01:34:07,920 --> 01:34:11,900 think of two things . The first is that 2122 01:34:11,910 --> 01:34:15,030 is one that the army can't do anything 2123 01:34:15,030 --> 01:34:18,080 about . But I think ought to be shaping 2124 01:34:18,080 --> 01:34:20,080 all of our consciousness , which is 2125 01:34:20,080 --> 01:34:23,330 that the gap between what we say we 2126 01:34:23,330 --> 01:34:25,497 have the ability to do and what we are 2127 01:34:25,497 --> 01:34:29,280 actually Funding in our defense budget 2128 01:34:29,290 --> 01:34:33,190 has been growing in a hair raising 2129 01:34:33,190 --> 01:34:37,020 way for about 15 years . Um 2130 01:34:37,200 --> 01:34:40,460 And uh the 2131 01:34:40,470 --> 01:34:43,480 challenge for the Defense Department is 2132 01:34:43,480 --> 01:34:47,450 how to be a team playing part of 2133 01:34:47,450 --> 01:34:49,120 an administration when the 2134 01:34:49,120 --> 01:34:50,990 administration is purporting the 2135 01:34:50,990 --> 01:34:53,880 fallacy that the budget is sufficient 2136 01:34:53,880 --> 01:34:57,730 to execute the strategy and that's a 2137 01:34:57,730 --> 01:35:01,070 difficult civil military challenge 2138 01:35:01,080 --> 01:35:03,720 when you're doing it in public . But 2139 01:35:03,720 --> 01:35:06,540 it's also just a practical challenge 2140 01:35:06,550 --> 01:35:10,100 for uh the day to day operations of the 2141 01:35:10,100 --> 01:35:12,470 military . So I guess the thing that 2142 01:35:12,470 --> 01:35:15,390 keeps me up at night is the gap between 2143 01:35:15,390 --> 01:35:19,100 strategy and funding that 2144 01:35:19,370 --> 01:35:21,537 the constructed hopefully constructive 2145 01:35:21,537 --> 01:35:24,440 suggestion I would offer is that I've 2146 01:35:24,440 --> 01:35:26,800 never understood why administrations 2147 01:35:26,810 --> 01:35:29,770 allow D . O . D . To do a national 2148 01:35:29,770 --> 01:35:33,360 defense strategy . Um I 2149 01:35:34,040 --> 01:35:37,080 I mean I wouldn't if if the reckless 2150 01:35:37,080 --> 01:35:39,780 american public elected me to uh 2151 01:35:39,790 --> 01:35:41,957 president , I wouldn't let D . O . D . 2152 01:35:41,957 --> 01:35:44,750 Do that because it gives Congress the 2153 01:35:44,750 --> 01:35:47,070 way to grade the administration's 2154 01:35:47,070 --> 01:35:49,100 homework . Does the budget actually 2155 01:35:49,100 --> 01:35:52,980 match the strategy ? What what I would 2156 01:35:52,980 --> 01:35:56,820 love to see D . O . D . Do Is instead 2157 01:35:56,820 --> 01:36:00,040 of purporting that here is a strategy 2158 01:36:00,050 --> 01:36:03,940 and by the way we need 3-5% year on 2159 01:36:03,940 --> 01:36:07,300 year growth in GDP to execute it right ? 2160 01:36:07,310 --> 01:36:09,588 Like why does the administration let D . 2161 01:36:09,588 --> 01:36:12,400 O . D . Say we're banking on continuous 2162 01:36:12,410 --> 01:36:15,110 increases in spending in order to carry 2163 01:36:15,110 --> 01:36:17,650 this out . What I'd love to see D . O . 2164 01:36:17,650 --> 01:36:21,640 D . Do is strategies namely 2165 01:36:21,650 --> 01:36:24,310 if we have a trillion dollar defense 2166 01:36:24,310 --> 01:36:26,421 budget , which Mackenzie Egland tells 2167 01:36:26,421 --> 01:36:28,477 me is what we need to actually carry 2168 01:36:28,477 --> 01:36:30,366 out our strategy here is the best 2169 01:36:30,366 --> 01:36:32,532 strategy for that . If you're going to 2170 01:36:32,532 --> 01:36:35,450 constrain us to $740 billion a year , 2171 01:36:35,630 --> 01:36:37,797 here's the best strategy I can come up 2172 01:36:37,797 --> 01:36:39,852 with to protect and advance american 2173 01:36:39,852 --> 01:36:42,100 interests . And if you're actually 2174 01:36:42,110 --> 01:36:45,410 gonna , I don't know , put a $40 2175 01:36:45,410 --> 01:36:47,690 billion , I'm pulling that as a rabbit 2176 01:36:47,690 --> 01:36:50,770 out of my hat uh $40 billion 2177 01:36:51,120 --> 01:36:54,420 green energy requirement into the D . O . 2178 01:36:54,420 --> 01:36:56,620 D . Budget because it's important to 2179 01:36:56,620 --> 01:36:58,453 the president , even if it's not 2180 01:36:58,453 --> 01:37:00,840 important to these guys ability to 2181 01:37:00,840 --> 01:37:04,310 carry out their missions . Uh then 2182 01:37:04,320 --> 01:37:06,487 here's the best strategy I can come up 2183 01:37:06,487 --> 01:37:08,653 with because if those three strategies 2184 01:37:08,653 --> 01:37:10,598 are the same strategies , they are 2185 01:37:10,598 --> 01:37:12,970 fundamentally dishonest vic . I'm gonna 2186 01:37:12,970 --> 01:37:16,260 take a pause and invite you to give 2187 01:37:16,260 --> 01:37:18,427 your conclusion here in a moment . I'm 2188 01:37:18,427 --> 01:37:20,482 going to go to this gentleman here . 2189 01:37:20,482 --> 01:37:22,649 Just give us your name who you're with 2190 01:37:22,649 --> 01:37:24,482 and go for it . Thank you . Mark 2191 01:37:24,482 --> 01:37:26,593 Faulkner , I'm with the Institute for 2192 01:37:26,593 --> 01:37:28,538 Defense and Business . My question 2193 01:37:28,538 --> 01:37:30,593 concerns deterrence and all All five 2194 01:37:30,593 --> 01:37:32,427 panel members have have spoke to 2195 01:37:32,427 --> 01:37:34,260 deterrents are service component 2196 01:37:34,260 --> 01:37:35,982 commanders from an operational 2197 01:37:35,982 --> 01:37:38,204 perspective that battle , space and our 2198 01:37:38,204 --> 01:37:40,260 other subject matter experts . So my 2199 01:37:40,260 --> 01:37:42,371 you know , the importance of maritime 2200 01:37:42,371 --> 01:37:44,204 and naval forces lately has been 2201 01:37:44,204 --> 01:37:46,371 getting a lot of attention and I would 2202 01:37:46,371 --> 01:37:48,482 I would argue more than more than the 2203 01:37:48,482 --> 01:37:50,482 other components . So , my question 2204 01:37:50,482 --> 01:37:52,649 really for for our generals as well as 2205 01:37:52,649 --> 01:37:54,593 our subject , our experts is as it 2206 01:37:54,593 --> 01:37:57,240 relates to forward deployed land forces , 2207 01:37:57,380 --> 01:37:59,658 permanent forward deployed land forces . 2208 01:38:00,120 --> 01:38:02,740 Do we have it right . If generals could 2209 01:38:02,740 --> 01:38:04,796 speak from a theater perspective and 2210 01:38:04,796 --> 01:38:08,090 then others , is it right . Do we need 2211 01:38:08,090 --> 01:38:11,340 more to be a greater deterrent or 2212 01:38:12,120 --> 01:38:14,176 you know , our our large scale joint 2213 01:38:14,176 --> 01:38:16,231 exercises sufficient going forward . 2214 01:38:16,231 --> 01:38:18,231 Thank you . Thanks for the question 2215 01:38:18,231 --> 01:38:20,398 generals , would you like to take that 2216 01:38:20,398 --> 01:38:24,180 1/1 . Um I would just 2217 01:38:24,190 --> 01:38:26,420 answer with the rather obvious response 2218 01:38:26,420 --> 01:38:29,210 that we constantly evaluate that and 2219 01:38:29,210 --> 01:38:31,266 then the decision on how much we put 2220 01:38:31,266 --> 01:38:33,321 forward and how much we we don't put 2221 01:38:33,321 --> 01:38:35,266 forward depends on an awful lot of 2222 01:38:35,266 --> 01:38:37,370 things um some of which are non 2223 01:38:37,370 --> 01:38:39,940 military in nature , you know , as 2224 01:38:39,940 --> 01:38:42,470 considerations . The second thing I'd 2225 01:38:42,470 --> 01:38:44,637 point out is that it is important when 2226 01:38:44,637 --> 01:38:48,430 we think about four um ford posture , 2227 01:38:48,820 --> 01:38:51,970 to distinguish between like in my case , 2228 01:38:51,980 --> 01:38:54,060 on the other side of the atlantic or 2229 01:38:54,060 --> 01:38:56,282 did you have something more specific in 2230 01:38:56,282 --> 01:38:58,338 mind ? Because once you get onto the 2231 01:38:58,338 --> 01:39:01,840 continent , the more specific you get , 2232 01:39:01,850 --> 01:39:03,820 the more bound you become to a 2233 01:39:03,820 --> 01:39:07,220 particularly imagined um adversary 2234 01:39:07,220 --> 01:39:09,380 course of action . Right ? So you've 2235 01:39:09,380 --> 01:39:11,430 got to the art of it is to be far 2236 01:39:11,430 --> 01:39:13,652 enough forward to be responsive but not 2237 01:39:13,652 --> 01:39:15,652 so far forward to be committed to a 2238 01:39:15,652 --> 01:39:18,320 single uh possibility . Um So there's a 2239 01:39:18,320 --> 01:39:20,740 balance in there , just as there's a 2240 01:39:20,750 --> 01:39:22,870 balance in the decision to do ford 2241 01:39:22,870 --> 01:39:25,000 posture in the first place . The last 2242 01:39:25,000 --> 01:39:26,944 point I'd make with regard to ford 2243 01:39:26,944 --> 01:39:28,722 posture and deterrence is it is 2244 01:39:28,722 --> 01:39:30,778 possible to posture too much forward 2245 01:39:30,778 --> 01:39:32,611 and to become provocative and to 2246 01:39:32,611 --> 01:39:34,667 destabilize your deterrence . Um and 2247 01:39:34,667 --> 01:39:37,250 and therefore the calibration of how 2248 01:39:37,250 --> 01:39:41,170 much power is how far forward and and 2249 01:39:41,180 --> 01:39:43,013 and what level of readiness it's 2250 01:39:43,013 --> 01:39:45,236 maintained is all part of the deterrent 2251 01:39:45,236 --> 01:39:48,300 question in the first place , I would 2252 01:39:48,460 --> 01:39:50,740 add on the readiness part that chris 2253 01:39:50,750 --> 01:39:54,660 mentioned about because um we do 2254 01:39:54,660 --> 01:39:56,920 have to calibrate it . There are 2255 01:39:56,930 --> 01:39:59,510 mentioned materials that could be an 2256 01:39:59,510 --> 01:40:01,510 element that we have in distributed 2257 01:40:01,510 --> 01:40:03,780 locations . I think one of the 2258 01:40:03,780 --> 01:40:06,200 important parts and this is actually 2259 01:40:06,200 --> 01:40:08,980 what I was going to say in closing is 2260 01:40:08,980 --> 01:40:11,620 that when we're forward 2261 01:40:12,210 --> 01:40:15,120 uh than the joint training 2262 01:40:15,810 --> 01:40:19,170 and the joint readiness and the joint 2263 01:40:19,180 --> 01:40:22,510 and coalition and or ally and partner 2264 01:40:22,520 --> 01:40:24,580 confidence that's gained by being 2265 01:40:24,580 --> 01:40:27,620 forward has an element of deterrent 2266 01:40:28,310 --> 01:40:32,240 deterrence in it . And I think that 2267 01:40:32,250 --> 01:40:36,130 that's sometimes it's kind of uh 2268 01:40:36,710 --> 01:40:39,200 may be overlooked a little bit in 2269 01:40:39,210 --> 01:40:41,540 posture discussions because people talk 2270 01:40:41,990 --> 01:40:45,220 more about hard things uh than some of 2271 01:40:45,220 --> 01:40:49,100 the sort of off access intangibles 2272 01:40:49,100 --> 01:40:51,330 that you gain by having capabilities 2273 01:40:51,330 --> 01:40:53,960 forward , exercising forward , 2274 01:40:53,960 --> 01:40:55,320 rehearsing forward , 2275 01:40:55,710 --> 01:40:59,500 understanding the culture , the road 2276 01:40:59,500 --> 01:41:01,880 networks , the bridge is just all , all 2277 01:41:01,880 --> 01:41:05,670 of that learning that goes on by 2278 01:41:05,680 --> 01:41:08,060 american soldier , sailor , airmen and 2279 01:41:08,060 --> 01:41:11,630 marines in addition to the allies and 2280 01:41:11,630 --> 01:41:13,800 partners that were operating forward 2281 01:41:13,800 --> 01:41:16,900 that uh , in and of itself I think has 2282 01:41:16,900 --> 01:41:19,170 an enormous deterrent value and it can 2283 01:41:19,170 --> 01:41:21,180 be from the small to the large as 2284 01:41:21,180 --> 01:41:23,402 christmas pointing out right . It's a , 2285 01:41:23,402 --> 01:41:25,930 it's not a one for one kind of thing , 2286 01:41:25,940 --> 01:41:28,960 it can be a different equation that can 2287 01:41:28,960 --> 01:41:32,450 solve some of that calculus Subject 2288 01:41:32,450 --> 01:41:35,260 Matter . You are itching . Can I one 2289 01:41:35,260 --> 01:41:38,890 point to that , so that um , Uh , 2290 01:41:38,900 --> 01:41:41,067 during the Eisenhower administration , 2291 01:41:41,067 --> 01:41:43,650 I think it's in the 1956 debates over 2292 01:41:43,650 --> 01:41:45,706 the basic national security policy , 2293 01:41:45,706 --> 01:41:47,928 they achieve a staff of the army brings 2294 01:41:47,928 --> 01:41:51,550 up that we need to be flowing forces to 2295 01:41:51,550 --> 01:41:53,970 Europe . If a crisis over Berlin 2296 01:41:53,980 --> 01:41:57,250 actually occurs in Eisenhower actually 2297 01:41:57,250 --> 01:42:00,680 says he should be impeached if he was 2298 01:42:00,680 --> 01:42:03,780 flowing american forces to europe in a 2299 01:42:03,780 --> 01:42:06,380 Berlin crisis because the army would be 2300 01:42:06,380 --> 01:42:09,860 needed to restore order in Baltimore 2301 01:42:09,870 --> 01:42:12,600 after the nuclear exchange , which 2302 01:42:12,600 --> 01:42:14,870 tells you right . Like that tells you 2303 01:42:14,870 --> 01:42:18,530 his commitment to Berlin , which is , 2304 01:42:18,540 --> 01:42:20,650 it doesn't matter if forces are in 2305 01:42:20,650 --> 01:42:23,990 theater because we're going to go all 2306 01:42:23,990 --> 01:42:26,046 the way up the escalation ladder for 2307 01:42:26,046 --> 01:42:29,320 the defense of Berlin . Most american 2308 01:42:29,320 --> 01:42:31,530 presidents can't pull off that party 2309 01:42:31,530 --> 01:42:34,550 trick that much credibility with that 2310 01:42:34,550 --> 01:42:37,830 little stuff forward . And so what 2311 01:42:37,840 --> 01:42:39,951 forward Stationing and forces does in 2312 01:42:39,951 --> 01:42:41,562 addition to all of the great 2313 01:42:41,562 --> 01:42:44,550 operational advantages is it plants the 2314 01:42:44,550 --> 01:42:46,600 flag that we are actually going to 2315 01:42:46,600 --> 01:42:49,940 fight for this territory ? And that 2316 01:42:49,940 --> 01:42:53,630 matters hugely . I'm not a big fan of 2317 01:42:53,640 --> 01:42:55,584 deterrence by punishment because I 2318 01:42:55,584 --> 01:42:57,700 don't think it actually deters nearly 2319 01:42:57,700 --> 01:42:59,700 as well as having the ability to do 2320 01:42:59,700 --> 01:43:02,150 what you say you're going to do . Um , 2321 01:43:02,160 --> 01:43:04,550 and so , uh , I think we should 2322 01:43:04,550 --> 01:43:06,900 actually have a big enough army to have 2323 01:43:06,900 --> 01:43:09,650 forward deployed forces in places we 2324 01:43:09,650 --> 01:43:12,830 actually intend to defend . McKenzie , 2325 01:43:13,600 --> 01:43:17,330 bravo . Mhm That was well said I 2326 01:43:19,960 --> 01:43:22,680 All right , vic , why don't you answer 2327 01:43:22,680 --> 01:43:24,960 the question ? And then you can give us 2328 01:43:24,960 --> 01:43:26,960 any other thoughts that you have to 2329 01:43:26,960 --> 01:43:29,430 share ? Uh , great thanks Francis for 2330 01:43:29,440 --> 01:43:31,551 leading us through all of this . Uh , 2331 01:43:31,551 --> 01:43:33,773 it's been , it's been a real pleasure . 2332 01:43:33,773 --> 01:43:35,940 I'm , I'm , I'm right there with Corey 2333 01:43:35,940 --> 01:43:38,330 on , uh , I think , I think , you know , 2334 01:43:38,330 --> 01:43:40,940 you can , people see our global posture 2335 01:43:40,940 --> 01:43:43,550 is somewhat sometimes as a , as 2336 01:43:43,550 --> 01:43:46,350 something that's anachronistic . Um , 2337 01:43:46,360 --> 01:43:49,100 the fact is we have left the places 2338 01:43:49,100 --> 01:43:51,044 we've lost and we've stayed in the 2339 01:43:51,044 --> 01:43:53,400 places we've won . And I , um , and I 2340 01:43:53,400 --> 01:43:55,800 actually think that suggests that going , 2341 01:43:55,810 --> 01:43:58,930 being in places that we care about uh , 2342 01:43:58,940 --> 01:44:01,530 has more of a signaling effect than we 2343 01:44:01,530 --> 01:44:04,390 might realize . And so I think the 2344 01:44:04,390 --> 01:44:06,920 thing to look at on posture is , is 2345 01:44:06,920 --> 01:44:08,864 that the right amount in the right 2346 01:44:08,864 --> 01:44:10,753 places ? Are we , is it the right 2347 01:44:10,753 --> 01:44:12,864 forces in the right places ? Um , and 2348 01:44:12,864 --> 01:44:15,087 they have , and it has obviously it has 2349 01:44:15,087 --> 01:44:17,740 a practical element , which is what 2350 01:44:17,750 --> 01:44:21,140 both are , both , both generals were 2351 01:44:21,140 --> 01:44:23,251 referring to , which is , it's , it's 2352 01:44:23,251 --> 01:44:25,362 about , you know , what we need to be 2353 01:44:25,362 --> 01:44:27,640 able to do with those partners , right ? 2354 01:44:27,640 --> 01:44:29,862 So it's about the day to day work . But 2355 01:44:29,862 --> 01:44:31,980 um , but thinking through that , uh , 2356 01:44:31,990 --> 01:44:34,790 the value of the skin in the game I 2357 01:44:34,790 --> 01:44:38,380 think is , is really high . Um , and uh , 2358 01:44:38,390 --> 01:44:40,612 and , and , and you know , so I would , 2359 01:44:40,612 --> 01:44:42,446 I would , I would definitely not 2360 01:44:42,446 --> 01:44:44,557 advocate , you know , bringing people 2361 01:44:44,557 --> 01:44:46,779 home . I didn't like it when we brought 2362 01:44:46,779 --> 01:44:49,112 people home from europe . Uh , you know , 2363 01:44:49,112 --> 01:44:51,279 a decade , a decade ago , I thought we 2364 01:44:51,279 --> 01:44:53,501 should leave people leave , leave a lot 2365 01:44:53,501 --> 01:44:55,668 of those , uh , those units in place . 2366 01:44:55,668 --> 01:44:57,834 Um , it's also , uh , it's also really 2367 01:44:57,834 --> 01:44:59,557 cost effective , um , which is 2368 01:44:59,557 --> 01:45:01,723 something if you do asia a lot and you 2369 01:45:01,723 --> 01:45:04,450 look at either , you know , just Japan 2370 01:45:04,450 --> 01:45:06,790 and Korea or you look at , you know , 2371 01:45:06,800 --> 01:45:09,150 rotating forces to Darwin when we were 2372 01:45:09,160 --> 01:45:11,430 that was my that was on my watch doing 2373 01:45:11,430 --> 01:45:15,340 those negotiations . Um you know , it's 2374 01:45:15,350 --> 01:45:18,050 it's good for us from an operational 2375 01:45:18,060 --> 01:45:20,660 standpoint . So I think there's a lot , 2376 01:45:20,660 --> 01:45:23,020 there's a lot to be said for that . Um 2377 01:45:23,690 --> 01:45:26,090 you know , on the technology front II 2378 01:45:26,100 --> 01:45:28,110 in closing the things I would the 2379 01:45:28,110 --> 01:45:31,260 things I would flag and uh general 2380 01:45:31,260 --> 01:45:33,460 casually mentioned , I mentioned the 2381 01:45:33,460 --> 01:45:35,460 Azerbaijan situation as well , like 2382 01:45:35,460 --> 01:45:37,571 these low , you know , these like mid 2383 01:45:37,571 --> 01:45:41,050 level adaptations . Um We need to 2384 01:45:41,050 --> 01:45:43,960 think uh we need to focus on our on the 2385 01:45:43,960 --> 01:45:45,960 creativity , the thing that's gonna 2386 01:45:45,960 --> 01:45:49,080 keep us ahead or things like um okay , 2387 01:45:49,090 --> 01:45:51,250 you , you know , we've been trying to 2388 01:45:51,250 --> 01:45:53,790 secure our networks forever . Well , 2389 01:45:53,800 --> 01:45:55,890 there's a good effort underway right 2390 01:45:55,890 --> 01:45:58,057 now to look at what about data centric 2391 01:45:58,390 --> 01:46:00,680 uh security . What about what about 2392 01:46:00,680 --> 01:46:02,791 using encryption and other tools that 2393 01:46:02,791 --> 01:46:05,450 we are ? No . And have advanced on 2394 01:46:05,450 --> 01:46:08,530 quite a bit to have things flow out and 2395 01:46:08,530 --> 01:46:11,600 be able to be more network agnostic um 2396 01:46:11,600 --> 01:46:13,711 but be secured and only be accessible 2397 01:46:13,711 --> 01:46:16,044 to the right people in the right places . 2398 01:46:16,044 --> 01:46:17,989 Um and there's there's a there's a 2399 01:46:17,989 --> 01:46:20,044 there's a good effort underway right 2400 01:46:20,044 --> 01:46:22,044 now to look at that , that would be 2401 01:46:22,044 --> 01:46:23,989 critical for allies and partners . 2402 01:46:23,989 --> 01:46:25,822 Imagine if the thing you need to 2403 01:46:25,822 --> 01:46:28,760 descend knew that it was a secret rail 2404 01:46:28,760 --> 01:46:31,050 Canada thing and that somebody in 2405 01:46:31,050 --> 01:46:33,217 Canada could look at it . But somebody 2406 01:46:33,217 --> 01:46:35,383 else somewhere else . Couldn't Right . 2407 01:46:35,383 --> 01:46:37,494 This is this is not um that that kind 2408 01:46:37,494 --> 01:46:39,383 of stuff is not science fiction . 2409 01:46:39,383 --> 01:46:41,494 There's uh there's uh there's a great 2410 01:46:41,494 --> 01:46:44,590 company um uh that's involved in those 2411 01:46:44,590 --> 01:46:46,534 efforts right now that has already 2412 01:46:46,534 --> 01:46:48,757 figured out how to I won't name it . So 2413 01:46:48,757 --> 01:46:50,812 I'm not plugging somebody but uh but 2414 01:46:50,812 --> 01:46:52,979 has already figured out like how to do 2415 01:46:52,979 --> 01:46:52,860 real time encryption of video with 2416 01:46:52,860 --> 01:46:55,230 those kinds of attributes uh , at 2417 01:46:55,240 --> 01:46:58,040 creation . So video is born , it's 2418 01:46:58,040 --> 01:47:00,240 transmitted . It can only be looked at 2419 01:47:00,240 --> 01:47:02,184 by people that it's supposed to be 2420 01:47:02,184 --> 01:47:04,296 looked at . These kinds of things are 2421 01:47:04,296 --> 01:47:06,073 like shifting how we think from 2422 01:47:06,073 --> 01:47:08,018 securing our perimeter in terms of 2423 01:47:08,018 --> 01:47:09,851 networks , which has proven very 2424 01:47:09,851 --> 01:47:11,907 difficult to saying , let's make the 2425 01:47:11,907 --> 01:47:14,018 things within the network secure . If 2426 01:47:14,018 --> 01:47:16,184 we can get there , our ability to work 2427 01:47:16,184 --> 01:47:18,351 with allies and partners is boosted in 2428 01:47:18,351 --> 01:47:20,518 our overall security . All of a sudden 2429 01:47:20,518 --> 01:47:22,629 something could be transmitted . Um , 2430 01:47:22,629 --> 01:47:24,518 you know , more agnostic to which 2431 01:47:24,518 --> 01:47:26,670 system it's it's resting on that . I 2432 01:47:26,670 --> 01:47:28,781 noticed my G6 wasn't in the room when 2433 01:47:28,781 --> 01:47:32,510 you said that victims too bad . 2434 01:47:32,520 --> 01:47:35,110 Um , you know , another joke , 2435 01:47:35,120 --> 01:47:38,750 a joke get right on it . All 2436 01:47:38,750 --> 01:47:42,200 right . They can put you in touch the 2437 01:47:42,210 --> 01:47:44,266 the you know , there's other there's 2438 01:47:44,266 --> 01:47:46,210 other there's other things we were 2439 01:47:46,210 --> 01:47:48,432 talking about installations earlier . I 2440 01:47:48,432 --> 01:47:50,210 mean , again , there's a lot of 2441 01:47:50,210 --> 01:47:52,432 commercial technologies out there right 2442 01:47:52,432 --> 01:47:54,543 now that are that are that that would 2443 01:47:54,543 --> 01:47:56,432 transform how you do installation 2444 01:47:56,432 --> 01:47:58,599 security for other people that where , 2445 01:47:58,599 --> 01:48:00,710 where the building knows who's in the 2446 01:48:00,710 --> 01:48:02,766 building , where the badges no , you 2447 01:48:02,766 --> 01:48:04,932 know what direction people are going , 2448 01:48:04,932 --> 01:48:07,154 where , you know , you know , there's a 2449 01:48:07,154 --> 01:48:09,377 there's a there's a far greater ability 2450 01:48:09,377 --> 01:48:11,266 and much more portable security . 2451 01:48:11,266 --> 01:48:13,432 There's a lot of things happening that 2452 01:48:13,432 --> 01:48:15,488 we could that we could grab onto and 2453 01:48:15,488 --> 01:48:17,543 for for land forces in particular at 2454 01:48:17,543 --> 01:48:19,654 the end of the day , land forces have 2455 01:48:19,654 --> 01:48:22,250 to operate in the contested territory . 2456 01:48:22,310 --> 01:48:25,360 Like physically they're flying over it , 2457 01:48:25,360 --> 01:48:27,693 they're not sailing near it there in it . 2458 01:48:28,170 --> 01:48:31,600 And so figuring out how to operate more 2459 01:48:31,600 --> 01:48:33,690 securely and more contested , 2460 01:48:33,690 --> 01:48:35,801 complicated environments . That's got 2461 01:48:35,801 --> 01:48:38,590 to be uh , just a fundamental focus of 2462 01:48:38,590 --> 01:48:42,140 how we keep our keep land power 2463 01:48:42,140 --> 01:48:44,410 capabilities relevant and effective 2464 01:48:44,420 --> 01:48:47,460 going forward . Gentlemen , before you 2465 01:48:47,470 --> 01:48:49,780 say your closing remarks , one more 2466 01:48:49,780 --> 01:48:51,947 question from the audience . Thank you 2467 01:48:51,947 --> 01:48:54,970 sir , for your patients . My name is 2468 01:48:54,970 --> 01:48:57,026 Cornell . Albertina had the military 2469 01:48:57,026 --> 01:48:59,530 attache from Spain and I would like to 2470 01:48:59,530 --> 01:49:02,960 know your views on the possibility of 2471 01:49:02,970 --> 01:49:05,840 uh , cooperation or coordination 2472 01:49:05,850 --> 01:49:09,110 between Russia and china in their 2473 01:49:09,120 --> 01:49:11,740 competition against the U . S , 2474 01:49:11,920 --> 01:49:15,730 particularly in africa where the force 2475 01:49:15,730 --> 01:49:19,490 posture is not so so strong . Thank you . 2476 01:49:19,970 --> 01:49:22,320 That's a terrific question and Corey , 2477 01:49:22,320 --> 01:49:24,542 I'm glad I'm not in between you and the 2478 01:49:24,542 --> 01:49:26,690 microphone or I would be physically 2479 01:49:26,690 --> 01:49:30,190 harmed . Uh , so I 2480 01:49:30,200 --> 01:49:33,620 think we too often look at 2481 01:49:33,620 --> 01:49:35,600 singular potential adversaries and 2482 01:49:35,600 --> 01:49:37,740 don't worry enough about cooperation 2483 01:49:37,740 --> 01:49:41,670 among potential adversaries and uh even 2484 01:49:41,670 --> 01:49:43,790 if there is a long term reason to 2485 01:49:43,790 --> 01:49:47,000 believe the Russians will bridle at 2486 01:49:47,010 --> 01:49:50,660 being , you know , um mar a 2487 01:49:50,660 --> 01:49:54,050 marginal small support to china's power . 2488 01:49:54,160 --> 01:49:57,040 They have really strong common interest 2489 01:49:57,050 --> 01:49:59,460 in wanting to break up the existing 2490 01:49:59,470 --> 01:50:03,430 order uh and wanting to create um 2491 01:50:03,440 --> 01:50:05,870 payment vehicles that are outside the 2492 01:50:05,870 --> 01:50:08,660 dollar zone , right ? The Petro yuan 2493 01:50:08,660 --> 01:50:10,549 and the way that the Russians are 2494 01:50:10,660 --> 01:50:12,771 playing around with crypto to try and 2495 01:50:12,771 --> 01:50:15,330 prevent um sanctions from being able to 2496 01:50:15,330 --> 01:50:19,090 bite them . They have a lot 2497 01:50:19,100 --> 01:50:22,850 of common interests in , for example , 2498 01:50:22,860 --> 01:50:26,540 uh containing Japan's burgeoning power 2499 01:50:26,550 --> 01:50:30,420 and activism in the region . They 2500 01:50:30,430 --> 01:50:32,590 could stumble over conflicting 2501 01:50:32,590 --> 01:50:34,757 interests in Central Asia , but that's 2502 01:50:34,757 --> 01:50:37,880 a long time coming . And the the 2503 01:50:37,890 --> 01:50:40,090 problems we imagine them having with 2504 01:50:40,090 --> 01:50:42,300 each other when we were imagining this 2505 01:50:42,300 --> 01:50:45,630 15 years ago was the demographic boom 2506 01:50:45,630 --> 01:50:49,590 of China moving into empty , sent uh 2507 01:50:49,600 --> 01:50:52,650 central Asia and into the Russian east 2508 01:50:52,660 --> 01:50:56,120 and now that has collapsed . So mostly 2509 01:50:56,120 --> 01:50:58,064 strategic failures are failures of 2510 01:50:58,064 --> 01:51:00,810 imagination . And I agree with you that 2511 01:51:00,810 --> 01:51:03,330 we don't we aren't exercising enough 2512 01:51:03,340 --> 01:51:05,660 imagination about what their 2513 01:51:05,660 --> 01:51:08,260 cooperation could mean . One other 2514 01:51:08,260 --> 01:51:10,420 point though , there's a scholar at 2515 01:51:10,420 --> 01:51:12,531 stanford University , also associated 2516 01:51:12,531 --> 01:51:15,960 with Ai Oriana Skylar mastro who is 2517 01:51:15,960 --> 01:51:19,750 doing very detailed research on the 2518 01:51:19,750 --> 01:51:22,810 kinds of specific military cooperation 2519 01:51:22,810 --> 01:51:26,280 they have going and the degree of 2520 01:51:26,290 --> 01:51:29,560 interconnectedness it portends . Um so 2521 01:51:29,570 --> 01:51:32,980 it's a really good source for making um 2522 01:51:33,560 --> 01:51:35,890 for making serious judgments about the 2523 01:51:35,890 --> 01:51:38,112 degree of cooperation and what it could 2524 01:51:38,112 --> 01:51:40,223 mean . Um With all due respect to vic 2525 01:51:40,223 --> 01:51:42,446 and Mackenzie for the purpose of time , 2526 01:51:42,446 --> 01:51:44,890 I'm going to defer to the generals and 2527 01:51:44,900 --> 01:51:46,910 invite you to either close general 2528 01:51:46,910 --> 01:51:49,740 Flynn or answer the question from the 2529 01:51:49,750 --> 01:51:53,640 last questioner . I'll just wrap up 2530 01:51:53,650 --> 01:51:55,650 by saying thanks . I appreciate the 2531 01:51:55,650 --> 01:51:58,830 discussion . Uh and I'm thankful for 2532 01:51:58,830 --> 01:52:00,886 all of you and your interests in the 2533 01:52:00,886 --> 01:52:02,886 challenges that we have . Thank you 2534 01:52:03,350 --> 01:52:06,340 General Cobolli . Um First Colonel with 2535 01:52:06,340 --> 01:52:09,670 regard to your question um uh 2536 01:52:10,050 --> 01:52:13,750 Sometimes it might be better for 2537 01:52:13,850 --> 01:52:17,800 me in uniform not to consider Too 2538 01:52:17,800 --> 01:52:20,040 much about what will they cooperate ? 2539 01:52:20,040 --> 01:52:22,096 Well they're not but just to observe 2540 01:52:22,096 --> 01:52:25,940 that clearly the action of one could 2541 01:52:25,940 --> 01:52:28,310 produce opportunities for the other . 2542 01:52:29,050 --> 01:52:32,700 And would the other have the agility 2543 01:52:32,710 --> 01:52:35,410 and the ability to take advantage of 2544 01:52:35,410 --> 01:52:37,521 that opportunity ? That's what I have 2545 01:52:37,521 --> 01:52:39,632 to think about . So that might be one 2546 01:52:39,632 --> 01:52:41,743 way to look at it . Um with regard to 2547 01:52:41,743 --> 01:52:43,966 closing comments . Um One thing that we 2548 01:52:43,966 --> 01:52:46,077 didn't get a chance to touch on but I 2549 01:52:46,077 --> 01:52:48,188 would like to briefly is the question 2550 01:52:48,188 --> 01:52:51,290 of interoperability and I bring it up 2551 01:52:51,300 --> 01:52:54,210 because many panel members have raised 2552 01:52:54,220 --> 01:52:57,850 the um point that our allies are our 2553 01:52:57,850 --> 01:52:59,980 strength . Our allies are a source of 2554 01:52:59,980 --> 01:53:02,380 strength . Our allies can substitute 2555 01:53:02,380 --> 01:53:06,270 complement um work with our forces in 2556 01:53:06,270 --> 01:53:08,550 many , many cases . I think this is 2557 01:53:08,550 --> 01:53:11,370 very important but it really works best 2558 01:53:11,450 --> 01:53:13,228 when we have a certain level of 2559 01:53:13,228 --> 01:53:15,283 interoperability together so that we 2560 01:53:15,283 --> 01:53:17,490 can function at a military technical 2561 01:53:17,490 --> 01:53:20,620 leather level together . Um we divide 2562 01:53:20,630 --> 01:53:23,870 interoperability into three categories . 2563 01:53:23,870 --> 01:53:25,890 Right ? Human interoperability , 2564 01:53:25,900 --> 01:53:28,330 procedural interoperability and 2565 01:53:28,340 --> 01:53:31,210 technical interoperability . I would 2566 01:53:31,210 --> 01:53:33,910 like to focus on the undervalued first 2567 01:53:33,910 --> 01:53:36,840 one . Human interoperability . We 2568 01:53:36,850 --> 01:53:38,906 undervalue it sometimes because it's 2569 01:53:38,906 --> 01:53:41,990 squishy and it's subjective and it's 2570 01:53:41,990 --> 01:53:44,670 not as easy as saying my radio does not 2571 01:53:44,670 --> 01:53:46,392 talk to your radio . We have a 2572 01:53:46,392 --> 01:53:48,226 technical problem or you do this 2573 01:53:48,226 --> 01:53:50,114 differently than I do . We have a 2574 01:53:50,114 --> 01:53:52,281 procedural problem . But in fact it is 2575 01:53:52,281 --> 01:53:54,337 really , I think both in both of our 2576 01:53:54,337 --> 01:53:56,840 theaters . Human interoperability , 2577 01:53:56,840 --> 01:54:00,780 cognitive commonality is really 2578 01:54:00,790 --> 01:54:03,310 the thing that will allow us to bridge 2579 01:54:03,310 --> 01:54:06,360 gaps in the other two domains of 2580 01:54:06,370 --> 01:54:08,910 interoperability and in that regard . I 2581 01:54:08,910 --> 01:54:10,966 would like , hey charlie , would you 2582 01:54:10,966 --> 01:54:12,910 stand up and introduce your deputy 2583 01:54:12,910 --> 01:54:11,870 please ? 2584 01:54:16,940 --> 01:54:17,940 Yes . 2585 01:54:24,940 --> 01:54:27,200 Thank you john would you stand up and 2586 01:54:27,210 --> 01:54:28,543 introduce your deputy ? 2587 01:54:37,340 --> 01:54:39,860 What ? These are just too small 2588 01:54:39,860 --> 01:54:43,650 examples all over the world and all 2589 01:54:43,660 --> 01:54:45,740 over the United States . We have 2590 01:54:45,750 --> 01:54:48,580 officers from close allies serving side 2591 01:54:48,580 --> 01:54:50,740 by side with us and we have our 2592 01:54:50,740 --> 01:54:52,796 officers and their formation serving 2593 01:54:52,796 --> 01:54:55,018 side by side with them . And I just saw 2594 01:54:55,018 --> 01:54:57,184 both of you sitting there and I wanted 2595 01:54:57,184 --> 01:54:59,407 to call attention to the important fact 2596 01:54:59,407 --> 01:55:01,351 that you're not just in our army . 2597 01:55:01,351 --> 01:55:03,351 You're also at a usa thank you very 2598 01:55:03,351 --> 01:55:05,684 much . I'm gonna take advantage on that . 2599 01:55:05,684 --> 01:55:08,370 So I have a deputy from Australia 2600 01:55:08,840 --> 01:55:12,080 actually interestingly enough . The 2601 01:55:12,080 --> 01:55:14,247 chief of the Australian army today was 2602 01:55:14,247 --> 01:55:16,690 the first deputy in the United States 2603 01:55:16,690 --> 01:55:20,680 Army pacific command recber um There's 2604 01:55:20,680 --> 01:55:22,791 a new Zealand deputy and the division 2605 01:55:22,791 --> 01:55:26,140 that chris and I uh commanded formally . 2606 01:55:26,150 --> 01:55:28,970 And then we have a Canadian deputy at 2607 01:55:28,980 --> 01:55:32,950 both first corps in Washington 2608 01:55:32,950 --> 01:55:35,260 State and Canadian deputy in the United 2609 01:55:35,260 --> 01:55:38,540 States Army Alaska . So again , another 2610 01:55:38,550 --> 01:55:42,010 illustration that chris pointed out and 2611 01:55:42,010 --> 01:55:44,066 I couldn't agree with you more about 2612 01:55:44,066 --> 01:55:46,450 the the human interoperability and 2613 01:55:46,460 --> 01:55:49,780 actually with the pandemic , it's even 2614 01:55:49,790 --> 01:55:52,850 more important that we get that and 2615 01:55:52,850 --> 01:55:55,072 regain that with some of the separation 2616 01:55:55,072 --> 01:55:57,239 that occurred naturally because of the 2617 01:55:57,239 --> 01:55:59,570 pandemic . So thanks uh thanks to all 2618 01:55:59,570 --> 01:56:01,790 of you for joining this conversation 2619 01:56:01,790 --> 01:56:04,160 today . Grateful for your time . Thanks 2620 01:56:04,160 --> 01:56:06,327 to a U . S . A . It is wonderful to be 2621 01:56:06,327 --> 01:56:08,640 back in person and thanks to all of you 2622 01:56:08,640 --> 01:56:09,670 for your attention .